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ABSTRACT
This Thesis considers Australia’s social security system as probably the world’s closest 
approximation to a Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) scheme. One important reform 
option is to further develop the system in a manner consistent with academic notions of 
a ‘pure’ GMI scheme.
In common with a number of other OECD countries, the pre-tax/transfer income 
distribution has tended to become more unequal in Australia over the past 15-20 years. 
To some extent the widening dispersion in earnings has been offset, in Australia, by 
changes in the tax/transfer system, which have made this system more progressive. One 
result is that new problems in the work/social security interface have emerged. 
Australia’s flat-rate means-tested system tends to create high earnings replacement rates 
for low wage earners, especially for those with family responsibilities, and work 
disincentives due to high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) as private incomes rise.
The New Tax System (NTS), which commenced on 1 July 2000, was in part designed to 
address work disincentive issues arising from high effective tax rates in both the income 
tax and also the tax/transfer system. These problems were addressed, in the context of 
the new 10% Goods and Services Tax (GST), by lowering income tax rates and raising 
tax thresholds; simplifying the structure and administration of family assistance; raising 
the income test thresholds for family assistance and reducing taper rates; and providing 
extra assistance for social security recipients and other lower income groups. This 
thesis analyses the success of these measures and considers the sustainability of the 
current system in the face of the apparent possibility that low pay and intermittent work 
will become an increasing issue in the years ahead.
Finally the thesis discusses the Australian retirement income system, noting that tax and 
means tests operate in very complex and not always consistent ways. Some options for 
addressing these problems are explored.
The thesis concludes that the NTS addresses pressing problems in tax/social security 
interactions, but leaves other problems still requiring action. Ultimately, major systemic 
reform may be the only way to fully address these issues. While I will argue that the 
direction of such reform would necessarily be consistent with academic conceptions of 
the Negative Income Tax (NIT) or GMI approach, the end point we might wish to arrive 
at would differ from this prescription in a number of important ways.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
1.1 Synopsis
This thesis considers Australia’s social security system as probably the world’s closest 
approximation to a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) scheme and, by implication, the 
lessons that might be learned by other countries wishing to consider such a scheme. It 
also considers options for further developing the Australian system, based on an 
assessment of existing issues and difficulties. One important option is to further 
develop the system in a manner consistent with academic notions of a ‘pure’ GMI 
scheme, although this raises a number of difficult issues.
In common with a number of other OECD countries, the pre-tax/transfer income 
distribution has tended to become more unequal in Australia over the past 15-20 years. 
The distribution of market incomes has also been impacted upon by labour market 
trends such as increases in casualisation and part-time work, increased women’s labour 
force participation and incidence of dual-earner families, and increasing long-term 
unemployment.
To some extent the widening dispersion in earnings has been offset, in Australia, by 
changes in the tax/transfer system, such as increases in the real value of basic pensions 
and allowances and dramatic improvements in family assistance, which have tended to 
make this system more progressive. The improvements, however, have not been 
without costs, and new problems in the work/social security interface have emerged.
Australia’s flat-rate means-tested system tends to create high earnings replacement rates 
for low wage earners, especially for those with family responsibilities, and work 
disincentives due to high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) as private incomes rise. 
Policy responses have (at least until recently) tended to add complexity and, in 
improving adequacy, to increase work disincentives. Another issue is that the system 
has mixed objectives: it seeks to support workforce attachment but also support mothers 
at home caring for young children, and these objectives can clash. The poverty 
alleviation objectives of the system can also conflict with use of monies to promote 
horizontal equity between different family types.
The New Tax System (NTS), which commenced on 1 July 2000, was in part designed to 
address work disincentive issues arising from high effective tax rates in both the income 
tax and also the tax/transfer system. These problems were addressed, in the context of
8
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the new 10% goods and services tax' (GST), by lowering income tax rates and 
increasing tax thresholds; simplifying the structure and administration of family 
assistance; raising the income test thresholds for family assistance and reducing taper 
rates; and providing extra assistance for social security recipients and other lower 
income groups.
In the future it is possible that we will see a continuing decline in the relative position of 
low wage earners, alongside a further slow de-regulation of the wage system. There are 
also pressures from academic economists for slow or no growth in award wages as a 
means of reducing unemployment. Typically, such economists are also concerned to 
offset the impact on low-income earners by social security and tax policies such as 
earned income tax credits (EITCs). These approaches are also considered in the thesis.
Finally the thesis discusses the Australian retirement income system, noting that tax and 
means tests operate in very complex and not always consistent ways. Some options for 
addressing these problems arc explored. It not necessarily sensible to apply the logic of 
the GMI in the retirement income arena, given that government policy has moved 
towards the income maintenance/compulsory savings principle in this area. For this 
reason options such as the guaranteed minimum pension idea may be worth considering.
The thesis concludes that the NTS addresses pressing problems in tax/social security 
interactions, but leaves other problems still requiring action. It is undoubtedly possible 
to further improve the existing system by incremental reform but, ultimately, major 
systemic reform may be the only way to fully and finally address these issues. While I 
will argue that the direction of such reform would necessarily be consistent with 
academic conceptions of the NIT or GMI approach, I will suggest that the end point we 
would wish to arrive at would differ from this prescription in a number of important 
ways.
1.2 Chapter 2: The Australian system
This Chapter briefly describes the Australian system, noting that there have been 
progressive developments over 90 years which have gradually had the effect of easing 
access conditions for many of those already in the system -  like the aged. This process 
of gradual universalism reached its high point in the 1970s when means tests for those 
over 70 were abolished entirely and later when the separate asset test was abolished.
1 In fact values added tax -  VAT.
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Subsequently some of these developments were rolled back, so that now all pensions 
and allowances (except for the blind) are income and asset tested.
There was a parallel process of creating eligibility for more and more previously 
excluded groups, such as sole parents in the 1970s and carers (including carers of 
children) in the 1980s and ‘90s. As a result coverage of the system has come to be very 
comprehensive; moreover, the means tests have come to look less and less like the tight 
tests of need underlying ‘social assistance’ schemes in other OECD countries, and more 
like tests of affluence: test designed to exclude only the well-off. As part of these 
developments, most ‘sudden death’ income and assets cut-offs have been replaced by 
tapered tests designed to provide a continuous incentive to earn or save more.
Both in terms of the gradualism of the means test structures, and in terms of the various 
extensions of eligibility, the system has gradually come to have the character of a 
guaranteed minimum income system. The main difference is that assistance continues 
to be conditional for those who are determined to be of workforce age, healthy and not 
to have caring responsibilities. The other main difference is that there are in effect dual 
systems: the pension system, which has higher rates and easier tapers, applied to the 
aged, disabled, and sole parents, and the allowance system which mainly affects the 
unemployed and their partners (Newstart Allowance), but also applies to the partners of 
low-income men if they have dependent children (via Parenting Payment (Partnered) -  
PPP).
Particular attention is paid to the families’ assistance area, which has been the focus of 
important and substantial change over the past 3 decades. Improving work incentives 
for the unemployed has also been an important policy direction.
Much of this thesis is directed at technical matters like EMTRs, progressivity of the 
tax/transfer system and the like. However we need to bear in mind that other aspects of 
the system can also have important effects. For example, there has been a general 
tendency in the Australian system to increase pressure on the unemployed to actively 
seek work under the general banner of “mutual obligations”, especially for young 
people. Such administrative approaches to some extent provide an alternative to 
increasing incentives through structural features of the incentive system. However it is 
likely that administrative measures will be most successful if married to a system which 
contains appropriate work incentives.
10
1 1
Technical solutions to the problems of high EMTRs are available, although it must be 
said we know little about precisely what impact these would have on behaviour. This is 
an area of research towards which -  as discussed in Ch 3 - we will increasingly need to 
direct attention.
1.3 Chapter 3: Work and savings incentives of social security
This chapter summarises available evidence on the work incentive effects of social 
security. It pays particular attention to the various methods that have been utilised by 
researchers in this area. Much of the literature surveyed relates to overseas rather than 
Australian studies, and for this reason is not always easily applied in the unique context 
of the Australian system. Nonetheless there is fairly persuasive evidence that social 
security systems influence work effort deeply and extensively. This, after all, is the 
justification for seeking to ameliorate design features of the system that might 
contribute to work and savings disincentives.
One line of research has focussed on benefit (earnings) replacement rates. After taking 
account of taxes and benefits such as housing assistance, net unemployment benefit 
replacement rates in Australia are not very different to the OECD average except for 
single people, for whom gross and net replacement rates are significantly lower than 
that average. Only for families with children do net replacement rates appear to be high 
(75-95%), although in almost all cases there are net financial incentives to undertake 
even low-paid work. The only exception is that for some people it may be 
advantageous to combine part-time work with allowance receipt, although the number 
of those actually in this situation is not great.
Studies relevant to effective tax rates and poverty traps have been another substantial 
line of research in Australia. We know that the EMTRs that many social security clients 
can be subject to are high, creating a prima facie case that work disincentives are 
created. However we have (at least in Australia) little direct evidence of the extent or 
effect of these hypothetical work disincentives. Additional evidence on this is found in 
studies on the incidence of high EMTRs, which suggest that the problem affects fewer 
families than we might have expected. However it is difficult to interpret this research, 
which may also be interpreted as showing that social security clients, quite rationally, 
avoid earning incomes in those zones where high EMTRs apply.
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The direct interview approach has been a popular method, within FaCS/DSS, of 
examining incentive effects of programs and effective tax structures. There has been a 
general finding that clients do not understand the way the system is structured, and that 
their decisions on whether and how much they work are based primarily on other 
factors. While this approach illuminates the important issue of how our schemes are 
comprehended out in the 'real world', the reliability of the interview approach has been 
questioned in tax studies where it was pioneered, and where it has been found to 
systematically understate work disincentive effects.
There is a lot of what might be called circumstantial evidence relating benefit 
availability to labour force participation. Relatively low rates of participation are 
observed among the spouses of the unemployed, wives of pensioners, older men, and 
sole parents. However it is too simplistic to relate these phenomenon only to the 
availability of income support for these groups.
Social experimentation has been out of fashion in recent years, partly in response to the 
apparent failure of the US income maintenance experiments in the 1970s. However 
more recent re-evaluations suggest that the experiments may not have been quite so 
unsuccessful as they at times seemed; in particular they appear to have substantially 
narrowed the range of realistic income and substitution2 effects, and also to have 
reduced the estimated size of these effects relative to the (even less reliable) non- 
experimental studies.
Prior to the income maintenance experiments, studies on taxation and work incentives 
had been our main source of information on income and substitution elasticities. Much 
of this work is based on econometric investigation using cross-sectional data; more 
recently use of panel data has become popular. The earlier approaches based on 
interview studies have been pretty much discontinued because of problems with 
response bias. However even with the sophisticated econometric techniques now in 
vogue there are formidable conceptual and measurement problems, and a very wide 
range of estimates from the various studies. One reasonably reliable finding is that 
prime age men have relatively low labour supply elasticities; women's elasticities are
2 Labour supply responses to both taxes and transfers can be summarised in terms of income and 
substitution elasticities. Income elasticity refers to labour supply response to the average tax rate (or 
negative tax rate, if an income transfer is involved), and substitution elasticity summarises the response to 
the marginal tax rate. The compensated supply elasticity is the summary measure of labour and 
substitution elasticities taken together.
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much higher but there are particular measurement difficulties for women (more so for 
sole mothers), and the range of estimated responses is very wide. It has been suggested 
that changing social expectations about women's labour force participation are making 
their behaviour more like men's.
Studies on the impact of income transfers are briefly summarised. Much of this 
literature is from the US. In a survey, Danziger et al (1981) 'guesstimate' that total US 
labour supply is reduced by about 5% by transfers; the total loss of earnings in the 
economy is calculated as 3.5%. Considerable uncertainty is attached to these and 
similar findings.
US spending on income transfers is low by international standards. But the overall cost 
o f the tax/transfer system is measured not by the cost to the budget, but rather by the 
economic distortions that are induced by that system. This includes not only the cost of 
transfers, but also the cost of the taxes that finance them. Estimates of this cost are 
critically dependent on estimates of labour supply elasticities: as estimated elasticities 
approach zero, so does economic cost, as no behaviour is changed by taxes or transfers.
In a sense this literature is not directly relevant insofar as the results are derivative of 
elasticity estimates obtained in other studies. However I have included this section 
because it is interesting, and illustrates the critical importance of labour supply 
elasticities in decisions about the size and design of the tax/transfer system. One very 
important finding is that the cost of increases in redistribution is, at the margin, very 
much greater than the average cost of redistribution. This explains why further 
expansion of the social safety net will be very much more difficult than the expansion 
that has occurred to date.
I was not able to find any estimates of the total economic cost of the Australian 
tax/transfer system. It is likely to be at least as high as that of the US system (estimates 
range from 3.5% to 7% of output), and -  because the Australian system is larger 
(particularly among the workforce age group) and more progressive -  economic costs 
may be higher. However these sorts of numbers are extremely imprecise and highly 
theoretical.
Looking at the labour supply of sole parents, the US evidence clearly indicates that the 
old Aid for Dependent Children (now Temporary Aid to Needy Families -  TANF) 
program generated 'non-trivial' work disincentives, but also appears to show that labour
13
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supplied would not have been much higher in the absence of the program. The transfer 
spillover was nonetheless high; on average studies show that $1.60 must be spent to 
raise the incomes of sole mothers by $1. This appears to be a fairly general finding not 
restricted to sole mothers; in simulations of negative income tax plans based on labour 
supply elasticities estimated from the income maintenance experiments, earnings 
reductions in two-parent families represented some 35-58% of the additional transfer 
cost of the program.
Benefit impacts on levels of unemployment have been of special interest to the OECD 
in recent years, as part of their program to explain high and rising underlying rates of 
unemployment in the OECD area. In the 1990s they have put a lot of weight on 
structural explanations focussing, inter alia, on the level of income support available to 
the unemployed. This evidence is briefly surveyed; there is little agreement on whether 
or to what extent benefits induce unemployment, but general agreement that, once 
unemployed, benefits act to prolong unemployment duration. However the size of this 
effect is debated.
1.4 Chapter 4: The optimal rate of tax/taper
If the social security system is to be reformed, an important question is what set of 
effective tax rates we might wish to put into effect. In the past, there has been an 
apparent consensus in the academic literature pointing towards the optimality of linear 
taxation. This literature is supportive of reform approaches based on a negative income 
tax employing a linear schedule of benefit tapers cum positive tax rates. This 
consensus appears to have evaporated following recent studies suggesting that higher 
marginal tax rates on the low-income population may well be economically efficient.
However considerable reservations attach to the conclusions in the latter class of 
studies, and there are a number of unresolved inconsistencies, particularly in that 
important class of studies which relate to the marginal welfare cost of redistribution. 
Resolution to these questions awaits the development of more sophisticated computer 
micro simulation models.
On balance it would be premature to conclude in favour of either a selective or a 
universal policy in the Australian context in the absence of such a full-scale behavioural
3 A secondary implication is that income support should in general be universal, rather than selective 
(means-tested).
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microsimulation study. However the number of contentious assumptions that will be 
required in such a modelling exercise (relating to behavioural elasticities and the social 
welfare function) probably mean that there will never be an unambiguous answer. The 
possibility should also be borne in mind that what may be an optimal solution for the 
aged, for example, might not be so for the unemployed. Such differences can in 
principle be modelled, assuming we know the relevant labour supply and saving 
elasticities, but social and political judgements (eg that the aged "deserve" a more 
liberal means test than the unemployed) will also continue to play an important role.
My reading of the literature is that more selective solutions will be found to be more 
efficient than universal ones on most behavioural assumptions. However I also 
anticipate that selective solutions will have less favourable distributional effects, so the 
social welfare optimising solution cannot be reliably predicted on the basis of our 
current knowledge. Given the lack of a clear mandate for any given approach, reform 
based on continuation of our current high/low/medium EMTR structure may be as good 
as any other.
1.5 Chapter 5: Rationalising tax and social security
In this chapter I examine problem areas remaining after the government’s NTS reforms 
and show that it is possible to iron out the worst of current anomalies and effective tax 
rate (ETR) 4 ‘hotspots’ by relatively simple changes to existing policy parameters 
designed in particular to ‘unstack’ areas of overlapping means test tapers.
Moreover, the required measures might be relatively inexpensive, since it is possible to 
offset part and perhaps all of the other “unstacking” costs by relatively modest 
adjustments which phase out the remaining quasi-universal payments in the system, 
payments which, I argue, no longer have a clear rationale in the context of the main 
poverty alleviation aims of the Australian system.
The question here is whether the Government wishes to remove those bits of ‘middle 
class welfare’ remaining in the family payment system. While I do not oppose 
universal family assistance as such5, the existing two-part taper in the family payments
4 The ETR is simply the weighted average of the EMTRs applying over a given income range. I use 
ETRs as useful summary measures of work incentives provided for in the system.
5 From an economic efficiency perspective it may not matter much whether family benefits are taxed back 
more severely, or taxed back less and general tax rates raised to finance this. See the relevant discussion 
in Ingles (1997).
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system represents a sort of uneasy compromise between vertical and horizontal equity 
objectives. I argue that a single, lower taper would achieve a sufficient measure of 
horizontal equity by allowing means-tested assistance to flow into the mid-ranges of the 
(equivalent) income distribution. Apart from the single taper proposal, it seems highly 
desirable that tapers on Youth Allowance (YA) and Family Tax Benefit (FTB) Parts (A) 
and (B) should be ‘unstacked’ so that they no longer overlap.
Whether Newstart Allowance and Parenting Payment (Partnered) tapers should be 
reduced is a difficult issue however. It may be preferable to reduce high EMTRs for 
allowees by action on the income tax side.
The measures discussed here are essentially alternative means of implementing the 
Keating/Lambert proposal for a single, sequential tapering of all Commonwealth 
income support payments. This, in turn, is not all that different from the Dawkins et al 
(1998a) proposal for a negative income tax system with a three-part rate structure, 
involving an initial tax/taper rate of 60%.
1.5.1 Keating and Lambert proposals
Keating and Lambert (1998a and b) put forward a proposal (subsequently updated to 
reflect NTS changes) designed to rationalise means tests for families. The method is to 
first establish a family's potential entitlement for assistance, and then establish their 
actual entitlement on the basis of their assessed means. For pragmatic reasons pensions 
and benefits would continue to have different free areas. However, all tapers would 
become 50%. At the family payment threshold of $28,200 pa, "second tier" payments 
would start to abate at a rate of 30%. This tier includes Family Tax Benefit, Youth 
Allowance (YA) and Rent Assistance (RA), "and would have included childcare 
assistance if that had been possible" (K&L 1998a p283).
Part of the proposal is financed by abolition of the quasi-universal component of the 
Family Tax Benefit -  that is, a single taper for all family payments is adopted.
The K&L proposal is an interesting one. My main response is that the objectives might 
be achieved more simply and directly by a simple set of pre-defined thresholds, 
disregards, and sequential tapers applied to FP, RA and YA, as described in this chapter. 
The effect would be that the means tests on these payments no longer “stack”.
My ‘unstacking” agenda, Keating and Lambert and the Dawkins et al modified negative 
income tax all end up looking quite similar in terms of their ultimate effects on financial
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incentives and families’ disposable incomes. The main difference is that the NIT makes 
some payment to those not eligible for a social security categorical payment, whereas 
the other two proposals do not. Otherwise, the main differences arise in relation to the 
different means of achieving a roughly similar objective -  ie, a more rational structure 
of effective tax rates. It is interesting that there is so much agreement among academics 
and policy professionals on what a desirable end product might look like.
1.6 Chapter 6: Fundamental reform options
1.6.1 Negative Income Tax (NIT)
Academic economists such as Dawkins et al (1997, 1998a) have advocated a NIT as a 
solution to problems of welfare complexity, high EMTRs, and low wages. In their view 
the NIT is a means of supporting low wage earners while at the same time allowing 
further de-regulation of wage setting, hopefully with the consequence of expanded job 
opportunities for low wage earners.
Since I have argued that the Australian social security already amounts to a form of 
guaranteed minimum income scheme for those categorically eligible, it can be discerned 
that the further step of tax/social integration through a mechanism like a NIT is not 
really such a radical reform.
There is no doubt that the present categorical system is complicated, cumbersome and 
arbitrary (see eg Perry 1995). There are apparent attractions in moving to a system 
where the only criterion for assistance is low income. However, there are also major 
problems with the NIT or GMI approach in its “pure” (ie non-categorical) form. For one 
thing, in order to preserve current maximum levels of benefits under a NIT with a 
uniform proportional tax rate, the required rate is computed by Dawkins et al to be no 
less than 57%. In a similar recent exercise a committee appointed by the Irish 
Government discovered a required linear tax rate of no less than 68% (Irish Expert 
Working Group, 1996).
This tax rate assumes that current patterns of work behaviour continue. Dawkins et al 
consider that their reforms would increase work effort and ultimately lower the cost. 
However, there is a risk in a non-categorical NIT is that those with incomes below the 
breakeven points (where tax paid equals benefits received) reduce their work effort -  as 
they did, for example, in US experiments in the 1970s based on the NIT principle.
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Another issue is that such a system cannot discriminate between those whose low 
income is voluntary, and those for whom it is not - ie, there would be no work test for 
the able-bodied unemployed. Furthermore, some individuals, notably the self- 
employed, are able to manipulate their affairs so as to declare an apparently low income 
when in fact their full (comprehensive) income may be quite adequate.
Thus using low income as the only criterion of need for assistance, while theoretically 
attractive, and certainly consistent with the earliest arguments for a NIT, is probably not 
workable. Low-income earners might be better assisted by other measures, such as 
those discussed in Chapter 7.
Even if all those not now categorically eligible are excluded from a linear NIT, the 
required uniform tax rate is still 50% (Dawkins et al 1998a). In other words, in order to 
reduce high EMTRs on social security clients, marginal tax rates on many other 
taxpayers would need to rise; in some cases, considerably. Another problem with the 
Dawkins et al NIT is that, in utilising a common definition of income in both the social 
security and taxation system, it loses the ability, in the social security means test, to 
discriminate between those with and those without high levels of assets holdings.
The basic problem is that if effective rates of taxation on capital income are high, the 
incentives to avoid tax increase commensurately. Moreover, the opportunities for 
avoidance are quite considerable under an income base that falls regretfully short of the 
full comprehensive income ideal.
Hence, despite its theoretical attractions, the NIT in its “pure” (ie linear, non- 
categorical) form remains an idea which would require considerable political courage to 
implement, and the benefits of which might not be clear-cut. That said, some of the 
modifications to the basic NIT proposed by Dawkins et al provide the potential for a 
realistic compromise: for example, the sub-options which involve a higher initial taper 
rate (60%), a lower tax rate on middle income earners, and continued categorical tests of 
eligibility.
1.6.2 Integration of tax and social security
Another means of fully integrating tax and social security would involve the social 
security system adopting the tax definition of income, and replacing means tests with 
tax surcharges or special tax rates on recipients of benefits designed to have 
approximately similar distributional impacts. The use of special tax rates would make
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tax interactions very explicit and allow systematic design of desired EMTR schedules.
In paying benefits, Centrelink would withhold an appropriate amount of tax (Ingles 
1985).
While there are administrative problems with the integration option, they are not 
insuperable. The biggest drawback to this option is that the tax and social security 
definitions of income are now very different and in particular the "extended deeming" 
system of imputing returns to assets is not duplicated in the tax system. Hence an 
integration system would be open to all the sorts of avoidance possibilities we saw 
during the period that the assets component of the means test was abolished.
1.6.3 “Full separation” of tax and social security
Dixon and Foster (1983a and b) provide a proposal designed to ensure that pensioners 
subject to the income test are not also subject to taxation. The mechanism for doing this 
is fairly simple, involving extension and modification of the special tax rebate for 
pensioners. To reduce the net benefit to higher income pensioners, the taper rate would 
be increased to, say, 60%. The special rebate would be withdrawn at the cutout points. 
The effect is to abolish “churning”: ie, when individuals both receive some social 
security payment and pay tax at the same time.
The rebate abatement rate can be set at 30% so that, combined with the normal 30% rate 
of income tax, the ETR of 60% applies until the rebate is fully abated. The great virtue 
of this plan is that a single designed effective tax rate applies right through the means 
test taper zone. Unlike the Dawkins et al NIT, the social security definition of income 
continues to apply, and thus includes imputed income from assets.
The previous government contemplated a similar system when they promised that age 
pensioners would be totally removed from the tax system by 1995. This did not 
proceed, mainly for the reasons that it was thought to be inequitable in relation to those 
in the workforce with similar incomes to pensioners; and to be too expensive. However 
these comments were in a context where there would not be offsetting changes to 
income test tapers and would not be relevant if the taper rate were raised, as under the 
Dixon/Foster proposal.
1.6.4 Separation applied to all additional payments
This refinement, in Ingles (1998a), is not in the original Dixon/Foster proposal, but is a 
logical extension of their idea. Additional payments for families (FTB and YA) and for
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rent (RA) would be added to basic benefits and also tapered at, say, 60% beyond the 
benefit cutout points. There would be matching tax credits in the income tax system, 
which would start to reduce at a rate of 30% once entitlement to all additional payments 
was exhausted. This would maintain the ETR at 60% until the net benefit to each 
family type was entirely exhausted. All such rebates would be withdrawn sequentially.
Note that the 60% tax rate is not intrinsic to the proposal. Rather, the objective is that 
all social security clients would become subject to a designed structure of marginal tax 
rates -  whatever that might be.
An alternative means of administration is to apply special tax scales to social security 
recipients. This is found to be a more workable solution.
This system would totally abolish churning -  that is, where the same people receive 
benefits and pay income tax. It would also have the advantage that additional payments 
for children and rent would become subject to the tighter social security definition of 
income, which includes imputed asset incomes. Thus full separation becomes a very 
effectively targeted system.
However, there are several important difficulties. Some people would have incomes 
excluding them from payment, but would be otherwise able to benefit from the special 
tax scales applicable to social security clients. Resolution to this requires that a ‘grey’ 
category of clients be catered for, who are designated by Centrelink as categorically 
eligible, who receive no pension, but are able to access the special tax scales. Another 
difficulty concerns those who move on and off benefits over the course of the year.
This requires that a part-year tax scale be applied in proportion to the time spent on 
benefit.
It follows that the problems are soluble, but the complications arising mean that going 
down this path is not as easy as might at first appear. Such complications are inevitable 
so long as the tax and social security systems employ different income units, income 
definitions, and income periods. These issues are addressed more elegantly by the full 
integration solution, but even here, some such issues arise because the annual income 
base of the income tax is simply too long to be a workable income period when needs 
are pressing and immediate. Only in a fully linear tax system can such problems be 
entirely avoided.
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1.6.5 Harmonisation
A final option (or, more correctly, class of options) is harmonisation. Tax and means 
testing would be allowed to operate over the same range of income, but would do so in a 
co-ordinated manner so as to achieve a designed structure of EMTRs. While 
harmonisation is not as target efficient as full separation - because the tax definition of 
income takes no account of assets - this option does have the advantage of having 
similarities to the current system, thus easing the transition. Most reform options 
currently under discussion, including those implemented in the Government’s NTS (Tax 
Package), are based on harmonisation.
While harmonisation options are generally simple, they are in many respects the least 
elegant. They involve the continuation of a great deal of churning and often accidental 
outcomes in terms of EMTRs.
1.7 Chapter 7: Low pay and earned income tax credits
A number of proposals for reducing unemployment in Australia focus on cuts or freezes 
in award wages which, by reducing the aggregate wage bill and also creating more 
flexibility in the dispersion of relative wages, are meant to increase employment. 
Typically, such proposals include (often vague) proposals to offset some of the 
distributional consequences by top-ups or other adjustments to the tax/transfer system. 
The best developed of these proposals is that of Dawkins and his collaborators, which 
envisages the introduction of a negative income tax (NIT). More recently, Keating and 
Lambert have developed an earned income tax credit (EITC) proposal as an adjunct to 
their wider welfare reform proposals.
Apart from the NIT and EITC there are other possible options to assist low wage 
earners. These include other forms of wage subsidies (eg removal of payroll tax from 
the low-paid); changes to existing social security parameters to reduce tapers (and 
improve replacement rates for the unemployed) -  as provided for in the Government’s 
Tax Package; reductions in the income tax faced by the low paid (notably increases in 
the tax threshold, or increases in the low income rebate); and perhaps new social 
security supplements for the low paid.
This chapter examines the available options and concludes that, given the current 
structure of the social security system, there are serious obstacles to the most common 
ones such as the NIT or the EITC. The NIT is already dealt with above. In Ingles
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(2000d) I show that the US EITC is essentially a device to increase the progressivity of 
the tax/transfer system for families, and to reduce (or even make negative) tax rates on 
low-income families. In the Australian context, both of these results are achievable by 
changes to family assistance, notably by reductions in the family payment taper (which, 
like the EITC, both improves work incentives for low earners and gives greatest benefits 
at the low-middle income range). These policy instruments are not available to US 
policy makers.
There is a case for further reducing tax burdens on low wage earners, but options in this 
area tend to be very expensive and/or require targeting on a family needs basis.
Reducing the tapers on Newstart and Parenting Allowance would help low wage 
families in a very targeted manner, but create a whole class of low income working 
people receiving a part-allowance, and this may not be a desirable development from 
either a policy or an administrative view. It would require a new philosophy as to the 
role of unemployment payments in particular, which have not hitherto been (widely) 
seen as a form of low wage subsidy. Also this strategy, while not so expensive in itself, 
pushes out the necessary threshold for the family payment, RA and youth allowance 
means test if means test “stacking” is to be avoided, and therefore has potentially 
significant flow-on costs.
Low wage earners can be helped in many different ways. A lot depends on the 
objectives we are seeking to achieve, and whom we wish to help. If we wish to ensure 
that low pay does not result in poverty then the present system, with minor refinements, 
is probably adequate to this task. For families with dependent children, substantial in­
work assistance is already provided to low wage earners. In addition, low-wage couples 
without dependents can receive unemployment assistance if one of them is willing to 
seek full-time work.
For the medium term future, low full-time pay -  assuming that the minimum wage of 
$400 pw is applied effectively - is unlikely to cause poverty for single individuals or 
working couples without children, so the lack of social security supplements for these 
groups is not an immediate issue. If supplementation were required, it should relate in 
the first instance to those with high housing costs. Hence one option canvassed 
involves changes to the rental assistance scheme to make it available to low wage 
earners outside of the current categorically eligible groups.
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Although the current system addresses poverty, if lower minimum rates of pay were 
adopted as a solution to structural unemployment that might start to cause problems of 
excessive earnings replacement rates on moving onto benefit. The answer here (we 
exclude the “solution” of cutting benefits) is to ease EMTRs for those on the margins of 
the welfare system. This has already been done for family assistance, under the NTS.
For couples coming off allowances, EMTRs are currently very high. Two approaches 
are possible. One is to directly reduce allowance tapers, but this has the problems noted 
above.
The alternative solution is to reduce income tax payments for those on the welfare 
margin. This has the advantage of keeping people out of the welfare system. It also 
helps in terms of tax/welfare interaction generally. Many of those who would benefit 
from easier tapers also pay income tax; often in substantial amounts. Reducing income 
tax on the low paid will therefore reduce churning, compared to the lower taper option, 
and it also helps those outside of the formal social security system. However it is likely 
to be much more expensive than reducing tapers, as it is more difficult to confine the 
benefits to a small target group.
The EITC is one version of this strategy. It can be tightly targeted if it is based on the 
family rather than the individual. But it may be better to explicitly change the tax unit -  
particularly at the low income end -  to reflect relative needs of families. A number of 
approaches for doing this are explored.
Another problem which policy might seek to address is that of increasing inequality, 
rather than poverty (the two are related, but not identical). However the policy response 
to this is not likely to be greatly different. Once we move from a focus on poverty 
alleviation to one where we are concerned about work incentives for those on the 
margins of the welfare system, we inevitably end up giving extra assistance to those on 
low to middle incomes.
A third possible objective is to “buy” award wage restraint before the Industrial 
Commission. In this context, a virtue of the EITC is that it would be a highly visible 
and saleable offset to any scheme of award wage restraint, and might make such a 
scheme acceptable to the Industrial Commission (and, with less likelihood, the trade 
union movement).
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A problem with an EITC as a compensation mechanism is that it limits compensation to 
a sub-group of the affected population. Indeed, this is precisely its point (from a cost 
perspective), but it is a serious weakness from a political perspective. In particular it 
implies that the union movement would be extremely unlikely to support the wage/tax 
tradeoff as currently envisaged by its proponents.
1.8 Chapter 8: The retirement income system
The taxation of superannuation reflects the general turmoil over the appropriate taxation 
of capital income. This is not just an Australian problem, it is found all over the world. 
However the Australian problem is exacerbated by the fact that we have a 
supplementary tax on capital income called the aged pension means test, and this 
interacts in complex and sometimes perverse ways with the rest of the income tax 
system.
There are two theoretically pure ways of taxing capital income. Either would require a 
radical upheaval of existing arrangements. One is the expenditure tax (ET), which 
effectively exempts most capital income from tax. The other approach is the 
comprehensive income tax (CIT), but for this to work properly it requires that capital 
income be taxed on a fully inflation-adjusted accrual basis. For example, capital gains 
should be taxed each year, at the individual’s marginal rate, on the difference between 
the start and the end values of the relevant assets, adjusted for inflation. Further, 
income should be imputed to items in use, of which the owner occupied home is the 
most important example.
Economic theory is not decisive as to which of these approaches are to be preferred. 
However it does suggest that intersectoral allocation of resources is improved if the one 
approach -  either the ET or the CIT - is applied to all forms of capital income.
All tax systems in practice employ mixtures of expenditure and income tax concepts. 
The ET approach is typically applied both to owner-occupied homes, and in many 
countries, to superannuation savings. Many theorists have therefore argued that 
efficient asset allocation would be furthered by applying an ET regime more widely. 
Others have argued that this would have an unacceptable impact on the distribution of 
income and wealth. This is precisely the problem that would arise if the ET concept 
were pursued more wholeheartedly in the superannuation arena in this country.
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If it were pursued, it would certainly be necessary to retain and probably tighten the 
pension means test in order to offset the inegalitarian consequences. However the 
means test can only operate as an implicit tax up to a certain point; beyond this the 
superannuation wealthy would enjoy a marked advantage. The means test has the 
additional disadvantage that it impacts alike on assets that have been taxed 
concessionally, and those which have not. This can contribute to marked horizontal 
inequities, as well as economic distortions. Finally, the means test undermines the 
whole conceptual basis of the ET approach and makes the exercise inherently flawed.
In consequence I do not favour that approach to reform. Rather, I would prefer to see 
the means test weakened, eg, by further reducing the taper from 40% to 25%. This 
would result in a roughly linear schedule of effective tax rates on the aged, at about 
50%. Alternatively, and preferably, the pension taper could be grossed up to 50% and 
full separation applied, with pensioners being subject to a special tax scale. Any ETR 
much less than 50% necessarily imposes a disproportionate burden on the younger 
sections of the population.
One option would be to pay for the taper reduction by further tightening the tax regime 
applying to superannuation. The big problem here is that this cannot be easily done 
without potentially disadvantaging some lower income earners who already receive a 
fairly marginal benefit from investing in superannuation. The fact that some of their 
involvement is involuntary does not excuse this. And yet it is hard to design any tax 
increases that do not have adverse impact on some people’s incentives to save through 
superannuation. The current system is based on a balance of offsetting distortions, 
which is not easily pushed or pulled at any one point.
I am attracted nonetheless to the fuller taxation of end benefits proposed in various 
forms by Knox, the Institute of Actuaries, and Atkinson et al, combined with reduction 
or abolition of the annuity rebate. Ideally this would be combined with a more generous 
scheme of rebates for employee contributions, as also envisioned in these proposals. 
Ideally we would end up not discriminating in any way between employee and 
employer contributions, and the concept of undeducted contributions would disappear. 
The remaining ‘concession’ for annuities would simply be the purchase price deduction. 
However all these proposals encounter various technical problems, as well as problems 
as to the transition.
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Another option is the “guaranteed minimum pension” approach discussed in Ingles
(2000c).
In the longer term we should look for a solution where the taxation of superannuation 
became part of a comprehensive reform of capital income taxation. However the 
changes likely to be necessary are so radical -  whether that be a full ET or a full CIT - 
that it is unlikely we will see anything like this for some considerable time to come.
1.9 Ch 9: Conclusion
There would appear to be advantage in developing the Australian social security system 
in a manner more consistent with academic notions of a GMI. However there are severe 
obstacles to the ‘pure’ GMI where the only test of eligibility is low income. Rather, it 
seems likely that we would wish to retain some test of ‘mutual obligation’ as a 
condition for receipt of income support. In particular, I argue that we need to persist 
with:
1. Categorisation -  albeit with three, not 22, categories. These three are the aged (65 
and over); the workforce aged who meet ‘mutual obligation’ requirements; and 
those who do not. The last group gets no income support from government, but in 
my proposals benefit from significant income tax cuts if their income is low.
2. Higher effective tax rates for beneficiaries than for those whose incomes exceed the 
benefit cutouts -  albeit that a linear tax schedule is proposed for the aged.
3. Different and more comprehensive income definitions for beneficiaries compared to 
taxpayers.
4. Different income periods for beneficiaries and taxpayers.
The consequence of the last three is that there must also be
5. Different income units for beneficiaries and taxpayers, albeit that the family unit 
preferred in the welfare system must be extended some way into the positive tax 
system in order to create a smooth transition.
Subject to these caveats, I propose a system that is substantially based on the GMI ideal. 
However its implementation is by means of the “full separation” system whereby all 
social security benefits are withdrawn before any income tax becomes payable. The 
effect would be that a designed structure of marginal rates is achieved; the system 
becomes transparent, rational and sustainable.
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2 CHAPTER 2: OUTLINE OF THE AUSTRALIAN SOCIAL 
SECURITY SYSTEM AND IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS.
2.1 The Australian system as a guaranteed minimum income (GMI)
This Thesis considers Australia’s social security system as the world’s closest 
approximation to a GMI scheme, and the lessons that might be learned by other 
countries wishing to consider such a scheme. The original concept of a GMI or 
negative income tax (NIT) was based on the logic that government’s have a basic duty 
to intervene in the free operation of the market in order to prevent poverty, but need not 
do more than this: ie, they have no need to try and maintain living standards by relating 
benefits to previous earnings. The simplest and most logical way to prevent poverty 
would be to provide a minimum entitlement to support which would be progressively 
withdrawn as income rises (see eg Friedman 1962). Because support is withdrawn 
progressively (ie with tapers well below 100%), individuals would continue to have an 
incentive to earn more, so that the system could operate purely automatically -  
administrative discretions or requirements might be entirely avoided. The only criterion 
for assistance would be low income.
The Australian system differs from academic conceptions of a GMI or NIT in several 
important respects:
• It is categorical in nature; having a low income is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for receiving assistance; this allows, for example, requirement that people 
be actively seeking work in order to receive unemployment related payments.
• There is not a single maximum rate but rather several, and also several different 
rates of taper (the rate at which benefits reduce as income rises).
• It is not integrated with the tax system except for family payments (although various 
special rebates operate to reduce tax on pensioners and beneficiaries).
• There are elements of the system which do not have a strict anti-poverty focus (as in 
the classic economist’s conception), but instead embody various degree of 
horizontal equity (some family payments) and maintenance of living standards (the 
compulsory superannuation system, for example, as well as employer provided sick 
leave entitlements, motor vehicle accident compensation and worker’s 
compensation).
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Notwithstanding the various eamings-related elements, the social security system stands 
in the background as a safety net for those whose entitlements run out or are otherwise 
inadequate (or non-existent). For this reason the thesis does not deal with them except 
for the superannuation system, which creates particular problems of integration 
(Chapter 8).
Since most benefits (in particular Newstart Allowance, for the unemployed) are paid 
without limit as to duration, the effect is that we have what might be described as a form 
of GMI scheme, albeit one restricted to those able to prove eligibility under various 
categories -  the aged, the unemployed, the sick, etc. The main difference between this 
system and a non-categorical GMI is that we exclude those whose low income is 
voluntary or difficult to measure: for example, the low-income self-employed (who are 
generally deemed not available for employment), and those who are not working nor 
actively seeking work (who would not satisfy the Newstart Allowance activity test). 
Another difference is that there is a family-based means test, rather than the individual 
entitlements envisaged in some ‘basic income’ proposals. This test tends to exclude 
‘dependent’ spouses from benefits.
2.2 Brief overview of the income security system6
The Australian income security system comprises:
• the social security system administered by the Commonwealth Government, 
which is funded from general taxation revenue and provides flat-rate, means- 
tested income support payments to those not expected to work (retired people, 
lone parents and carers), unable to work (people with disabilities and the sick) or 
unable to find work (the unemployed). Additional means-tested payments are 
available to those who pay rent in the private rental market and to assist with the 
costs of dependent children;
• pensions for war veterans and their dependants, which include both income 
support and compensation elements and are funded by the Commonwealth 
Government from general revenue;
• a mix o f compulsory and voluntary occupational superannuation, funded by 
employers and employees and supported by tax concessions. This system
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provides either lump sum benefits or eamings-related pensions on retirement, or 
a mix of both;
• compensation arrangements for work injuries and deaths, legislated by 
State/Territory Governments and providing for 'no-faulf eamings-related benefits 
(either as periodic payments or lump sums), financed by compulsory, risk-related 
premiums or levies paid by employers to commercial insurers or, in some States, 
governmental compensation funds;
• compensation arrangements for road accident injuries and deaths, which mainly 
provide for lump sum damages financed by compulsory annual levies on motor 
vehicle owners paid to commercial insurers;
• life and contingency insurance, which operates through commercial insurers and 
is essentially voluntary in nature;
• paid sick leave, which is mandated by legislation and provided and financed by 
employers. Usually this provides full or partial income replacement to sick 
employees for defined periods, often with arrangements whereby sick leave 
credits accumulate with increasing length of service with an employer; and
• other cash and in-kind welfare benefits and services, such as subsidised child 
care, public housing and transport, domiciliary and residential care services for 
aged and disabled people, rebates on local government property taxes for 
pensioners and reductions in charges for utilities such as water, electricity and 
gas. These are provided at Commonwealth, State and local levels, with the 
Commonwealth Government providing additional funds for them.
In addition, there are concessions within the personal income tax system, for example, 
for sole parents, dependent spouses and medical expenses (notably health insurance).
There is a general system of compulsory health insurance financed from a combination 
of general revenue and an income-related tax surcharge (the Medicare levy).
Housing assistance is provided in three main forms:
6 This overview draws heavily on Whiteford (1998 and 2000).
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• the Commonwealth Government provides income support for rental housing costs in 
the private sector in the form of Rent Assistance payments through the social 
security system;
• the Commonwealth and State Governments fund the provision of public and 
community housing through the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement 
(CSHA). Rental levels are modest, and are further reduced by a system of low- 
income rent rebates; and
• a new grant has recently become payable to first home owners as a form of 
compensation for cost increases arising from the GST.
The Commonwealth Government provides substantial Childcare Assistance to families 
to reduce the costs of child care. This assistance reduces gradually as family incomes 
increase, although there is a small quasi-universal component.
The Child Support Scheme provides financial support for children of separated parents 
by obtaining contributions from parents to the support of their children in accordance 
with their taxable income. Payments collected by the CSA are paid out to custodial 
parents by FaCS. Child support payments reduce the higher rate of Family Allowance 
for children received by custodial parents.
Since 1992, Australia has had a compulsory, occupational-based, superannuation 
(private pension) system. Under the Superannuation Guarantee, employers are required 
to make prescribed minimum contributions, on behalf of their employees, to complying 
superannuation funds. The required minimum contribution was set at 3 per cent of 
employee earnings in 1992, rising to 9 per cent in 2002-03; it is currently 8%.
In 1996, some 6.3 million or approximately 89 per cent of public and private sector 
employees were covered by superannuation. Most of the 11 per cent of employees with 
no superannuation fall below the income threshold for the Superannuation Guarantee. 
The low income threshold is being raised from $450 to $900 a month.
There are two long-standing values that provide the basis of the Australian income 
support system. One is that government and community responsibility to assist those in 
need. The other is that private provision outside the social security system is to be
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encouraged as far as possible, with the income support system being primarily a safety 
net.
This distinguishes Australia from most other developed countries (apart from New 
Zealand) - the primary focus of Australia's social security system is protection against 
poverty. In most other OECD countries, by contrast, the primary principle is one of 
income maintenance across an individual's life-cycle, notably through defined 
contingencies such as sickness, unemployment and old age, although many have poverty 
relief as an important additional objective.
In Australia the income maintenance principle is mainly reflected in the mandatory 
superannuation guarantee (SG) system, although it is heavily modified by the residual 
pension entitlement that most people in receipt of SG benefits will also access. Benefits 
are flat rate and paid from general government revenue; there are no eamings-related 
features.
A marked departure from the ‘safety net’ model was proposed in 1974, when the 
Whitlam Labor Government wanted to introduce a ‘national compensation’ scheme 
modelled on a similar scheme in New Zealand. This would have replaced existing 
schemes of workers and accident compensation, as well as the disability pension, 
replacing them with a single eamings-related scheme. This Government also set up an 
inquiry into a ‘national superannuation’ system paying contribution-related benefits on 
the social insurance model, but lost office before it received the report.
There is also an extensive system of supplementary payments for families with children. 
This provides direct cash assistance for around 80 per cent of all families, and higher 
levels of assistance for those receiving basic income support benefits or in low paid 
jobs. Other payments include a maternity allowance, payments for all low-income 
parents caring for children, and assistance with child care costs. Those renting privately 
may be entitled to assistance with housing costs.
Benefits are effectively available on an indefinite basis, subject to the means tests. 
Because payments are not contributory, coverage of the system is quasi-universal, being 
subject only to a range of residence requirements. Payments for the unemployed are 
subject to an activity test. Because of the relatively relaxed income tests, it is possible
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to combine receipt of income support with part-time work (and in some cases low- 
waged full-time work).
2.3 The income support system
The government income support system comprises:
• Twenty-two income support payments divided between two classes, pensions and 
allowances; payments are made on a categorical basis, with the most important 
categories being the aged, people with disabilities and those caring for people with 
disabilities, the unemployed, sole parents, the short-term sick, and war veterans.
- these are designed to provide a subsistence standard of living for an adult or a 
couple;
• two payments in respect of dependent children;
- these are paid at the same maximum rate to beneficiaries and low income working 
families;
• rent assistance, paid at five maximum rates according to family composition; and
• four income supplements.
Income support payments and most supplementary payments are income and assets 
tested. Eligibility for different income support payments is based on the reason a 
claimant is unable or not expected to support him or herself through paid work. These 
reasons include illness or disability, parenting or caring responsibilities, age or 
unemployment, and participation in full-time education or long-term training. Only the 
unemployment payments, currently Newstart and Youth Allowance, are subject to an 
activity test, although eligibility for Carer Payment is based on the level of care actually 
provided.
Participation in full-time paid work does not itself preclude eligibility for income 
support, although the allowance income test makes it unlikely that many people could 
combine full-time work and any income support entitlement. All payments allow 
recipients to combine some earnings with income support, although for several 
payments there is a restriction on the permissible hours of work. For example, an 
applicant for Newstart allowance who was already working full-time would be regarded
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as not being available for work and therefore be ineligible, even though his income 
might be below the relevant cut-out. This provision mainly affects the self-employed.
Rates and income and assets tests are standardised for pensions and are more generous 
than the standard rates and income and assets tests for allowances.
All pensions plus Parenting Allowance, Maternity Allowance and Rent Assistance are 
adjusted twice yearly in accordance with movements in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
(in March and September), while family payments and Child Disability Allowance are 
adjusted once a year, in January. The single rate of pension is indexed at a minimum of 
25 per cent of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE), with flow-ons to the 
married rate of pension. CPI indexation is intended to protect the real purchasing power 
of the pension, while maintaining the pension at 25 per cent of MTAWE is intended to 
allow pensioners to share in rising community living standards.
The indexation of pension to MTAWE is opening up a gap compared to allowance 
payments, and this will tend to increase over time due to the tendency of wage growth 
to outstrip price growth by around the rate of productivity growth - about 1.5% pa.
Major policy initiatives in the 1990s include the introduction of'deeming' of a minimum 
rate of return on financial assets, and the integration of the various income-tested family 
payments to improve take-up of assistance, particularly among those in low paid work. 
Payments to students and the young unemployed were integrated in a single “Youth 
Allowance” means tested on parental as well as individual income. Changes to the 
family payment system are described later.
Changes were also made to the structure of income support for the unemployed. In 
essence, these involved the partial individualisation of the benefit system for couples. 
This required the spouses of unemployment benefit (Newstart allowance) recipients to 
claim benefit in their own right (and be work-tested, or a parent) unless they were in 
older age groups. The withdrawal rate on unemployment payments was reduced, with 
the maximum taper falling from 100 to 70%.
2.3.1 Means testing in the Australian system
The Australian system of social protection differs from those in most OECD countries 
in generally eschewing the “social insurance’ approach of compulsory contributions and 
eamings-related benefits in favour of a flat-rate means tested system. Means-testing
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arrangements are designed to ‘target’ social security payments to those most in need, 
while not discouraging self-help and financial independence for those with other 
resources. The definition of'income' for the purposes of calculating a social security 
entitlement includes gross (before tax) employment income and deemed investment 
income.
In 1990-91 income-tested payments in Australia amounted to 5.2 per cent of GDP, or 90 
per cent of total social security spending. The average for the OECD as a whole was 
1.9 per cent of GDP and 14 per cent of social security spending (Eardley et al 1996). As 
a consequence, comparatively high proportions of the Australian population were 
subject to income-testing. The proportion of the total population in Australia receiving 
social assistance benefits in 1992 was nearly two and a half times the average of OECD 
countries, and was consistently higher for all groups apart from lone parents.
However the means tests employed are generally in the nature of tests designed to 
exclude the reasonably well off, rather than being meant to include only the poorest. As 
such, Australian means tests have sometimes been described as “affluence” tests rather 
than “poverty” tests
Typically, for example, there is some “free area” below which income or assets do not 
affect payments, and the taper on the main allowances as income rises is 50% rising to 
70% beyond certain income levels. By “pension” I mean all those payments with a 
pension-type means test (free areas of $106 per fortnight, single, and $188, couple, and 
40% taper beyond), and by “allowance” I refer to those payments with an allowance- 
type means test (free areas of up to $62 per fortnight, each person, and taper of 50% up 
to $146 per fortnight and 70% thereafter). “Benefits” I use as a generic term covering 
all our payments, including family payments7.
Tapers on pensions become 40% under the July 2000 New Tax System (NTS) (down 
from 50%), and 30% for family payments (previously 50%). Moreover family 
payments have a two-part taper with a semi-universal component which does not abate 
until income levels exceed $73,000 pa. This means that the cutout points even for first-
7 This usage is not consistent with the Social Security Act definitions of the terms 'pension' and 'benefit'. 
Nor is the legal terminology for the classes reflected in the names of individual payments: some pensions 
have 'allowance' or 'payment' in their names, only one benefit is known by the name benefit and one 
family payment is called a pension.
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tier benefits tend to be at higher levels in the earnings distribution than are benefits paid 
under most “social assistance’ schemes overseas.
By contrast, social assistance recipients in other OECD countries will typically face 
100% withdrawal rates, before their EMTRs drop as they exit income support. Only the 
Special Benefit in Australia has this style of means test, and this is a tiny residual 
benefit available to those not meeting other categorical criteria (for example, 
residentially unqualified aged people).
Because of their character as affluence tests, Australian means tests have the potential to 
affect behaviour over quite wide bands of income. Withdrawal of benefits as income 
rises and “stacking’ of multiple means tests can, when combined with income taxation, 
create very high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) for some clients.
There is a quite complicated regime for assets. 'Assets' are generally a person's financial 
and other property. Some items of property are not included as assets, the most
o
significant of which is a person's principal residence. Financial assets are “deemed” to 
earn income at a rate which is set from time to time at the prevailing level of interest 
rates -  currently 4.5% for the initial $30,000 and 5.5% thereafter. Financial institutions 
typically provide special pensioner accounts paying the deeming rates, although it is 
possible to invest in higher yielding assets and still be deemed to earn at these rates.
In addition there is a separate assets test on most benefits (no longer on family 
payments), but these are set at levels that in general affect relatively few people. The 
assets test for allowances is harsher than for pensions, involving a “sudden death” loss 
of benefit if assets exceed the threshold. For pensioners there is a gradual loss of 
benefits on exceeding the thresholds which involves an implicit deeming rate of 19.5%. 
Whereas only financial assets are included under the main deeming regime, all assets 
except the owner-occupied home are included in the separate asset test. Higher limits 
apply where the client is not a home-owner.
The assets thresholds are the same for pensions and allowances, but a pension is tapered 
above these thresholds, by $3 per fortnight for every $1,000 of assets. For allowance
8 Their own home represents a substantial asset for many retirees. As at June 1995,43% of Australian 
households owned their own home and 27% were purchasing, a total of 70%. In March 1997, 69% of age 
pensioners owned their own home.
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recipients there is, instead, a “sudden death” disqualification at these thresholds. The 
limits are dependent upon marital status and home ownership. There is no longer -  post 
the July 2000 changes which effectively change family payments into tax credits -  an 
asset test for family payments. The rate of pension is calculated under both the income 
(including deemed income) and assets tests, and the test that results in the lower rate is 
the one that applies. Most (95%) pensioners are assessed under the income rather than 
the assets test.
Finally, there is a “liquid asset test” for Newstart Allowance applicants designed to 
delay eligibility for those who have left a job with a severance payout. This affects only 
liquid financial assets, but is quite severe, with a waiting period of up to 26 weeks being 
served by those whose liquid assets, at the time of applying for allowance exceed 
$9,000. Once on allowance, however, only the normal asset limits apply.
The amount of income a person may receive before pension is reduced (called the “free 
area”) is dependent upon marital status and the number of dependent children. At July 
2000, a single person may receive $106 per fortnight before pension is reduced and a 
pensioner couple may receive $188 per fortnight (combined) before pension is reduced. 
$24.60 per fortnight is added for each dependent child. Income in excess of these free 
areas reduces pension entitlement by 40 cents in the dollar (for a single person) and 20 
cents each in the dollar for a couple.
These income test parameters, in conjunction with the maximum rates, produce “cut-out 
points” which are the private income levels at which benefit payments are reduced to 
zero. At July 2000, these “cut-out points” are $1,087 per fortnight ($28,260 pa) for a 
single person and $1,817 pf ($47,240) for a couple. For allowances cutouts are $578 pf 
($15,030 pa) for singles; $1,029 pf ($26,750 pa) for couples (or more, depending on 
how the couple’s income is distributed). By way of comparison average male weekly 
earnings is $39,490 pa, and $26,156 for females. The presence of dependent children, 
and payment of private rent, raise the cutout.
The income cutout points (with the exception of the child deduction amount) rise 
automatically following indexation changes to the base amounts and the free areas.
In 1969 the "tapered means test" was introduced with a 50% rather than a 100% 
withdrawal rate. In 1972 the pension free areas were doubled, and in 1973 the
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Government abolished the means test for those aged 75 years and over, and in 1975 for 
those aged 70 to 74 years. In 1976 the means test was replaced by a test on income 
alone. The rates of the income test free pension were frozen in 1978, and in 1983 the 
pension for those aged 70 years and over was again subject to the income test. In 1985 
an assets test on pensions was reintroduced.
As an illustration of the extent to which people qualify for payment under these 
arrangements, Figure 2.1 shows social security income recipients as a proportion of the 
pension age population from 1965 to 1999. Currently they represent some 70-75% of 
the total.
Figure 2.1: Proportion of the population of age pension age receiving social 
security payments, 1965 to 1999
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—♦—Proportion of population (Age Pension plus old age service pension recipients)
—■—Proportion of Population (Age Pension plus all service pensions minus estimate of workforce-age recipients)
Source: Whiteford and Angenent 2001
2.3.2 Taxation issues
Most basic rates of pension and allowance are taxable, the major exceptions being 
payments to disability support pensioners (and wives or carers of disability support
37
38
pensioners) not of age pension age. Additional payments, such as family payments and 
Rent Assistance are generally not taxable, but are means tested.
Since the annual rates of most taxable pensions exceed the general tax threshold, special 
tax rebates are used to ensure that full year pensioners, with little or no other income, 
are protected from tax liability. The pensioner rebates for both married and single 
pensioners are increased each year to ensure that income equal to the income test free 
areas remains tax-free. The rebates are progressively withdrawn at higher levels of 
income, a process that can exacerbate high EMTRs. The same problem occurs for 
allowees, but the rebates are less generous, so tax liability can commence within the free 
areas.
Over time, the amount of rebate needed to offset the ordinary tax liability of pensioners 
has risen, as the value of the payments has increased much faster than the value of the 
tax-free threshold. Pensioners and allowees are also eligible for the range of rebates 
available to other taxpayers, for example the low-income rebate, sole parent rebate, the 
dependent spouse rebate and the zone rebate.
Partly as a consequence of the unusual nature of its system of income support, the 
Australian tax system differs significantly from those of other OECD countries. Total 
tax revenue in 1995 was 30.9 per cent of GDP compared to an OECD average of 37.4 
per cent (OECD, 1996).
Taxes on income and profits accounted for 55.3 per cent of total revenue compared to an 
OECD average of 35.3 per cent. However, there are no social security contributions in 
Australia (apart from the 1.5/2.5% Medicare levy), while such contributions account for 
about 25 per cent of total revenue and 10 per cent of GDP for the OECD as a whole. 
Including the Australian mandatory superannuation scheme would change this picture, 
of course.
The top marginal tax rate (47%) in Australia is below the top rate in 12 other OECD 
countries. However, marginal rates over 45 per cent cut in Australia at income levels 
below that in any other OECD country apart from Turkey and Ireland. The relatively 
low level at which the top rate applies in Australia reflects the non-indexation of the 
income tax scales to inflation. Over time, this has increased its effective progressivity.
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The Government has recently introduced wide-ranging reforms to taxation and social 
security programs. This involved the replacement of the Wholesale Sales Tax with a 
broad-based Goods and Services Tax (GST) -  really a value-added tax (VAT) -, 
extensive cuts to income taxes, a compensation package for the effects of the tax 
changes and family assistance changes, and a range of other reforms - eg, to funding for 
the States.
2.3.3 Tax and income test interactions
Over the past 20 years there has been a substantial increase in the degree of interaction 
between social security and other sources of income. Overall, around 60 per cent of 
social security customers in December 1997 had private income in addition to their 
social security payments. This proportion ranges from around 10 per cent of Special 
Beneficiaries and 30 per cent of Newstart Allowees to 45 per cent of Disability Support 
Pensioners, 60 percent of Sole Parents (who receive Parenting Payment -  Unpartnered) 
and 80 per cent of Age Pensioners. The trend to declaring increased private income has 
been particularly significant for sole parents.
Increasing tax interactions are very important, since more individuals come to face high 
effective marginal tax rates due to the overlap between income tests and the tax system. 
Where these tax rates act as a barrier to social security recipients from taking part-time 
work, they are known as "poverty traps". Where they act as a barrier to those in work 
from increasing their earnings they are known as a "low income trap".
An income support recipient completely reliant on payments or with very low additional 
income initially faces a low effective marginal tax rate, since none of their payments are 
withdrawn under the free area, and most social security recipients will have zero or very 
low income tax liabilities. However, once they are over the free area and paying income 
taxes, their EMTRs will increase quite significantly.
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Figure 2.2: Disposable income schedule for families (two children, 4 and 7 years)
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Figure 2.2 illustrates the effects of the income support and family payment systems and 
their interaction with the income tax system prior to the July 2000 NTS reforms. The 
figure shows the disposable income schedule for a single income couple with two 
children (aged 4 and 7 years). Without any earnings, the family received social security 
and family payments totalling just over $21,000. Disposable income increased only 
slowly as earnings increase, since social security benefits are lost, tax becomes payable, 
and family payments are withdrawn.
This continues to be the situation even after the NTS reforms. However the reduction in 
the taper on family assistance provides for greater work incentives in the incomes zones 
(over $28,000pa) where this reduces.
Family cash benefits are very important in reducing the dispersion of original income. 
But their withdrawal gives rise to effective tax rates, especially for families, that can be 
high over very wide ranges of income. At specific points or narrower income ranges, 
they can exceed 80-90 and even 100 per cent. These high EMTRs are a consequence of 
the high degree of targeting imposed in the Australian family payments system.
Whiteford (2000 p41) concludes that the structure of the direct tax and family benefit 
system in Australia is more progressive than in other OECD countries studied, a finding
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that reinforces the picture of Australia as a country committed to targeting. The 
consequence of this progressivity is that the average effective tax rate over this wide 
income range is higher in Australia than in any most other countries.
2.4 Trends in pension and benefit receipt
Over the period 1965 to 1999, the total number of income support recipients has 
increased from around 900,000 to 4.3 million. Of these, some 2 million in 1999 were 
age pensioners or received Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) payments.
Figure 2.3 shows social security recipients as a percentage of the total population aged 
15 years and over. Between 1965 and 1999 the proportion of the adult population who 
were social security recipients increased from under 11 to 27 per cent9. These figures 
exclude those receiving family payment only.
Figure 2.3: Proportion of the population aged 15 years and over receiving social 
security payments, 1965 to 1999
20 9 21 !
Source: Whiteford and Angenent 2001
9 The jump in 1999 is attributable to the inclusion of Youth Allowance recipients, who would previously 
have been in the Austudy system. These estimates of coverage are calculated as rates of receipt by 
comparing the total number of social security recipients and the total population. To some extent, this 
will give an exaggerated picture of levels of reliance on income support, as it will treat part-rate 
pensioners as the same as persons with no other income apart from government cash benefits.
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Figure 2.3 includes the pensioner age group. Figure 2.4 shows the proportion of the 
workforce age population receiving a benefit. At 20% currently, this is considerably 
lower than the 29% shown in figure 2.3, often cited as Australia’s ‘dependency ratio’. 
Nonetheless there are concerns that even 20% is too high. The Government has recently 
received a report from the Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000a and b) which 
has focussed on issues of welfare dependency.
Figure 2.4: Proportion of population of workforce age receiving social security 
payments, 1965 to 1999
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-» -P rop o rtio n  (TOTAL minus Age Pension recipients and old age service pensioners)
Source: Whiteford and Angenent 2001
Figure 2.5 shows income support incidence by age. While dependency among prime- 
age groups is around 20%, it rises rapidly beyond 55 years reflecting a widespread early 
retirement phenomenon among older males which has been observed over the past 30 
years (although it may have stabilised in the past decade -  see Ingles 2000a). The 
tendency for it to fall away among older males may be attributable to the cohort of war 
service pensioners, whose median age is now around 80.
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Figure 2.5: Income Support Recipients by Age and Gender, June 2000
o o o
Source: Whiteford and Angenent 2001
2.5 Growth in income support spending
Over the past thirty years there has been a significant long-term increase in the level of 
income support spending in Australia, associated with the increase in the number of 
individuals and families receiving social security payments.
Figure 2.6: Spending by the Department of Social Security, % of GDP, 1963-99
6
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Source: Whiteford and Angenent 2001
Figure 2.6 shows that spending on cash transfers by the (then) Department of Social 
Security rose from around 3 per cent of GDP during the 1960s to 5.4 per cent in 1976,
6.8 per cent in 1983, and 7.8 per cent of GDP in 1999. Unemployment spending has 
been the largest single contributor to the total increase, growing from 0.03 per cent of 
GDP to 1.1 per cent. Other significant components of the increase include disability 
payments, which increased from 0.3 to just under 1 per cent of GDP, payments for 
widows and sole parents which grew from 0.2 to 0.6 per cent of GDP, and payments for 
families.
Changes in the economic and social environment have been the most significant 
contributor to increased spending over the past 30 years. These changes include the 
demographic ageing of the population, the increase in unemployment, and the increase 
in the incidence of lone parenthood. Demographic ageing has provided upward pressure 
on spending on age pensions; the aged10 as a proportion of the total population has been 
growing steadily, from 10 per cent in 1971 to 14 per cent in 1997. There has also been 
an effect arising from workforce withdrawal among males aged 50-64. The influence of 
unemployment is cyclical, but the long-term trend in unemployment has been upward. 
Social security spending has tended to fall -  or at least plateau - during periods of strong 
economic growth.
Policy changes have had different influences in different periods. Increases in real 
benefit rates for both the aged and those of working age were particularly significant in 
the period 1970 to 1975. The period 1975 to 1980 saw reductions in real benefit rates 
for the unemployed. The late 1980s saw substantial increases from higher rates of 
family payments. In other periods, changes in real benefit rates have played a less 
substantial role.
2.5.1 Australian spending in perspective
OECD data (Figure 2.7) indicates that spending on social security was 8.12 per cent of 
GDP in Australia in 1997. This is about 64 per cent of the OECD average, very much at 
the lower end of the league table.
l0Men aged 65 and over, women aged 60 and over. The phased increase in women's age pension age to 
65 has not been taken into account in this discussion.
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Figure 2.7: Social Security Expenditure, OECD, 1997
Source: Calculated from OECD Social Expenditure Database 2001.
Probably the most important reason for relatively low spending levels on older people is 
that Australia operates a targeted income support system, with flat rate benefits. The 
Australian pension system has been described as "radically redistributive" by an 
American observer (Aaron, 1992). Khan (1998) has estimated that abolition of the 
means test on age and service pensions would increase spending in this area by about 
one-third to around 5% of GDP. Khan's calculations suggest that it is the flat-rate nature 
of Australian benefits, rather than means testing, that most significantly reduces the 
average benefit level paid relative to other countries paying eamings-related benefits.
OECD studies also show that the overall distribution of direct transfers in Australia is 
one of the most progressive in the OECD. Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) 
estimated that in Australia in the mid-1980s the poorest group received nearly eight 
times as much in social security transfers as the richest group. In all other countries 
apart from France the ratio is less than 3 to 1. In Sweden, Japan and Italy the richest 20 
per cent actually received more in transfers than the poorest income quintile.
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The progressivity of the transfer structure does not necessarily mean that the Australian 
system is more effective at redistribution. The degree of redistribution achieved by a 
benefits system depends on the quantum of benefits as well as the progressivity of the 
formula for allocating benefits. It is the quantum of redistribution, not the quantum of 
taxes or benefits separately, that determines the redistributive effects of a tax-benefit 
system. Redistribution is a function of the distribution of the differences between taxes 
and benefits as a proportion of income.
International comparative research (Whiteford 1997) suggests that the Australia transfer 
system is very redistributive despite the low level of overall spending. The degree of 
targeting is so pronounced that the level of net redistribution to the poorest 30 per cent 
is significantly higher than in many other countries with much higher spending.
The degree of equality in the income distribution and the level of poverty are also 
affected by the pre-tax and transfer distribution of income. An important issue is 
whether the Australian system of social protection has adverse behavioural effects that 
impact on the underlying level of inequality and poverty. If this is so, the apparently 
marked redistributive impact of the system may be over-stated.
2.5.2 The generosity of benefits
International comparisons of the generosity of benefits are difficult. The most common 
form of comparison involves the use of replacement rates, whereby the level of net 
benefits of defined types of individuals are compared with the disposable incomes of 
wage earners in similar family types. These sorts of comparisons tend to show Australia 
as having very low levels of benefit generosity, precisely because the Australian system 
lacks eamings-related features. Thus, by European standards, the Australian pension 
replacement rate of 25 per cent of average male earnings appears to be extraordinarily 
low.
Because of differences in the role of employer social security contributions, it has been 
argued that replacement rates - which compare benefit levels to wage rates - do not 
provide consistent measures of benefit generosity across countries (Whiteford, 1995). 
The preferred methodology in his study therefore was based on comparisons using 
absolute benefit levels adjusted by purchasing power parities. He estimates that the 
standard rate of age pension for a single person in 1991 when adjusted using OECD 
purchasing power parities was higher than the comparable minimum benefits in 20
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OECD countries, apart from Canada, Iceland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. This 
study suggests that rather than being very low the Australian safety net is set at a 
relatively high level. Rankings varied by family types, however.
These measures are complicated by the substantial differences between social assistance 
and social insurance benefits in other countries. Apart from Australia and New Zealand, 
only a few countries applied fairly uniform benefit levels across both systems.
Another way of looking at the ‘generosity’ of the Australian system is to calculate the 
general income tax rate required to abolish all means tests. This is something like 57%. 
To keep this in perspective, the required tax rate in Ireland was calculated to be 68%
(see references in Chapter 6). One problem with this indicator is that it depends on the 
comprehensiveness of the income tax base relative to ‘real’ national income.
2.6 Developments in family assistance
Family payments have been an area of almost constant change over the last 25 years, 
with further radical changes in the NTS. Over time, family assistance has evolved from 
a scheme where horizontal equity11 was a predominant goal -  principally based on tax 
deductions for wage earners with dependant wives and children -  to one where 
prevention and/or relief of poverty has become a main focus. However horizontal 
equity has continued to be an important, albeit residual, objective. Thus, family 
payment has a two-step means test, with first-tier benefits abating at modest incomes 
levels but a modest quasi-universal component continuing up to a family income of over 
$73,000 pa.
The philosophy of universal assistance by way of cash payments to families reached its 
high point in 1976, when tax rebates in respect of children were “cashed out” and 
merged with the then universal (but low rate) Family Allowance system. These 
universal benefits were gradually unwound during the late 1970s and 1980s as pressure 
increased to means test so-called “middle-class” welfare, partly to offset the costs of 
large increases in assistance for low income families, described below.
11 By “horizontal equity” I mean that people in like circumstances should be treated equally, and 
conversely that those in unlike circumstances -  such as those with and those without family 
responsibilities -  should be treated differently in recognition of their different needs.
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Starting in the 1980s, there were very large improvements in in-work benefits available 
to families. The Family Income Supplement (FIS -  later Family Payment) scheme 
introduced in 1983 had marked similarities to its UK predecessor, and very similar 
motives for its introduction. Initially it had a threshold set at around the cutout point for 
receipt of unemployment benefits, and a taper (abatement) rate of 50%.
FIS was introduced partly (or mainly) as a result of concerns about work incentives, and 
later increased in large part because of concerns about poverty. The flat-rate nature of 
the benefit system, allied with the additional payments available for the children of 
beneficiaries, meant that earnings replacement rates (ERRs) for low income earners on 
becoming unemployed could be very high if they were married to a non-earner and 
particularly if they had dependents.
For example, Saunders, Bradbury and Whiteford (1989) found that whereas the median 
replacement rate for all families was only 30%, replacement rates increased with 
number of children. For couples with children the median ERR was 40%; for sole 
parents, 60%. A large number of families with three or more children faced 
replacements rates of 90% or higher. These estimates post-date the introduction of FIS, 
implying that the increase in ERRs with increasing family size was even more severe 
before 1982.
Extension of children’s benefits to low income workers generally had the effect of 
reducing replacement rates or, equivalently, increasing incentives for unemployed 
family heads to take up work. At least one recent study has suggested, however, that 
the improvements in ERRs brought about by the introduction of FIS have not been 
sustained into the late 1990s (Redmond 1999). The reason is the continuing decline in 
the relative wages of low-income earners.
In 1987 the then Prime Minister, Hawke, pledged that “By 1990 no Australian child will 
be living in poverty”. The central element of the 1987 “Family Package” was a major 
new payment -  Family Allowance Supplement (FAS)— which replaced FIS, provided 
higher payments, and a more liberal income test. Explicit benchmarks of adequacy, 
specified as percentages of the married rate of pension, were also introduced. One 
result was that the number of children in families receiving means-tested assistance rose 
from 93,000 in 1987, to 353,000 in 1988.
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The extension of Rental Assistance (RA) to low income families in 1987 also helped 
improve ERRs. Previously, Commonwealth rental assistance had been confined to 
social security beneficiaries. RA does not start to abate until all first-tier family benefits 
(now FTB(A)) are exhausted. This means that RA is payable to families up to quite 
reasonable incomes -  typically in excess of $35,000 pa. A negative side effect is that 
such families continue to be subject to high effective tax rates until their RA is 
exhausted.
In 1988 the Government announced moves towards the eventual full integration of FAS 
with the then universal Family Allowance in a new Family Payment (FP) system. This 
was phased in over several years, and fully effected from January 1993. Integration, as 
originally recommended by the Social Security Review (Cass 1986), was expected to 
bring several benefits:
• create a single, readily accessible family payment system
• improve take up, and simplify movements between payments
• ensure continuity of entitlement for families moving in and out of the benefit system
• remove poverty traps associated with loss of RA and child payments on returning to 
work.
In 1991 there were 456,000 children in families receiving family payment. By 1993 this 
had climbed to 661,000. In 1986 a family with one child under 13 lost all FIS with a 
family income half (50%) of the median for that family type; by 1996 this cutout had 
risen to 72% of the median. For a family with two such children, the relevant cutouts 
moved from 54% of median earnings to 80%. The NTS changes will further raise 
cutouts for first-tier assistance, to around the median income level.
Other important changes during the 1990s included reducing taper rates on 
unemployment payments, and improving incentives for the wives of unemployed men 
to work by introducing a partly individual basis of assessment. There has also been a 
widespread movement away from paying benefits to women on the basis of their 
assumed workforce incapacity (or dependence on a man), and towards requiring women 
to be actively seeking work (or eligible under some other category). Accompanying this
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development, Parenting Payment was introduced to provide a non-activity tested 
payment recognising parenting as a valid activity in its own right.
As taper rates on allowances were eased, it also became necessary to increase the low- 
income threshold for family payment. Otherwise, people coming off allowances (and 
who were eligible for the full rate of family payment while on them) could be subject to 
“sudden death” loss of part of their family payment. This is an issue that the NTS 
addresses explicitly. The effect is that family payment thresholds are now set at about 
60% of median incomes for families with dependent children (currently the threshold is 
$28,200 pa, if one child, for first tier payment, and $73,000 for the second tier). 
Moreover the first-tier benefits do not fully abate until family incomes are well into the 
medium family income bracket.
The increase in threshold and reduction of taper designed into NTS will further remove 
FIS/FAS/FP from its origins as a tightly means-tested benefit for a small group of 
poorer people, and make it much more of a mainstream family benefit, one which 
reduces only gradually as family income rises above the thresholds. Figure 2.8 shows 
trends in the proportion of children living in families receiving income-tested payments 
increased from 11.5 per cent in 1978 to 43 per cent in 1999.
Figure 2.8: Proportion of children in families receiving income-tested payments 
Source: Whiteford and Angenent 2001
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Source: Whiteford and Angenent 2001
2.7 Protection for non-family individuals and couples
In general single low wage earners that do not have dependent children receive 
relatively little or no assistance. The implicit assumption is that single people without 
child dependents, and who are employed full-time, are able to support themselves from 
their earnings. On current trends it is unlikely that this assumption will be called into 
question. An adult’s full-time wage would need to be below about $300 pw for them to 
be eligible for payment under the allowance income test. Currently, the lowest full-time 
wages in most awards are over $450 a week, and the minimum wage is $413.40 pw.
In the case of a couple, the July 1995 changes introducing a partly individual basis of 
assessment means that, where one partner is in a low wage job, the other can get 
assistance (subject to the means test) if he or she is prepared to seek full-time work.
This means that the social security system will supplement the income of the couple, 
through that partner, up to the point where their total earnings is around $550 a week, 
depending on the distribution of income within the couple -  or higher, if Rent
1 9Assistance is payable.
Although I have likened the Australian system to a GMI, in the case of Newstart 
Allowance the fact that a worker may have an income below the cutout points does not 
automatically qualify him or her for assistance. In the case of a couple with children, 
one partner can apply for Parenting Payment (Partnered) -PPP -  which is an automatic 
entitlement. The other will need to apply for Newstart. If there are no dependent 
children then both will need to apply for and be eligible for Newstart in their own right.
If he/she is already a full-time worker, he/she is regarded as employed and is therefore 
not eligible. While it unlikely that a full-time worker on an award rate would be below 
the cutout point, an increasing number of workers are not paid at award rates. There are 
also many self-employed that declare incomes below the cutouts. The self-employed 
are not usually able to satisfy the test of being available for work. If an applicant is a 
part-time worker, he or she may be eligible for part-rate provided he is available for and 
actively seeking full-time work. Likewise, if the worker is initially unemployed and
12 Note that for a couple where one is on payment, RA is payable at the full rate for the couple.
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then obtains a part-time job, he/she can remain in receipt of partial Allowance so long as 
he continues to seek full-time work and his/her income is below the cutout points.
There is some potential for confusion and possible inequity in this system, and it may be 
that we will need to rethink the current rules at some time in the future. That said, it is 
unlikely that simple solutions will be found, short of converting the system to one where 
low income is the only relevant test. However there are serious disadvantages to this 
sort of non-categorical GMI, as I will discuss in Chapter 5.
2.8 Trends In earnings dispersion and income distribution
For many years there has been a widely held view that Australia was characterised by a 
relatively equal distribution of earned income. This view goes back to the turn of the 
century. One of the most cited sources for this view was Lydall's (1968) survey of 
earnings inequality, which concluded that among 25 countries surveyed, Australia and 
New Zealand along with Czechoslovakia and Hungary had the lowest degree of 
dispersion of (pre-tax) employment income.
The conclusion that Australia has had a relatively compressed earnings distribution for 
individuals, while initially based on fairly suspect data, is supported by recent OECD 
studies, which include a wider range of countries and also considers the distribution of 
female earnings.
The evidence from LIS and from OECD sources is consistent with the view that, at least 
up until the early 1990s, Australia had a relatively equal distribution of income from 
earnings. The distribution of earnings for full-time workers (both male and female) is 
more compressed than most other OECD countries, with the notable exception of 
Scandinavia; there is a lower incidence of low pay in Australia than in many other 
countries apart from Belgium and (probably) the Scandinavian countries. One 
explanation for this finding is that Australia's centralised wage-fixing institutions 
continue to compress wage differentials.
The distribution of equivalent family incomes differs from that of wage incomes for 
several reasons. One is the relative incidence of zero or small part-time earnings, 
something the Australian system may encourage. Another is that incomes are assumed 
to be shared within families, so fragmentation of the population into sole parents and 
single individuals tends to increase measured dispersion. Another reason is that there
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are now many two-earner couples, and conversely, many no-eamer couples. This tends 
to increase family income dispersion. Also, Australia has a relatively high proportion of 
children in households where there is no full-time wage earner, a finding which may 
reflect to some degree the work disincentives facing a low-wage spouse if the other 
spouse is unemployed.
Cross-national studies of poverty and inequality in developed nations -  such as the 
OECD study by Oxley et al (1997) -  tend to find that Australia is:
• Towards the upper-middle of the range of countries in inequality of equivalised 
market incomes;
• Around the middle of the range in inequality of net disposable incomes, after taking 
taxes and transfers into account; and
• In the lower middle of the range in the proportion of people in poverty (see below).
Such findings clearly reflect the priority given to the poverty-alleviation objective in the 
Australian system.
2=8,1 Trends in poverty and adequacy of payments
Since the alleviation of poverty is one of the primary objectives of the Australian 
income support system, poverty reduction efficacy could be regarded as a key measure 
of the success or otherwise of social security spending.
In assessing the impact of the system on trends in poverty, there are a number of 
conflicting considerations. On the one hand, levels of unemployment and of non­
participation among men have increased substantially. These trends, together with the 
increase in the extent of sole parenthood, are likely to have contributed to an increase in 
the extent of vulnerability to poverty among people of workforce age. They are also 
likely to be associated with significant changes in the composition of the low-income 
population. In the past it was the retired elderly who were most likely to be in poverty, 
whereas now it appears to be lone parents and the unemployed.
In general, the pre-tax/transfer equivalent income distribution in Australia has tended to 
become more unequal over the last 15-20 years, a trend also observed in many other 
OECD countries. However, measurement and conceptual difficulties make it hard to be 
precise about the exact dimensions of this trend, and it is still subject to considerable
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debate, with movements in the Gini coefficients not always statistically significant. 
Thus, while there is consensus that market income inequality has widened, there is no 
real consensus on the extent of that widening. There has been a plethora of academic 
studies in this area, using different methods (and sometimes different data) to reach 
sometimes quite different conclusions.
Other trends in labour markets -  casualisation and part-time work, women’s labour 
force participation, dual-earner families, and increasing unemployment (especially long­
term) -  have also tended to impact adversely on the distribution of market incomes.
This would normally have been expected to increase poverty, other things being equal.
It appears, however, that in Australia the widening dispersion in market incomes has 
been offset at least partly (and possibly wholly) by changes in the tax/transfer system 
which have tended to make this system more progressive (Harding and Szukalska 1999, 
2000) .
Media attention on poverty and inequality studies has tended to focus on the gloomiest. 
Academic studies with titles like “The disappearing middle’, “The disappointing 
decades 1970-1990” (Gregory 1993) or “An ever rising tide?: Poverty in Australia in 
the eighties” (Saunders and Matheson 1991) have attracted media attention, but 
sometimes reached conclusion of debatable validity. Poverty measurement has been a 
remarkable growth industry in Australia, although it must be said that there is no 
consistency as to its output (see Whiteford 1998 for a summary of findings). There are 
about as many poverty measures as there are publications on this topic.
Peter Saunders (1994) found that the tax/transfer system lessened the degree to which 
the inequality of disposable income grew, but did not reverse it. Similarly he found that 
the incidence of poverty had risen to a remarkable degree: by 60% on one measure. One 
of Saunders’ measures using the ‘Henderson poverty line’ put the incidence of poverty 
at 17% of the population in the early 1990s, compared to the roughly 10% found by the 
Henderson Poverty Inquiry in 1975.
Other prominent researchers have suggested that while the distribution of market 
incomes had become more unequal over the 1980s, government tax/transfer policy had 
been very effective in offsetting the increasing inequality of market incomes, and in 
preventing growth in the incidence of poverty.
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Partly in frustration at spending so much money for such apparently poor (or at least 
contentious) results, the previous Government commissioned a study in 1994 which was 
to assess trends in incomes and income distribution inclusive of both cash and non-cash 
benefits such as education, health, child care and housing (Johnson, Manning and 
Hellwig 1995).
The study found that all household types experienced an increase in their average 
equivalent social wage income of around 9% between 1981-82 and 1993-94; that the 
share of disposable income for the least well-off households increased, while that for the 
top quartile declined slightly; and that the “social wage” had both increased in value and 
also had a progressive effect. Further, groups targeted for special assistance, such a sole 
parents, had improved their relative position. One of the impressive achievements of 
the 1970s and 1980s had been the marked reduction in measured poverty amongst the 
aged.
The Johnson et al study is not likely to be the last word on this issue. However this saga 
does illustrate the difficulties that can arise in measuring income distribution and 
poverty, even in a single country using fairly consistent time series data. Moreover, 
even if public policy has managed to hold back the tide of rising inequality, there is no 
intrinsic “rightness” in maintaining any given initial level.
Rather, the “right” level of inequality must ultimately be defined in relation to the times 
and conditions that prevail. Nonetheless, there is at least some comfort in the apparent 
finding that public policy has contributed to social cohesion -  at least as regards 
measured incomes -  over the last two rather difficult decades.
2.9 Problems at the work/social security interface
These gains have not been without costs, and new problems in the work/social security 
interface. As noted earlier, Australia’s flat-rate means-tested system tends to create 
high earnings replacement rates at the bottom end, and these have tended to rise 
notwithstanding increases in in-work assistance. This is partly reflective of declining 
earnings in the lowest quartile of the income distribution. Moreover, means testing of 
family benefits can create work disincentives due to high EMTRs as private incomes 
rise. Policy responses have tended to add complexity and, in improving adequacy, to 
increase work disincentives.
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“Poverty traps” for social security beneficiaries have been studied for many years. In 
the late 1980s there was a concerted effort to address these issues, through the “Poverty 
traps reduction package”. This package was mainly aimed at increasing free areas -  ie, 
the amounts beneficiaries could earn before benefits start to taper away. For example, 
Rent Assistance was no longer tapered at a 100% rate within the free area, but rather 
tapered after the basic payment was fully abated, and at the same rate.
However, poverty traps for working families had been less well documented, partly 
because they were a more recent phenomenon. They arose first, from the introduction 
of FIS cum FAS, and subsequently from large increases in real rates of family 
assistance. A further important factor was the extension of rent assistance to working 
families. Finally, in easing poverty traps, policy changes have sometimes merely 
shifted high EMTRs into other income zones where they can do even more harm.
In “Low income traps for working families” (Ingles 1997), I documented the very high 
effective tax rates (ETRs) that families could face when trying to increase their 
earnings. High ETRs arose from the interaction of the first-tier Family Payment (AFP) 
taper - 50% - and income tax, typically at a rate around 35%.
This paper provided calculations of the average effective tax rate faced by a family 
raising its earnings from the Family Payment threshold (then $23,000 pa) up to the 
cutout point for the first tier of family payment. I found that the typical ETR for a 
family earning over this range was in the order of 90%; for families with several 
children, or receiving rent assistance (which tapers after first-tier family payment cuts 
out), the range of income subject to a high ETR could be very wide. For example, for a 
family with 3 children receiving RA, the gain in disposable income by increasing 
private income from $441 pw to $758 pw (ie by $317) was only $36: an ETR of 89%.
For some families, and depending on income splits within the family, ETRs could 
exceed 100%. This was particularly likely if receipt of family payment coincided with 
receipt of another means tested benefit such as student assistance for an older child, or 
State rental housing benefits.
2.10 Government’s New Tax System (NTS) July 2000
In the 1998 general election, both parties were promoting policies designed to reduce 
effective tax rates faced by families. However, the Government’s package of reforms
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(Costello, 1998) was the more radical of the two, and the government was re-elected on 
this platform.
The NTS was designed to address problems arising from high effective tax rates in both 
the income tax and also the tax/transfer system with particular attention paid to 
problems in the social security system described above, such as work incentives, 
complexity, and the adequacy of support for low wage earners outside of the social 
security categorical groups.
The centrepiece of the package was a “goods and services tax” (GST), more commonly 
known overseas as a “value added tax” (VAT). Although part of the price impact of the 
GST is offset by the abolition of a range of existing indirect taxes, it still generates 
substantial additional revenue which, together with projected fiscal drag, suffices to 
fund quite substantial reductions in marginal rates of income tax. The aggregate price 
impact of the 10% GST was about 2%.
Almost as radical as the GST was the swingeing reform of family assistance 
implemented in the NTS. Twelve family benefits (8 cash payments and 4 tax benefits) 
were simplified to three:
• Minimum Family Allowance, Family Allowance and Family Tax Benefit part A 
combined with Family Tax Assistance Part A to become Family Tax Benefit Part A 
(FTB(A))'
• Basic Parenting Payment, Guardian Allowance and Family Tax Payment Part B 
combined with Dependent Spouse Rebate, Sole Parent Rebate and Family Tax 
Assistance Part B to become Family Tax Benefit Part B (FTB(B))\ and
• Childcare Cash Rebate and Child Care Assistance became a single Child Care 
Benefit.
Further detail is provided in Attachment A.
As part of this reform all “sudden death” cutouts were abolished and replaced by 
uniform tapers of 30%. The 50% taper previously applied to family payment and Rent 
Assistance also reduced to 30%, which, in combination with the reductions in marginal 
tax rates mentioned earlier, dramatically lowered EMTRs facing families. The new 
structure took effect from July 2000.
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Another change is that FTB(A) and (B) both became deliverable through the tax system. 
A New Family Assistance Office (FAO) was set up as a joint venture between 
Centrelink and the Tax Office, to deliver FTB. The primary carer within the family has 
a choice as to how they wish to receive the assistance -  either through regular payments 
to their bank account, reduced deductions from their or their partner’s pay-packet, or an 
end-of-year tax credit.
There are some marked similarities between these reforms and those recently 
implemented by the UK Government. The UK Government has converted its social 
security benefit for in-work families (Family Credit) into a new "Working Families Tax 
Credit" (UK Government 1988). This also involves a reduction in the taper rate from 
70 to 55%. These rates are not directly comparable with ours because they apply to net 
-  ie after tax -  income, not gross income as in Australia. The effect of the UK reforms, 
like the NTS, is that most families became subject to ETRs of less than 70%.
Under the UK changes, family credit is normally claimed by the working spouse but can 
be claimed by the mother as a cash payment. Cash payments are made to those, such as 
social security beneficiaries, who are presumed to have income too low to benefit fully 
from a tax credit.
2.11 Issues likely to arise in the future
In the future, it is possible and perhaps likely that we will see a continuing decline in the 
relative position of low wage earners, alongside a continuing de-regulation of the wage 
(ie industrial award) system. There are also pressures from academic economists for 
slow or no growth in award wages as a means of reducing unemployment. Typically, 
such economists are also concerned to offset the impact on low-income earners by 
compensatory social security and tax policies.
Recently, for example, five eminent economists in an open letter to the Prime Minister 
suggested a 4-year freeze on awards, the impact of which was to be offset by a new tax 
credit (Dawkins et al 1998b). The proposal was expected to reduce the aggregate 
growth in real wages by some 3-4%; “This should reduce the level of unemployment by 
1.5 to 2 percentage points below the level that would otherwise be obtainable, to about 5 
to 5.5%”.
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Obviously the proposal depends on estimates as to the elasticity of labour demand with 
respect to the real wage level, and particularly on the demand for less skilled people. I 
make no comment on these aspects. The current rate of unemployment is 6.7%, 
reflecting the long boom of the 1990s. If current improvements are sustained an 
unemployment rate of 5 or 5.5% might be achievable, notwithstanding continued annual 
increases in the minimum wage. These are awarded by an independent body, the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission.
Nonetheless it seems likely that proposals for wage engineering will continue, and that 
irrespective of government policy in this area, continuing developments such as 
globalisation will continue to put downward pressure on wages at the low-skilled end of 
the spectrum. It is also quite likely that governments will seek to avoid the deleterious 
consequences for social cohesion by providing additional assistance for families 
dependent on low wages.
While such policies are rejected by trade unions, it is interesting to note that a very 
similar set of policies was effected under the Labor Government of 1983-1995. Under 
the “Accord” with the peak trade union organisation, the ACTU, the union movement 
exercised real wage restraint in return for improvements in the “social wage’ provided 
by government -  whether through the tax/transfer system, expenditures in areas such as 
health and education, or regulation on employment conditions such as the 
“superannuation guarantee”.
Economic analysis of the Accord period has generally indicated that this policy was 
successful in promoting wage restraint and employment growth, although as always 
such findings are not uncontentious. Further, as the Johnson et al study cited earlier 
indicates, these policies were reasonably successful in terms of their impact on the 
living standards of the working population. It must be conceded, however, that 
productivity growth was not particularly strong during the Accord period. By contrast 
the Tong boom’ of the 1990s has seen strong growth in productivity and wages, but has 
had a less marked impact on employment.
It is now well understood that regulation of wages is a fairly blunt instrument for 
addressing poverty and inequality. The reason, as Richardson and Harding (1998) have 
pointed out, is that people receiving low wages are often part of families which are not 
so badly off. “People receiving low wages are well spread through the distribution of
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family incomes. This makes Living Wage adjustments a very blunt equity device” 
(Dawkins et al 1998b).
2.12 Conclusion
The economic and social pressures faced by the income support system in the last two 
decades have been similar to those affecting many other industrialised countries. They 
include:
•an ageing population;
•increased long-term unemployment;
•changes in work patterns, with increased female labour force participation, 
increased incidence of part-time work, and reduced labour force activity among 
older males; and
•an increasing diversity in family structures and life patterns such as a large rise 
in the number of lone parents.
These pressures have resulted in increased social security coverage of the population, 
together with demands for increases in the levels of payments.
Reforms over the past decade have focused on several areas:
•increased coverage and extensions to eligibility, for example, for families 
dependent on low wage employment and carers of elderly and disabled people;
•increased adequacy of payments through, for example, substantial increases in 
family payments and rent assistance and the regular indexation of virtually all 
payments;
•an increased emphasis on targeting payments to those in need;
•introduction of ‘mutual obligation’ measures like “Work for the dole’ (the dole 
being Australian argot for unemployment payments), based on the concept that 
all people have the right to and should participate in society to the maximum 
extent possible;
•reforming payments in such a way as to provide families with more support in 
balancing workforce participation and child-rearing responsibilities.
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There are concerns that the future ageing of the population in combination with a 
relative shrinking of the employed workforce will place strains on the Australian 
welfare state. Australia already has a comparatively very tightly targeted social security 
system, and a direct tax system with a highly progressive rate structure. In the past two 
decades, spending restraint has been mainly achieved through tighter targeting. 
Continuation of this approach would either further increase EMTRs applying to social 
security customers, or if targeting is pursued through categorisation, the complexity of 
the system may be increased.
The Australian model gives more emphasis to poverty alleviation than most other 
systems, mainly achieved through targeting of benefits. The system is relatively low 
cost (in terms of spending as a percentage of GDP), reflecting the operation of the 
means tests and the provision of flat rate rather than earnings related benefits. While the 
overall system is more means-tested than those of any other OECD country, the means 
tests used are actually more relaxed than those typically applying in social assistance 
schemes in Europe and America.
Thus, the effects of means testing is felt much higher up the income distribution than is 
typical in social insurance systems. This approach is associated with relatively high 
EMTRs on low income working families, even though overall levels of taxation are low 
by the standards of OECD countries.
The New Tax System addressed pressing problems in the tax/social security system. In 
particular it provided for a drastic simplification of a very complicated system of family 
assistance, and a rationalisation and improvement in work incentives for families. 
However, there will be a continuing need to adjust policy instruments in order to 
address likely emerging problems in the future, given the pressures arising from 
widening inequality of market incomes and the very strong arguments for providing 
incentives to help keep social security clients in contact with the world of work.
Much of this thesis is directed at technical matters like EMTRs, progressivity of the 
tax/transfer system and the like. However we need to bear in mind that other aspects of 
the system can also have important effects. For example, there has been a general 
tendency in the Australian system to increase pressure on the unemployed to actively 
seek work under the general banner of “mutual obligations”, especially for young 
people. Such administrative approaches to some extent provide an alternative to
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increasing incentives through structural features of the incentive system. The problem 
is, as always, to get the balance right.
Technical solutions to the problems of high EMTRs are available, although reducing 
EMTRs for some inevitably means increasing them for others. It must also be said we 
don’t really know much about precisely what impact such changes would have on 
behaviour. This is an area of research towards which -  as discussed in Ch 3 - we will 
increasingly need to direct our attention.
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2.13 Attachment A: NTS measures in social security13
Income Tax Cuts
The tax-free threshold for all taxpayers will be increased from $5,400 to $6,000, 
benefiting low-income earners. The table below outlines other changes in income tax 
rates.
These income tax cuts represent reduction in marginal tax rates for about 95 per cent of 
all individual taxpayers. Combined with other changes, the effective marginal tax rate 
of low and middle income working families will be reduced over a substantial range of 
income.
Details of income tax cuts
Current Income Tax Scale Reform Package ncome Tax Scale
Taxable income ($) % Taxable income ($) %
0-5,400 0 0-6,000 0
5,401-20,700 20 6,001-20,000 17
20,701-38,000 34
20,001-50,000 30
38,001-50,000 43
50,001+ 47 50,001-75,000 40
75,001 + 47
Simplifying and restructuring family assistance
Incentives to work and save are provided by reducing the family benefits withdrawal 
rate from 50 per cent to 30 per cent and increasing the income threshold for family 
payments from $24,350 to $28,200. These measures benefit around 375,000 families. 
Further details are provided in 5.7 (Appendix A).
13 This is a verbatim copy of a sheet issued by the Government at the time. Hence the use of the future 
tense.
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Pensions
All pension and benefit rates will increase by 4% initially. In addition, the Government 
is committed to ensuring that the single rate of pension does not fall below 25 per cent 
of male total average weekly earnings.
A 2.5 per cent increase in the income test free areas will be applied to social security, 
veterans and student income support payments.
The income test for pensions eased by reducing the taper rate from 50 per cent to 40 per 
cent, a measure which will:
• enable all 845,000 part-rate pensioners to keep an extra 10 cents of pension for 
every dollar of income they receive above the income test free areas;
• benefit self-funded retirees with modest incomes who will become eligible for a 
part-rate pension; and
• improve incentives to save for retirement by increasing the returns from such 
saving at the time that people retire.
The overall cost of increases in, and adjustments to, pensions and benefits will be over 
$3 billion in 2000-01 and around $1.8 billion per year thereafter.
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3 CHAPTER 3: INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF WORKFORCE AGE
PAYMENTS
3.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to gauge the incentive effects of income support payments, to help 
provide a context for the discussion of policy approaches that follows in later Chapters.
My general approach has been to survey available surveys rather than the detailed 
research literature. This latter task would have been enormously time-consuming. 
Nonetheless there are certain areas in which no relevant or timely surveys exist, notably 
in respect of the Australian literature, and in these areas I have sometimes had recourse 
to original sources.
The survey is organised according to the various methods that have been employed to 
assess work incentive effects, and subsequently according to the various client groups 
typically of interest.
3.2 What research methods have been used?
A. Indirect:
1. replacement rate and income difference calculations, especially for unemployment 
benefits (see eg. EPAC 1988b, Whitlock 1994)
2. calculations of effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs)
3. incidence of high EMTRs using micro simulation (eg. Harding and Polette 1995)
4. direct interview approach (eg. Puniard and Harrington 1993), and
5. circumstantial evidence, such as low labour force participation among spouses of 
unemployed men, (sometimes supplemented by econometric testing -eg. Bradbury 
1995).
B Direct measures of labour supply effects using econometric techniques:
1. social experimentation (notably the US income maintenance experiments in the 
1970s)
2. national cross section or time series evidence
3. cross national comparisons ( eg OECD 1994)
4. use of panel data to obtain time series evidence for individuals, and
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5. microsimulation (using elasticities derived from other techniques) to generalise 
results of hypothetical policy changes.
3.3 Indirect measures of labour supply effects 
3.3.1 Replacement rates
Most of this work concerns benefits for the unemployed. In 1995, the OECD calculated 
an overall index of gross replacement rates of 31%. The comparable figure for 
Australia was around 28% (Chart 2.2 in OECD 1996a).
However this gross figure does not take account of taxation, family benefits, social 
assistance and so on. Net replacement rates can therefore be much higher than 30%. 
High net replacement rates create an "unemployment trap", defined as a situation where 
a family may not be better off in work than on benefit. The OECD note: "In particular, 
the unemployment trap for families with children can be particularly pronounced. ...In 
work expenses, in particular for child care, can eliminate any financial reward from 
working. ...Furthermore, lack of knowledge about tax and benefit systems can lead the 
unemployed to conclude that incomes in work are too uncertain to risk giving up their 
low, but secure, benefit income" (1996a p.26).
In addition to the unemployment trap, there is a risk of a "poverty trap" if, as in 
Australia, benefits are means tested. Also, means testing based on family income may 
leave no incentive for the spouse of an unemployed person to seek work. Historically, 
the labour force participation rate of spouses of the unemployed has been low in 
Australia, although a number of factors other than the poverty trap may be important in 
explaining this.
The OECD calculated the following net replacement rates for 1994:
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Table 3.1: net replacement rates (NRRs) for single earner households, 1994 at 
average production worker income
In first month of unemployment (no social assistance)
In 60th month of 
unemplovment
(includes social assistance)
couple, no couple + 2 couple, 2 chn, couple, 2 chn, housing
chn (%) chn (%) h/sing benefit benefit (%)
Aust. 49.00 64.00 71.00 71.00
OECD 
Av. (a)
60.00 68.00 73.00 67.00
(a) Unweighted OECD average. Source: OECD 1996a, Table 2.1 p.31.
It can clearly be seen from this Table that although replacement rates in Australia have 
been low compared with the OECD (unweighted) average, net replacement rates are 
much closer to the average (especially for couples and those with children), and those 
for long-term recipients are actually higher. In fact short-term and long term 
replacement rates are the same in Australia, whereas the insurance-type schemes 
common overseas tend to cut out after a fixed period, forcing reliance on typically much 
lower rates of social assistance.
Since unemployment beneficiaries typically have lower earnings expectations than other 
workers (Saunders et al 1989),14 the OECD also conducted a similar replacement rate 
analysis at the level of 2/3 the average production workers earnings. This is 
summarised, for Australia, in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: net replacement rates (NRRs) for single earner households, 1994, at 2/3 
average production worker income level
In 60th month of 
unemployment
In first month of unemployment (no social assistance) (includes social assistance)
couple, no 
children
couple + 2 
children
couple, 2 chn, 
housing benefit
couple, 2 chn , housing 
benefit
Aust. 66.00 76.00 78.00 78.00
OECD
Av.
68.00 73.00 77.00 80.00
Source: OECD 1996a Table 2.2
Generally, net replacement rates are considerably higher at the level of 2/3 the average 
production worker's income. Again, the Australian figures for net replacement rates are 
very close to the OECD averages (except for single people, not shown in the Tables, 
where the Australian gross and net replacement rates are considerably lower). Further 
information on Australian replacement rates for minimum wage earners is in Appendix 
A to Chapter 7.
Net replacement rate calculations are interesting but ultimately still only "broad brush" 
in concept. A more refined approach is to use micro-simulation modelling to compare 
the incomes of those currently employed with what they might expect to receive if they 
became unemployed. The OECD (1996a) presents results from such an exercise for 14 
countries including Australia (pp.33-37).
In broad terms the results confirm the picture from the hypothetical cases in Table 3.2.
In Australia and the US the most common replacement rate is in the 21 to 40% range. 
This low rate in Australia reflects the high incidence of single people amongst the 
unemployed, and the relatively low benefits for single people in this country (OECD 
1996a p.32). In other countries the most common replacement rates are typically higher, 
ranging from 40 to 100%.
14Also, wage offers for unemployed people are found to be about 12% lower than offers to 
employed, but otherwise identical people: a phenomenon known as "wage scarring" (Bradbury et al 
1991).
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In Australia, Whitlock (1994) comprehensively surveyed replacement rates. She 
examined "exit" replacement rates for the unemployed, and "entry" replacement rates 
for those currently employed who might become unemployed at some future time.
Whitlock shows that replacement rates have risen considerably in Australia in the post­
war period, in common with most other countries. In particular there was a significant 
increase in the early 1970s, and this was (roughly) maintained into the 1990s. Further, 
rent allowance was extended to the long-term unemployed in 1986, and has 
subsequently become available to all the unemployed except those aged under 18. In 
addition the income test has been liberalised. "The rise in the real value of family 
allowances increases the monetary gain from combining part-time work with income 
from unemployment payments (Whitlock 1994 pp.6-7). However, activity (work) tests 
have been tightened in recent years.
The combination of rising numbers of unemployed, rising structural unemployment and 
increased real values of unemployment benefits have created concerns about work 
incentives (Moore, 1997). Further, greater inequality in earnings (Gregory 1993) has 
probably increased actual (as opposed to hypothetical) replacement rates for low- 
income earners.
Saunders et al (1989) examined entry replacement rates for families with full-time 
workers. For the vast majority (92%) of families, they found replacement rates between 
25 and 75%. Less than 1% faced an estimated replacement rate over 100%.
Bradbury et al (1991) examined the exit replacement rates of hypothetical families 
receiving unemployment benefits. Replacement rates are calculated for current 
beneficiaries (for whom wages are estimated), and ex-beneficiaries (for whom 
unemployment benefits are estimated). Their main finding was that the average person 
leaving unemployment could expect a more than doubling of their income unit 
disposable income. This finding applied both in 1986 and 1991.15
Single people generally had low replacement rates. For those over 30, the median 
replacement rate was 35-39%. At least 90% of young people had replacement rates 
below 50%. Replacement rates for couples without children were between 61 and 72%.
15There is a potential problem with selection bias in data on labour market transitions. An 
unemployed person deterred from taking a job because of a high NRR will not have an observable exit 
replacement rate. Those we do observe taking jobs are those who, by definition, are not deterred.
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Families with children had the highest median replacement rates. For families in receipt 
of Additional Family Payment (AFP) in 1991, the median replacement rate was 77%. 
AFP has been successful in reducing the very high replacement rates previously facing 
families since it increases disposable income when employed (Whitlock 1994 p i4). 
However Redmond (1999) suggests that the ERR improvements bought about by the 
introduction of AFP have been gradually eroded by the increase in earnings inequality 
experienced in the 1980s and 1990s.
Whitlock's 1994 study uses a similar methodology to Saunders et al (1989), and survey 
data from the 1989-90 income distribution survey. The main difference is that she tests 
whether all employed workers are better off remaining employed, not just full-time 
workers (pi 5). In 1990, part-time workers represented 21% of the employed workforce. 
For all families, Whitlock found a median replacement rate of 30%. For 94% of 
families, the replacement rate was between 20 and 80% (pi5). Replacement rates rose 
with the number of children, as one might expect.
For single people and couples without children, the median replacement rate was 30%, 
with 85% of them facing replacement rates of 20-50%. For couples with children the 
median replacement rate was 40%, with 88% facing replacement rates of 30-80%. For 
sole parents the median replacement rate is 60%. It is only among families with three or 
more children that a large number face replacement rates of 90% or more.
For the sample as a whole, 2.5% of families face replacement rates in excess of 100%. 
Obviously non-fmancial considerations are important in the decision of such families to 
work. Also, Chapman and Oliver (1999) have pointed out that many individuals will 
still find it pays to work in such a situation if they expect that, as a result, their wage 
rate will increase in the future.
Whitlock then examines replacement rates compared to several minimum award rates, 
chosen as the lowest federal awards payable to a substantial number of employees. In 
broad terms replacement rates are not found to be high for single people or sole parents 
(median replacement rate = 58%). For couples, they are higher (median replacement 
rate = 80%), but even at the highest replacement rate of 92% (for a couple with one 
partner on the minimum metal trades award), the family is found to be $24pw better off 
working than not. Whitlock suggests that: "It does not seem likely that this income
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differential would be sufficient to encourage an employed person to take unemployment 
payments instead" (1994, p20).
Where people can combine part-time work and benefit receipt, replacement rates are 
higher, exceeding 100% for some couples. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not a new 
phenomenon, but it has become more marked following liberalisation of the 
unemployment benefit means test in the 1990s. However allowees combining regular 
part-time work with benefit receipt will generally be in income zones where high 
effective tax rates apply, such that they will have a strong incentive to work either less 
hours or, alternatively, to jump right out of the poverty trap zone by working more 
hours.
Whitlock concludes that "..the value of unemployment benefits does not generally seem 
to be sufficiently high to discourage people from working " (pi 6). This is, of course, 
very much a matter of judgement.
Another indirect approach to estimating work incentives is that of calculating the 
absolute financial gain from working as a dollar amount. One example is Bradbury et al 
(1988), as re-calculated in EPAC 1988b. This EPAC report concluded that 70% of 
families would experience an income drop of $150 pw upon one member becoming 
unemployed, while less than 5% would experience a decline of less that $75 pw (p.36). 
However these numbers take no account of the possibility of combining part-time work 
with unemployment benefit receipt.
While replacement rate calculations are indicative of possible work disincentives, they 
are not really able to tell us whether or to what extent a supply response is occurring. 
Economic theory predicts that almost any level of unemployment benefits will 
discourage work among some marginal participants. Obviously the degree of 
discouragement will increase as replacement rates rise; the real question is the elasticity 
of the work disincentive relative to the replacement rate, and this cannot be measured 
except by econometric methods in which the replacement rate is an explanatory 
variable. For this reason replacement rate calculations, while interesting and important 
tools for international and intertemporal comparisons, are best regarded as being - at 
best - only a very rough guide to the incentive effects of payments.
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3.3.2 Effective tax rates (ETRs) and "poverty traps"
This has been another substantial line of research in Australia and overseas: see, eg, 
EPAC 1988, Whiteford et al 1989, Gallagher et al 1992, and Ingles 1997.
Whitlock (1994) compared schedules of effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) for 
unemployed people in 1973, 1983 and 1993. Her charts 6.1 and 6.2 show that in general 
improvements in benefit levels and in extra payments for children have resulted in high 
EMTRs extending over progressively longer income ranges, although in some cases 
there have been reductions in the highest EMTRs, especially compared to 1973.
Dollery and Fletcher (1997) examined poverty traps for the young unemployed, finding 
that disincentive effects are pervasive for young people and those on low wages, 
especially part-time workers.
EPAC (1988a) also looked at EMTRs facing families, taking into account payments 
outside the Commonwealth social security system such as Austudy, childcare assistance 
and state housing rental rebates. A more recent review of such evidence, particularly 
relating to families, is in Ingles (1997) and Chapter 5.
The OECD (1996a) summarises evidence on poverty traps and EMTRs (called METRs 
in their study) across a number of countries. The OECD procedure is however 
somewhat obscure, since it is hard to believe that EMTRs for countries can be 
summarised by a single rate (OECD 1996a, Table 2.4, p44). That said, however, it is 
clear that many other OECD countries apart from Australia face a similar problem. 
Moreover, it is a growing one, as countries find unemployment insurance needs to be 
supplemented by other forms of means-tested assistance in the face of high levels of 
structural unemployment and rising welfare dependency.
The OECD suggest that "Where the marginal rates are high over a relatively wide range 
of earnings they indicate a breaking of the link between effort and reward which reduces 
work incentives" (1996, p.45). Further, high EMTRs, in conjunction with work-related 
expenses, can give rise to a "poverty trap" where attempts to supplement a low income 
can actually leave a family worse off. Finally, the incentive for a spouse to work can be 
affected by the unemployment of the other spouse (on which more later): "This pattern - 
low participation by wives of unemployed men - is increasingly observed in other 
countries as greater numbers receive means-tested benefits" (OECD 1996a p.46).
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3.3.3 Incidence of high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs)
Do high EMTRs actually affect behaviour? A first step is to document the number of 
income units subject to high EMTRs. We have some Australian evidence on this from 
Polette (1995) and Polette and Harding (1995). Using the NATSEM16 microsimulation 
model, they find that relatively few families are subject to high EMTRs. In most cases 
family income falls either below or above the income ranges where high EMTRs apply. 
The number of families affected by very high EMTRs has been reduced by the NTS, but 
the number on EMTRs of 60% and over is increased (Beer and Harding 1999).
However there are still less than 7% of all income units so affected.
Findlay and Jones (1982) and Bascard and Porter (1986) also estimated the distribution 
of EMTRs, in order to calculate the efficiency costs of taxation in Australia (see Section 
3.5). More recently Campbell and Bond (1997b) have also estimated the distribution of 
EMTRs in Australia, finding that they are generally higher than the average EMTRs 
published by Harding and Polette.
Table 3.3: Average EMTRs from two studies
Disposable income decile
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
Harding/
Polette
0.06 0.23 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.38
Campbell/
Bond
0.33 0.33 0.44 0.70 0.55 0.48 0.37 0.45 0.43 0.43
Source: Campbell and Bond (1997b) Table 1, p i 55. Figures for Campbell and Bond 
refer to weighted EMTRs.
The C&B estimates show much higher EMTRs in all deciles, but particularly in lower 
income deciles. There are several reasons for the different results of these two studies. 
The most important is that the Campbell and Bond study includes indirect taxes, and 
also government in-kind benefits (some of which reduce in value as incomes increase). 
Another is that families were grouped by disposable equivalent family income in H&P, 
and by disposable household income in C&B. A final reason is that H&P exclude some 
families (see Campbell and Bond for a discussion of these differences).
16 National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling, University of Canberra.
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The Campbell and Bond estimates are designed for the purpose of estimating the 
efficiency costs of the tax/transfer system, and are more appropriate than H&P for this 
purpose. In particular they are a more comprehensive measure of the overall tax 
"wedge" which is the source of efficiency loss from taxation. However the H&P 
measure may be useful for other purposes where indirect taxes and in-kind benefits are 
not relevant.
It is difficult to interpret the apparent finding that relatively few households are affected 
by high EMTRs. For example, it cannot be ruled out that social security clients are 
responding quite rationally to such tax rates by avoiding declaring incomes that fall in 
the affected zones. If this is the case, then high tax rates are having profound 
behavioural effects but they are not being picked up in this sort of study. To answer this 
requires recourse to a model embodying behavioural estimates, something that has not 
yet been done in Australia. This is an important issue I will return to later.
3.3.4 Direct interview approach
This approach involves asking people (a) whether they are aware of aspects of the social 
security system that might affect their behaviour (such as means test free areas and 
tapers), and (b) how they (think that they) have responded to these perceived features. 
Often, such questions have been asked as part of the evaluation of particular policy 
initiatives. Two examples are in the DSS evaluation of Parenting Allowance (Chan and 
Wilson 1996), and the survey of sole parent pensioners and unemployment beneficiaries 
(Puniard and Harrington 1994). This last study in particular was aimed, inter alia, at 
determining client's understanding of the effects of income tests and the tax system.
Puniard and Harrington refer to a 1986 survey of sole parent pensioners indicating that 
"a majority did not understand the income tests applied by DSS, or the implications for 
the rate of income support when earning income (Crompton 1987)" (p.2). Their own 
survey indicated a similar lack of knowledge by unemployment beneficiaries (pp9-10). 
However there was some tendency to view the income test as harsher than it actually is 
(plO). Moreover, "despite the lack of detailed knowledge of means testing as measured 
by the questionnaire, some respondents nonetheless had a general idea of how it affects 
their disposable income" (p8).
A similar lack of knowledge among clients is revealed in Chan and Wilson's (1996) 
evaluation of parenting allowance (PgA): "In general, PgA respondents were unaware
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of how their, or their partner's income, would affect their payments. Most respondents 
understood that if they gained employment, their PgA would be reduced until it was cut 
out. ...The effect on income of PgA and its possible impact on the decision process was 
minimal for most respondents" (p45). Further, "..it appears that families do not consider 
the availability of income supplement or the problems with EMTRs as crucial factors in 
determining their participation in paid work" (p46).
The direct interview approach has been a popular method, within the Department of 
Social Security (now FaCS), of analysing incentive effects of programs. This is 
probably because it is relatively simple and the results can be analysed without severe 
technical difficultly. However the approach has been found, in tax studies where it was 
pioneered, to systematically understate incentive effects (see Brown 1983, pp.50-51).
In this field such methods have been largely superseded be newer approaches. The 
basic problem is that the interview approach only measures perceptions, not actuality. 
People may not understand how incentives affect them, but be affected nonetheless. 
More contemporary techniques bypass the issue of perception and seek to measure 
incentive effects from observed behaviour.
3.4 Direct measures of labour participation effects
3.4.1 A note on income and substitution elasticities
Results of econometric studies of labour supply response are usually summarised in 
terms of elasticities. Elasticity is a measure of the proportional responsiveness of one 
variable (eg hours worked) to the change in another variable (eg the after-tax hourly 
wage). For example, an elasticity of one means that a one- percent fall in the net hourly 
wage rate induces a one- percent decrease in hours worked.
Taxes create two separate effects. First, they reduce net income. This "income effect" 
is expected to induce labour supply: if our income is reduced, we will normally try and 
compensate by working more. Their second effect is to reduce the rate at which we can 
"trade" hours of leisure for dollars. A fall in the net hourly wage rate is expected to 
create a "substitution effect" discouraging work effort. These two effects tend to cancel 
each other to some extent; the net effect is the actual (uncompensated) labour supply 
response to a tax rise.
It is important for many purposes to disentangle income and substitution effects. For 
example, a rise in the pension rate without any change to means tests will have a pure
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income effect for current recipients, and we may wish to estimate their likely labour 
supply response. The income effect is the impact on labour supply if income rises or 
falls in lump sum fashion, ie, without any change in the net wage rate at the margin.
This is measured by the "total income elasticity", which is expected to be negative (a 
fall in income induces a rise in labour supply).
The substitution effect is the impact of changing the net wage at the margin without any 
change in total net income; this is measured by the "compensated substitution 
elasticity", which is normally positive (a rise in the net wage rate induces a rise in 
labour supply). The two effects combined give the "uncompensated substitution 
elasticity", which can be positive or negative. A negative sign means that labour supply 
will rise if the net wage rate falls (ie if tax rises). This can happen when income effects 
are stronger than substitution effects and, perhaps surprisingly, is not an unusual finding 
for prime-age males. Most other groups in the labour market exhibit positive 
uncompensated substitution elasticities; ic their labour supply falls if taxes rise.
Although taxes have impacts on labour supply that are ambiguous, a priori, the same 
cannot be said of means-tested social security transfers. For transfer recipients income 
and substitution effects work in the same direction - ie, to depress labour supply. The 
question is, by how much?
3.4.2 Social experimentation
This approach became popular in the US in the late 1960s and 1970s when the 
government sponsored four large-scale social experiments to measure individual labour 
supply responses to different levels of benefits and taxes under various negative income 
tax (NIT) plans. The last of these experiments, which ran for five years, ended in 1982. 
Results of these experiments are summarised in Whiteford (1981) and more recently in 
Munnell (1987).
Munnell suggests that "..the results for labour supply responses are quite robust across 
sites, populations and treatments ... Generally, the experiments caused moderate 
reductions in work effort. The responses were greater among women ... Weighted 
averages of income and substitution effects from the four experiments imply a much 
smaller responsiveness to guaranteed income disincentives than do most non- 
experimental estimates, and they also fall in a far narrower range. [However] ..earnings 
reductions would offset at least part of the income gains to the poor produced by the
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plan..." (pp3-4). And, while the overall work reduction is small (about 10% in 
aggregate among recipients), earnings loss among recipient breadwinners amounted to 
as much as 40-58% of their additional payments. This loss is less severe for sole 
mothers (some 10-20% of additional transfer costs), presumably reflecting their pre­
existing eligibility for payments such as Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC).
However these interpretations of the results were criticised by some participants in the 
Conference. For example Ashenfelter (in Munnell 1987) pointed out that some, indeed 
the greater part, of the reduction in work effort is spurious, since it reflected income 
under-reporting by participants as checked against, eg., social security payroll tax 
records. Further, he regards the estimates of income and substitution effects (see below) 
as reflecting econometric models based on the prior beliefs of investigators (pp.4-5). 
Nonetheless, all the experts agreed that "...the experiments refined the estimates of 
individual's responses to net wage rates, measured by using variations in taxes, and to 
unearned income, demonstrated by using variations in guaranteed income.." (p20).
Burtless (1987) distinguishes three different types of labour supply estimates produced 
by the experiments. The first was obtained by measuring the simple difference between 
the work effort of people who were assigned to experimental negative income plans and 
that of people who were assigned to the control groups (p22).
A second type of estimate is produced by using structural econometric models of work 
effort response. Such models allow decomposition of income and substitution effects, 
thus allowing analysts to generalise the findings of the experiments over a much wider 
range of plans and populations. Experimental results were used in this way to predict 
the consequences of both the Nixon and Carter welfare reform proposals, and have been 
used in numerous academic studies.
The third kind of estimate is really a derivative of the second; that is, the use of 
microsimulation to generalise the results and produce estimates of various plans' 
impacts of aggregate labour supply, the distribution of income and so on.
Burtless notes that from a scientific viewpoint the most reliable set of estimates of work 
response is produced by the first method - ie, simple differences relative to control. "It is 
inherently more difficult to decompose the overall response into income and 
substitution effects, although in this respect the experiments possess substantial 
advantages over non-experimental sources of data. The experimentally based
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simulations of national response are [even] more problematical... Unfortunately, from 
the perspective of their policy usefulness, the three kinds of estimates of response would 
rank in the reverse order" (Burtless, pp24-25).
Burtless presents a useful summary of income and substitution elasticities, averaged 
across a large number of studies based on results of the four experiments (Table 3, p34, 
reproduced below as Table 3.4). He compares these results with non-experimental 
results also averaged across a large number of studies.
Table 3.4: Estimates of income and substitution effects from experimental and 
non-experimental studies
subjects number of 
studies
uncompensated
substitution
elasticity
compensated
substitution
elasticity
total income 
elasticity
men - NIT (a) 21.00 -0.02 0.09 -0.11
men - non- 
experimental
26.00 -0.10 0.28 -0.38
women - NIT 20.00 -0.07 0.18 -0.11
wives - NIT 14.00 0.17 0.24 -0.07
female heads - 
NIT
11.00 -0.04 0.14 -0.18
women - non- 
experimental
38(b) 1.36 1.37 -0.01
(a) weighted for scale o f NIT experiment
(b) excludes lowest and highest five estimates from 48 studies.
Source: Burtless (1987) Table 3, p34.
These estimates can be compared with Keeley's (1981) survey of the non-experimental 
literature, which gave a means estimate of uncompensated and compensated elasticities 
for married men o f-0.11 and 0.10, respectively, with 1.28 and 1.05 as the corresponding 
figures for married women. Moffitt and Kehrer's (1981) survey offers similar averages, 
with generally lower elasticities found in the experimental results.
On balance Burtless finds that the experimental estimates imply a smaller response to 
disincentives than most non-experimental estimates. Further, they fall in a far narrower 
range. The experimental results are also described as more robust, because of the "large
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amount of experimentally induced random variation in net wages and non-wage income 
levels ... The experiments thus appear to have achieved their major goal. They have 
substantially reduced our uncertainty about the size and work effort reductions in 
response to wage rate and income changes " (1987 p38). Unfortunately for US 
advocates of welfare reform, the estimated earnings reductions turn out to be high 
relative to the additional transfer cost of simulated programs: in simulations of NITs 
based on the estimated labour supply assumptions, earnings reductions in two parent 
families represented some 35-58% of the additional transfer cost of the program. Put 
another way, for the most generous plan tested, it costs about $1.89 to transfer an 
additional dollar to the poor (p45). On these figures, Arthur Okun's famous "leaky 
bucket"17 is indeed rather leaky.
Taken alone, the negative total net labour supply responses of both men and women (ie 
uncompensated supply elasticities) estimated from the experimental responses indicate 
that more work will be supplied as taxes rise. The reason NITs nonetheless turn out to 
reduce labour supply has already been suggested, and is as follows. The small net 
labour supply effects for men and women are made up of larger partial effects (income 
and substitution) operating in opposite directions. In the positive part of the tax system, 
these partly offset each other, and labour supply is relatively insensitive to the tax rate. 
But in the negative part of the system - ie., below the breakeven levels of income18 - 
these income and substitution effects are operating in the same direction, to reduce 
labour supply. Income effects will also tend to dominate substitution effects in the 
income zones immediately above the breakeven levels.19
Two caveats should be made about the experimental estimates of supply elasticities. 
First, they may understate longer-term labour supply responses. There is some evidence 
of this from the experiments themselves (p46). Second, at least part of the apparent 
labour supply response is known to have been a reporting phenomenon rather than a real
1 ^Arthur Okun (1975) likened moves to equalise incomes as transfers of money using a "leaky 
bucket'; because of adverse incentive effects the cost to taxpayers is greater than the benefit to recipients. 
Lambert (1988) noted that on some assumptions the "leak" could exceed the size of the bucket.
18The breakeven income level is that level of income where positive tax paid by the income unit 
equals transfers received. Above this level income units become net taxpayers; below it they are net 
beneficiaries of the transfer system.
19If the uncompensated supply elasticity of a group, such as prime age men, is zero, their labour 
supply will be unaffected by a uniform percentage tax, since income and substitution effects cancel. If
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reduction in work effort. It is difficult therefore to predict the consequences of a full- 
scale national program with its associated benefits control measures and the like.
The experimental findings offer some support for Akerlofs (1978) hypothesis on the 
economics of "tagging": that is, that benefits should be provided more generously to 
families whose earnings are less responsive to work disincentives.
3.4.3 Studies on taxation and work incentives
Prior to the income maintenance experiments this had been our major source of 
information on income and substitution elasticities. While much of this literature has 
concentrated on the positive tax system, the results can, at least in theory, also be 
applied to the tax-transfer system. Some more recent studies have modelled the tax- 
transfer system explicitly.
Brown (1983) provides a useful survey of this literature. He lists the various 
methodologies that have been applied:
• interview approach
• cross-sectional econometric studies
• experimental approach,
and points to formidable conceptual and measurement problems, particularly in the 
econometric approaches which characterise much of the work in the field.
From his survey of the econometric evidence, particularly the more sophisticated later 
generation models, Brown concludes that "..it would be a mistake for policy makers to 
assume that labour supply is not responsive to tax changes. The evidence suggests both 
that people are responsive and that modelling this response very carefully is important. 
Precisely how responsive people are is still an open question, but it does seem 
reasonably well established that the price [ie uncompensated] elasticity for men is low 
and negative" (p81).
As noted in the previous section, the general range of income and substitution 
elasticities found in the non-experimental studies is higher than that found in the 
experimental studies. However both types of studies suggest that women's' labour
the tax is progressive, the average tax rate will everywhere be less than the marginal tax rate and so we 
can expect some disincentives at each income level. A NIT has a similar (albeit stronger) effect.
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supply is much more responsive than that of men, and that their price elasticity is 
positive. Brown notes that existing elasticity estimates may be less firmly based for 
women than for men. In the more recent literature the "new view" of women's labour 
supply is that such supply is elastic, not because they are women, but because a lot of 
women are at the extensive margin of the labour market. On this view men with 
marginal labour force attachment are also likely to have positively elastic labour supply 
response.
Leib fritz et al (1997), in a survey of the effect of taxes on labour supply, note that the 
main hypothesis underlying empirical research in this area are:
• men and unmarried women, as primary earners, have little choice about labour 
participation and normally work full-time, so their labour supply should be 
relatively inelastic
• married women are more likely to be sensitive to tax wedges, since they 
normally face a wider choice set (which includes household production)
• lone mothers are by definition primary earners but their labour supply decisions 
are highly conditioned by the welfare system
• all mothers with children face high fixed costs connected with childcare.
These hypotheses may be losing relevance as male participation rates have fallen and 
those for females have risen in recent years. Hence female elasticities estimated on the 
basis of past experience may exaggerate their response (p40).
The estimates summarised in Leibfritz et al's Table 11 suggest that supply elasticities 
for women are large, around 0.5 or even higher, and participation elasticities are often 
as high as 1, although lower in more recent studies. This Table, comprising results of 
22 studies, is summarised, by calculating medians, in Table 3.5 below.
Table 3.5: Median estimates of labour supply elasticities
uncompensated wage 
elasticity
compensated 
elasticity (substitution 
effect)
income elasticity 
(income effect)
married women 0.88 0.90 -0.18
men -0.10 0.28 -0.32
lone mothers 0.76 1.28 -0.24
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Source. Calculated from Leibfritz et al (1987) Table 11, p59.
Note. Income and substitution effects should sum to give the uncompensated elasticity. 
They do not do so in this table because the medians refer, in each case, to different 
studies.
Elasticities for men are negligible, or even slightly negative. Lone mothers' appear to 
have roughly similar responses to married women, albeit possibly greater substitution 
effects. However studies also suggest that women's supply response may be uneven, as 
at low hours the response is large and positive, whereas at full-time hours the response 
drops suddenly and becomes more like that for men - ie negligible or negative, 
suggesting that the income effect starts to dominate. There is also evidence that female 
labour supply is influenced by other household income, usually that of the husband 
(p41).
The median uncompensated elasticity of 0.88 for married women may be on the high 
side. Blundell (1997a), reviewing similar estimates, notes that "There is still debate 
over the sensitivity of these labour supply estimates to small changes in specification, 
and studies adopting more robust procedures tend to find slightly smaller elasticities.
An elasticity o f about 0.5 for married women is a fairly robust result, and higher 
elasticities such as those found in the studies by Hauseman and KaiseT et a\ partly 
reflect an upward bias from the participation response" (p i9) [emphasis added].
Married women's decisions whether to work or not potentially exhibit the largest 
response to taxation. A particularly important issue is the presence of fixed costs of 
work; this interferes with the estimation of the participation response. Nonetheless a 
large number of studies in different countries point to a large participation effect that is 
"probably reasonably well determined and around unity" (Blundell 1997a, p20).
To estimate a total economy elasticity of labour supply, one approach is to derive a 
weighted average across the labour force. The Congressional Budget Office (1996) has 
done this for the United States; the result is a US elasticity of between 0 and 0.3%. 
Taking the midpoint (0.15) suggests that a tax cut would induce a modest supply 
response; half of this would be from people joining the labour force, and half from an 
increase in hours worked. Most of this response would come from married women. 
However Blundell (1997a) has commented that "There can be no single, representative 
labour supply elasticity, as different individuals face both different incentives and
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different responses to those incentives" (p 7). Blundell's preference is for a full-blooded 
micro-simulation approach - see below.
Despite the finding that women have high labour supply elasticities, "cross-country 
difference in female participation rates appear to be only weakly, and sometimes even 
perversely, correlated with difference in overall tax wedges... And, despite rising taxes, 
participation rates of women have been on a strong rising trend in OECD countries.. 
Thus taxes were not the main factor driving women's participation, but may have had 
important effects at the margin" (Leibfritz et al 1997 p42).
In the 1980s top marginal rates of tax were cut sharply in the US and a number of 
European countries. This appears to have resulted mainly in more entry of married 
women into the labour force, although higher incomes were reported by both married 
and single upper-income taxpayers (p42). It is important of course, to distinguish 
income reporting and actual labour supply effects, although for some purposes (such as 
estimating revenue from a tax change) fne distinction is unimportant..
Another recent survey of tax and labour supply is that of Blundell (1997b). This article 
reflects the increasing attention that is being given to microsimulation modelling, 
reflecting the facts that
• different individuals face different marginal tax rates
• different groups respond differently to such rates.
In his exhaustive survey of male labour supply Pencavel (1986) noted that the small and 
negative labour supply responsiveness of prime aged men derived from early 
econometric analysis that had been challenged in the "second generation" studies 
developed by Burtless and Hauseman (1978) and Hauseman (1981). However the 
Hauseman procedure has been shown to be sensitive to mis-specification and 
measurement error; more robust recent techniques appear to point (again) to smaller 
elasticities (MaCurdy et al 1990), or to at least indicate sensitivity to the measurement 
of marginal tax rates and non-taxable other income.
For married women these sensitivity issues are even more critical" ...once it is 
recognised how influential, and unreliable, the estimated wage effect on participation 
can be [see Mrotz (1987) on the US and Blundell et al (1987) on the UK].... It is easy to 
show that many of the large elasticities of female labour supply are simply and
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extrapolation of the wage effect to participation ... This distinction between participation 
and hours of work is an example of how potentially important features of the labour 
market are often ignored in simulation models" (Blundell 1997a plO). Another 
important issue is the joint response of a household to a tax change: if a tax rise reduces 
household income, the (positive) income effect on the women's labour supply can 
largely offset the negative substitution effect (Blundell 1997a p i8, Table 6).
Also, withdrawal of welfare benefits can produce quite complex interactions in 
household labour supply, which are difficult to model. And, if there are a lot of marginal 
rate "kinks" (as there are), empirical results can be further misleading (Blundell 1997b 
P-9).
In contrast to Brown, Blundell asserts that "By far the most reliable picture of labour 
supply responses concerns married women although.... the range of estimated 
elasticities is large " (1997b p 10). He agrees that prime age males probably have low, 
negative elasticities, although he finds "many fewer believable studies of male labour 
supply" (pi 1). As alluded to above, male working hours are relatively constrained, 
compared to females, and supply response is correspondingly difficult to model and test.
For lone parents, empirical results tend to be more recent and therefore less well 
established. There are particular methodological problems that make the results for this 
group fairly divergent (pi2).
Gruber and Saez note: ‘A number of influential articles, such as Hausman (1981) and 
Boskin (1978) argued that behaviours such as labor supply and savings were very 
elastic with respect to their prices... a large body of subsequent literature, however, 
suggested that these behavioural elasticities were actually rather modest (Slemrod 
1990).. .over the past few years, however, a new literature has emerged which has 
pointed out that.. .other responses such as the form of compensation, unmeasured 
effort, and compliance may ultimately determine taxable income, and these may be 
more elastic with respect to taxation. Feldstein (1995) in particular observed that it is 
the overall elasticity of taxable income which is relevant for assessing the implications 
of tax changes for revenue raising” (Gruber and Saez 2000 p3).
These researchers find that the overall elasticity of taxable income is about 0.4; but the 
elasticity of real income, not including tax preferences, is much lower. This overall 
elasticity is primarily due to a very elastic response among taxpayers with incomes over
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$US 100,000 pa, with an elasticity of nearly 0.6, while for those below this level the 
elasticity is only one-third as large. This finding has two policy implications: first, that 
tax preferences are to be avoided, and second, that the optimal tax structure might be 
degressive in character, consisting of a large demogrant that is rapidly taxed away for 
low income earners, with lower marginal rates at high income levels.
Estimates of labour supply elasticities are an essential input into dynamic 
microsimulation20. Hence the uncertainties noted above must affect the reliability of 
such microsimulation. Nonetheless Blundell is a keen advocate of this approach to 
enhancing our understanding of tax and benefit reform, and of likely responses at the 
disaggregated level. I agree with this judgement. It is after all, better to be partly right 
than wholly wrong, and using static microsimulation to assess policy change, especially 
changes explicitly aimed at affecting behaviour, can (except by accident) only give 
wholly wrong answers.
It is interesting to note that the interview technique, on which the pioneering studies of 
tax effects were based, is no longer used in taxation research. The results are regarded 
as simply too unreliable. It seems likely that the same conclusion will eventually apply 
to the uses of the interview technique in research on social security work incentive 
effects.
3.4.4 Estimates of labour supply functions using panel data
This is a relatively new field, reflecting the scarcity of panel data prior to the 1980s. 
However it is a rapidly growing one. Panel data allow the incorporation of life cycle 
models which, at least in theory, might be expected to have some advantages over the 
usual cross-sectional econometric approach for estimating labour supply elasticities. A 
particular advantage is that particular individuals and households can be followed 
through time, so that their individual response to changing circumstance is not "washed 
out" in the same way as in normal time series data. In this way many of the problems of 
heterogeneity which bedevil normal econometric analysis can be controlled for.
However a survey by Laisney et al (1992) indicates that these hoped-for gains have yet 
to be realised in practise. Laisney et al note: "Concentrating first on the elasticities 
obtained for both men and women, it is clear that the variance of the "guesstimate" is
20 Static microsimulation assumes unchanged labour supply in response to policy changes. The case for 
dynamic microsimulation is discussed in the Appendix to this Chapter.
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not much lower for life cycle models using panel data than for models estimated on 
cross sections ... the cross section results of Mrotz (1987) on the great sensitivity of 
elasticity estimates, based on a single linear labour supply specification to exclusion 
restrictions, choice of stochastic assumptions and estimation methods, extend to panel 
data studies. ...Even in fairly homogeneous groups [of specifications] the variability is 
considerable. This points out the fragility of the results. Clearly more work is needed 
on refinement of the economic specification [etc.]..." (p460).
3.5 Findings on behavioural responses of particular groups
There is a lot of circumstantial evidence that workforce participation among certain 
groups is influenced by the availability of social security benefits. However, great care 
is needed in separating benefit effects from other possible influences, at a time when we 
are seeing great social and economic changes, which must by themselves affect 
workforce participation. Virtually every study cited which has sought to disentangle 
benefit and other effects has found the former to explain less than half, and in some 
cases less than a quarter, of observed differences or declines in workforce participation. 
This is also the conclusion in the literature on the early retirement phenomenon, 
discussed later in this section.
This section considers the following groups
• sole parents
• the unemployed and their spouses
• the disabled
• older unemployed people and early retirees.
3.5.1 Sole parents
It has long been argued that the level and availability of income support for sole parents 
has contributed to the number of low income sole parent families. Sole mothers in 
Australia work less than married women: Colledge notes that Australia shares with the 
UK the distinction of having a low rate of labour force participation among sole 
mothers, and of also having a sole mothers' participation rate lower than that for married 
mothers (1991 pi 1). For other OECD countries it was either the same or higher. In May 
1990 the participation rate for married mothers was 61% compared to 53% for sole 
mothers (pi3). Bradshaw et al (1996) confirm this finding.
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Most of the difference in sole parent and married women's participation rates appears to 
relate to part-time work. In 1990, the overall percentages in full-time employment were 
very similar for married mothers and sole parents, at about 25-27%; in contrast the part- 
time employment rate for sole mothers was only 60% of that for married mothers (20% 
vs 33%).
There are possible reasons for these differences apart from sole parents’ benefits. For 
example, sole parents may have younger children, be less well educated and so on. 
However Ross and Saunders' (1993) study gives some support to the view that the 
relatively low part-time employment status of sole parents results from the financial 
disincentives associated with the poverty trap (pi 18). That said, they also conclude that 
"sole mothers respond to labour market signals in much the same way as married 
mothers, with the important exception that they ... are much more responsive to changes 
in access to other sources of income - particularly government cash transfers but more 
generally to all non-wage income sources" (p i31).
Recent policy initiatives such as the JET scheme have specifically sought to increase 
labour supply among sole parents, and there is evidence that this is having an effect.
The proportion of sole parent pensioners with earnings has risen from 9% in 1983 to 
24% in 1995. However, there may be mechanical reasons for this increase, as well, 
such as the rise in the real value of the sole parent pension over this period. This, along 
with increases in free areas, automatically extends the range of incomes eligible for 
SPP.
Whiteford and Bradshaw (1994), in a survey of 17 countries, found some evidence for a 
positive relationship between the level of benefits and the level of sole parenthood, 
although there was not a clear relationship between the structure of benefit systems for 
sole parents and their behaviour. Other studies have found that while financial 
incentives to work are perceived to be important, they are not as important as other 
factors such as the availability of child care (Kalb 1999 p40).
The labour supply of sole parents has been an issue of considerable interest in the US; in 
a review of incentive effects of the US welfare system, Moffitt (1992) notes: "The 
extraordinarily low levels of work effort and earnings among welfare recipients have 
long been suspected of being partly the result of [long term welfare dependency and 
work] disincentives" (p.l).
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In the US context, 'welfare' means means-tested benefits mainly provided at state level, 
and not social insurance (which is called 'social security'). In practice welfare has come 
to mean mainly single parents benefits (AFDC), food stamps, Medicaid and housing 
assistance. Moffitt notes that "..any significant labor supply effects of the transfer 
system will be found only among female heads" (p5).
He first considers time series evidence, which appears to show a close correlation 
between the explosion in AFCD caseloads in the late 1960s and rises in the average real 
benefit. However, some of this correlation is mechanical in origin; as benefits rise or 
tapers reduce, coverage automatically rises because more of the existing sole parent 
population become eligible (pp.10-11).
Female heads in the US have relatively low levels of labour supply. However these are 
not lower than those of single (never married) women, or those of married women. Sole 
mothers work, on average, about the same as all other women, and generally earn more:
" ...it is not obvious that there is a "problem" with low work effort among female heads. 
Likewise their earnings do not obviously imply that there is any problem with their level 
of human capital" (pi 4).
Moffitt summarised research on the labour supply effect of AFDC, noting that Danziger 
et al (1981) indicated that the research shows that AFDC generates 'non-triviaV work 
disincentives. This suggests that, in the absence of AFDC, female heads would work 
more than other mothers. A mid-point disincentive estimate is that AFDC mothers, who 
now work 9 hrs per week on average, would work 14 hrs per week in the absence of the 
program: not a high level in any case. However this amount of lost earnings is a high 
fraction of AFDC transfers: for every dollar transferred, 37c appears to 'leak out' in the 
form of reduced earnings. Put differently, $1.60 must be spent to raise the income of 
female heads by $ 1 (pp. 16-17).
But labour supply effects of welfare are by no means sufficient to explain the high rates 
of poverty among female heads; "...most AFDC women would, apparently, be poor 
even in the absence of the AFDC program" (p41).
One interesting finding in this literature concerns the impact of reducing the benefit 
reduction rate (ie taper). This is nominally 100%; in practice less, due to earnings 
credits, childcare deductions and the like. The labour supply effect of reducing the 
benefit reduction rate is theoretically indeterminate: some existing recipients should be
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incentivized21, whereas new recipients brought into the system are expected to work 
fewer hours. "The econometric evidence on this issue now strongly suggests that the 
labour supply effects of old and new recipients essentially cancel each other out 
...[making it] extremely unlikely that the benefit reduction rate can be used to achieve 
significant gains in work effort among the low income population" (Danziger et al 1981 
p41). This appears to be a fairly robust result across a number of studies, and is one 
reason that NITs and the like are no longer in fashion in US welfare debates.
Swan and Bemstam (1988) have criticised unintended consequences of sole parents 
benefits, suggesting that 'becoming a single parent could be a sensible career choice" 
(p226). Moffitt finds little evidence of such an effect: "...the econometric estimates of 
family structure effects are not large enough to explain long run declines in marriage 
rates and, in any case, are incapable of explaining recent upward trends in female 
headship, because welfare benefits have been declining. Thus the welfare system does 
not appear to be capable of explaining most of the long run trend or any of the recent 
trend of increasing numbers of female headed families in the United States" (p 43 ).
Kalb’s (1999) survey concludes that “The studies o f .. .sole mothers indicate that 
financial incentives may have some effect, in particular some form of wage subsidy 
seems to be effective. The estimated size of this effect, however is not clear and varies 
considerably over the different studies. Generally, it does not seem to be large, 
particularly when compared to the effect of an additional child age five or below” (p49).
3.5.2 Benefit impacts on levels and duration of unemployment
Do unemployment benefits increase recorded levels of unemployment? Studies of 
replacement rates provide impressionistic evidence but are not really capable of 
answering this question. In principle it should be capable of econometric analysis, and 
many studies of this type have appeared. In Australia, the broad conclusion was that the 
real level of unemployment payments affects the aggregate unemployment rate, but not 
to a marked extent (Whitlock 1994 p26). Estimates have ranged from elasticities of 
zero to 0.4.
2 11 am indebted to the US for this useful addition to the English language. Our current Prime Minister at 
one time sought to popularise the term ‘incentivate’, but it never caught on.
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A slightly different proposition is that an increased rate of unemployment benefit leads 
to an increase in the take-up of unemployment payments. Again, researchers have 
found some link, but there is no agreement on the size (Whitlock 1994 p.27).
UK studies found no strong evidence that unemployment benefit levels impact on 
inflows onto unemployment benefit. US studies indicate some effect, but this may well 
reflect demand as well as supply side influences. That is, employers may use 
unemployment insurance as a subsidy supporting fluctuating employment patterns 
(Atkinson and Micklewright 1991).
The most durable finding in the literature concerns benefit duration. A number of 
studies in the 1970s and 1980s found that unemployment benefit levels impacted on 
average period spent on benefit. For example, Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), in a 
survey of the international literature, suggest that there is consistent evidence of a 
duration effect but results vary widely: elasticities range from 0.2 to 0.9. Their own 
work suggests that a 10 percentage point fall in the replacement rate will lead to a fall in 
the unemployment rate of 1.7 percentage points. Note, however, that most of these 
studies relate to unemployment insurance systems, which are very different from 
Australia's. However Australian studies have also found some duration effect of benefit 
levels (see Whitlock's (1994) survey).
Layard et al’s simulation of a 10% fall in replacement rates leads to the question of 
policy relevance: such a fall in the replacement rate would imply a benefit cut of around 
$30 pw (single and married), and around $45 pw for couples with children (Whitlock 
1994 p.27).
A further proposition that has been tested is that benefits of long or infinite duration 
increase not only the average duration, but also the number of long-term unemployed. 
This cannot be easily tested in Australia, since unemployment benefit has always been 
available for an unlimited duration. US estimates in the 1980s suggest that extending 
the duration of unemployment insurance by one week increases mean duration of 
unemployment by 0.1 to 0.2 weeks. Estimates for Canada and later estimates for the 
US show somewhat higher elasticities (Whitlock 1994 pp.27-28).
Finally there is a group of studies that assess the impact of activity testing. Layard et al 
(1991) found that tight administration of unemployment benefits appeared to have a 
marked influence on outflow from unemployment.
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The OECD tends to be somewhat hawkish on the relationship between benefit 
generosity and the rate of unemployment. The OECD Jobs Study (1994) notes that 
previous cross-national studies had failed to find any correlation between countries' 
unemployment benefit rates and their levels of unemployment (pi 72). This evidence is 
updated and re-examined in this study; the result appears to point to a rather high 
elasticity of one, at the mean, between the summary measure of benefit entitlement and 
the unemployment rate (pi79).
This estimated elasticity is "larger than the elasticities of individual supply response 
estimated in microeconomic studies of the duration of benefit entitlement on the 
duration of unemployment spells using large cross-section data sets. These elasticities 
are in the range 0 to 1.0 (according to Atkinson, 1987), or 0.2 to 0.9 (according to 
Layard et al., 1991)... Such an estimate should be understood as including the effect of 
responses by firms (eg. increased use of layoffs) and workers (eg. increased wage 
demands) when benefits change" (OECD 1994 p.179). However, a significant part of 
any increase in unemployment caused by benefits may not reflect an actual reduction in 
employment. Rather, it may indicate a decrease in the number of people reported to be 
out of the labour force (pi 91).
The OECD Jobs Study provides other evidence of a benefit - unemployment rate link, 
albeit one which may take many years to actualise following rises in real benefit levels. 
This includes:
1. evidence that GMI- type benefits lead to claims from unemployment beneficiaries, 
in the long run, at least several times greater than the number who appeared to be 
eligible at the time of introduction of the payment (pp 194-195);
2. US and Canada: evidence of a growing unemployment rate gap between the US and 
Canada, associated with more generous unemployment benefit levels and conditions 
in Canada (pp 195-196)
3. Finland and Sweden: evidence following benefit reforms and rising real benefits
4. Belgium and Norway: unemployment benefits for part-time workers appear to create 
a substantial unanticipated clientele (pp 198-200)
5. The Netherlands: disability benefit reforms encourage early retirement (pp200-201).
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The OECD note that if benefit administration can be kept tight, the potential 
disincentive effects of benefits can be largely contained. However adverse demand side 
shocks which cause rapid increases in unemployment can cause previously well­
functioning administrations (such as Sweden's, before the 1990s) to be overwhelmed. 
Then, if people get used to living on benefit, it may be difficult for a variety of reasons 
to again place them in employment. This can create a ratchet effect so that future 
economic shocks cause further increases in unemployment to a yet higher level, a 
phenomenon known as hysteresis.
The OECD has long been concerned about high and rising unemployment in the OECD 
area generally. Its explanation for unemployment hysteresis is now very clearly 
focussed on institutional impediments to labour market clearing, notably the tax and 
benefit systems. While its research on benefit/unemployment links might be seen as 
ideologically based, and the results need further testing and academic debate, it would 
be a mistake not to regard them as an important and serious contribution to the debate.
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) have critically reviewed much of the literature of 
benefit impacts on unemployment. They clearly demonstrate that this is a very difficult 
topic and one not easily conducive to simplistic econometric estimation techniques. For 
example , the  theoretical literature on unemployment benefit largely ignores important 
institutional features of actual social security schemes ... Unemployment compensation 
is often treated as if it were simply the wage of the unemployed... [in fact] only a 
fraction of the unemployed receive UI, a fact that is frequently overlooked" (pp 1688- 
89). Further, "Although reference is made on occasion to the relevance of search 
activity to the conditions of eligibility for benefit... this is not typically made explicit in 
the analysis of the effects of unemployment compensation" (pi 700).
The bottom line is that these well-regarded researchers are extremely sceptical about a 
lot of the research that has been conducted in this area, and about the apparent 
consensus on certain findings such as the impact of benefits on average duration. 
Atkinson (1987) concludes: “..the initial simplicity of findings with regard to incentive 
effects tends to disappear when the issue is investigated in more detail.” Kalb argues 
that “If this is true, not much can be said about the effect of unemployment benefits on 
people’s labour market behaviour, except that it is unlikely to be large (as far as can be 
inferred form the studies currently available) (1999 p24).
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In conclusion, it is difficult to summarise the literature on unemployment and benefits. 
That higher benefits induce more people into the labour market seems clear. It is also 
reasonably well established that duration limits affect behaviour. Whether higher 
benefits actually reduce the number of people working is much less easy to determine.
3.5.2.1 Low labour force participation among spouses of the unemployed
Contrary to the apparent results of the interview approach, statistics on labour force 
participation among the wives of unemployed men appear to indicate a very large 
disincentive effect (Whiteford 1987, Pech 1991, and Bradbury 1995). In 1991 the 
employment rate for these wives was 28%, compared to 65% for the wives of employed 
men. This phenomenon is also observed in a number of other countries, such as the 
UK, where unemployment insurance is supplemented by means-tested assistance.
On the face of it, a husbands' unemployment should create a strong incentive for the 
wife to seek work - the "additional worker effect" (Scherer 1978). In practice, the 
reverse appears to apply. Moreover, this phenomenon appears to be becoming more 
marked. Pech (1991) notes that while women with employed husbands increased their 
employment rate from 47 to 60% in the decade to 1988, the wives of unemployed men 
made no sustained employment gains during this period (p 29).
Explanations for this phenomenon have tended to focus on disincentives inherent in the 
family income test for unemployment benefit. This is particularly marked in the UK 
system; once Unemployment Insurance (UI) runs out, assistance is paid to the family 
which reduces, beyond a disregarded amount, pound for pound. A UK review by 
Cooke (1987, cited in Pech 1991)) concluded that the discouraged worker effect 
outweighs the additional worker effect, and this is particularly marked when income 
support is subject to joint income testing.
However there are a number of possible reasons why wives of unemployed men might 
have low employment rates, unrelated to benefit. Such wives are not a random sample 
but rather are likely to differ from the norm in relation to factors such as
• education
• age
• location.
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Collectively, such factors are known as "heterogeneity".
Bradbury (1995) calculates, on the basis of 1991 data, that "unlike the situation in the 
UK, variations in [such] characteristics are sufficient to explain all the employment rate 
gap in Australia" (p50). This study is based in part on cross-sectional econometric 
analysis and in part on analysis of DSS panel data. It should also be noted that the rate 
of withdrawal of benefit as family income rises is, in Australia, less harsh than in the 
UK.
Bradbury suggests "..two-thirds of the employment rate difference between these two 
groups exists prior to the husband becoming unemployed. Of the remaining one-third, 
most can be accounted for by the low employment rates of women whose husbands 
have low probabilities of exit from unemployment benefit... In other words 
heterogeneity is much more important than state dependence.. Education and age 
homogamy between spouses plays a part - but only a small part. Surprisingly regional 
characteristics seem to be even less important. For the present... most of this 
heterogeneity must be described as unobservable." (p68). Sociologists might find 
explanations in concepts such as the "underclass".
There is a problem with the apparent finding that two-thirds of the employment rate 
difference of wives existed prior to the husband becoming unemployed. That is, it fails 
to account for multiple unemployment spells (which register as single spells of low 
duration in the data), which have been found in UK panel surveys to reduce the 
likelihood of the wife working. This clearly illustrates the pitfalls that can arise from 
the use of cross sectional data, and casts serious doubt on Bradbury's main finding of 'no 
benefit effect'.
Bradbury concludes, however, that "...this does not mean that economic factors such as 
income tests are unimportant in influencing wives employment patterns. This may be 
true, but an alternative explanation is that the price effect of the income test is more or 
less offset by the income effect of the household's fall in income." (p69).
This conclusion is restated, more clearly, in King et al (1995): "...a small net effect is 
possibly the outcome of large disincentive effects of the social security income test 
being offset by equally large incentive effects from the need to supplement family 
incomes" (p5).
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King et al supplemented cross-sectional econometric analysis with a small-scale 
interview survey. None of the 75 respondents reported decreasing their labour force 
activity in response to their partner's unemployment; 24 said they increased it (pp.9-10). 
Among those not looking for some or more paid work, financial disincentives ranked 
6th on a list of 7 reasons for not doing so (pi 1). However the sample is not large.
Overseas econometric analysis, controlling for heterogeneity factors, suggests that "..the 
shortfall in employment rates of women married to unemployed men cannot always be 
explained by these [heterogeneity] factors alone" (OECD 1996 p35). In the UK 
researchers have estimated shortfalls of between 10 and 40% that could be directly 
attributed to the husband's unemployment. "This pattern - low participation by wives of 
unemployed men - is increasingly observed in other countries as greater numbers 
receive means-tested benefit" (OECD 1996 p35).
Reforms to the unemployment benefit system following the White Paper on 
Employment and Growth (Commonwealth of Australia 1994) introduced a reduced 
taper across some range of income and a partly individual basis of assessment. Initial 
indications are that these changes have been successful in inducing greater reported 
earnings among the unemployed (Warburton et al 1999).
3.5.3 Disincentives for disabled and sick people
In principle, one might expect the effect of financial incentives for the sick and disabled 
to be weaker than for able-bodied people. It is not clear, however, that this expectation 
is backed up by the empirical research.
In Leonard’s (1986) review of the US literature, he concluded that disability transfer 
programs led to a reduction in labour supply, with the benefit level being the most 
important factor. However most research had concentrated on older men, and little was 
known about younger men, and women. Bound and Waidman (1992) estimate that up 
to a quarter of the twenty percentage point decline in participation among 55-64 year 
old men between WW2 and the late 1980s can be accounted for by disability insurance. 
They argue that while the number reporting themselves as disabled has risen over time, 
true health status has not changed, so that the increased number reporting disability is a 
reflection of the extent to which the disability program induces early retirement. In 
Canada, Hyatt (1996) found that increasing benefits might reduce employment.
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Kalb concludes that, from the studies surveyed, “..the level and acceptance rates of 
disability benefits may have some importance in the labour market decisions that 
disabled people make. However, many studies emphasise the fact that people 
participating in these welfare programs often face impairments that can make it hard to 
find and keep employment at a level which provides them with adequate incomes”
(1999 p57).
3.5.3.1 Wives of disability support pensioners
In general women who indirectly qualify for income support because of their husband's 
eligibility have low employment rates. This is partly a mechanistic feature of means 
tests - those on higher levels of family income will automatically be disqualified. 
However it may also reflect a disincentive effect. One study in Australia concerned 
wives of disability support pensioners. This survey, by King and McHugh (1995) was 
of an exploratory nature, involving interviews with a small sample of 57 women. Of 
these, 10 women had increased their labour force participation at the time her partner 
began receiving DSP; another 9 women had decreased theirs (p.6). The researchers 
concluded: "...any disincentives of income testing are broadly balanced by the 
incentives to supplement income" (pi 1). This conclusion is similar to that reached in 
studies of the wives of the unemployed, although clearly much work remains do be 
done in this area.
3.5.4 Labour force participation of older men and women
Aggregate labour force participation rates of men have been falling for a number of 
years, while those for women have been rising. This phenomenon has been particularly 
marked for older men, and young men and women (relating to participation in 
education) - see Chart 1. There is some speculation that disability support pension has 
been a form of early retirement pension for some older men. Unemployment benefit 
activity tests have been deliberately eased for some older unemployed. Finally, there 
has been a cohort of ex-servicemen who became eligible for service pension (payable at 
age 60) in the late 1970s; this appears to have been associated with a marked decline in 
labour force participation among men 60-65 (Chart 1). Chart 2 shows the same 
information for older women. For those aged 50-64, aggregate dependence on social 
security in 1997 was 34%, up from 27% in 1978, and 31% in 1988.
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The strong trends towards early retirement evident among males in the 1970s and 
early1980s are now moderating. The percentage of those not in the labour force or 
unemployed peaked at 54% in 1983-85, and has since declined to 46%. Bacon (1997) 
suggests that "the increase in early retirement has slowed and ...it might even have 
stabilised" (p32). Bacon shows age-specific retirement rates from full-time work; the S- 
shaped curves for both males and females in each of the 45-49, 50-54 and 55-59 age 
groups all appear to indicate that we have been through a transition to a new equilibrium 
which may well prove to be sustained. In the US, similarly, Quinn (1998) suggests that 
there has been a marked break from the previous sustained downward trend in older 
men’s labour force participation, a phenomenon also noted in several other OECD 
countries.
On the other hand there are factors, such as the spread of occupational superannuation, 
which will tend to make early retirement more affordable for some. Superannuation 
coverage of the workforce has increased from some 40% in 1983 to 92% (National 
Commission of Audit 1996 p323). Increased usage of some social security benefits 
such as Disability Support Pension (DSP) will also support earlier retirement for those 
with some level of disability.
There are a number of explanations for early retirement. These include the observation 
that the generation of workers now retiring have enjoyed relatively secure economic 
conditions for much of their working lives, and have accumulated wealth, homes and 
the like, allowing them the opportunity to choose leisure over further work. Other 
factors adduced as explanation are the increased incidence of second income earners in 
families, and the rising spread of occupational superannuation. Finally, the availability 
of social security benefits may be important.
Anderson et al (1997) consider the impact of pensions and social security on labour 
force participation by older males in the US. In 1947 almost 55% of married males over 
65 were in the labour force, but by 1985 that figure had fallen below 20%. For those 
over 55 the trend started later. In 1957 90% of married males between 55 and 64 were 
still in the labour force, but in 1985 the figure had fallen below two-thirds. Anderson et 
al find that social security and (private) pension changes can explain perhaps a quarter 
of the decline amongst those aged 55-64, but none of the decline among the 65- plus 
group. Among the 'residual' factors explaining the trend to earlier retirement are 
increased real wages, greater opportunities for leisure activities, changing social
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preferences and expectations, and the changing structure of jobs. Other explanations 
involving health insurance are also possible. Certainly, earlier retirement is not a uni­
dimensional phenomenon.
Quinn argues that “The simplest explanation for the long-run decline in the labour 
supply of older American workers is wealth.. .For many current retirees, this general 
national prosperity has been augmented by windfall gains from two sources -  a strong 
real estate market and large and unexpected increases in social security benefits” (1998 
p6). Although the Australian age pension is very different to US social insurance, the 
same general comment could well apply here. Some researchers have attributed most of 
the decline in the participation of older US men to rising social security wealth; others 
about one third -  still a substantial fraction (Quinn 1998 p7).
Also important have been employer pension plans - especially those of the defined 
benefit variety - which contain incentives to early retirement. Anderson, Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1997) focussing on the 1969-89 period, attribute about a quarter of the 
reduction in men’s full time work to changes in employer pensions and social security 
together.
So why has this changed in recent years? One hypothesis, in the US, is that changes in 
incentives to retire have had and will continue to have a permanent impact on work by 
older Americans. The other is that temporary cyclical factors are responsible, and that 
when the current upswing ends, the long-run decline will resume. Quinn attempts to 
disentangle long term and cyclical influences using regression techniques. He 
concludes that, even allowing for a strong economy, there has been a clear break-out 
from previous trends: “Although the strong economy is important, I believe that there is 
also a new attitude to work late in life, encouraged by public policy initiatives that have 
changed the incentives facing older Americans. These incentives work.” [Quinn 1998 
p9, emphasis added]. While the choices and incentives facing retiring workers are very 
complex, “Considerable research using the RHS22 has established that workers do 
behave as though they understand and respond to both Social Security and [employer] 
pension incentives” (Quinn 1998 p i6).
22 Retirement History Study, a 10-year longitudinal study of about 8,000 older Americans sponsored by 
the US Social Security administration.
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The idea that accumulated wealth and the increased incidence of second income earners 
in the family has enabled many to choose early retirement seems inconsistent with the 
observation that many older Australians are on means-tested social security payments 
related to unemployment and disability. Also, there is evidence from surveys that some 
early "retirement" is involuntary: those involved do not realise that they have in fact 
retired, like it or not, until they have been unsuccessfully seeking work for some time.
Some of the contemporary employment problems experienced by older workers may 
have their origins in relatively low average education and skill levels (OECD 1998c, 
p50). We might therefore expect to see a diminution of current trends to early 
retirement (particularly the involuntary component) as better-educated and more 
adaptable younger people pass through the relevant age brackets. Also, greater 
mechanisation and reduced requirements for hard physical effort should reduce the 
impact of age disadvantage in employment, although a conflicting trend is the tendency 
for some new technologies to make life more difficult for some older workers.
3.5.4.1 Voluntary or involuntary?
Modelling by the Treasury’s Retirement Income Modelling Unit (RIMU) suggests that 
there are three distinct retirement peaks for men, the initial one being at age 55 (the 
preservation age); the second at 60 (the retirement age in many superannuation 
schemes), and the largest at age 65 (pension age). These peaks -  which are also found 
in most other countries -  are strongly suggestive of at least some policy impact on 
retirement decisions.
Involuntary retirement is normally the result of retrenchment followed by a period of 
unemployment and active job seeking and a gradual realisation that a new job will not 
be forthcoming. Voluntary retirement is related to lifestyle choices either not to 
continue working, or not to actively seek work following redundancy or retrenchment. 
In practice there is likely to be a considerable "grey area" between these two extremes. 
Older workers may agree, for example, to accept a redundancy package and be prepared 
to take the chance that they may or may not be able to find other work thereafter.
In examining labour market statistics, older workers appear not to suffer from any 
marked disadvantage in the labour market (Department of Family and Community 
Services - DFaCS -1999, Ingles 2000c). However, the average duration of 
unemployment is greater for older age groups: “This suggests a hard core of
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unemployed older males with an average duration of unemployment at close to two 
years” (O’Brien 1998, p i4).
The fact that the unemployment rate among older workers is not high may be due in part 
to the discouraged worker effect and associated withdrawal from the labour force.
Older workers who lose their jobs appear to have great difficulty in finding another job 
and are at great risk of entering long-term unemployment or of, eventually, withdrawing 
entirely from the labour force. The decline in labour force participation is most marked 
for those with low levels of skills and/or education.
Many older workers face barriers to their continuing employment or re-employment.
The availability of lump sum termination payments at age 55 has made this a de-facto 
early retirement age. In one survey, most employers thought of an "older worker" as 
one of about 50 years of age or, in some cases, as low as 45. The majority of 55-64 year 
olds believed that age discrimination commences at or below age 45 (Unikowski 1996 
p27). Certainly, older workers are now more likely to be made redundant or retrenched 
than are younger ones, in marked contrast to earlier “last on first off’ policies.
3.5.4.2 Evidence on “Push vs Pull”
Once unemployed, older workers face a high risk of remaining unemployed because of 
negative employer perceptions regarding their efficiency. Disability, sickness or lack of 
skills may be further obstacles, and re-training opportunities are often felt to be the 
preserve of younger workers. Also, the trend towards part time and casual work may 
mean that there may be fewer opportunities to obtain work based on the traditional 40- 
hour week.
An ABS survey in 1996 appeared to show that the extent of induced or involuntary 
early retirement is quite marked compared with voluntary early retirement (Cornish 
1997). In total 81% of male retirees aged 45 or over and 64% of women reported 
"induced" retirements motivated by constraints such as employment problems, health 
problems (both of self and others) and compulsory retirement or redundancy.
Unikowski (1996) reports: "Around one-fifth of male early retirees, and one quarter of 
females, gave their preferences for more leisure as the reason for their retirement... Ill 
health or injury is of far greater significance as a cause of male early retirement than any 
other voluntary or involuntary factor, accounting for almost half of male early
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retirements. The reasons for women's early retirement are more evenly divided between 
ill health and preference for leisure and family reasons, in that order" (p26).
However, the respondent's health status is self-assessed: ill health may be a more 
socially accepted reason for early retirement than the preference for leisure, and is a pre­
requisite for receipt of DSP (Unikowski 1996 p26). Cornish concludes that there are 
two distinct early retirement patterns. The first is "voluntary"; the second and more 
common pattern was "induced" in the sense that while some element of choice may 
have existed, the retirement was actually initiated by factors beyond the individual's 
control. "In total, approximately four in five men and two in three women who retired 
early over this period reported retirements consistent with the concept of induced early 
retirement" (1997 p i4).
There are difficulties in interpreting this survey evidence. There is some concern in the 
literature, for example, about the utility of self-reported health status as a measure of 
actual health problems. Poor health may be used to rationalise early retirement, being 
seen as more socially acceptable than a simple preference for leisure. Another problem 
is that the results of these surveys may reflect the particular economic conditions 
prevailing after the recession of the early 1990s, rather than any more general tendency.
In the US, self-reported survey evidence on reasons for retirement is now regarded with 
a great deal of scepticism (see Quinn et al 1990, Chapters 2 and 3). A person in poor 
(but not disabling) health is likely to give health as a reason for retirement; whereas in 
fact the real reason was the interaction of poor health and the availability and amount of 
social security and/or retirement benefits. The two sets of forces interact deeply and 
extensively. Also, answers to these sorts of questions have been found to depend on the 
exact manner in which they are asked (ibid p47).
Modem research using longitudinal data sets and sophisticated measures of financial 
incentives tends to give answers to these questions in direct contradiction to the earlier 
tradition of self-reported reasons for retirement. Such data “.. .permits researchers to 
study the objective circumstances that existed prior to the behaviour under study and, 
thereby, to supplement the explanations given by the respondents themselves... Early 
evidence suggested that the overwhelming reasons for retirement were health and labour 
market constraints, and that very few people retired voluntarily. Modem research 
suggests the opposite -  that many Americans do leave their career jobs voluntarily”
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(Quinn et al 1990 p 122-123). It is also quite possible that there has been a real trend 
over time, with an increasing proportion of voluntary quits.
For Australia, induced retirement was found by Cornish to be associated with reliance 
on government pensions/benefits. It is interesting that around one-quarter of voluntary 
early retirees in Cornish's survey also reported pensions/benefits as their main source of 
income (1997 p i6). This is consistent with the view that social security is being used to 
support some voluntary early retirement in Australia.
The debate here is about supply vs demand theories of employment. Those attuned to 
the view that the real problem is inadequate demand for older workers will argue for 
sympathetic government policies and avoiding coercion. The other view is that greater 
supply will induce greater demand -  through, for example, falls in relative wage rates, 
through pressures on employers to retrench less selectively, and through financial 
pressures on retirees not to leave jobs.
3.5.4.3 Does the social security system induce early retirement?
There is an argument that the incentive to retire early is embedded in the ratio of income 
from employment to income from superannuation plus social security. A simple 
"eyeballing" of the retirement age trend graph and the graph of real social security 
payment rates in Australia would appear to indicate a correlation between the two 
series: prima facie evidence of an induced retirement effect. This would be reinforced 
by calculation of earnings replacement rates when one takes account of the relative 
stagnation of male wages in the lowest quartile of the income distribution.
However, such an exercise can be deceptive. While age pension replacement rates (ie, 
income in retirement as a percentage of pre-retirement earnings) are one determinant of 
retirement behaviour, there are many others. Replacement rates in Australia are very 
much at the low end of the OECD average except for those on low incomes (OECD 
1998b). A study by Johnson (1999) similarly indicated that retirement incomes in 
Australia are very much at the low end of the OECD spectrum, although Whiteford and 
Bond (1999) showed that this conclusion might be modified by a fuller definition of 
income taking into account housing and other assets, as well as government social 
expenditures.
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In addition to the real level of publicly provided retirement benefits, the OECD argue 
that implicit tax rates on pre-retirement earnings are an important determinant of the 
retirement age.23 In many countries continued work at older ages is heavily taxed either 
because the age pension benefit formulae provide diminishing returns, or because of the 
benefits foregone such as those for unemployment or disability. According to the 
OECD's calculations, the implicit tax rate on work from 55 to 64 is, in Australia, 21% 
(1998c Table 5). This is at the low end of the international spectrum.
Gruber and Wise (1998) call this implicit tax “the tax force to retire”. They report a 
“strong correspondence between the tax force to retire and unused labour capacity”
(pi61-2). (Labour capacity is measured in relation to the difference between labour 
force participation rates among older workers in the 1960s, and now.) A regression of 
unused capacity against tax force explained 82% of the country variation in unused 
labour capacity. Moreover, Gruber and Wise observe that changes in early retirement 
provisions precede changes in labour force participation.
Simple correlation appears to corroborate the OECD's findings that "incentives to retire 
early have a potentially strong effect on activity rates of older people" (OECD 1998c 
p i87). Econometric results suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the implicit 
tax rate for those aged 55-64 leads to a drop in male participation of 3.5 percentage 
points. On this basis the implicit tax rate in Australia would have reduced male 
participation in this age range by over 7 percentage points. If other non-employment 
benefits such as DSP were included, the implicit tax rate and hence implied employment 
impact might be even larger.
However, the implicit tax on older workers cannot be easily removed, since in the 
Australian context it would probably need to involve a drastic tightening of eligibility 
conditions for paying benefits to such workers, many of whom might not easily find 
jobs. Tightening eligibility for DSP, for example, is likely to lead to increased claims 
for unemployment and sickness benefits. The OECD note that "the removal of 
disincentives to work may need to be accompanied by labour market reforms that 
promote job opportunities for older workers" (1998b pi 92).
Atkinson and Creedy (1996) simulated individual’s work-to-retirement decisions using 
an optimal choice model to calculate an individual’s best route through the “retirement
23 Based on the Working Paper by Blondal and Scarpetta (1998b).
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maze”. While a large number of simplifying assumptions had to be made, the authors 
found that
current policies provide a significant incentive to retire early; and the pension means 
test -  at least hypothetically - has a substantial impact on the choice of the retirement 
age and the allocation of assets at retirement.
An alternative view is that public policy may have little impact on retirement decisions. 
Several US studies have found that, despite the marked trend towards earlier male 
retirement in the 1970s and 1980s, changes to pension plans and social security 
entitlements probably explained only a third or a quarter of these trends, with the 
remainder being accounted for by other factors. These include rising real wages, 
changes in disability insurance, changes in tastes for retirement and changes in the 
industrial distribution of jobs (Anderson et al, 1997 p.4, Quinn et al 1990).
Several studies predict that changes to the US Old Age, Survivor’s and Disability 
Insurance (OASDI) system designed to make the system actuarially fair to older retirees 
will have relatively little impact on the average retirement age. The normal retirement 
age in OASDI will rise from 65 to 67 in gradual steps starting in the year 2000, and the 
delayed retirement credit from 3% pa to 8%. This is predicted to cause the number of 
individuals working full-time between the ages of 65 and 68 to be 4-6 points higher than 
under the pre-1983 rules (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1985).
The recent New Zealand experience provides a rather different picture. Starting in 1992 
the age of eligibility for the NZ superannuation scheme is being raised from 60 in 3 
month increments every six months, and will reach 65 in 2001. According to one 
researcher, the estimated behavioural effect is for a staggering 30.5 point increase in 
participation among those 60-64, although with the policy affecting only 55% of this 
group it translates into a predicted 16.8 point overall rise (Maloney, 1997b p29). Most 
surprisingly, this policy has not been accompanied by greater unemployment among the 
60-64 group. Much of the increase in participation appears to have been accommodated 
by people simply staying longer in their existing jobs.
Such a result is not simply transferable to the Australian situation. There is a 
considerable difference between the NZ superannuation pension and other social
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security benefits for those below pensionable age, and also a considerable difference in 
means tests (NZ super is universal)24.
To conclude, international comparative experience suggests that "..the overall package 
of non-work benefits (disability, early retirement, and unemployment) for older workers 
also affects their employment rates strongly" (OECD 1994, p i91). In the US, Quinn et 
al conclude in their survey: "Circumstantial evidence points to our public and private 
retirement income systems as likely influences [to early retirement]" (1990 p233). Kalb 
also concludes that “...retirement, (long-term) unemployment and disability are more or 
less interchangeable and interdependent. Changes to one scheme can have effects on 
the inflow into other schemes” (1999 p60).
3.6 Overall impact of income transfers
Danziger et al (1981) provide a comprehensive survey of this literature, noting that 
"..there is no consensus on the economic and redistributive effect of transfers" (p976). 
Their article is essentially about the US social security system. Virtually all the 
research surveyed is econometric in nature. They conclude as follows:
Old Age , Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
• While most studies suggest that the labour supply and retirement decisions of the 
aged are negatively affected by OASDI (notably it contributes to earlier retirement), 
the size of the disincentive is not agreed (p.987). Danziger et al suggest that, on 
balance, up to half of the 25 percentage point decline in the participation rate of men 
over 65 in the last 25 years might be attributed to the program.
• While the studies concur that disability insurance benefits may have induced some, 
particularly older males, to leave the workforce, the size of the effect has not been 
established. One study suggests that DI lowers the participation rate of 45-54 year 
old men by 2 percentage points.
Unemployment insurance (UI)
• Danziger et al suggest that "...a positive relation between unemployment insurance 
and duration of unemployment appears robust" (p.993). Their best estimate is that a 
10% increase in the gross replacement rate raises average duration by a week.
24 * iIt is taxable, so to this extent is reduced with rising personal income. Until
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Aid for dependent children (AFCD)
• Virtually all studies find negative labour supply effects among sole mothers.
However the coefficients very widely. A ballpark figure is that AFDC reduces work 
effort of the average recipient by about 600 hours per annum (p.993).
Danziger et al provide a "guesstimate" of how much higher total labour supply would be 
if all income transfer benefits were eliminated. This amounts to 4.8% of total hours 
worked by all workers. However since additional supply would be partly unemployed, 
and because those receiving benefits tend to have below average wage rates, the total 
loss of earnings in the economy is calculated to be about 3.5% (p.999). The authors 
regard this as an "upper bound", not as a reliable figure. This figure does not include 
the effect of taxes which finance welfare; Burtless and Hauseman (1978) suggest that 
taxes and transfer payments together may reduce total labour supply in the US by about 
5%. However, there is more consensus on redistributive effects: "Our review suggests 
that the incidence of poverty is about 75% lower and the Gini coefficient about 19% 
lower than in the absence of transfers" (Danziger et al p. 1019).
The authors go on to calculate the size of the leak in Okun's bucket - which they find to 
be about 23 cents in every dollar of transfer expenditure. (Transfers equalled about 
15.2% of total earnings in 1978, and 3.5/15.2 = 0.23.) This suggests that it cost $1.30 to 
transfer $ 1 to the poor, not taking into account labour supply effects amongst taxpayers. 
This is about half of the leak estimated in Munnell (1987) for NIT programs. The two 
estimates may not be inconsistent: Danziger et al point out that an expansion of the 
current system would yield a less favourable trade-off than currently exists. They 
conclude that "...reductions in, or the elimination of, current benefits will increase 
income poverty and achieve only small increases in work effort and savings. Finally, 
the research findings are too varied, too uncertain, and themselves too coloured with 
judgement to serve as more than a rough guide to policy choices" (pi020).
3.7 Overall efficiency cost of the tax/transfer system
A number of studies have attempted to estimate the cost of the transfer system taking 
account of the impact of the taxes that finance the system. Such studies are relevant to
recently a special surcharge also applied.
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work incentives, because efficiency costs are normally calculated by reference to labour 
supply reductions among both transfer recipients and taxpayers. Typically, such studies 
also concern themselves with the cost of marginal expansions of the tax/transfer system, 
and find that the cost of further expansion is, at the margin, very high. However such 
estimates are highly theoretical, and some doubt must attach to how we should interpret 
these results, especially since there can be considerable variation in the estimates.
An important paper in this literature is that of Browning and Johnston (1984). They 
used microdata for the US to estimate current effective tax rates and then applied a 
range of plausible elasticity estimates to calculate the total labour supply effect. On 
their preferred parameter values (implying an average uncompensated elasticity of 0.2, 
and compensated elasticity of 0.3), they suggest that"... the effect of the existing tax 
and transfer system on labour supply has been relatively modest, if these parameter 
values are valid. The median household with an ATR [average tax rate] =0.1 and MTR 
[marginal tax rate] = 0.4 has reduced labour supply about 3% as a result of the tax- 
transfer system, while low-income households (ATR = -0.41, MTR = .54) have 
probably reduced labour supply by 20 percent or so. Taking all households together, we 
estimate a total reduction of labour supply caused by the tax-transfer system of 5.2 
percent " (pi90).
This estimate is comparable with the 5% estimate of Danziger et al and also Lampman 
(1980), who found a total tax/transfer effect of 7 percent.25 It should be noted that none 
of these are measures of the true economic cost of the tax/transfer system, which ought 
to include an estimate of the value of increased leisure when labour supply declines. 
Typically, estimates of welfare cost taking leisure into account are about one-third to 
one half those that relate only to labour supply (see Browning and Johnston p. 197, 
Bascard and Porter (1986) pp.363-364).
25 Actually, Lampman's is an estimate of the loss of US labour supply relative to the situation 
had transfer expenditure been maintained at 9 percent of GDP (as it was in 1950) rather than the 21 
percent prevailing in 1976. Moreover it is an estimate of benefit effects, and does not include taxes apart 
from benefit tapers. This implies that the total tax/transfer effect could be much higher; possibly in the 
order of 15-20%.
However the methodology is very unsophisticated (see Lampman 1980 pl43); Lampman also 
points out that given the generally low productivity of those whose labour supply is affected, the output 
loss is considerably less than 7 percent (pl44). Interestingly, Lampman suggests that older men and 
disabled persons are the groups most responsive to increases in guarantees; there has been virtually no 
empirical work on this in Australia.
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Considering Danziger et al's assessment of the distributional impact of the US 
tax/transfer system, most researchers would probably find these estimates of the cost of 
that system plausible. What is perhaps less acceptable is Browning and Johnson's 
calculation that any expansion of that system would be extremely costly at the margin. 
Specifically, the disposable income of upper-income households is depressed by $9.51 
for each dollar net increase in the incomes of lower-income households. If the 
offsetting value of leisure is included, the marginal cost is estimated to be $3.49 (p.175).
In terms of Okun's bucket, this means that at the margin each dollar of cost to upper 
income households only provides a benefit to lower income households of 29 cents, a 
leakage of 71 percent. Browning and Johnston also suggest, surprisingly, that the US 
welfare system has already pushed the limits of redistribution close to its outer efficient 
value. The income of the lowest quintile of households is estimated to be at 92.5 
percent of its maximum value. Redistribution beyond the Rawlsian "maximin" point26 
would actually start to lower the income of the poorest households. It must be said that 
few students of comparative social policy would agree that the US system is close to the 
point of maximum feasible redistribution.
Browning and Johnson conclude by noting that "..the marginal cost of less income 
inequality is surprisingly high even when supply elasticities are relatively low" (p201). 
This conclusion has been supported in other studies, although with some reservations. 
Another important conclusion is that the magnitude of compensated supply elasticities 
(substitution effect) is the major influence on the trade-off between equality and 
efficiency; even on the relatively narrow rage of compensated elasticities considered, 
from 0.2 to 0.45, the trade-off showed wide variation (p202). This is a serious problem, 
since this ratio is far from being well determined in the empirical literature.
Browning (1993) defends his 1984 estimate of the marginal efficiency cost of 
redistribution, arguing that if anything it is an understatement (p4), particularly if 
lifetime rather than annual redistribution is being assessed.
Bascard and Porter (1986) use an approach similar to Browning and Johnson to estimate 
the marginal cost of the Australian tax/transfer system, but use somewhat lower
26Rawls (1971) proposed that society should pursue equality up to the point where no further 
gains to the poorest of household are possible. Since this implies a social welfare function that gives no 
weight to increments in the welfare of upper income groups, most people would regard this as the 
extreme limit of feasible income redistribution policies.
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elasticities. Their preferred estimates incorporate an uncompensated elasticity of 0.04 
and compensated elasticity of 0.19. As with Browning and Johnson, elasticities are 
assumed to be higher for low-income households, and lower (or even negative) for high- 
income ones (p359).27 The overall cost ratio for tax transfers was found to be 4 (ie it 
costs upper income taxpayers $4 in order for lower income ones to be better off by $1). 
However taking account of the value of increased leisure reduced this cost ratio to 2.3. 
Even this latter figure implies that each dollar of cost to upper income households 
provides only 44 cents to beneficiary households. "In other words 56 per cent of the 
intended redistribution has "leaked out" along the way" (p364). Unfortunately, Bascard 
and Porter confine their research to the marginal cost of transfers and do not calculate 
the cost of the current system.
Bascard and Porter also find that the marginal efficiency cost of helping low income 
households is reduced if that assistance is selective. (Previous studies such as Browning 
and Johnson's had all assumed a linear income tax.) However this finding is subject to 
serious reservations; Browning (1993) finds that "..moving from a linear income tax to 
a more general NIT type of policy does not produce a substantial decrease in the 
marginal cost of redistribution" (p.24). This whole issue is discussed in Chapter 4.
Campbell and Bond (1997b) use a methodology similar to Browning and Johnson and 
Bascard and Porter, and elasticities based on Australian estimates by Apps and Savage 
(1989). The average household’s uncompensated supply elasticity is 0.065 and 
compensated elasticity is 0.141. They find that a demogrant that raises the income of 
target groups by one dollar reduces the disposable income of non-target groups by 
$2.72, in comparison with the $4.03 estimate of Bascard and Porter. Accounting for 
leisure, a marginal expansion of the tax/transfer system would cost $1.76 for each dollar 
transferred to net gainers (compared with $2.30 in B&P).
It is not altogether clear why C&B’s estimates diverge from those of Bascard and 
Porter. The elasticities assumed are similar, although they follow a slightly different 
pattern - they tend to be lower for high-income groups and higher for low-income 
groups. Another reason is that Bascard and Porter allocate corporation taxes to 
households. Finally, Campbell and Bond solve for a new equilibrium level of labour
27This is not based on studies of elasticity by income class, but rather is a property of the 
equations used to estimate behavioural effects. Nonetheless the elasticities that fall out of this procedure 
are not implausible.
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supply whereas B&P consider only first round effects; however this appears to only 
contribute 2 or 3 percent to the difference and in any case is in the wrong direction.
There have also been a number of estimates of the marginal cost of raising government 
revenue. While not directly relevant to this essay, they are interesting insofar as they 
help to indicate the relative contributions of the tax and the transfer system to efficiency 
loss. Campbell and Bond (1997a), updating the 1982 estimates of Findlay and Jones, 
found a dead-weight loss in the range of 19-24 cents for every dollar of tax revenue 
raised. (Ballard et al (1985) had estimated a marginal efficiency cost of between 17 and 
56 cents for the US.)28 It appears to follow that the marginal efficiency cost of transfer 
expenditure is in the order of 52-57 cents, for each dollar spent. While it is no doubt a 
gross simplification to imply that the cost of the benefit system can be imputed by 
subtracting the cost of raising taxes from the total cost of the tax/transfer system 
(computed using a different methodology), this is broadly consistent with estimates 
from other sources.
It would seem safe to conclude that while estimates of the marginal efficiency cost of 
redistribution are interesting and important, we are still a long way from pinning down 
the actual magnitudes involved. A significant reservation, as Browning has noted, is 
that the estimates pertain to transfer programs that operate like negative income taxes - 
ie, without categorisation or work tests (1993, p4). In addition, there is no Australian 
estimate of the overall (as distinct from marginal) efficiency cost of the tax/transfer 
system.29 Using the Browning and Johnson figure of a 5.2% reduction in labour supply 
as the benchmark, we can see several influences tending either to raise or lower the 
comparable Australian figure. Those raising it are
28Freebaim (1995) criticises the generality of studies on the welfare cost of taxation, most of 
which report preferred estimates of the marginal welfare cost of a dollar of tax revenue at 20 cents or 
more. "One key assumption of these models seems inappropriate ..[ie] that wages adjust so as to equate 
the demand for and supply of labour" (pi 21). Instead, he uses a "sticky wage" model with provision for 
involuntary unemployment, (p i24), and finds that average tax rates are important and perhaps more 
important than the marginal tax rate which is the sole tax variable in the conventional model (p i29). By 
contrast the elasticity of labour supply is a relatively unimportant variable in the sticky wage model. 
Freebaim argues that there is no deadweight loss associated with a tax increase on labour supply in the 
presence of a constant sticky wage; however, in the absence of any data on the stickiness of wages this 
article provides no clear answer as to what is the marginal welfare cost of taxation.
29Findlay and Jones estimated the efficiency cost of labour supply distortions from taxation at 
5% of wage income; Bascard and Trengove (1990) estimated them at 2% of GDP.
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• the Australian welfare system is more comprehensive, and for poorer people 
significantly more generous
• except for sole mothers and the working poor, there is more reliance on means 
tests in the Australian system,.
On the other hand,
• Australian estimates of labour supply elasticities tend to be lower
• Australian estimates of marginal deadweight cost tend to be considerable lower, 
and these could be expected to be reflected in any estimate of aggregate welfare 
cost.
However we cannot be entirely assured that these are reliable findings. On balance the 
5% figure may be a reasonable estimate of the total output cost of the Australian 
tax/transfer system, at least until better evidence comes to hand.
Lambert (1990, p99)), using an optimal tax model (with the usual simplifying 
assumptions), calculated that over a wide range of equity-efficiency trade-offs the 
output cost of a 1 % reduction in the Gini coefficient is approximately 1 %. Since 
studies have generally shown the Australian tax/transfer system reduces inequality 
substantially (eg from a Gini of .5 to .3), the implication is that output is reduced some 
20 percent. However all such studies take as their counterfactual the pre-tax/transfer 
income distribution, rather than the hypothetical distribution if there were no taxes and 
transfers. Presumably this latter measure, which is the one theoretically most 
appropriate, would show a lesser actual reduction in inequality and hence a smaller 
output cost.
In this context it is interesting to note a recent OECD finding (1998e) that the 
distribution of earnings in Australia is among the most unequal of all member countries 
studied, whereas the progressivity of taxes and transfers is among the greatest. The net 
result is that the post- tax/transfer income distribution is roughly in the middle of the 
pack (see Table 3.7, from table 3.5, OECD p 25). The problem is this: is our earnings 
distribution inherently unequal, due to some structural feature of the Australian 
economy, or does it reflect incentives inherent in a highly progressive tax/transfer 
system? If the latter is the case the system may indeed be creating some serious loss of 
output. It must be said, however, that international comparisons of income and earnings
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distributions are fraught with difficulty, and this OECD conclusion differs from those of 
other studies.
3.8 Conclusion
We now know quite a lot about incentive effects of the social security system in general, 
and workforce age payments in particular, notwithstanding some grave reservations 
about the detailed results and research methodologies. Certainly it is no longer tenable - 
if it ever was - to pretend that incentive effects are unimportant.
However our knowledge is patchy and uneven. Research tends to have an underlying 
ethical agenda. It has not been regarded as an issue in Australia, for example, that the 
age pension (not to mention private superannuation) may induce early retirement, 
whereas there has been a lot of attention on benefits for those supposed to be working or 
at least capable of working, such as the unemployed and their wives. Sole parents and 
the disabled fall some where between these two extremes in terms of the ethical 
dimension and the associated degree of research interest. I am not suggesting that this is 
inappropriate, but we do need to be conscious of such undeclared biases.
It is also notable that researchers in this field tend to be divided into hawks and doves; 
the former with a strong belief in the importance of financial incentives and a general 
antagonism to high benefit levels and allowed durations, and the doves with an 
underlying view that financial incentives are basically of second-order importance. The 
latter tend to be strong supporters of the welfare state, and of improvements to it. In 
practice both camps are able to find econometric evidence to support their beliefs. My 
own view is that financial incentives do matter, sometimes significantly, but that some 
level of induced labour market withdrawal is a necessary price to pay for a civilised 
society, and for a dynamic capitalist society which is relatively accepting of structural 
change. And, while I do not hope for major gains flowing from the policy changes to be 
discussed in this thesis, I do view an appropriate incentive structure as an important pre­
condition -  a foundation, if you like -  onto which other parts of a sustainable welfare 
system can then be built. If you haven’t got the foundations right, you can be pretty 
sure that nothing you build onto them will work properly.
Another important conclusion is that researchers need to get into the business of 
behavioural microsimulation in order to be able to get a handle on the likely labour 
supply impacts of possible policy changes. This approach is discussed in the Appendix.
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3.9 Appendix: behavioural microsimulation and policy evaluation
The objection to incorporating behavioural responses in modelling has always been that
• we don't know the pre- tax/transfer income distribution, and/or
• we don't know the relevant income and substitution elasticities.30
Harding (1993), for example, argues thateconom etric  studies designed to assess the 
magnitude of behavioural change have produced such wildly divergent estimates of the 
relevant elasticities that it appears that the most that can be done is to present the results 
for a number of different estimates... the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning office 
decided to exclude behavioural response because of concern about the value of the 
elasticities, while Statistics Canada arrived at a similar conclusion on labour 
supply...".31
These objections are not valid. Our current static policy simulations in fact assume that 
the existing income distribution and the pre-tax/transfer distribution are one and the 
same; analogously, they assume an uncompensated substitution elasticity of zero.
These assumptions lead to a certain set of results in any policy simulation, results that 
are almost certain to be incorrect. This is especially a problem when simulating policy 
changes designed to produce behavioural changes. By substituting a more realistic set 
of behavioural assumptions we at least have a chance of getting results which are "in the 
ballpark"; this must be better than being almost certainly wrong. This will be 
particularly important in modelling major change options with marked behavioural 
impacts, such as a NIT.
Another point to note is that there are many possible sources of error in microsimulation 
models (see Betson 1990) and additional sources of error in dynamic models that 
predict change over time. While behavioural microsimulation will induce further 
sources of error, it is far from clear that they will necessarily add to, rather than reduce, 
errors arising from these sources.
Haveman (1996) notes of microsimulation models: "The more advanced of these 
models take account for estimates of the responses of individuals to the relative price
30Actually, (a) and (b) amount to the same thing, since if (a) is known (b) can be deduced and 
visa versa.
113
114
and income effects of the policy. Micro data simulation models that incorporate such 
behavioural elasticities are generally viewed as more reliable than models that ignore 
behavioural effects. This is so even though available behavioural response estimates 
vary widely. While the use of such models has become accepted in the United States 
and Canada, they are not generally available in many OECD countries" (fn.10, p 38).
The starting point for behavioural assumptions might be the results of the US income 
maintenance experiments. Although these estimates are now somewhat old, and relate 
to another country, they are at least statistically robust and appear, moreover, to avoid 
what appears to be a consistent over-estimation bias in elasticity estimates based on 
cross-sectional or time series data. The income maintenance estimates should of course 
be kept under review as new and hopefully better estimates come to hand. One source 
of new information will be feedback from the modelling process itself. If, for example, 
the model were to under-predict a behavioural response to an actual policy change, we 
could then revise the relevant elasticity estimates upwards.
Further, a behavioural microsimulation model will make it possible to test the 
sensitivity of policy to a range of possible behavioural parameters. Again, this is 
something that is simply not possible with our current static microsimulation approach.
It should be possible to build a behavioural component onto an existing micTosimulation 
model (such as Stinmod). Short-cut algorithms are available which would allow this to 
be done quite quickly. For example, the Browning and Johnson approach only requires 
knowledge of the average and the marginal effective tax rate (together with estimates of 
aggregate income and substitution elasticities) in order to estimate behavioural 
change.32 However the modelling procedure adopted may need to be quite complicated 
if we are seeking more exact solutions, especially to major policy changes where quite 
substantial changes in clients budget constraints are envisaged (see Creedy and Dawkins 
1999).
31 Wolfson (1990) notes of the Statistics Canada model that" the capacity for behavioural 
modelling may be added in the future" (p366).
32A s an approximation of labour supply response to tax changes, Browning and Johnson (1984 
p. 187) use the formula Y1 = (1-MTR b)(l + aATR) .Yo, where Y1 is labour supply, MTR and ATR are 
the marginal and average tax rates, and Yo is labour supply with no taxes or transfers. The parameters a 
and b can be changed to describe a spectrum of possible labour supply responses; (b) is related to the 
substitution effect and (a) captures the income effect.
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A further useful development of such a model would be to explicitly test trade-offs 
between equity and efficiency, in a manner analogous to "optimal tax" methodologies. 
This technique requires the specification of some index of inequality aversion, such that 
any change in output consequent on the labour supply response to a policy change is 
translated into a net increment or detriment to social welfare, taking into account the 
distributional consequences.
In modelling a NIT, for example, this would allow the estimation of an optimal 
guarantee level and associated tax rate for each degree of inequality aversion and each 
specified set of behavioural assumptions.
This matrix will not tell us what policy we should adopt. But it will give us a range of 
feasible parameter values under a range of realistic assumptions. Moreover in testing 
policy alternatives, it may tell us whether one policy choice consistently dominates 
another, over a range of parameter values. If it does, we can be pretty sure that it is the 
right way to go.
Such a matrix underlies the discussion of possible policy changes which follows in this 
thesis. The implicit evaluation criterion for any change is to jointly optimise equity and 
efficiency so as to maximise “social welfare”. Lacking a formal model to calculate this 
my approach is necessarily somewhat intuitive or heuristic; but the underlying 
theoretical model is clear, nonetheless.
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CHAPTER 4: UNIVERSAL AND SELECTIVE BENEFITS 
(REFLECTIONS ON OPTIMAL RATES OF TAX AND TAPERS)33
4.1 Introduction
In evaluating reform options it is necessary to have a clear view about what we are 
trying to achieve. Too often the aim is expressed in simple terms like “getting rid of 
poverty traps”, without any clear idea of where in the income distribution higher tax 
rates are to be moved, and which sorts of income units are to pay34.
There is a large social policy literature about universality versus selectivity (see eg 
Eardley 1997, Deacon and Bradshaw 1983). While the following discussion emphasises 
the purely economic, this is not to suggest that well-known criticisms of means testing 
such as 'social inclusion', intrusive inquiry, stigma, low take-up and the like are in any 
way unimportant. However, this Chapter focuses on the economic arguments for or 
against selectivity.
In evaluating universality versus selectivity it is necessary to be clear precisely what is 
the difference. Jackson (1982) argues that the difference between the universal and the 
selective approach is that the former involves lower EMTRs at lower income levels but 
higher rates at some higher levels. Selective approaches, by contrast, involve higher 
EMTRs on low-income earners. “Indeed the difference in the patterns of [effective] 
marginal tax rates is the essential distinguishing feature o f universal and selective 
programs ” (Jackson 1982, p21). Sadka et al (1982) note that once the issue of income 
testing is framed in general terms, the issue becomes simply: 'What is the pattern of 
optimal tax rates by income class?' (1982, p292).
Target efficiency is a measure of the proportion of transfers that accrue to people below 
the poverty line. A goal of maximising target efficiency, which is implicit in much of 
the popular debate about “middle class welfare”, therefore implies that a transfer 
scheme should have no free area and a 100% taper. But such a scheme might be neither 
economically efficient nor welfare maximising. It is now widely recognised among 
serious policy analysts that target efficiency is a very poor measure of the overall 
economic efficiency of a transfer program. A further important issue is the need to 
jointly maximise efficiency and equity.
33 This is an edited version of Ingles 1998b.
34 Ultimately such questions can only be sensibly framed in terms of “optimal tax” analysis, which seeks 
to jointly maximise both output and social welfare, based on some explicit index of inequality aversion.
117
118
In theory the efficiency of the transfer system should be maximised simultaneously with 
the efficiency o f the taxes that finance it; this may or may not involve higher EMTRs on 
program recipients than on taxpayers generally, and this is a question that can only be 
resolved empirically, not by recourse to a priori notions like target efficiency.
These issues are not just of theoretical interest. Reform proposals, such as those of 
Dawkins et al (1997, 1998a) for a negative income tax (NIT), illustrate that the issue of 
the optimal structure of marginal rates will continue to be an important one. Later 
Chapters in this Thesis consider the case for reducing tapers on social security benefits; 
typically these reductions need to be financed by increasing tax rates on the general 
population, so the trade-off between the benefits and costs of such measures are an 
important issue.
4.1.1 A note on terminology
There is a great deal of confusion about terminology in the literature. I will use 
guaranteed minimum income (GMI) as a generic term covering NITs, Basic Income and 
the like, as well as referring to the minimum income level guaranteed by any of these 
schemes. A NIT is normally understood as a GMI scheme separate from the normal tax 
system; usually a NIT involves an initial tax rate higher than the normal positive tax 
rate. In a linear NIT35, by contrast, the negative and positive tax rates are the same, so 
the negative and positive tax systems can be integrated.
Creedy and Dawkins note that . .the meaning attached to these terms is not consistent 
in the literature, so it seems useful to describe the main alternatives in terms of ‘basic 
income with flat tax’ (BI/FT) and ‘means-tested with graduated tax’ (MT/GT) 
schemes.” .. .“Criticism of a BI/FT scheme tends to focus on the high level of the 
constant marginal rate required to finance the basic income..”. “In a MT/GT system, 
lower income groups face much higher marginal tax rates than higher income groups, 
creating a strong incentive for them not to participate in paid employment.” (1999 p61)
A basic income guarantee (BIG) is also sometimes known as a demogrant scheme; it 
involves payment of the GMI to all citizens, and taxation of all incomes. It differs from 
the linear NIT only in that the latter nets out positive tax liability against negative tax
35 Sometimes called a credit income tax (CIT). These definitions are similar (but not identical) to those of 
Haveman (1996a).
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eligibility at source, and therefore involves substantially less "churning" than a 
demogrant scheme. Whether churning is important is, however, not at all clear (see 
Chapter 6).
4.2 Basic issues in means test design
Three main issues are important in designing means tests:
• the base for assessment ( ie. the definitions of income, the time period and the 
income unit)
• the income test taper(s), and
• the income test threshold (or thresholds, if there is more than one taper).
I will set aside for this chapter the question of the appropriate definition of the 
assessment base (issue No.l above), and concentrate on issues 2 and 3, the taper and the 
thresholds.
Traditionally, it has been held that there is an inherent trade-off between the competing 
objectives of minimising public expenditure through tight targeting, and creating 
incentives for self-help through more relaxed free areas and means test tapers. On this 
view it was pretty much a matter of judgement, and political choice, which parameter 
settings were adopted. One of the contentions of this chapter is that, at least in theory, it 
is possible to do better than that. In practice, however, it will be found that science has 
no exact solutions.
4.3 Optimal rate of tax (taper)
I first consider the optimal taper rate (also known as the benefit reduction rate - BRR), 
bearing in mind that the actual taper which applies at any level of income needs to be 
calculated by reference to both the tax and social security systems. In practice quite 
complicated computer models are used to do this; the results are often shown 
graphically by plotting the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) against private income.
A typical graph for a client of the Australian social security system shows a low or zero 
initial tax rate (the free area), rising quite sharply to around 50-70% at the income level 
where the taper cuts in, with humps where some higher rates apply due to tax
36 Churning means that recipients of transfer payments also pay tax, which has the effect o f reducing their 
net transfer receipts. Churning is held to be inefficient because a smaller, single transfer would have the
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interactions and, in the case of allowances such as Newstart, the cut-in of the 70% taper. 
Then the marginal rate drops abruptly back to the normal tax rates, although if there are 
dependent children it jumps again to around 60% over the income range where family 
payment (FTB) is tapered. Subsequently it falls again to the tax rate of around 30%, 
then gradually rises to 50% reflecting the progressive structure of positive tax rates. 
Chapter 5 provides some examples.
Oliver (1997) suggested a theoretical approach to determining the optimal taper rate.
The approach is initially based on the concept of a Laffer curve - ie a graph showing 
revenue raised plotted against the marginal tax rate. The US economist Laffer 
suggested that as the marginal tax rate rises, revenue would at first rise and then peak 
before starting to fall, so that beyond a certain point higher tax rates become incapable 
of raising additional revenue - indeed, counterproductive. Analogously, tighter 
targeting of welfare benefits is suggested by Oliver to become, at some point, counter­
productive from the point of view of saving government expenditure. Oliver's Figure 2 
shows an "inverted Laffer curve" (a graph of assumed total government outlay plotted 
against the benefit withdrawal (taper) rate) which implies that expenditure is minimised 
with an EMTR well below 100%.
Oliver then points out that the point of minimal government expenditure is not 
necessarily the point of greatest economic efficiency. That point is achieved when the 
marginal efficiency cost of raising a dollar of revenue is equal to the marginal efficiency 
cost of saving a dollar of expenditure. Oliver's figure 3 shows that this point (plotted 
using the rule of thumb originally attributable to Harberger (1969) that the deadweight 
cost - ie the economic cost - of an income tax is approximately proportional to the 
square of its rate) is very likely to be at a taper rate rather less than the rate at which 
expenditure is minimised.
In fact it can be shown, using the Harberger rule, that if elasticities of labour supply are 
approximately constant across income classes, efficiency losses are minimised by a 
schedule of EMTRs which is roughly constant. If this proportional tax is allied with 
cash demogrants or refundable tax credits, it creates a progressive structure of average 
tax rates. The tax rate and guarantee rate can be modified to achieve any desired degree 
of progressivity in the tax/transfer system. Indeed, "optimal tax" analysis generally
same effect as the higher transfer less taxation clawback.
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indicates that welfare is maximised by an approximately constant marginal rate of tax, 
such that the basic income/flat tax (BI/FT) type of solution appears indicated. But such 
analysis is characterised by "simplifying and debatable assumptions... particularly as to 
social preferences on the distribution of income and the pattern of labour supply 
elasticities.." (Oliver 1997, p2).
There are two difficulties with the Oliver approach, which operate in opposite 
directions. One is the hypothesis that, in relation to the benefit withdrawal rate, a Laffer 
curve actually exists. Its existence is problematic due to the mechanical effect that 
easing taper rates automatically increases the eligible population as cut-out points rise 
up the income scale, and the effect of this on expenditure can outweigh any gains due to 
greater income declarations amongst the originally eligible population. This appears to 
lead towards the possibility of a "comer solution", if cost is the only concern, involving 
a 100% taper.
The second difficulty is that Oliver's analysis is concerned only with economic 
efficiency and does not take explicit account of income distribution objectives.
However, efficiency and distribution need to be maximised simultaneously.
In theory, there are two approaches that can be used for the computation of optimal 
tax/taper regimes. Optimal tax analysis is one means of answering questions about the 
efficiency and redistributive impact of alternative tax regimes. Higher taxes and 
transfers create more redistribution, on the one hand, and therefore raise total social 
welfare on the assumption of diminishing marginal utility of income. On the other hand 
higher taxes and transfers induce less work effort, the extent of that reduction being 
estimated by using behavioural parameters (income and substitution elasticities). The 
optimal tradeoff between these opposing forces is then computed using an artificial or 
hypothetical income distribution, with the assumed social welfare function37 (inequality 
aversion) and behavioural parameters plugged in.
By contrast, behavioural microsimulation uses a sample of the actual population in 
order to answer such questions (see Appendix to Chapter 3). First, a random sample of 
households drawn from an income or expenditure survey is used to characterise the pre­
reform status of a representative group of the nation's families. In the second step 
relevant characteristics such as disposable incomes and net wage rates are adjusted to
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what they would be after the simulated reforms were implemented, but before any 
changes to work effort. Finally, hours of work and earnings are adjusted to account for 
labour supply responses resulting from the simulated plans, based on pre-existing 
estimates of labour supply elasticities. The appropriate tax-transfer schedules are then 
used to compute post-reform disposable incomes after all the labour supply adjustments 
have taken place. A final step is to calculate total social welfare under alternative plans 
using an explicit index of poverty or inequality aversion, analogously to the optimal tax 
procedure.
4.3.1 Arguments for a constant marginal tax rate
Analysis in the 1970s and 1980s using optimal tax and microsimulation techniques 
generally tended to favour more universal approaches. When an explicit index of 
inequality aversion was used to weight the measure of total output in the economy38, it 
has generally been found that higher tax rates on low income earners are not desirable.
Kesselman and Garfinkel (1978) compared means-tested and universal provision in a 
two-class model, allowing for incentive effects. By holding the condition of the poorer 
class constant, they tested the conditions that made the richer class better off. Creedy 
(1996, pi 61) notes that this procedure has the advantage of using the weaker value 
judgement underlying Pareto efficiency rather than a specific social welfare function.
Kesselman and Garfinkel found that the efficiency of income testing depends upon how 
the elasticity of labour supply varies by income class. If the compensated wage 
derivative of labour supply (the change in labour supply per unit of change in the net 
wage rate) either increases or remains constant as income increases, then income testing 
is economically efficient. But they also found that for reasonable estimates of the 
differences in the compensated elasticity of labour supply across income classes, the 
economic efficiency gains or losses from income testing were so small as to be 
inconsequential for policy purposes. The differing administrative costs of alternatives 
were therefore a relatively important consideration.
Sadka et al (1982) conducted a microsimulation using five groups of workers and an 
explicit social welfare function. They used two different sets of labour supply
3  ̂ Such functions require the specification of an explicit index of inequality aversion. See Creedy 1996.
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estimates: one in which the poor respond more than the non-poor to tax changes, and 
one in which their responses are identical. Not surprisingly, they found that the NIT is 
optimal in the former case while in the latter case (which they believe is more realistic), 
the CIT is optimal. But they also found that the efficiency cost of being wrong is small.
This theoretical finding appears to be supported by the results of microsimulation 
experiments conducted by Betson et al (1982) and by Dickert et al (1995), which allow 
for different labour supply responses by men, women, and sole parents. Such 
techniques allow for the evaluation of program changes affecting not just benefit 
recipients, but also taxpayers in general, as well as those on the borderline of eligibility 
who can change their behaviour in order to qualify.
Estimates of labour supply elasticities are obviously a critical input into the simulation, 
although it is also possible to test the sensitivity of results to different elasticity 
assumptions. In their simulations Betson et al use labour supply responses estimated 
from the Seattle-Denver Income maintenance experiments. These are subject to a 
number of reservations, although some researchers feel that the experimental findings 
are more reliable than the non-experimental ones, which typically yield higher labour 
supply elasticities (see Burtless 1987, and Chapter 3). In general Betson et al are 
confident of these parameters as they affect low and middle income groups, but have 
reservations about the estimates for upper income groups, particularly wives, who were 
not well represented in the income maintenance experiments.
Subject to that qualification, Betson et al's results throw interesting light on the 
universal-selective debate. The simulation performed analyses the choice between a 
negative income tax (NIT) and a credit income tax (CIT) plan. The essential difference 
is that the NIT is a selective program; it imposes high tax rates on low-income earners 
as benefits are withdrawn. By contrast the CIT imposes uniform tax rates on all income 
earners.
Betson et al's (1982) simulations suggest that in terms of economic efficiency it really 
doesn't matter much which way we go. These simulations imply that none of the major 
NIT or CIT reforms considered would have very detrimental effects on earnings or 
economic efficiency, and they could even have modest positive effects.
_________________________________________123_____________________ ___________________
38 One simple approach is to adjust total output by the factor 1-G, where G is the Gini index of post­
tax/transfer inequality. Since a higher G denotes greater inequality, weighted output is depressed as
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Kesselman (1982) compares efficiency under a NIT versus that under a CIT, taking into 
account administrative efficiency. The CIT assumed here is in fact a demogrant 
scheme: benefits are paid to everyone, and financed through proportional taxes. The 
NIT by contrast pays benefits only to low income persons. Kesselman argues that the 
administrative savings from adopting a CIT in lieu of a NIT are in the order of 
US$2,000M per annum. Further, because the income tested NIT has two or more 
different tax rates, it induces people to (a) alter the timing of income receipts, in order to 
maximise their benefits, and (b) alter their marital status or living arrangements. It has 
long been argued in the tax reform literature that there are major administrative and 
other advantages in moving towards a proportional tax structure, and this study of 
Kesselman's in effect generalises these findings to the tax/transfer system.
Lambert (1990) evaluated a range of transfer schemes using an "output possibility 
curve" specified in terms of arithmetic mean income and the Gini measure of inequality. 
He used as his general tax form a "dual rate negative income tax (NIT)"; when the taper 
and tax rates are equal the resulting linear tax was called a "credit income tax (CIT)". 
Allowing for labour supply effects, he found that "1... Any dual rate ...NIT can be 
improved upon by another dual rate NIT with a higher threshold - and by a flat-rate CIT 
with a higher threshold”. This finding reinforces from a different perspective the thesis 
of Kesselman and Garfinkel (1978, p.215), that the CIT offers “minimal disruption of 
laissez-faire principles...” (op cit p97). Further, "2. Dual rate NITs for which marginal 
tax rate exceeds benefit withdrawal rate offer scope for further improvement" (p98), and 
"3. Redistribution schemes designed to secure perfect equality below the tax threshold 
[ie with a 100% BRR] are inferior to all others" (op cit p99).
In Australia Creedy (1994) has compared means-tested and universal transfer schemes 
using microsimulation techniques applied to a synthetic income distribution. Creedy 
generalised these results using a social welfare function based on individual utility on 
the assumption that leisure has a positive value. In addition the welfare functions used 
include the Atkinson as well as the Gini measures of inequality; these imply very 
different social evaluation functions. The main finding is that...'the optimum marginal 
rate of linear tax will always produce both a higher value of social welfare, and a lower 
poverty measure, than any modified [selective] scheme' (Creedy 1994 p.10). This
inequality rises (G is always greater than 0 and less than 1).
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conclusion is re-iterated in Creedy 1996: "...the maximum value of social welfare (for 
both the Atkinson- and Gini-based abbreviated welfare functions) is higher with the 
linear tax than with the two-rate schedule" (pi63).
An interesting refinement in Creedy's 1996 study is the extension of the analysis to 
allow for the relief of poverty as an important or primary objective, reflecting the focus 
of those who use the target efficiency measure to justify the use of means testing (pi 61). 
However even with this objective,".. .the optimum marginal rate in the linear tax will 
always produce both a higher value of social welfare, and a lower poverty measure, than 
any modified minimum income guarantee scheme. The difference is more marked the 
greater the degree of inequality aversion of the welfare function" (pi 65).
4.3.2 Arguments for tight targeting
More recently, there have been several studies that have cast doubt on this apparent 
academic consensus in favour of a constant marginal tax rate. One is the finding that 
the NIT approach to tapering does not necessarily induce greater work effort than do 
more targeted approaches. Evidence from the US Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) 
scheme suggests that easing of the program taper rules in 1967 (from 100 to 67%) and 
the subsequent reintroduction of the 100% rate in 1982 had very little net effect on 
labour supply, partly because: "The econometric evidence on this issue now strongly 
suggests that the labour supply effects on old and new recipients essentially cancel each 
other out, at least over the relevant range of guarantees and BRRs [benefit reduction 
rates}"... (Moffitt 1992, p41).
In effect, although current recipients are ‘incentivized’ by easing taper rates, the newly 
eligible population is disincentivized. Although this is as predicted by economic theory, 
we have not in the past had empirical estimates as to the relative magnitudes of 
incentive and disincentive effects. It must however be said that these results cannot be 
generalised to the Australian situation, since they may also reflect peculiarities in the 
US setting such as the relative lack of government support for child care costs.
Bradbury (1999) surveys optimal tax theory and what it says about the optimal structure 
of EMTRs. He notes that while no simple answers emerge from the literature, it has 
begun to clearly identify the factors that might be important. These fall into two 
categories: aspects of the empirical reality of labour supply and skills, and normative 
assumptions about the goals of social policy (p.iii).
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In the traditional welfare optimisation framework, the fact that low skilled workers may 
withdraw from the labour force because of a transfer program is not necessarily a bar to 
the program. The utility they gain from greater leisure is evaluated positively. But if 
poverty alleviation is the social goal, rather than welfare maximisation, no value is 
placed on the leisure of the poor (in some frameworks it may even have a negative 
value). Compared to a welfarist measure, a poverty alleviation perspective tends to lead 
to somewhat higher marginal rates, especially at the low end, driven by the need to 
focus resources on those below the poverty line.
Two things seem clear from Bradbury’s survey. First, a U-shaped or falling structure of 
marginal rates may well be called for, rather than a constant marginal rate . In 
simulations with relatively inelastic labour supply, and assuming that poverty 
alleviation is emphasised rather than welfare maximisation, some research suggests that 
marginal rates at the very lowest end (ie the 1 Oth percentile) of the wage distribution 
should be close to 90%.
Second, administrative issues are also important. If fully effective labour incentive 
programs (such as workfare) are available, it can be optimal to tax the least skilled 
workers at a marginal rate of 100%. However, attention needs also to be paid to the 
demand side of the labour market, and how this might interact with measures to increase 
labour supply.
There is a large and diverse literature available in the US about the elasticity of taxable 
income with respect to tax changes, some of it discussed in the previous chapter. Gruber 
and Saez (2000) find that the overall elasticity of taxable income of about 0.4 is 
primarily explained by a very elastic response among taxpayers with incomes over 
$US 100,000 pa. They note that . .the substantial concern currently expressed about 
the distorting impact of high implicit tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution 
may be overblown... the distributional advantages of tightly targeted tax subsidies [such 
as the EITC] may outweigh the efficiency costs of high implicit marginal rates on the 
lower middle income taxpayers, as is illustrated by the high optimal rates in this bracket 
in our simulations” (G&S 2000 p33). This finding implies that the optimal tax structure
39 Sometimes called “degressive”, a word used rather than “regressive” because falling marginal rates can 
co-exist with rising average rates in the presence of cash transfers, and it is the average rates which 
determine the progressivity or otherwise of the system.
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might consist of a large demogrant that is rapidly taxed away for low-income earners, 
with lower marginal rates at high-income levels.
A related view supporting tight targeting is that, if we are to means test, its better to get 
it over with quickly so that the adverse incentive effects of benefit withdrawal do not 
extend too far into the income distribution. The OECD, in its Jobs Study (1994), 
mounts an interesting argument for having either tight targeting, or none at all. It 
suggest that in paying a means tested unemployment benefit, the average effective 
marginal rate across the working population can be minimised by either 100% tapers, or 
complete universality.
This is demonstrated, for a hypothetical income distribution, in Table 9.11 of the 
Report. This considers an economy where unemployment benefits are set at ten units 
and there is a roughly normal distribution of earnings. This Table is reproduced below 
(Table 4.1) with the addition of the two end rows, showing the effect of 12.25 and 0% 
BRRs, respectively. This last calculation approximates a non-categorical demogrant 
scheme. In addition, the ETRs are re-calculated to show the impact of the positive taxes 
necessary to finance benefits, assuming they are levied equi-proportionately on all non­
benefit income.
Table 4.1: average effective tax rates: hypothetical case
income no of people 
with such 
income
total
income
received
BRRs: 100.00 50.00 33.30 25.00 12.25 0.00
10.00 100.00 1000.00 100.00 51.20 36.50 31.00 28.60 28.60
20.00 200.00 4000.00 0.00 51.20 36.50 31.00 28.60 28.60
30.00 300.00 9000.00 0.00 1.20 36.50 31.00 28.60 28.60
40.00 300.00 12000.00 0.00 1.20 3.20 31.00 28.60 28.60
50.00 200.00 10000.00 0.00 1.20 3.20 6.00 28.60 28.60
60.00 100.00 6000.00 0.00 1.20 3.20 6.00 28.60 28.60
TOTAL 1200.00 42000.00
av. ETR 8.30 13.70 19.90 24.80 28.60 28.60
Memo.
item:
OECD
figures
8.30 12.50 16.70 18.80 12.25
(a)
0.0
(a)
Source: OECD 1994 Table 9.11, p266; ETRs recalculated to show effect o f financing
taxes.
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(a) These figures not calculated by OECD but are based on their methodology. This 
method gives increasingly misleading results as the cost o f the scheme rises.
The OECD infers from its Table that disincentives, as reflected in the average ETR, 
might be minimised by making benefits either wholly means-tested (100% BRR) or 
fully universal (zero BRR - p267). In fact the latter conclusion is erroneous, and 
appears to arise from not including the impact of the taxes necessary to finance the 
scheme. This is made clear from a comparison of the average ETRs calculated on the 
OECD method, and those re-calculated by myself to include financing costs (last two 
rows of Table 4.1). On this mathematics, and with the normal income distribution 
assumed40, a highly selective scheme would appear likely to always result in the lowest 
average EMTR. The OECD also suggests that this conclusion would be buttressed if 
the average EMTR were weighted by income to which it applied, rather than to the 
number of persons.
A further argument for a short and sharp means test is that, otherwise, some among the 
unemployed may find it worthwhile to combine part-time earnings with benefit on a 
more or less permanent basis. The OECD argues that the experiences of Belgium and 
Norway, where unemployment benefit means tests were liberalised to allow more part- 
time work, illustrate this problem: both employers and employees altered their 
behaviour to take advantage of the possibility of working part-time while claiming 
benefits. The result was a "costly growth in the incidence of part-time work among 
people who would otherwise be working full-time" (OECD 1994, p. 198). However the 
OECD notes that a 100% taper has a marked effect on the workforce participation rates 
of wives (1994, p 271).
The OECD recognises that the arguments for a "short and sharp" means test, based on 
the mathematics shown in Table 4.1, depend on a number of assumptions: first, that the 
earnings distribution is roughly normal, second, that labour supply disincentives are 
minimised by minimising the average marginal tax rate, and third, that we are 
concerned with total employment rather than with total hours worked. Their following 
comments relate to these points.
1. As regards the earnings distribution, the OECD argues that whereas the 
assumption of a normal (or at least a lognormal) distribution may be
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appropriate for prime age males, it is not so for sole parents and married 
women. A 100% BRR on family income would place many such women in 
a poverty trap (p267). Hence, "the argument for high BRRs for benefits in 
order to minimise average marginal rates looks rather weaker for females 
than it does for males" (p269). However policy options also include other 
methods, such as disregards or subsidies for child care costs.
2. The optimal tax/benefit schedule is sensitive to the relative elasticity of 
labour supply for low earners as compared with high earners. There is some 
evidence that high marginal rates on high earners have less cost in terms of 
work disincentives (p269).
3. "The result of exceptionally high marginal rates for those with low incomes 
may be a reduced attachment to the workforce. The link between effort... 
[and reward] is broken, leading to potential disillusionment with the formal 
job market, and reliance on other sources of income" (p270).
Even if one accepts the argument for a short sharp means test, it is by no means clear 
that the taper rate should be 100%. Oliver's (1997) analysis shows the theoretical 
possibility that this would not be cost-minimising for taxpayers. Lambert (1990) 
calculates, using an optimal tax model, that "the withdrawal of cash benefits at a 100% 
rate against earnings does not, in general, minimise the marginal rate faced by 
taxpayers" (pi02).
4.3.3 Studies on the marginal welfare cost of redistribution
By contrast, Bascard and Porter (B&P 1986) have sought to demonstrate that selective 
transfers involve less efficiency costs than universal ones. This demonstration was part 
of a study to establish the marginal efficiency cost of redistribution in Australia. The 
study initially follows the procedure of Browning and Johnson (1984), who posit a 
redistributive demogrant scheme which provides equal per capita transfers funded by a 
one percentage point increase in existing effective tax rates. On this methodology, B&P 
find that the marginal cost of a dollar net increase in income among poorer households 
is $2.30. However, where alternative redistributive schemes involving some targeting
40 In fact a lognormal distribution is found to better fit actual populations.
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are adopted, the ratios of loss to gain were reduced to 1.5 and 1.641 respectively; well 
below the cost of the universal scheme.
Campbell and Bond, who broadly follow the B&P methodology, find a somewhat lower 
efficiency cost of transfers ($1.80 for the demogrant) but, consistent with B&P, some 
benefit from selectivity: confining the demogrant to deciles 1 -5 reduces the efficiency 
cost of transfers to $1.20 (1997 pi 90). However it is not clear whether, or how, the 
necessary higher tax rates in deciles 5-6 were modelled in this study.
These findings are subject to serious reservations. Both B&P and Browning (1993) 
model the higher marginal rates on low-income earners that are a necessary corollary of 
greater selectivity. However B&P confine this higher rate to the third quintile of 
earners (pp.364-365). Browning, in stark contrast to B&P, models a higher rate for all 
households below the NIT breakeven points, and finds that "marginal cost cannot be 
reduced simply by using a lower break-even level and restricting transfers only to those 
with quite low earnings. Indeed, the opposite is true". (1993, p22). Further, "...moving 
from a linear income tax to a more general NIT type of policy does not produce a 
substantial decrease in the marginal cost of redistribution" (p24). Since Browning (with 
Johnson, 1984) is one of the pioneers of research in this area, his comments carry 
considerable weight.
4.3.4 Conclusion on the optimal taper rate
As the qualifications attached to the OECD analysis make clear, neither the 'minimise 
economic inefficiency' nor the 'get it over with' approach is really satisfactory. The 
optimal set of taxes and tapers depends upon the labour supply elasticities of the 
relevant groups, the density of the income distribution over the zone where tapers apply, 
and the degree of inequality (or poverty) aversion in one's social welfare function. The 
theoretically appropriate approach to determining optimal tapers therefore requires a 
detailed micro-simulation model showing the actual distribution of income among the 
target group. To this must be added estimates of relevant labour supply elasticities, 
disaggregated as necessary according to earnings, sex and so on. Adjustments must also 
be made for labour supply effects among the non-target (taxpaying) population. To test 
whether a proposed change to BRRs is a welfare improvement compared to the old
4 1 The figure given in B&P is 1.1. Campbell and Bond (1997c p i90, fh. 1) note that this appears to be a 
misprint and provide the figure of 1.6.
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requires the further step of specifying some explicit index of inequality aversion, which 
is used to adjust the new measure of output.
Clearly this is a hairy and complex task. In Australia optimal tax theorists such as 
Creedy (1996) have attempted it for a hypothetical income distribution; it has not been 
done on a full micro-simulation basis. However there is no reason in principle why it 
could not be attempted. In practice the results would have to be presented in the form of 
a sensitivity matrix using for example, labour supply elasticities in the high, medium 
and low range, and a similar range of inequality aversion indicators (see Appendix to 
chapter 3). Only if one policy was found to dominate another across a substantial 
number of cells could we be reasonably confident of its superiority.
4.4 Optimal tax on families
If a uniform tax rate were to apply to all income beyond the basic transfer payments, the 
effect would be to convert family assistance to a universal basis42. That is, at any given 
level of private income a family will be better off than a non-family by the amount of 
the supplements for children. These can be very substantial, especially for older 
children and students. This is one reason for the high costs of the Dawkins et al NIT.
As with the question of the optimal tax/taper rate, it probably doesn't matter much in 
economic terms whether family assistance is universal or selective: there are 
countervailing arguments in both directions. Selective assistance implies higher ETRs 
on families than on individuals and childless couples with similar levels of income, and 
consequently lower general tax rates; the economic cost of the high ETRs on families 
weigh against the gain from the latter. Nor is it clear which is the more equitable 
solution. Some may feel that relatively well off families have made their own choice to 
have children, and require no community subsidy in consequence.
My view is that so long as family assistance is not tapered too steeply with rising 
income, there is no real problem with a selective system of family assistance and the 
associated higher effective marginal rates that must in consequence apply to families. 
But what is 'too' steep must ultimately be a matter for judgement; in Ingles (1997) I 
argued that (then) current EMTRs on families were so steep that they could easily cause 
"switching" among the rank order of family well-being, and thus violate conventional
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notions of horizontal and vertical equity. Moreover such EMTRs provided virtually no 
allowance for the extra costs, like childcare, necessarily incurred by a second income 
earner in earning an income. In Ch 5 I show that the NTS package addresses these 
problems effectively, by reducing family payment tapers to 30%.
Should this taper be lower than that for both pensions and allowances? In the case of 
pensions the 40% taper combines with income tax to produce an ETR of around 60%, 
which is also the ETR produced by the combination of 30% family payment taper and 
30% income tax. So policy has -  possibly accidentally -  landed at a point where a 60% 
ETR is achieved throughout. In the case of allowances and Parenting Payment 
(Partnered), however, the initial ETR is close to 80%, so the 60% ETR for families is a 
step down.
As argued earlier, the justification for this might be that it makes sense to have a high 
taper in the initial range of low income where they affect relatively few people, but once 
we are in income zones where a considerable number of families are present, the rate 
should not be too draconian. Moreover there are horizontal equity benefits from 
spreading family assistance into a range of income brackets. Certainly my view is that 
the current situation is theoretically defensible and a great improvement on the previous 
situation where ETRs of 80 and 90% prevailed through the family taper zones.
4.5 The free area
I have not seen explicit attention given to free areas in optimal tax analysis. Normally 
the assumption is made that the poor are to be helped by the basic guarantee payment, 
and all income above this is to be taxed at the calculated necessary rate. From a tax 
policy and administration perspective, there are obviously advantages in taxing all 
income at a single uniform rate. For example, it makes source withholding much easier, 
and reduces the gains from income splitting and other avoidance devices. Dawkins et al 
do not explicitly discuss free areas but appear to contemplate their effective abolition as 
part of the proportional income tax under the NIT.
Free areas are important because, if tapers are eased without downward adjustment to 
free areas, the overall costs to revenue could be significant. There is also a possibility 
that benefits would be perceived to extend too far up the income scale, creating
Universal payments are those paid free of means test. Payments that are reduced as income rises are
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invidious comparisons (in a categorical system) relative to the non-eligible working 
population. Moreover the free areas for family payments are roughly related to the 
cutout points for basic pensions and benefits. The two tapers cannot be allowed to 
overlap to any great extent, without causing a zone where EMTRs exceed 100%, so that 
if benefit cut-out points rise so too will the family payment threshold need to rise, with 
associated cost implications.43
It can be questioned whether there is any remaining theoretical justification for free 
areas in the social security system. Prior to the invention of the tapered means test in the 
1960s free areas would have had some benefit in terms of incentives to work and save, 
but once the 50% pension taper was introduced (along with the possibility of other 
tapers) they really have ceased to have a consistent rationale. They create a kink in the 
budget opportunity set facing clients, which must cause a strong tendency for their 
incomes to cluster below that point. This can indeed be observed in income statistics 
for income support recipients, especially for the aged.
On the basis of this sort of a priori reasoning it seems highly likely that a combination 
of no free area, a higher basic rate and/or a lower taper will always dominate (in terms 
of social welfare) an equal cost combination involving some free area, on virtually any 
reasonable assumptions about the income distribution of the relevant client group, the 
relevant labour supply elasticities, and the degree of inequality or poverty aversion 
specified. If the benefit cutout point is taken as a given, any free area will always 
require that tapers be higher than otherwise. From the viewpoint of work incentives, 
there is a strong presumption that any tradeoff involving lower tapers and lower free 
areas will be beneficial.
Why then do we persevere with free areas? First, the arguments above have not been 
widely disseminated or understood. Moreover they are at this stage only theoretical and 
have yet to be backed up by testing with microsimulation. The political difficulty of 
withdrawing an existing benefit is also an important factor: pensioners with low private 
incomes would be losers, whereas the gainers from lower tapers would be further up the 
income scale44. (However free areas could be phased out fairly quickly, without losers
referred to as "selective".
43 These comments are less relevant for the aged, who are unlikely to have dependent children.
44 Note that this would also be an issue under the Dawkins et al NIT, despite their assertion that the basic 
option "leaves no existing social security recipient worse off' (1997 p2).
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in nominal terms, if they were reduced at each indexed pension rise). Another difficulty 
with any reform meant to have behavioural responses is that the costs are short term, 
whereas the hoped-for benefits in terms of behavioural responses are likely to emerge 
only over time. Finally, our current budgetary mechanisms commonly provide little 
weight to hoped-for long term behavioural change - partly reflective of our inability, 
with existing models, to satisfactorily model such change.45
An additional explanation for at least some free areas, like the additional income 
disregard for each dependent child, may be that they were originally intended to 
compensate for inadequacies in additional payments, and in childcare support. It is 
questionable whether such an explanation would have any current validity.
An important argument for free areas has been administrative: "assessing and paying a 
part-rate benefit is a considerable administrative load and also imposes compliance 
costs. Ignoring a small amount of income avoids these costs for most recipients"
(Oliver 1997 p.7). However this argument is really an assertion, albeit a frequent one, 
without supporting evidence. Prior to the reform of rent assistance in the mid-1980s 
there was in fact a minimal free area - $2 pw - for this benefit, and it is not clear that this 
created administrative problems. Moreover, the administrative argument ignores the 
potential simplification attendant upon a single proportional tax on all private income, 
noted above. The administrative costs argument might (or might not) justify the 
allowance free areas of $31 a week; it would not appear to justify the pension ones.
A final argument for free areas is that there are fixed costs involved in work and the 
initial income required to cover these ought not to not be taxed. This argument would, 
however, also appear to suggest free areas closer to those now provided for allowances 
than those for pensions. The biggest cost of work for many people is childcare, but this 
is subsidised under a separate scheme.
Surprisingly, the "poverty traps reduction package" introduced in the mid-1980s 
concentrated almost entirely on raising free areas, not on reducing tapers. The 
consequence was that the problem of high EMTRs was moved out to other zones in the 
income distribution where the interaction with the tax system became even more acute. 
It may be that some "poverty traps" were converted to Tow income traps’ in this
45 A project (MITTS) is currently being pursued by the Melbourne Institute to rectify this. See Creedy 
and Dawkins 2000.
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process, but it is hard to see that this provided any real long-term remedy to the 
underlying problem of high EMTRs.
By contrast the “Working nation” changes reducing allowance tapers and introducing a 
partly individual basis of assessment were effective in reducing the very high EMTRs 
that had previously prevailed in relation to allowances, although with EMTRs in some 
income ranges still close to 90% (Chapter 5), it might be questioned whether these 
changes have gone far enough.
The family payment (FTB) free area ($28,200 with one child, plus $624 for each extra 
child) is obviously a different kettle of fish. These are not only basic income support 
payments, but also supplements meant to provide horizontal equity between low-income 
families with and without children. In practice the free areas need to be at least as high 
as the cutout points for Newstart and Parenting Payment, otherwise the tapers will stack. 
This is pretty much the current situation, except for some issues that are discussed in 
Chapter 5.
4.6 Should tapers be common to all categorically eligible groups?
Economic theory tells us that we can usefully differentiate between categories of payees 
according to their different elasticities of labour supply, etc. In theory this could 
provide a rationale for different means tests regimes (and for different rates). In 
practice our current rate and means test structure has never been explicitly justified 
along these lines, and probably could not be. Moreover the informational requirements 
for such an optimisation strategy are extreme. The very act of categorisation creates 
incentives for people to attempt to move into favoured categories. Often we have very 
little basis for choosing one category over another (sickness, invalidity, mature age 
unemployment), and the dividing lines are inevitably arbitrary. If people have some 
flexibility in choosing their preferred income support payment, behavioural effects 
could be totally at odds with those that might originally have been predicted.
An important issue is whether there ought to be a systemic discrimination in favour of 
long-term clients. There is some argument for this in relation to maximum rates: 
whereas short term recipients may be thought able to run down their assets for some 
period, long term recipients may run out of assets to run down. The Budget Standards 
study (Saunders et al 1998) shows that asset depreciation can potentially be a very 
important item in clients' budgets. However, the current system poorly identifies long-
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term and short-term clients. Moreover the appropriate response to this issue would 
probably be a supplement payable after a certain time on the system, not differing 
tapers.
Another issue is whether there ought to be different tapers for age pensioners compared 
to those of workforce age. This issue has become more cogent under the 40% pension 
taper in the Government’s tax package (NTS). The economic argument for this might 
be that the aged have a long time to plan for their retirement, so that the behavioural 
effect of means testing is greater. This argument assumes that the elasticity of saving 
with respect to the net rate of return is greater than the elasticity of work with respect to 
the net wage rate, although both have been the subject of controversy in the literature 
and, if anything, it seems more likely that savings respond to net returns more 
inelastically than does work effort, especially work effort of those with a marginal 
attachment to the labour force. On the other hand it seems likely that the form in which 
savings are held is very elastic with respect to the tax rate, with the present system 
strongly favouring exempt forms such as the owner-occupied house. This provides an 
argument for a lower taper on retirees.
On balance I don't see a strong economic argument for discriminating between the aged 
and other client groups in respect of tapers. However this is a tentative conclusion in 
the absence of any firm economic evidence on behavioural effects. If superannuation 
tax concessions were further reduced the argument for a more relaxed taper on age 
pensions (compared to workforce age payments) might have more force, in order to 
maintain a reasonable net rate of return on retirement savings.46 This argument is 
discussed more fully in Chapter 8.
4.7 Conclusion
The previous apparent consensus in the academic literature pointing towards the social 
optimality of linear taxation appears to have evaporated following recent studies 
suggesting that higher rates on the low-income population may well be economically 
efficient. However considerable reservations attach to the conclusions in the latter class 
of studies, and it must be said that there are a number of unresolved inconsistencies, 
particularly in that important class of studies which relate to the marginal welfare cost
46 It must be conceded that this argument is weakened by the presence of an increasing element of 
compulsion in superannuation savings.
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of redistribution. Resolution to these questions awaits the development of more 
sophisticated computer microsimulation models allowing for behavioural response to 
tax changes, and allowing the injection of specific value judgements as to the 
desirability of the distribution of incomes which flows from alternative policies.
On balance it would be premature to conclude in favour of either a selective or a 
universal policy in the Australian context in the absence of such a full-scale behavioural 
microsimulation study. However the number of contentious assumptions that will be 
required in such a modelling exercise (relating to behavioural elasticities and the social 
welfare function) probably mean that there will never be an unambiguous answer. The 
possibility should also be borne in mind that what may be an optimal solution for the 
aged, for example, might be quite different to that for the unemployed. Such 
differences can in principle be modelled (assuming we know what are the relevant 
labour supply and saving elasticities), but social and political judgements (eg that the 
aged "deserve" a more liberal means test than the unemployed) will also continue to 
play an important role which cannot easily be modelled.
My reading of the literature is that more selective solutions will be found to be more 
efficient than universal ones on most behavioural assumptions. However I also 
anticipate that selective solutions will have less favourable distributional effects47, so 
the social welfare optimising solution cannot be reliably predicted on the basis of our 
current knowledge. The bottom line is that we should ‘hasten slowly’ in moving to any 
current structure of effective tax rates radically different to that now prevailing.
47 This is not necessarily an obvious result. The optimal tax literature has examined these issues within 
the framework o f the maximisation of a social welfare function which incorporates both equity and 
efficiency goals. It is difficult to separate out a purely distributional result in this context (even the 
Rawlsian SWF implies a concern with efficiency issues). Given that inequality-averse SWFs tend to 
imply higher tax rates, it is possible that concern with distributional issues might lead to more selectivity 
than the reverse.
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5 CHAPTER 5: RATIONALISING THE INTERACTION OF TAX
AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
5.1 Introduction
This chapter considers options for addressing problems in the way the tax and social 
security systems interact. These include
• complexity (in both systems), with associated lack of clarity, loss of client 
understanding, possibilities of poor take-up, and lack of equity (see eg Harding 
1997b, Dawkins et al 1998a);
• high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) over some income ranges due to tax and 
means test interactions, with associated "low income traps"48 (Ingles 1997, Beer 
1998);
• "notches", where there is a 'sudden death' loss of benefit at some point;
• means test "stacking" - ie, where two or more means tested benefits are withdrawn 
over the same range of income;
• "churning", meaning that some clients both receive benefits and pay tax at the same 
time; and
• lack of support for many low wage earners just outside the boundaries of the transfer 
system, with pressures for yet more targeted payments for low-income earners 
(Dawkins and Freebaim 1997).
These problems are sufficiently extensive to create the likelihood of perverse effects on 
work and savings, particularly for those at the margin of the labour force. In addition, 
the fact that the two systems overlap widely, such that many clients are liable to tax and 
means testing on the same income, implies that administrative and compliance costs are 
likely to be unnecessarily high.
The starting point for this chapter is the social security reforms -  the simplification of 
family payments and reduction in tapers - contained in the Government’s New Tax 
System (NTS -  Costello 1998). These reforms substantially reduce “Low income traps 
for working families” as described in Ingles 1997.
48 A term which I will use in preference to "poverty traps", since not all areas of high EMTRs are 
confined to those in poverty.
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This chapter argues that while these reforms are very positive they could have gone 
further. Particular problem areas remaining include:
• “stacking” of means tests for the new Family Tax Benefit (FTB) and Youth 
Allowances, which creates high effective tax rates (ETRs);
• stacking of means tests for FTB parts (A) and (B), causing disincentives for 
secondary income earners in particular; and
• high ETRs for couples on the allowance margins (ie on single incomes just above 
the minimum wage).
These problems are detailed below, and some remedies suggested. However it must be 
recognised at the outset that dealing with ETR problems is like dealing with a rubber 
ball that bulges in places: pushing in the bulge at one spot inevitably causes it to bulge 
somewhere else. High ETRs can be levelled down only by raising tax rates for others, 
or taxes in general. Ultimately the question becomes one of the optimal structure of tax 
rates on both the beneficiary and the non-beneficiary populations, one which I discussed 
in Ingles 1998b. That article concludes that the case for a linear structure of marginal 
tax rates is not unambiguous, and that there may be merit in the current approach of 
high effective taxes on low incomes -  at least until better information is available on the 
effects of changing tax/taper rates.
The NTS provides for a sweeping reform of the family payment system (details in 
Appendix A). One part of this is a substantial increase in family payment thresholds, to 
avoid "sudden death" losses for some people coming off benefit. Further, there is a cut 
in the taper on family payment49 from 50% to 30%. I will show that this keeps ETRs 
below 75-85% over the relevant taper zones, a substantial improvement on existing 
ETRs.
However, the reform of family assistance raises a number of issues. The means test for 
the new “Family Tax Benefit” Part A -  FTB(A) - overlaps with that for the old Austudy 
cum new Youth Allowance. These interactions are potentially quite serious. There is 
therefore a case for action in relation to Youth Allowance thresholds and tapers in 
multiple child families. The specific proposal contained here could be implemented for
49Family payment is a generic term covering the old minimum and base rate family allowance, and the 
new “family tax benefit” under the NTS.
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a comparatively modest cost of around $200-300m pa., assuming no behavioural 
change.
Further, stacking between the means tests for FTB (A), FTB (B), and Parenting 
Payment (Partnered) has the potential to be a problem in terms of the work incentives 
facing spouses with young children. This can be addressed for little or no net cost 
provided we are willing to accept some redistribution within the family payment 
system. The specific option proposed is that FTB(B) be added to the base rate for 
FTB(A), and abolished as a separate payment. This means that there would no longer 
be any circumstances where the two payments could abate simultaneously.
The Keating and Lambert (1998a and b) proposal for aggregating all family payments 
and tapering them sequentially would be one means of rationalising means test 
interactions. However I will argue that it could be substantially implemented by the 
strategy outlined here of unstacking FTB, Youth Allowance and possibly Rent 
Allowance by provision of appropriate disregards in the relevant means tests. 
Nonetheless it provides a useful concept for guiding further reform.
Outside of the families area, another set of reform options involves reductions in tapers 
on basic income support payments, notably the allowance taper which remains at 50% 
cum 70% under the NTS (the pension taper reduces to 40%). However there are 
problems with reducing the allowance taper; it is expensive, and it extends assistance 
further up the income scale to people whom many might not consider to be "in need". It 
can thus exacerbate inequities between those in, and those outside of, the categorically 
eligible population. Finally, it can create problems for the family payment system, 
given that family payments cannot sensibly commence to taper until after basic income 
support is fully abated. I conclude that, while a single taper of 60% might be a useful 
short-term reform goal, priority needs to be given to reducing taxes on all low-income 
families - irrespective of whether they are working or in the allowance system.
5.1.1 Some basic parameters
Social security terminology is not always clear. In this chapter I will refer to pensions 
as being all those benefits having a pension-like means test - ie a $53/$94 pw free area 
and 40% taper (including the aged, Disability Support pensioners and sole parents who 
now receive "Parenting Payment - Unpartnered" -  PPU). Allowances are those benefits
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having an allowance income test: ie a smaller $31 pw free area and 50/70% taper (see 
below). Benefit is a generic term covering both pensions and allowances.
The pension withdrawal rate on income in excess of the free areas was reduced from 50 
to 40% under the NTS. By contrast the allowance system parameters are almost 
unchanged, apart from small increases in thresholds. The free area for the main 
allowance-type benefits (Newstart Allowance (NSA), Parenting Payment (Partnered) 
(PPP) etc) is $31 pw, for each adult. The initial taper is 50% but this rises to 70% 
beyond $72 pw, except in the case of a Parenting Payment (Partnered) Allowee for 
whom the second step now occurs at $121.50 pw.
For pensions, the income unit is the couple; for Newstart Allowance/PPP couples it is 
an amalgam of individual and combined income unit. The personal income test applies 
to each of a married couple. However, once the high-income earner ceases to receive 
Newstart Allowance/PPP any additional income received by them tapers the partner’s 
payment at 70%.
By contrast the tax unit is predominantly the individual, although this is modified by the 
dependent spouse rebate (DSR) and the Medicare levy. The interaction of the 
individual tax unit and the couple unit mainly used in the social security system is the 
cause of some of the problems in social security and tax interactions, an issue 1 address 
explicitly in Chapter 6.
Most basic pensions and allowances are taxable, Disability Support Pension (DSP) 
being a notable exception. However a system of rebates operates to protect full-rate 
beneficiaries from being subject to tax. Family payments and Rent Allowance are not 
subject to taxation. The reason for this is that to assess these as taxable income would 
lower the effective tax threshold for families, and therefore undermine the adequacy of 
these payments unless they were grossed up considerably -  thereby increasing the 
apparent level of welfare outlays without having any effect on the actual adequacy of 
the payments themselves.
If a benefit is not taxable the taper rate and tax rate can be added to give the EMTR 
applying. If it is taxable, the interactive effect means that the EMTR is less than the 
sum of those two rates, since tax applies to the increment to private income less the loss 
of benefit. A similar procedure applies when two means tests are ’’stacked": ie, it is not 
always appropriate to simply add their taper rates in order to calculate the EMTR.
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5.1.2 Means test tapers and EMTRs
The effective tax rate which applies at any level of income needs to be calculated by 
reference to both the tax and social security systems. In practice, quite complicated 
computer models are used to do this; the results are often shown graphically by plotting 
the EMTR against private income. It is usual to also plot disposable income on the 
same graph, since the two are closely related.50 Chart 5.1 shows an example, for an 
allowee couple as at July 2000.
Chart 5.1: EMTRs and disposable income 
NSA/PPP Allowee couple - rates at July 2000 
No children, paying private rent of $200.00pw, 
100% of private income to head
100%
80%E $700
60% cc
g $500
5  $400
£ $300
$1,000 $1,200$600
Weekly Private Income
—•—Weekly Disposable Income —►— EMTR
It must be stressed that these sort of calculations necessarily embody a range of 
simplifying assumptions, such that the EMTRs shown are somewhat theoretical and 
may not reflect the actual incentives facing a family at a point in time. For example, in 
the case of Youth Allowance the income tests normally relate to a prior financial year, 
whereas the calculations assume that all income tests operate on a current annual basis -  
or, equivalently, that income is spread evenly over and within years, such that the exact 
definition of the income period makes no difference to the outcome. This is one reason 
for uncertainty about the behavioural impact of high EMTRs.
^Mathematically, the derivative of the disposable income graph with respect to private income gives the 
effective marginal gain, which equals 1 -EMTR.
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High EMTRs show as dips or plateaus in the disposable income line. People find it 
difficult or impossible to improve their net income position by earning more over such 
ranges. Chart 5.1 shows that an allowee couple gains relatively little from earnings 
between $50 and $500 pw. High EMTRs affect most basic allowance payments, 
notwithstanding the 1994 reforms to Newstart Allowance and related payments 
reducing the maximum rate of taper from 100% to 70% and introducing a partly 
individual basis of assessment.
5.2 Impact of the government’s New Tax System (NTS)
EMTR graphs can conveniently be reduced to summary measures of effective average 
tax rates (EATRs), calculated over a given range of income. This is the basis of Table 
5.1, which summarise effective tax rates affecting a range of client family types in $100 
bands up to $ 1,000. This table illustrates that there are some bands of income where 
families either gain marginally by earning extra income, or in some cases may go 
backwards.
This Table shows two "hotspots" where very high ETRs (over 85%) continue to occur 
even after the implementation of the NTS. The first set relate to allowee couples with 
an income of between $400 and $500 a week. In this income range loss of allowance 
(taper = 70%) co-exists with income tax of up to 30%, resulting in ETRs over 90% and 
hence very small net gains.
Another problem area concerns spouses of low wage earners in the income range $100 
to $200 a week. This is where the loss of family payments can become a serious work 
disincentive (ETRs exceed 85%), especially if childcare costs were to be taken into 
account.
Table 5.2 summarises effective average tax rates for a range of families, and the impact 
that the NTS package has had. It has eight columns, with the odd columns prior to the 
NTS and the evens, after. Cols 1 and 2 show EATRs calculated over the range from the 
benefit free area to the cutout point; Cols 3 and 4 show EATRs over the family payment 
threshold to the cutout; Cols 5 and 6 combine Cols 1 and 3; 2 and 4; and Cols 7 and 8 
calculate the EATR from nil income -  ie, taking into account the impact of the free 
areas.
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pre post- pre post- pre post- pre post-
ANTSANTS ANTS ANTS ANTS ANTS ANTS ANTS
FAMILY TYPE pension ETR AFP ETR FTB ETR com bined ETR ETR from zero
1 sole parent, I child, RA 0.62 0.61 0.89 0.61 0.71 0.62 0.64 0.57
_____I................. J.........................
2 sole parent, 2 children, RA 0.64 0.62 0.89 0.65 0.74 0.63 0.66 0.58
I ! ] | j
3 sole parent, 3 children, RA 0.65 0.61 0.91 0.69 0.78 0.66 0.70 0.61
I ......I................... .....J _ _ ..........
4 sole parent, 2 children 0.63 0.62 0.89
..............
0.67 0.72 0.63 0.63 0.57
i .................. I.......... ........ ..... ................... j
5 N S A /P P P  couple, I child, RA 0.81 0.76 0.90 0.62 0.81 0.69 0.77 0.66
100:0 incom e split
N S A /P P P  couple, 2 children, RA 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.58 0.80 0.67 0.74 0.64
50%  split
N S A /P P P  couple, 2 children, RA 0.81 0.76 0.88 0.63 0.80 0.68 0.77 0.66
100 split
8 single NSA, no children, RA 0.82 0.80 0.76 0.73
i . J .........................
9 single NSA, no children 0.79 0.78
.......
0.72 0.70
10 NSA couple, no children, RA 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.78
100 split
11 NSA couple, no children 0.80 0.79 0.73 0.71
12
RA, 50%  sp lit
s ingle age pensioner, no children 0.73 0.63 0.65 0.57
RA
13 single age pensioner, no children 0.68 0.61 0.60 0.55
! ......
14 Age pension couple, RA, 100 split 0.76 0.65 0.68 0.59
r  i i ..................
15 Age pension couple, no children 0.74 0.63 | 0.65 0.57
100 split
i..................
NOTES  1 ch ild  - under 5; 2 children; 1 under 5 and 1 5-12; 3 children add child 13-15.
ETR: effective tax rate RA - recei\es maximum Rent Allowance
AFP: additional fam ily paym ent PPP - Parenting payment (partnered) !.................
FTB: fam ily tax benefit NSA - Newstart A llowance
Although Col 4 shows lower EATRs than do the other columns, it is interesting that the 
EATRs so calculated are still all over 57%, and as high as 78%.
Table 5.3 shows the percentage point reduction due to the NTS for each of these family 
types. The NTS has had a marked impact on family payment ETRs, reducing them by 
between 12 and 30 percentage points. The "low income trap" for families, which I 
described in Ingles (1997), can therefore be regarded as pretty well resolved except for the 
specific problems I will discuss.
Table 5.3: reduction in ETRs under the NTS
family
benefit payment combined ETR from
FAMILY TYPE ETR ETR ETR zero
1 sole parent, I child, RA 0.01 0.28 0.09 0.07
2 sole parent, 2 children, RA 0.02 0.24 0.11 0.08
3 sole parent, 3 children, RA 0.04 0.22 0.12 0.09
4 sole parent, 2 children 0.01 0.22 0.09 0.06
5 NSA/PgA couple, I child, RA 0.05 0.28 0.12 0.11
100:0 income split 
6 NSA/PgA couple, 2 children, RA 0.02 0.17 0.13 0.10
50% split
7 NSA/PgA couple, 2 children, RA 0.05 0.25 0.12 0.11
100 split
8 single NSA, no children, RA 0.02 0.03
9 single NSA, no children 0.01 0.02
10 NSA/PgA couple, no children, RA 0.02 0.02
100 split
11 NSA/PgA couple, no children 0.01 0.02
RA, 50% split
12 single age pensioner, no children 0.10 0.08
RA
13 single age pensioner, no children 0.07 0.05
14 Age pension couple, RA, 100 split 0.11 0.09
15 Age pension couple, no children 0.11 0.08
100 split
Source: calculated from Table 2 
NOTES: see notes to Table 2
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It is interesting to note that ETRs for sole parents do not fall by much, despite the 10 
percentage point reduction in their taper. This appears to be due, in part, to the ‘cashing 
out’ of the sole parent rebate in an expanded Family Tax Benefit Part B. As such, the 
benefit no longer reduces sole parent EMTRs over the initial range of taxable income.
Prima facie, it would be desirable if the range of EATRs between client types and across 
income cells were such that all clients had a continuous incentive to increase their declared 
income.
Whether it is optimal to have a single marginal rate across all these cells, or a 
high/low/medium rate structure like that under the current system is an issue discussed in 
Ingles 1998b. This Chapter will propose reforms on the assumption that the current 
structure of effective tax burdens will not be too radically changed in the short term: that 
is, that a high/low/ medium rate structure will continue to prevail, and that allowances will 
be ‘taxed back’ more quickly than pensions. This assumption is not critical, however, and 
the major policy options proposed in Chapter 6 provide the flexibility to move the overall 
rate structure in any desired direction.
One final point deserved some attention. The typical EMTR graph for social security 
recipients looks like a high rise city block with peaks, troughs, protuberances and spikes51. 
Is this a problem that needs attention?
Policy analysts find this sort of thing aesthetically displeasing. Whether it constitutes an 
actual problem, however, is another question. Certainly clients are unlikely to be fully 
aware of how this affects them, and in my view the important thing is the average ETR 
calculated over some sufficiently wide range of income, such as shown in Tables 5.1 and 
5.2.
The other important thing is that the graph of disposable income should rise fairly 
smoothly with income; if anomalies in the EMTR schedule cause marked dips and hollows 
in the disposable income line then they should be regarded as a policy problem. One aim 
of the options presented here will be to smooth out such anomalies.
51 In some cases, the EMTR spikes are of infinite height, as reflected in the “sudden death” losses (notches) 
in the disposable income line. These spikes are not shown on the graphs.
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5.2.1 How extensive is the high EMTR problem?
Work on the distribution of EMTRs by income class (eg Harding and Polette 1995, Beer 
1998) suggests that "only 6 per cent of the population, just over half a million people, face 
EMTRs in excess of 60%" (Beer 1998 p266). Beer and Harding (1999) put this figure at 
7%. On these figures, EMTRs may not be a burning issue.
However, Beer also notes that the figures are likely to be underestimates due to certain 
exclusions. These include childcare, HECS , and state housing rental rebates (p265).
Beer observes: "...individuals with very high incomes are escaping high EMTRs while 
those with low-middle incomes ... are most likely to face high EMTRs" (p268). Further, 
she notes a high proportion of individuals with children in the high EMTR ranges (pp268).
Beer and Harding (1999) indicate that the NTS reforms, while lowering the family 
payment tapers and reducing the peaks in EMTRs, spreads them across a wider range of 
family incomes: “...potentially about 85,000 single income families with children have 
been newly drawn into the shade-out range for Family Tax Benefit Part A -.. .and will for 
the first time face EMTRs above 60 per cent” (p21). This is of course an inevitable result 
of “levelling down” peak EMTRs by shading tapers into other income ranges. The authors 
also notes that the “vast majority of those who face high EMTRs also have wage and salary 
income” (plO).
A particular problem in interpreting work on the distribution of EMTRs is that we really do 
not know the extent to which the existing income distribution is already influenced by the 
EMTR schedule. For example, among the pensioner population we find a very high 
incidence of individuals with incomes below the free area who, on the Harding/Polette and 
Beer measures, face an EMTR of zero. But would they have such low incomes if there 
were no pension means test?
Another problem is that EMTR studies don’t pick up the effect of losing various 
allowances and concessions if income exceeds relevant thresholds. Cowling (1998), using 
the results of a client survey, suggests that the loss of these “- most notably the Health Care 
Card, Rent Assistance and State Government concessions on energy, water, sewage, 
municipal rates and transport...-  was much more significant in the decision-making 
process than any consideration of payment thresholds and taper rates” (p28).
52 Higher Education Contributions Scheme, under which repayment of tertiary loans is a percentage of 
income above a threshold. Details are in Ingles 1997.
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The argument for fixing up high EMTRs is not really founded in empirical studies of their 
current impact. Rather, it is based on the notion that
1. high EMTRs are unfair53 to the affected clients;
2. we don’t know how much damage they are doing, although we suspect them of being
equally as damaging in the social security system as they are in the direct tax system 
(where a lot of effort has gone into reducing them); and
3. it's not necessary to take the risk. The problem is fixable; technical solutions are 
available which don’t necessarily cost a lot and have other advantages in terms of 
income redistribution objectives, so why live with it?
That is not to deny that it would be extremely useful if more were known about how high 
EMTRs actually affect behaviour.
5.2.2 Free area for family payment
The full rate of Family Tax Benefit and Rent Allowance is paid automatically to those 
receiving any basic income support payment (called ‘auto-max’ FTB). When clients cease 
to be eligible for such a payment, they receive only the part-rate applicable to their new 
income situation. Hence, there can be "sudden death" losses for clients on reaching the 
cutout points. (This is also referred to in the literature as a “notch” problem.)
The NTS increased the threshold for the new integrated family payment (Family Tax 
Benefit Part A) to $28,200. This almost addresses the “sudden death” problem for 
allowees, and indeed would have done so fully but for the 1999 Budget decision to expand 
the range of the initial 50% taper for Parenting Payment (Partnered) from $62-142 to $62- 
245 a fortnight. This has the potential to create notch problems, depending how the 
couple’s income is split. This could be addressed by lifting the FTB(A) threshold slightly.
In a similar manner some pensioner couples, who also receive the full rate of family 
payment automatically, can suffer a "sudden death" loss if their income exceeds the 
pension cutouts54. Single pensioners (sole parents) are not affected by the notch problem,
53 In the economic (ie optimal tax) literature ‘fairness’ is most often considered to be a function of average 
rather than marginal tax rates, so there is no presumption that a high marginal rate on the poor is inherently 
unfair. Nonetheless the fact that a high marginal rate on the poor makes it hard for them to climb out of 
poverty does appear to have an equity dimension, particularly in the popular discourse.
54 For pensioner couples, this loss was $ 36.50 pw with one child; $72.60 pw with two, and $87.05 pw with a 
third child aged 13-15, pre-NTS. The loss for a pensioner/allowee couple was similar. Post NTS notches 
are shown in the Table.
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since their pension cuts out below the family payment threshold. Such problems are 
exacerbated for pensioners after July 1, due to the lower pension taper of 40%. The 
following table shows the extent of the notch on the assumption that the couples’ income is 
split 100:0 (in the case of pensioners the results are not very sensitive to the income split).
Table 5.4 “sudden death loss” ($ pw) on exceeding pension cutout: July 2000
DSP/PPP couple NoRA WithRA
1 child under 5 41.10 88.70
2 children (<5, 5-12) 80.80 128.40
3 children (<5, 5-12, 13-15) 134.20 134.20
Chart 5.2 shows how the disposable income of a DSP/PPP couple falls markedly at this 
notch point (numbered 8 on the chart). The result, in this 3-child example, is that the 
couple gains almost no income from earnings in the range $500 to $1,000 pw. However 
there are not many pensioners with children in the relevant income ranges. There are also 
rules on how many hours someone on DSP can work and still be considered “disabled”.
Chart 5.2: DSP/PPP couple at July 2000 
Children under 5 = 1, children 5-12 = 1, children 13-15 = 1, 
Paying no rent, 100% of private income to head
$ 1,200 100%
$ 1,000
- 40%
20%
$ 1,200 $1,400$1,000 $1,600
Weekly Private Income
Weekly Disposable Income EMTR
It would be expensive to push out the family payment thresholds to levels approaching the 
new pension cutouts which, for a couple, are well in excess of average weekly earnings. 
One solution here might involve the abolition of pension type payments for those under 
age pension age, and the creation of a "single workforce age payment" means tested closer
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to allowance lines. Only those aged 65 or over would be entitled to the more generous 
pension means test. Age pensioners would not be eligible for FTB, although they could 
apply for a workforce age payment if this was to their advantage. Very few age pensioners 
have dependent children.
5.2.3 Two-step or one-step taper?
The Government's NTS combined
- Minimum Family Payment
- Family Allowance Supplement, and
- Family Tax Payment (FTP) part A
into a single Family Tax Benefit (FTB) Part A with a maximum rate slightly higher than 
the previous combination of payments, and lower taper of 30%55.
The FTB(A) continues to have the same two-part taper as the pre-NTS system, albeit that 
sudden death losses of basic family payment around the $70,000 annual family income 
level no longer occur, these being replaced by another 30% taper on incomes exceeding 
$73,000 pa.
The problem with the two-part taper -  which admittedly is an established part of the family 
payment system - is that it makes the system into a hybrid which is not consistently 
directed towards either poverty alleviation or horizontal equity. In terms of welfare, such a 
two-part taper can in theory be improved upon by a single, lower taper that costs the same. 
The reason is that the single taper redistributes from higher income to middle income 
families, and is thus unequivocally redistributive, and does so with very little or no net cost 
in terms of incentives, since all those now subject to the first tier of the taper and most of 
those subject to the second tier face a lower EMTR. Only those families between the first- 
tier cutouts and the second tier thresholds face an increased EMTR.
Ingles (1997) and Keating and Lambert (1998a) propose a similar reform. Ingles 
suggested that a single 25% taper would be approximately cost-neutral compared with the 
(then) current system; K&L a 30% taper (theirs is higher due to other changes involved in 
their proposal, as described later in this Chapter). However, there would be some losers on
It is a pity it does not take the opportunity to abolish the large family element of FA, which has no 
consistent rationale in the current system. It was brought in at a time when supplements for children were 
very low compared to current levels, and designed to ameliorate the risk of poverty among larger families.
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medium to high incomes (around $35-65,000), notably those with only one or two 
children.56 Such families do not gain sufficiently from the lower taper to compensate them 
for the loss of minimum FTB(A).
Following the NTS changes, a lower single taper of around 20% might be cost neutral. 
Specifically, minimum FTB(A) of $18.70 a week would be abolished, and FTB(A) grossed 
up to $58.10 pw (ages 0-12) and $73.65 pw (13-15). A single taper of, say, 20% would 
apply. The impact of the proposal on a family with three children is shown in Chart 5.3. It 
can be seen that families earning between $600 and $ 1200 pw gain; there are some losers 
on family incomes between $1200 and $1400 pw. The pattern of gains and losses varies 
with family size, but is basically redistributive in favour of low and middle incomes.
Chart 5.3 NTS vs proposed 20% single FTB(A) taper, Couple with 3 children and 100:0 income
split
$1,200 120%
$1,000 100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
---  0%
$1,600$1,200 $1,400$1,000
Private Income
ANTS — proposal —•— ANTS — — proposal
5.2.4 Youth Allowance and family payment overlaps
Quite severe ETRs can be experienced by those families with a Youth Allowance child in 
addition to family payment children. The Youth Allowance threshold was not raised under
56An option would be to "grandfather" current entitlements so that there were no current losers (although
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the NTS, leaving it, at $24,388, well below the new $28,200 threshold for FTB(A). While 
there are additional disregards for other children under Youth Allowance, they are not 
always sufficiently high to prevent overlapping tapers.
In consequence, for many families the presence of a Youth Allowance child in addition to 
other dependent children will result in their being some income range where ETRs exceed 
100% - ie, where disposable income actually falls as private income rises. This problem is 
illustrated in Table 5.5, which shows some very small and even negative net income gains 
among families earning additional income in the ranges $400-$800 pw. The issue is 
recognised in the Report of the Reference Group Welfare Reform (2000b p30), (McClure 
Report), and a recommendation made that it be fixed.
there would be prospective ones).
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The extension of the parental income test to the young unemployed involved in the Youth 
Allowance scheme has greatly increased the numbers subject to stacking. Keating and 
Lambert estimated that up to 40,000 families will be affected by stacking between FTB 
and Youth Allowance (1998b p287). However, it should be noted that, notwithstanding 
such problems, these families are still better off under the NTS.
Chart 5.4 shows EMTRs for a couple with 2 Youth Allowance and 2 other children. The 
very long range of private incomes where disposable income gains are extremely small -  
and in some ranges negative - ($50-800 pw) is quite apparent.
Chart 5.4: NSA/PPP couple with YA children at July 2000 
Ch.< 5 = 0, Ch. 5-12 = 1, Ch. 13-15 = 1 Pay no rent, 100% of priv. Inc. to head, 
Student YA's = 2, Unemployed YA's = 0
160%
$1,200 140%
$ 1,000 120%
100%
80% S
S 1.000 SI,200 $1,400 S 1.400
Weekly Private Income
—•— Weekly Disposable Income —•— B/fTR
There are other problems with Youth Allowance. One is a notch problem similar to that 
for pensioners with dependent children. A family coming off an income support allowance 
(and therefore receiving auto-max Youth Allowance) can suffer a “sudden death” loss of 
that Youth Allowance. A further concern is that certain additional benefits are lost when a 
dependent child moves onto Youth Allowance -  notably Guardian’s Allowance and Rent 
Allowance. Thus, the family may be better of on FTB(A) than Youth Allowance, 
notwithstanding the higher maximum rates under the latter.
The second problem has been partially addressed by extending the age limit and creating a 
special YA rate for FTB(A). However, giving families a choice as to which benefit to 
receive is not really a long-term solution to such problems. First, a rational choice requires 
a high degree of knowledge as to the relevant provisions. Second, the system fails to 
discriminate between families on the basis of relative need. It is well established in
156
equivalence scale research that costs of children rise with age, whereas the system fails to 
consistently direct extra assistance to some families with older dependent children. A fuller 
resolution would need to involve incorporating Youth Allowance into an integrated family 
payment system for all children up to, say age 21.
5.2.4.1 Option for integrating YA and family payment income tests
This ‘unstacking’ option, described in detail in Appendix B, addresses three issues:
1. stacking between the allowance means test and the Youth Allowance taper over the 
income range $24,388 and $28,200 pa (this can give rise to a “sudden death” loss of 
up to $1200 pa in “auto” Youth Allowance);
2. stacking between the taper on the new FTB(A) and Youth Allowance (the 30% and 
25% tapers are additive once the Youth Allowance disregard of $1230 for the first 
sibling under 16 is used up, causing EMTRs of over 85%). This could cause a 
significant work disincentive for families in the income range $30,000- $40,000 (the 
exact range depends on number and age of Youth Allowance and non-Youth 
Allowance children); and
3. the Youth Allowance income test stacks on itself if there is more than one Youth 
Allowance child, since existing disregards of $3,790 per Youth Allowance sibling are 
insufficient to prevent this occurring. Such stacking can lead to EMTRs of over 80%, 
or higher if there are also non-Youth Allowance dependent children.
Unstacking the whole system will be costly. A possible cost offset would be to raise the 
Youth Allowance taper from 25 to 30%; this would appear to be a logical move in any 
case, assuming the family payment taper remains at 30%.
5.2A2 Conclusion: Youth Allowance reform
The effect of the three options in Appendix B, taken together, would be to create a 
situation where (apart from Rent Allowance), Youth Allowance and FTB(A) were very 
close to an integrated system. Except for renters, no family would lose more than 30 cents 
in the dollar of welfare benefits as private income rises. Combined with the standard 
income tax rate of 30%, EMTRs would be close to 60% for most affected families (except 
Rent Allowance recipients also receiving Youth Allowance). Although this is still high, it 
is probably sustainable: Table 5.6 and Chart 5.5.
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Chart 5.5: impact of integration on disposable income: 
couple with one child 13-15 plus two YA children
99D
* 890
irt̂ cnRA irtegrdicn noRA
"  790
0 690
private income ($100 pw)
The total cost of the “unstacking” package comes to an estimated $200-300 million pa (the 
higher cost applies if the taper is left at 25%). There would be few if any losers from the 
package, with the higher thresholds overcompensating for the slightly higher (30%) taper. 
An estimated 40% of families currently receiving part-rate Youth Allowance would 
benefit.
Stacking will continue to be an issue for those receiving Youth Allowance and Rent 
Allowance, and for those receiving FTB(B). It may be appropriate to allow Rent 
Allowance to stack with Youth Allowance, as is now done. Alternatively, tapering of 
Youth Allowance could be held off until Rent Allowance is exhausted (an option 
consistent with Keating and Lambert’s proposals (see below).
Full integration of Rent Allowance and Youth Allowance requires that Youth Allowance 
disregards be set sufficiently high such that all Rent Allowance is lost before Youth 
Allowance starts to taper (or visa versa). For larger families, these thresholds could be 
very high indeed: see the discussion of Rent Allowance options below.
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5.2.5 Stacking between FTB(A), FTB(B) and Parenting Payment (Partnered)
Parenting Payment (Partnered) tapers after the spousal income exceeds $32 pw, at the rate 
of 50/70%. The FTB(B) tapers at 30% on spousal income in excess of $32 pw, up to a 
cutout of either $8,750 pa (child 5-15) or $10,500 pa (child 0-4). The two tests stack, 
implying high effective tax rates on spousal income, especially where the partner is a low 
wage earner. This is illustrated in Chart 5.6, which shows that EMTRs for a spouse of a 
minimum wage earner (2 children, pay rent) are very high between $40 and $200 pw.
Chart 5l6 - spouse  incentives: ANTS- NS/VRjAooifte with 2 children at Jliy2000 
Ch.<5=1,Ch. 5-12=1,0x13-15=0 Ffcy priv. rent of $200 pw, head earn s min w age
V\feekty R-ivate Income
V\feeWy Dspo6ade hccme
If the spouse is considering a job, and her husband’s income is $28,200 pa, FTB (B) will
stack with FTB (A), with the two payments tapering away simultaneously at the rate of 
30% each. With childcare costs, this could result in a substantial disincentive to her 
working. The fact that Childcare Assistance also commences to taper above $28,200 (at 
the rate of 10%, one child or 15%, if two or more) does not help this situation.
It should be noted that these stacking problems are not new. Partly they are due to the loss
cn
of the couple’s residual allowance over the income range between the husband’s earnings 
and $28,200 and, prior to the NTS, FTB(B) had a “sudden death” spousal income limit of 
$4,777 pa. Clearly, it is preferable to have a more gradual taper as under the NTS, despite
160
stacking problems. However it would be even more preferable to get rid of such problems 
entirely.
The basic issue here is that the social security system has moved beyond its traditional 
poverty-alleviation function and, through FTB(B), taken on the additional role of 
compensating for some of the indirect costs of young children - notwithstanding that it is 
paying this assistance to many people who are entirely outside of the workforce and for 
whom indirect costs are therefore a somewhat tenuous concept. Since this assistance then 
has, for cost reasons, to be withdrawn as family income rises, the necessary implication is 
that there must be high EMTRs on working mothers.
One solution is to get compensation for indirect costs out of the social security system and 
back into the tax system -  eg, as a reinvigorated dependent spouse rebate. However I 
appreciate that this view is totally at odds with developments in the social security system 
during the 1990s. The other possible solution is to cash out compensation for indirect costs 
as a supplement to existing basic rates. This would result in a single FTB system replacing
C O
FTB(A) and (B); the maximum rates required to avoid any losers would be as follows : 
Age $pa
0-4 5,616
5-12 4,831
13-15 5,639.
This Table makes explicit another of the problems introduced into the system once we start 
compensating for the indirect costs of children. That is, the maximum rates of assistance 
first fall, then rise, with increasing age of the child. This is contrary to the results of 
research on the relative (direct) costs of children. However, the option of a single FTB 
with such a rate structure does at least make the system transparent.
There may indeed be a case for providing some childcare assistance as a direct payment to 
mothers of young children, although the appropriate balance between cash assistance and
57 It is not easy to totally obliterate sexist assumptions without making the meaning incomprehensible. For 
this reason I have persevered with the traditional male breadwinner model in explaining the current system, 
although it is technically no longer applicable.
58 While these rates fully compensate one-child families, they over-compensate families with two or more 
children, who currently receive FTB(B) only once. Hence a cost-neutral reform would necessarily involve 
lower rates and tend to under-compensate smaller families.
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fee reimbursement is itself a difficult issue. A neat compromises is perhaps to make 
assistance for children independent of the age of the child, at least up to age 12, a structure 
now being pursued in the UK and which would not be very different to the system I 
propose above.
Chart 5.7 shows one example of the consequences of this option for EMTRs and 
disposable income. In general the ‘front loading” of EMTRs for the spouse is reduced, but 
at the possible cost of backloading them higher up the income scale. Another important 
consequence is that the disposable income curve rises more smoothly over the important 
income range of $ 150 to $400 pw.
Chart 5.7: comparison of ANTS vs FTB(B) unstacking option: spouse incentive, 
couple with one child 0-4, receiving RA
proposal
Option 1 ~ " “"Option 2
Cashing out FTB(B) as a supplement to FTB(A) payments has two main consequences 
(apart from easing EMTRs on working mothers). First, it provides substantial additional
assistance to low income families where the mother is working. In this example she is a net 
gainer on any personal income between nil and $600 pw. Second, it reduces assistance to 
high-income families where the mother is not working59. The incentive effects are likely to 
be favourable, on balance, to the workforce participation of low-income mothers.
59 Assuming that access to the DSR is also restricted for such families. This proposal would suggest that the 
DSR for those without children be abolished.
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5.2.6 Childcare assistance
Childcare assistance tapers beyond $28,200 pa family income at a rate of 10% if one child; 
15% if two or more. Higher tapers apply where family income exceeds $66,000 pa (see 
Appendix A). This creates a stacking problem with the FTB taper.
It would be highly desirable if the taper on childcare assistance could be reformed to avoid 
stacking problems with means tests on other payments. In the UK system, for example, 
childcare assistance is part of the total Working Families Tax Credit, and abates 
sequentially.60 This would also be possible in Australia and indeed this is the treatment 
suggested by Keating and Lambert (see below), although they were unable to cost it 
because of data limitations.
An implication of treating childcare in this manner is that the cutout point for combined 
family payments, rent assistance and childcare assistance could be very high indeed, more 
so if the FTB taper were further reduced. With four children, for example, the cutout 
would be well over $70,000 pa. The issue is, should this be regarded as a problem?
I suggest that it should not. Childcare assistance could validly be regarded as a horizontal 
equity-type payment, and indeed a logical alternative to our current means tested system 
would be a straightforward tax deduction ore rebate for childcare costs. For this reason I 
have no concern about a system which allows childcare assistance to flow to quite high- 
income earners, particularly those with several children. Equivalence scale research tells 
us that such a family, on $70,000 pa, would not be better off than a childless couple on 
something like $35,000 pa61.
Another argument in support of such an approach is that research on comparative fertility 
has suggested that fertility is higher, other things equal, in those countries that actively 
support working mothers’ labour force participation (McDonald 1997). In this manner 
having children should not need to become an enormous sacrifice, in terms of foregone
60 Strangely enough, this is not true of housing assistance in the UK, which is a separate scheme and can 
stack quite severely with other tapers. In Australia this is only true of state housing rental rebates, and 
Commonwealth RA does not stack. Hence the Australian and UK systems are opposite. Since secondary 
incomes are found to be more sensitive to incentives than primary ones, it may be the UK solution is a better 
one.
61 The validity of this point depends on the ‘revealed preference critique’ of equivalence scales (discussed 
elsewhere) not being valid. On this critique the presence of wanted children does not reduce the welfare of 
the parents.
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earnings. Family policy in Australia will increasingly have to consider fertility as an 
important aim, in the context of sharply falling fertility rates and an ageing population .
5.3 Keating/Lambert proposals
The Keating and Lambert proposals, briefly described earlier (and in more detail in 
Appendix C) are designed to rationalise means tests for families. The method is to first 
establish a family's potential entitlement for assistance, and then establish their actual 
entitlement on the basis of their assessed means. For pragmatic reasons pensions and 
benefits would continue to have different free areas. However, all tapers would become 
50%63. At the family payment threshold of $542 pw ($28,200 pa), "second tier" payments 
would start to abate at a rate of 30%. This tier includes FTB(A) and (B), Youth Allowance 
and Rent Assistance, "and would have included childcare assistance if that had been 
possible [ie amenable to costing using NATSEM’s (Stinmod) microsimulation model]" 
(K&L 1998b p283).
Part of the proposal is financed by abolition of the quasi-universal component of FTB(A), 
and also of FTB(B). In general the K&L proposal is a sensible one, albeit that the 
administrative details need elucidation. My main comment is that the objectives can be 
achieved more simply and directly by the options set out above (single taper for FTB(A), 
Youth Allowance unstacking and FTB(A) and (B) integration), which combined have a 
very similar effect to the Keating and Lambert plan but a simple set of pre-defined 
thresholds and sequential tapers. The other outstanding issues relate to allowance tapers 
and Rent Allowance, as discussed below.
5.4 Reduce allowance tapers?
K&L propose an allowance taper of 50%. A 20 percentage point taper cut results in a net 
decrease in EMTRs of 16 percentage points (Chart 5.8)64. This would address the ‘hot 
spots’ found among the allowance ETRs, but at the cost of blowing out the cutouts and 
exacerbating the notch problem unless the FTB(A) threshold were further raised.
62 See Ingles 2000a. Singapore, with a serious fertility problem, has recently announced a substantial ‘baby 
bonus’ for second and subsequent children.
63 Note that this proposal pre-dates the 40% pension taper in the NTS.
64 Reducing tapers will reduce EMTRs, but not quite to the same extent. If the allowance is taxable, the extra 
tax payable will offset some of the benefit of the taper reduction. If a 70% taper is reduced to 50%, and the 
tax rate applicable is 20%, then the old EMTR is (70 + .2*30) = 76%, and the new EMTR is (50 + .2*50) = 
60%.
163
164
Chart 5.8: allowee couple: ANTS vs 50% allowance taper ( income split 100:0; max RA)
One advantage of reducing allowance tapers is that it reduces horizontal inequities as 
between allowees and pensioners. At the moment, for example, there is a very substantial 
incentive for clients to apply for a Disability Support Pension, for example, rather than 
Newstart or Sickness Allowance. While the higher basic rate for singles is one aspect of 
this, so too are the much more lenient means test conditions.
This is illustrated in Chart 5.9, comparing single Newstart Allowees with single Disability 
Support Pension recipients (both receiving Rent Allowance). The Chart shows that an 
initial differential of $25 pw in favour of the Disability Support Pension recipient becomes 
as high as $213 pw at around $350 pw of private income. This is caused by the large 
difference in free areas and tapers for the different clients (the non-taxation of Disability 
Support Pension also contributes to this). Rate and taper differences may also be 
manifested in the increasing rate of take-up of Disability Support Pension among the older 
working age population (see Ingles 1998c and 2000a).
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Chart 5.9: Newstart allowance vs DSP, single with RA
£  $503
Private Income
newstart Disability support pension —•— newstart ——* Disability sipport pension
A similar issue arises for sole parents as opposed to mothers who are in a couple. In the 
case of a 2 child family, the initial rate differential in favour of the couple, already quite 
low at $416 vs $494 pw (a ratio of .84), actually reverses at higher income levels and at a 
private income of $494 becomes negative, at up to $24 a week extra for the sole parent, 
before the two disposable income lines ultimately converge. The superimposed EMTR 
graph in Chart 5.10 shows that this reversal is due to the lower (40%) NTS taper on 
Parenting Payment for sole parents. I find it hard to believe that the Government had this 
result in mind when they designed the NTS measures.
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166
Chart 5.10: sole parent vs couple, 2 chn + F&
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Such anomalies can be addressed either by reducing allowance tapers or tightening pension 
ones. Reducing tapers can be quite expensive, and extends benefits to relatively high- 
income levels -  compared, for example, to low full-time wages. For example, reducing the 
pension taper from 50 to 40% in the NTS moved the age pension cut-out points from 
$21,320 pa (singles) and $35,620 pa (couple), to $25,649 and $43,030 pa, respectively.
Currently, there are many full-time workers who have income below the allowance cutouts 
but are ineligible for allowance because of the work test. It would cost some $3 billion pa 
to extend eligibility to them. I do not argue for this because it implies a role for 
unemployment payments quite different to the current philosophy, and also because of the 
difficulty in measuring the incomes of the self-employed. But I do suggest that further 
extension of the allowance cutouts may not be a high priority; rather, priority should be 
placed on reducing tax on low-income families whether or not they are in the allowance 
system. While this will be more costly it will help to preserve work incentives and 
maintain horizontal equity.
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The cost of fully aligning the allowance with the pension means test (including $3 billion 
from extension of eligibility to full-time workers) is estimated to be as high as $14 billion 
pa, with a further $2 billion flow-on from the necessary increase in the FTB(A) threshold.
Instead, pension tapers for those of working age could be dragged back more into line with 
those already applying to allowances, possibly with some small adjustment to iron out 
EMTR “hotspots”. The ultimate aim might be a “single workforce age payment” with a 
simple common taper of, say, 60% and utilising the existing allowance free areas of $31 
pw per adult. This would blow out the benefit cutout to about $30,400 pa for a couple 
(income split 50:50 -  see Chart 5.11) with a consequent need to raise the family payment 
threshold by $2,200 pa, but overall the cost would be relatively containable.
Chart 5.11 Allowee couple EMTR (income split 50:50): ANTS vs single 60%taper
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The concept of a single workforce age payment has been endorsed in the interim and final 
reports of the Reference Group On Welfare Reform (2000a and b), albeit that the report is 
rather light on detail. The basic problem is that a common payment based on pension 
conditions is probably not affordable unless the behavioural response were very large; 
whereas one based on allowance conditions would result in significant losses among some 
Disability Support Pension and sole parent (Parenting Payment - Unpartnered) recipients.
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Basic rates could be standardised among the workforce aged, bringing the allowance rate 
up to the pension rate (possibly with some reduction for those under say 25), but could be 
supplemented by special allowances such as for costs associated with disability.
Raising all allowance rates to the pension maxima would cost some $700m in a full year, 
but this cost will escalate progressively if the allowances were -  like pensions - indexed to 
Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE). There would be further costs associated 
with any easing of means test parameters for allowances, and some savings from pulling 
back Disability Support Pension and sole parent means test parameters towards those 
prevailing in the allowance regime. There would also need to be abolition of the “sudden 
death’ asset test now applying to allowances65.
The bottom line is that the social security measures in the government’s Tax Package have 
undercut what should arguably be the ultimate aim of commonality in rates and tapers 
across the workforce age population, and compounded serious horizontal inequities which 
already exist within the system. The iower pension taper could have been restricted to the 
aged, where -  as Chapter 8 discusses - different considerations (notably relating to savings 
incentives and interaction with superannuation tax) apply.
5.5 What should be done with Rent Assistance
There are a number of anomalies in the current system of rent assistance, State and federal. 
Commonwealth Rent Assistance for those without children tapers beyond the pension or 
allowance cutout points, and at the same rate - ie, 50% for pensioners and 70% for 
allowees. However assistance for those with children tapers out beyond the cutout points 
at the same 30% rate as for basic family payments. State public housing rent assistance 
phases out at around 20-25% from a family income of around $20,000 (depending on 
family size), and thus stacks extensively with family payments and even allowance tapers. 
As I showed in Ingles 1997, this can cause serious disincentives.
Because of the large differences between the Commonwealth and State schemes, the 
Industry Commission (1993) recommended moving Commonwealth rental assistance to a 
State housing- type formula. Such a move was not then desirable in the case of families 
because it would, at the time, have caused very serious stacking problems with the 50% 
family payment means test taper.
65 One option is its replacement with a single graduated deeming regime applying to all financial and non- 
financial assets. This need not necessarily imply a net cost if the deeming rate were high enough
168
169
There are several options for Rent Allowance. The most generous is that Rent Allowance 
not taper until all maximum family payments are lost. This is the solution employed in the 
NTS, and also proposed by Keating and Lambert - who extend the principal to Youth 
Allowance payments as well, and wished to extend it to childcare payments. One obvious 
problem is that family payment cutouts rise significantly as the taper rate is reduced, with a 
corresponding rise in the costs of Rent Allowance.
A less generous option (at least for families) is that Rent Allowance be de-coupled from 
the family payment system and, as recommended by the Industry Commission (1993), be 
paid on similar lines to State Housing Rental Rebates (SHRRs), meaning that Rent 
Allowance would be allowed to stack with other means tests in the family payments 
system.
With the family payment taper reducing to 30% under NTS, or even 20% under the 
proposals in this chapter, this stacking problem could perhaps be lived with. Stacking with 
basic allowance tapers could be resolved by indexing the Rent Allowance and SHRR 
thresholds to the allowance cutout points.
This option creates the potential for savings that could be redirected to other parts of the 
Rent Allowance system. If, for example, Rent Allowance were de-coupled from benefit 
payments to non-family couples and individuals and the tapeT reduced to that applying to 
families, RA would be transformed from an out-of work benefit mainly restricted to 
clients, to an in-work benefit that tapers only moderately with rising income66. Current 
inequities as between state housing clients and Commonwealth social security clients 
would be substantially ameliorated.
There is a horizontal equity argument for allowing Rent Allowance to flow to quite high 
income households, since renters at all income levels have less resources than homeowners 
(but not necessarily homebuyers). On this argument Rent Allowance is a sort of rough 
compensation for the non-taxation of imputed rent. This argument supports the “long-tail” 
Rent Allowance taper.
There is, conversely, a horizontal equity argument of making Commonwealth and State 
rent assistance more similar, one that supports allowing the tapers to stack. This argument 
is somewhat weakened, however, by the very large differences in maximum assistance
66 Currently , where there are no dependent children RA tapers as a continuation of the allowance or pension 
taper applicable; ie, at 70 or 40%.
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provided by the two systems.67 It ought to be the ultimate goal that the two systems 
converge.
There is also the issue of horizontal equity between homeowners, homebuyers, and renters. 
The first best solution to this is simply to gross up all payments in the system to include an 
adequate component for housing costs, (including supplements for high cost areas like 
Sydney), and then tax back imputed income from wealth including housing wealth. Since 
this is unlikely to obtain political support in the near (or even the distant) future, the second 
best solution is to support the regular payments made by renters and also homebuyers with 
small amounts o f equity in their homes. In the UK, for example, an extensive system of 
Housing Assistance helps home purchasers as well as renters.
The government, in the GST compensation package, has chosen to revive the approach of a 
lump sum $7,000 subsidy for first homebuyers. Very few people mourned the passing of 
the original First Home Owners Scheme in the 1980s. One option is that this subsidy 
should ultimately be abolished and be replaced by an extension of Commonwealth Rent 
Assistance to homebuyers based on means testing comprehensive assets -  ie including 
housing equity. Only in this manner can a comprehensive and neutral system of low 
income housing assistance be achieved.
Whether such a system of housing assistance should be tapered sequentially with other 
family and Youth Allowance payments, or allowed to stack, should be decided at the time 
by reference to the tapers ultimately decided on. If, for example, the family payment taper 
were reduced to 20% (as proposed earlier in this Chapter), a stacked housing assistance 
taper of say 20% could perhaps be tolerated.
5.6 Conclusion: the NTS and associated reforms
The measures discussed here are essentially alternative means of implementing the 
Keating/Lambert proposal for a single, sequential tapering of all Commonwealth income 
support payments. This, in turn, is not so different from the Dawkins et al (1998a) 
proposal for a negative income tax system with a three-part rate structure and an initial 
60% marginal rate. I show, however, that it is possible to iron out the worst of current 
anomalies and ETR ‘hotspots’ by relatively simple changes to existing policy parameters.
67 The value of state rental assistance typically exceeds Commonwealth Rent Allowance by a substantial 
margin - see Industry Commission 1993.
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Moreover, the required measures are relatively inexpensive, in the case of Youth 
Allowance adding up to no more than $200-3 00m in a full year (note that this is a small 
amount in the context of the whole social security budget). What is more, as Keating and 
Lambert have shown, it is possible to offset part and perhaps all of the other “unstacking” 
costs by relatively modest adjustments which phase out the remaining quasi-universal 
payments in the system, payments which have no clear rationale in the context of the main 
poverty alleviation aims of the Australian system.
The question here, however, is whether the Government is willing to abolish those bits of 
“middle class welfare” remaining in the family payment system. While I do not oppose
/TO
universal family assistance as such , the existing two-part taper might be regarded as an 
uneasy compromise between poverty alleviation and horizontal equity objectives, and I 
also note that a substantial measure of horizontal equity is achieved by low tapers which 
allow means-tested assistance to flow into the mid-ranges of the (equivalent) income 
distribution.
Apart from the single 20% family payment taper proposal, it seems highly desirable that 
the main parts of the Youth Allowance and FTB(A) unstacking exercise should proceed. 
Whether Newstart Allowance and Parenting Payment (Partnered) tapers should be reduced 
is a difficult issue however. The main problem is that this would exacerbate horizontal 
inequities vis-a-vis low-income earners not in the categorical system, such as the self- 
employed. I conclude that a single taper of 60%, with the current thresholds, may be as far 
as can sensibly be gone at this time. Alternatively, drastic action could be taken to reduce 
income taxes on allowees along with other low-income earners, as proposed in Chapter 6.
My ‘unstacking” agenda, Keating and Lambert “family accounts” and the Dawkins et al 
modified negative income tax all end up looking quite similar in terms of their ultimate 
effects on financial incentives and families’ disposable incomes.
The Australian income support system is very close -  certainly the closest in all the OECD 
area - to academic views of a pure NIT system, except for some aberrations around the 
edges, and the presence of activity tests. Further and more fundamental reforms aimed at 
enhancing the operation of this system are discussed in Chapter 6.
68 From an economic efficiency perspective it may not matter much whether family benefits are taxed back 
more severely, or taxed back less and general tax rates raised to finance this. See the relevant discussion in 
Ingles 1997.
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5.7 Appendix A: The NTS changes to assistance for families69
To accompany the changes to the personal income tax system, the Government will 
introduce substantial reforms to the various forms of assistance provided to families 
through the income tax and social security systems. These reforms will boost the amount 
of the income tax cuts that families receive, substantially improve work incentives for low 
and middle income families and simplify the complex array of assistance provided 
currently to families.
Extra assistance is provided to families by extending the Family Tax Initiative (FTI), 
introduced by the Government in January 1997, at a cost of over $2 billion in 2000-01.
The FTI currently provides an increase in the tax-free threshold of $ 1,000 for each 
dependent child, plus an extra $2,500 for single income families with a child aged under 5 
years. From 1 July 2000, these thresholds will be doubled to $2,000 and $5,000 
respectively. The effect of this is that all single income families (including sole parents) 
with a child under 5 years will have an effective tax-free threshold of $13,000. This is 
made up of the new $6,000 tax-free threshold plus $2,000 for one dependent child and the 
further $5,000 provided to single income families with young children. Overall, such 
families have a tax-free threshold that is more than double the general $6,000 threshold.
For families, the doubling of the FTI means:
• an increase in assistance of $140 a year (a 70 per cent increase) for each dependent 
child; and
• an extra $350 a year (a 70 per cent increase) for single income families with a child 
aged under 5 years.
Other elements of the families package.
Improving incentives for families to work, including the unemployed
The current system of assistance for families, particularly the overlap between the various 
income tests for benefits, results in disincentives for low and moderate-income families to 
work. Many families face an effective marginal tax rate of 85.5 per cent or more if they 
increase their income.
69 This is an edited version of the Governments Tax package summary as released on the Treasury Website. 
See also Costello 1998.
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To remove these overlaps and disincentives, the Government will, from July 2000, ease 
substantially the income test for Family Allowance by:
• increasing the level of income at which it begins to be income tested from $24,350 
a year (for one child) to $28,200 a year; and
• reducing the income test taper rate from 50 per cent to 30 per cent.
These measures provide substantial extra income to help lower income families raise their 
children and improve work incentives. They ensure that unemployed families will not 
incur a sudden drop in Family Allowance (and hence income) when they leave the income 
support system, improving incentives for them to obtain a full-time job.
At the same time, these measures, combined with the tax cuts, will ensure that low income 
working families will have much better incentives to improve their circumstances. For 
example, their effective marginal tax rate will drop from 85.5 per cent to 61.5 per cent over 
a substantial range of income.
Simplifying the structure and delivery of Family Assistance
Building on these increased levels of assistance and greater work incentives for families, 
the Government proposes to greatly simplify the structure of assistance for families, with 
effect from July 2000. The new structure will reduce the types of assistance for families 
through the tax and social security systems from twelve to three.
Family Tax Benefit, Part A
First, it is proposed that the four forms of assistance provided to help families with the 
costs of raising children [ie Minimum family Allowance, family Allowance, Family Tax 
Payment (FTP) part (A) and Family Tax Assistance (FTA) part (A)] will be merged into 
one benefit, the Family Tax Benefit, Part A (FTB (A)). This will:
• have the same rate structure as the programs it replaces (ie maximum and minimum 
rates), but with the extra $140 a year for each dependent child outlined above;
• use the relaxed income test for Family Allowance outlined above for the maximum 
benefit (ie a threshold of $28,200 a year and a 30 per cent taper rate);
• replace the ‘sudden death’ income tests for minimum Family Allowance, Family Tax 
Payment (FTP) and Family Tax Assistance (FTA) with a single relaxed income test for
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the minimum FTB(A) of $73,000 a year (plus $3,000 a year for each child after the 
first) and a taper rate of 30 per cent;
• abolish the assets test that applies currently to Family Allowance and minimum Family 
Allowance; and
• be increased annually in line with movements in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the 
same manner as applies currently for Family Allowance.
Family Tax Benefit, Part B
Second, it is proposed that the six forms of assistance provided to single income families
(including sole parents) [Basic Parenting Payment, Guardian Allowance, Family Tax
Payment Part B, Dependent spouse rebate (with children), Sole parent rebate, and Family
Tax Assistance part B] will be merged into a Family Tax Benefit, Part B (FTB (B)). This
will:
• have a similar rate structure to the current system (ie with the level of assistance being 
higher where the youngest child is aged less than 5 years), but with
• the additional $350 a year for single income families (including sole parents) with a 
child under 5 years outlined above;
• an additional $61 a year, where the youngest child is aged 5-16 years, meaning that a 
single-income family with two children aged over 5 years receives an additional $341 a 
year comprising $280 plus an additional $61;
• for couples, replace three different income tests on the non-working partner's income 
with one test that has a free area of $ 1,616 a year and a 30 per cent taper (thereby 
increasing the cut-out point for assistance from $6,090 a year to $10,500 for a family 
with a child aged under 5 years):
• this will greatly improve work incentives for primary carers (who are usually women);
• abolish the FT A/FTP income test on the working partner's (or sole parent's) income 
that applies currently from $65,000 a year; and
• be indexed annually in line with movements in the CPI in the same manner as applies 
currently to Family Allowance.
Child Care Benefit
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Third, it is proposed that the two forms of assistance available to help families with the 
costs of childcare outside the home will be merged into one. The new benefit will greatly 
simplify government assistance for childcare costs, enabling families to receive all 
assistance with childcare through the one program and under one set of rules. The Child 
Care Benefit will provide:
• maximum assistance (for 50 hours of work-related care per week) of $ 116.40 a week 
per child in formal care, with an additional S11 a week loading where there are 2 
children in care and a $32 a week loading for 3 or more children in care;
• for informal work-related care, the maximum level of assistance is $20.10 a week per 
child in care (for 50 hours of care);
• a single income test, with a family income threshold of $28,200 a year (for formal care) 
and taper rates of:
• 10 per cent for one child in care;
• 15 per cent and (above $66,000) 25 per cent for 2 children in care;
• 15 per cent and (above $66,000) 35 per cent for 3 or more children in care;
• the income test will not apply for incomes above $78,400 (one child in care). This will, 
in effect, maintain entitlements to assistance (equivalent to that available under the 
Childcare Cash Rebate at the 20 per cent rate) for higher income families.
Compared to the current system, the Child Care Benefit will provide an increase in the 
maximum level of assistance of $7.50 a week. This will be of particular benefit to 200,000 
lower income families, who receive the maximum level of assistance.
Delivery of family assistance
The Government's reform of family assistance will also simplify and integrate the delivery 
of such assistance to Australian families. Currently, the 12 forms of assistance for families 
are delivered through a combination of Centrelink, the Tax Office and the Health Insurance 
Commission. A new Family Assistance Office (FAO) will be set up within the Tax Office 
to deliver the new simplified set of family assistance programs.
The FAO will be a joint venture between Centrelink and the Tax Office that will specialise 
in delivering assistance to families. It will enable families to deal with just one agency and 
one set of rules. The primary carer in the family (generally the mother) will have a choice
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as to how they wish to receive their assistance either through regular fortnightly payments 
to their bank account, as reduced tax deductions from their (or their partner's) pay-packet 
or as an end-of-year lump sum through the tax system.
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5.8 Appendix B: Youth Allowance unstacking proposal
The following proposals address the issues identified in the text.
1. Align the Youth Allowance threshold with the new FTB(A) threshold at $28,200 pa.
The cost is estimated at $ 100 million pa.
2. Provide disregards for siblings under 16 in the Youth Allowance means test sufficient to 
fully exhaust FTB(A) entitlement before the Youth Allowance taper cuts in.
The necessary disregards, after July 1, are as follows:
Under 13 $6593 pa
13-15 $9216 pa
These compare with current disregards of $1230 for a first sibling under 16; $2500 for 
second and subsequent. The cost is $85m pa. The effect of the higher disregards is that 
all FTB(A) would exhaust before the Youth Allowance income tests cuts in, so EMTRs
70will not normally exceed 55%.
The Youth Allowance income test stacks on itself if there is a Youth Allowance sibling -  
that is, payments for both siblings can taper simultaneously. This stacking is ameliorated 
but not abolished by virtue of the relatively high disregard for second and subsequent 
Youth Allowance children. High EMTRs for families with several dependent Youth 
Allowance recipients could be addressed by increasing the Youth Allowance sibling 
disregard or, equivalently, by the reintroduction of variable tapers for families with 
different numbers of such dependents.
Splitting tapers is preferred to higher disregards because this allows all Youth Allowance 
recipients to receive their appropriate rate of allowance. In terms of the families’ 
aggregated entitlement to Youth Allowance, the two approaches are identical.71
3. Raise the taper for Youth Allowance from 25% to 30%, and re-introduce split tapers of 
15% for 2 Youth Allowance children; 10% for three. Abolish the existing sibling 
concessions ($3,790 for other Youth Allowance siblings, $7,400 for two Youth Allowance 
children living away from home). The cost is negligible: an estimated $11 million. The
70 However, they could exceed this because YA will continue to stack with rent allowance and, in some 
cases, the taper on FTB(B).
71 Some previous versions of AUSTUDY did allow variable tapers where there was more than one 
AUSTUDY recipient.
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savings from the higher taper (applying to the three-quarters of families with a single 
Youth Allowance child) almost offset the costs of the split tapers (which benefit the other 
quarter of Youth Allowance families).
4. Standardise income period definitions by moving the Youth Allowance test from 
previous financial year to current financial year, as for FTB (A). (No costing available: 
this would probably provide some savings.72)
These options would pave the way for an possible full integration of Youth Allowance and 
FTB(A) up to, say, age 21, as a single scheme with common income definitions, etc. This 
should be the long-term aim of reform in this area.
5. One outstanding issue in the YA area is the personal income test applied to the 
individual YA recipient, in addition to the family income test. The individual test for 
students is derived from the Austudy system; there is a free area of $236 per fortnight 
($6,136 pa) and a taper of 50% up to $8,216 and 70% beyond. The young unemployed, by 
contrast, have taper parameters derived from the Newstart allowance system; ie a free area 
of $62 per fortnight ($1612 pa), a 50% taper to $142 per fortnight ($3692 pa), and a 70% 
taper beyond.
This is clearly anomalous in itself, and the student taper is anomalous if it were desired to 
introduce a common workforce age allowance. On the other hand the parameters proposed 
for such an allowance (free area of $1612 pa and a 60% taper) could be a substantial 
disincentive to a student’s part-time or vacation earnings, and moreover appear harsh when 
one considers that this applies in addition to the parental income test. I would suggest, 
therefore, that the test on a dependent’s own earnings should be simply an extension of the 
parental test, so that in effect the payment to the student or unemployed young person 
becomes independent of the distribution of earnings within the family. This implies that a 
simple 25 or 30% taper should apply to the student’s own income, but this should only 
apply once the families’ total income threshold is exceeded.
72 The FTB system now uses a full current year basis, with end-of year reconciliation through the tax system. 
The Youth Allowance income test is based on income in the tax year two or at most one year prior (with 
some exceptions for, eg, the self-employed). It would appear a logical step to reconcile these very different 
income assessment periods by using a thoroughgoing current income basis. (This would be essential if  FTB 
and Youth Allowance were to become fully integrated.)
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5.9 Appendix C: Keating and Lambert proposal for reform of family 
payments
Keating and Lambert (1998a and b) put forward a proposal designed to rationalise means 
tests for families. This proposal is updated in their Submission to the Senate Inquiry into 
tax reform (K&L 1999). Their EITC scheme is actually an adjunct to this proposal.
K&L’s method is to first establish a family's potential entitlement for assistance, and then 
establish their actual entitlement based on their assessed financial means. For pragmatic 
reasons, pensions and allowances would continue to have different free areas. However, 
all allowance tapers would become 50%. At the new family payment threshold of $28,200 
pa "second tier" payments would start to abate at a rate of 30%. This tier includes FTB(A), 
FTB(B), Youth Allowance (YA) and Rent Assistance (RA), and would ideally have 
included childcare assistance.
Pari offne proposal is financed by abolition of the quasi-universal (second tier) component 
of the Family Tax Payment. The net cost of the proposal is estimated as $ 1.1 billion, or 
$1.6 billion inclusive of allowance taper reform. This compares with the ANTS family 
package of $2.3 billion in 2000-01.73
The reason that the K&L plan can unstack all these payments, reduce allowance tapers and 
still be cheaper than the NTS system of family payments is that the latter still involves 
considerable “horizontal equity” type payments. For example, after first tier FTB(A) is 
exhausted, a flat rate payment continues to be made up to family income of $73,000 pa. 
Similarly, FTB(B) is tested only on the spouse’s income, not that of the working partner.
The K&L plan not only provides for a single taper but also effectively adds FTB(B) and 
(A), so that both taper on the combined parental income. The same effect could be 
achieved under the present system if FTB(B) were abolished, and replaced by higher 
payments for younger children in the FTB(A) rate structure. The effect would be to make 
the age/rate structure for family benefits almost flat. I advocate a similar reform in Chapter 
5.
Bits of detail in K&L need clarification. One problem is that the new family payment 
threshold of $28,200 only makes sense if the allowance taper continues to be 50/70%.
73 These costings are prior to the rate rises in the NTS Mk ii. They are used here for ease of comparison.
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Otherwise, the family payment and allowance tapers interact to produce a “sudden death” 
loss of FP on coming off an allowance. This could be resolved in the proposal by setting 
the new threshold at approximately $33,500, which is the new maximum allowance cutout 
point with a 50% taper.
There is no discussion of the administration of the K&L scheme. In 1991 the NZ 
Government, with a similar system of means tested family assistance to that in Australia, 
put forward a new vision for social security named “family accounts” which appears to 
have been very like the K&L plan, with the addition of means-tested health services (St 
John 1993, p39). Full integration was to proceed in steps, since existing provisions could 
not be placed on the new basis overnight. St John notes: ’’After considerable effort and 
expense, the work on family accounts was finally abandoned in mid-1993. It was an idea 
that proved complex and unworkable" (1993, p.40). However, some of the difficulties 
appear to have related to the inclusion of health benefits in the plan (see Boston and St 
John, 1999).
Family accounts proved unworkable because the modem family cannot be easily defined 
and its circumstances put on a smart card, as the 1991 idea o f ‘global abatement’ proposed. 
Using the family unit presupposes some stability in its structure and is desperately 
complicated by the fragmentation of the modem family, older children being dependent for 
longer, blended families and the like.
K&L is less ambitious than NZ family accounts and the administrative difficulties should 
not be insurmountable. K&L’s objectives might be achieved simply and directly by 
introducing a set of pre-defined thresholds, disregards, and sequential tapers applied (using 
a common income period) to FTB, RA and YA. If RA were included in the option, and if 
allowance tapers were reduced to 50% (with consequent adjustment to the new FTB 
threshold), the aims of the K&L plan would be achieved.
I conclude that the K&L plan, suitably developed, might be a good one, but its financial 
feasibility may depend on Government’s willingness to abolish the remaining quasi- 
universal family payments. This in turn depends on the relative importance one attaches 
to EMTR problems in the system compared with meeting horizontal equity concerns 
amongst middle and upper income groups. Alternatively one could proceed in this 
direction without abolishing the quasi-universal payments, but the net cost could be quite 
high.
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6 CHAPTER 6: TAX AND SOCIAL SECURITY INTERACTIONS
PART TWO: FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OPTIONS
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 described current problems in the interaction of the tax and social security 
systems, analysed the impact of the new tax system reforms, and proposed a number of 
reforms aimed at further addressing problems of high effective tax rates and associated work 
disincentives.
This chapter takes the analysis a step further by considering more major structural reforms 
which could address such problems in a systematic manner, and allow the implementation of 
a designed set of effective tax rates (ETRs) for social security clients and taxpayers.
There are four main classes of reform options, namely:
1. Negative Income Tax (NIT) or Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI)
2. integration of tax and social security’, abolishing separate social security means
tests and using a system of income tax surcharges and/or special rates to recoup 
benefits as income rises
3. full separation of the two systems, using special tax scales or tax rebates to
avoid tax cutting in until benefit entitlements are fully exhausted; and
4. full (integrated) coexistence, such that the combined tax and social security tax 
rates approached a desired configuration.
The notion that the tax and social security systems should he more closely integrated has had 
considerable currency in Australia and overseas. In Australia, it reflects current concerns 
about high ETRs, with consequent disincentives to earn additional income or to save for 
retirement. While a number of ad hoc rebates have been introduced (and increased) in order 
to exempt basic rate pensioners and beneficiaries from liability to income tax, this approach 
falls short of providing long term solutions and can create new problems of its own. For 
example, withdrawal of such tax rebates increases effective tax rates over the income range 
it is withdrawn.
With 4 million welfare clients at any one time (and more over the course of a year) as 
compared with some 8 million taxpayers, it might be questioned whether it is appropriate to 
maintain two separate administrative systems, each with their own rules, definitions and 
procedures, and both charged with essentially the same role: reducing net disposable income
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according to some measure of need. If the net value of social security benefits could be 
withdrawn through the positive tax system, administrative burdens on Centrelink could be 
reduced, compliance facilitated, and ease of understanding greatly improved. This is the 
reasoning behind advocacy of the NIT and similar reform proposals.
6.2 The Negative Income Tax (NIT) Or Guaranteed Minimum Income 
(GMI)
The current system provides benefits to the poorest in our society in a manner not too far 
removed from a NIT or GMI scheme, albeit of the categorical (and conditional) type. The 
main condition is that a person who is assessed as being able to work -  that is not aged, 
disabled, a carer or parent, or sick -  is expected to actively seek work. However it is a GMI 
characterised by poor design, excessive complexity, and unwanted overlaps with the tax 
system and other income transfers. It must be said, however, the Australian system is very 
redistributive and manages to be significantly more generous to the poorest than the OECD 
average, when the purchasing power of basic benefits is compared rather than replacement 
rates (Whiteford 1997, p48).
Admittedly, the current system's ability to help the poorest is achieved by something of a 
subterfuge: clients often do not understand the extent of the very high effective tax rates they 
face, and these are in part the secret of the scheme’s ability to redistribute. However they are 
also one of its major weaknesses. There are also social and political difficulties created by 
helping the very poorest, while doing relatively little for those just outside this group. These 
difficulties are manifested in recent proposals to provide extra assistance, such as earned 
income tax credits (EITCs), to low wage earners: see Ingles and Oliver (1999a and b), and 
Ingles (2000). But the EITC proposal does not sit easily with Australia’s system which is 
essentially based on the GMI approach, and which already provides substantial in-work 
assistance to low-income families.
There are several radical NIT or guaranteed minimum income (GMI) options that have been 
proposed to address design problems. The most recent is the NIT proposal of Dawkins et al 
(1997, 1998a), although this is one in a long list of similar proposals stretching back to the 
Poverty Inquiry (Henderson, 1975) and beyond. One of the important contentions of this 
chapter is that it is not necessary to so radically overhaul the whole structure of the 
tax/transfer system in order to achieve many of the benefits being sought.
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The basic philosophy underlying the GMI approach involves rejecting categorisation (by 
age, disability etc.) as a criterion for assistance in favour of using low income as the sole 
indicator of need. But the NIT in its pure (ie non-categorical)74 form has a number of 
significant problems. These include:
• the very high tax rates required across the whole population if the basic income 
guarantee level is to be at the same rate as existing categorical payments (this is 
estimated as 57% by Dawkins et al - 1997 p2),
• the consequent possibility of a significant general work and saving and/or tax avoidance 
response
• the apparent extension of assistance to those whose need may not be great, such as those 
voluntarily not in the workforce
• if the tax definition of income is adopted in the unified system, as proposed by Dawkins 
et al, the social security system loses the ability to distinguish those wdth substantial 
assets.
Given the problems of taxpayer resistance already being encountered in the income tax and 
the likely efficiency implications of placing further weight on this tax, this seems unlikely to 
be generally acceptable. On equity grounds alone one could question the appropriateness of 
placing further weight on a definition of income already widely regarded as deficient in 
measuring real command over resources (unless there is a thoroughgoing reform of the tax 
base towards a more comprehensive income definition, possibly including the inclusion of 
imputed asset income75).
There is also the issue of the likely public reaction if benefits were payable without any test 
on work intentions. The Commission of Inquiry into Poverty felt that its proposed GMI 
would not damage work incentives because 'Australians have no respect for the bludger' 
(Henderson 1975, p.391). In contrast, the Taxation Review Committee argued that GMI 
schemes seemed likely to have 'consequences for incentives to work and save which make it 
impossible to consider such a scheme seriously' (Asprey 1975, p. 180).
74"Non-categorical" implies that the full negative income guarantee would be available to all those with 
sufficiently low incomes, without reference to their eligibility under categories such as the aged, invalid, 
unemployed etc.
75As proposed, for example, by D Dixon (1985).
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The Committee of Inquiry into Poverty (Henderson 1975) and the Priorities Review Staff 
(1975) both recommended a shift toward a GMI system integrating benefit withdrawal into 
the positive tax system. Neither the Poverty Inquiry nor the Priorities Review Staff actually 
went so far as to advocate the removal of all forms of categorisation, as implied by the pure 
form of GMI. Rather, they would have applied one level of income guarantee to existing 
categorical groups and a lower level to others. The effect would have been to diminish, but 
certainly not eliminate, the effects of categorisation. Since for many taxpayers the effect of 
the low guarantee would be broadly similar to that of the existing tax threshold, the overall 
distributional impact would be broadly similar to the existing system.
Similarly, Dawkins et al proposed a number of modifications that allow the required linear 
tax rate to be reduced:76
• The first sub-option (lb) involves lowering the guaranteed minimum income (GMI) 
level by 25% to reduce the required tax rate to 45%. Dawkins et al correctly note that 
this approach is "unlikely to be acceptable" (pi9).
• The second Option (2) tapers out the tax credits on middle incomes, defined as between 
$30,000 and $80,000. Basic benefits must be cut by 19% in order to achieve the target 
45% nominal tax rate, and the tapering out of credit causes the effective tax rate to rise 
over the taper range.
• Option (3) is similar to (2), but with an initially higher tax rate of 60%, a nominal rate of 
30% on middle incomes (but a higher effective rate due to the tax credit taper) and a 
nominal and effective tax rate on incomes over $80,000 of 50%.
• Option (4a) proposes the continuation of some degree of categorisation. Current 
categorically eligible groups would receive a full GMI; the remainder of the population 
would be eligible for a GMI equal to 25% of the maximum. In this "two tiered" GMI 
system (which is quite similar to Henderson's original proposal), the flat tax is computed 
to be 52% (p23).
• Further sub-options (4b and 4c) might allow the flat tax to be reduced to 50%, but all 
involve a higher effective rate at some point in the income distribution (pp24-25).
76 These options are drawn from Dawkins et al 1997. Dawkins et al 1998a provides an essentially similar 
proposal, but with some modifications.
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What this illustrates is very simple. That is, it is very difficult for a NIT to avoid most of the 
issues that underlie difficulties in the existing system - principally categorisation and high 
tax rates on low-income earners - if any new system is to be socially and politically 
acceptable. (This is quite aside from any questions as to its economic credibility).
Given this, and all the problems that will therefore remain - proving eligibility, definition of 
the income unit, the time period for assessment, etc - it might seem preferable to stick with 
the current system for the moment and adopt a more incremental approach, albeit paying 
particular attention to low income earners.
It is interesting to note the differences between Dawkins et al's costing and those of the 
Poverty Inquiry. The Poverty Inquiry thought that a pure GMI would involve a financing 
tax rate of 50% (Henderson 1975 p74); Dawkins et al suggest 57%. The Poverty Inquiry's 
two-tier GMI involved a 35 or 40% general tax rate; Dawkins et al suggest 52%. While 
there are some differences of detail, the main differences between now and 1975 are the 
greater coverage of the social security system, and the higher real and relative rates of 
benefit for some groups, such as children. These have made a GMI an even more difficult 
proposition than it was in 1975. However the introduction of a GST has eased EMTR 
problems for some groups (see Chapter 5), and should lower the required NIT tax rate.
Some specific issues with the GMI are:
1. Is it desirable to avoid categorising the population into various eligible groups,
2. Is a linear benefit withdrawal-cum-tax rate optimal?
3. Should additional assistance needs to be directed to low wage earners (Dawkins 1996)? 
These are discussed below.
6.2.1 To categorise or not?
There is no doubt that the present categorical system is complicated, cumbersome and 
arbitrary (see eg Perry 1995). There are apparent attractions in moving to a system where 
the only criterion for assistance is low income. However, there are also major problems:
• such a system cannot discriminate between those whose low income is voluntary, 
and those for whom it is not - ie, there would be no work test for the able-bodied 
unemployed; and
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• some individuals, notably the self-employed and those with substantial asset 
incomes, are able to manipulate their affairs so as to declare an apparently low 
income when in fact their full (comprehensive) income may be quite adequate.
In relation to the first point, current policy is moving dramatically away from the concept of 
a social security payment as an unconditional entitlement for those of working age, and 
current rhetoric focuses instead on the idea of ‘mutual obligations’ (see eg. Reference Group 
on Welfare Reform, 2000a and b).
On the second point, it is interesting to note that the Youth Allowance means test attempts to 
better assess the real income of the self-employed by using the so-called "actual means test", 
which involves a mixture of wealth and consumption measures. However there are major 
difficulties with this test. When applied to the pension system in the late 1970s the test on 
income only gave rise to widespread “income rigging’ practices, resulting in the re­
imposition of the asset test. Until such issues are resolved, using low income as the only 
criterion of need for assistance, while theoretically attractive, is probably not workable.
For these reasons I will assume that some form of categorical system will continue to 
operate. However some of the options discussed in this chapter have the effect of sizeably 
reducing differences in the treatment of those categorically eligible and those not, and this 
will generally be a desirable direction for reform. Low income earners might be best assisted 
by measures such as raising the tax threshold, since this involves much reduced 
measurement and incentive problems (see the discussion on "convergence" later in this 
Chapter).
6.2.2 The optimal tax/taper rate
Dawkins et al estimate that even if categorisation were retained, the linear tax/taper rate 
required to finance existing maximum benefits would need to be 50%, if it were uniform 
across income classes (1998a p251).
Raising the benefit withdrawal rate can reduce the general tax rate; the appropriate trade-off 
between these two is a difficult issue. “Optimal tax” theory has tended to suggest that a 
linear rate is optimal, but this conclusion is by no means universally accepted and depends 
on the limitations inherent in optimal tax analysis. There may in fact be good economic 
reasons for a higher initial marginal rate (Chapter 4).
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Suffice to say that the precise way this question is answered probably does not matter too 
much, if considered purely in terms of economic efficiency. From a horizontal and vertical 
equity perspective, however, it is highly desirable that ETRs do not exceed, say, 75% over 
any substantial income range. Otherwise, because of childcare, travel and other costs, there 
is no effective gain from working - and for the retired, little incentive to invest in assets 
subject to asset test or deeming provisions.
Chapter 5 showed (Table 3) that ETRs for some of our payments are in fact in excess of the 
75% figure, although implementation of the NTS has reduced ETR problems for families. It 
is mainly in the allowance area (Newstart Allowance and Parenting Payment (Partnered)) 
that high ETRs now arise. There can be disincentives to move from part-time to full-time 
employment and/or for a spouse to take up employment if a couple is in receipt of these 
payments.
In Chapter 5 I argued that high ETRs for allowees are best addressed by action on the tax 
side, rather than further lowering tapers. Reducing tapers exacerbates horizontal inequities 
between those categorically eligible for payment and those not, and there is already a 
substantial group of low income earners not eligible for any categorical payment. The size of 
this group is indicated by the $3 billion estimated cost of extending eligibility for Newstart 
allowance to full-time earners77.
6.2.3 Low wage earners
Low wage earners are a policy concern partly because of the increasing dispersion of 
earnings in Australia (see eg Gregory 1993), a problem we share with a number of other 
OECD countries, and partly because a number of economists have argued for pursuing 
increased earnings dispersion in order to allow the creation of more jobs (Dawkins et al 
1998b). Dawkins (1996) and Dawkins and Freebaim (1997) have argued the economic 
benefits of moving towards a more decentralised (ie market oriented) wage system, while 
using the social security system -  either through a NIT or an EITC - to prop up the 
incomes of those who would otherwise be disadvantaged - notably the low-skilled.
The NIT proposal is not without adverse consequences for work . Low wage earners can 
be helped in many different ways. If we wish to direct additional assistance to those not in
77 Many o f these would be self-employed people currently excluded by the activity test -  ie, they are not 
regarded as ‘available for work’.
78 Dawkins et al suggest that a NIT would "provide a safety net for all families without dulling incentives to 
enter paid work. Indeed, it could be expected to improve the incentive to work [by virtue o f reducing poverty
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the social security system but with earnings below the existing tax threshold, then the NIT 
or refundable tax credit approach may be required. But it seems more likely to me that our 
main concern should be the deteriorating position of those on low full- or nearly full-time 
earnings - ie, with incomes well above the current tax threshold (Ingles and Oliver 1999).
It follows that the most direct way to help the relevant target group is by reform of the tax 
rate structure. One option is an EITC; another is to substantially raise the tax threshold 
and, if necessary, finance this by imposing a higher initial marginal rate (currently 17%). 
The effect of the higher initial rate is to quarantine the benefits of the threshold increase to 
low income earners . As described later, however, there are problems in a policy of 
raising both thresholds and the first marginal rate; it can actually exacerbate the EMTR 
problems described above. Hence the preferred policy approach canvassed later in this 
chapter is to apply a partial family basis to the tax structure, extending the lowest (17%) 
tax bracket from $20,000 pa to $29,000 pa for couples.
The New Tax System (NTS) increased the tax threshold to $6,000, or effectively $6,882
Of)
inclusive of low-income rebate. Single income families with a young child are claimed 
to have an effective tax threshold of $13,882, made up of the new $6,000 threshold plus 
$2,000 for one dependent child and a further $5,000 for single income families with a child 
under 5 years of age under FTB(B), plus $882 from the low income rebate.
There is a dubious logic in paying a refundable tax credit -  in fact a cash benefit - such as 
the FTB(B) and calculating a tax threshold as if that were a conventional tax rebate. It is 
true that the family is at least as well off in cash terms. But families in receipt of FTB(B) 
in fact face positive tax rates at income levels well below $13,882, particularly if some of 
that income is earned by the spouse.
traps and low income traps]" (1997 p413). While it cannot be ruled out that reform of low-income traps may 
improve work incentives for those now subject to them, it is wrong to imply that a NIT would necessarily 
improve aggregate incentives to enter paid work. In the US NIT experiments conducted during the 1970s, an 
aggregate loss of labour supply of around 10 percent among recipients was found (see Burtless 1987).
While this would vary in the Australian situation depending on a number of parameters, the predicted effect 
on work effort by low wage earners currently outside of the current social security system is certainly 
negative. This is because income and substitution effects are both operating in the same direction below the 
NIT breakeven point, to depress labour supply. This must be counted as a cost to be offset against the hoped- 
for benefits of moving towards a more deregulated wage environment.
79 One objection to raising the tax threshold is that this is not target-efficient, because it benefits high- 
income earners, secondary earners, income splitters and the like. This objection is partly addressed by the 
claw-back proposal in the text. Moreover, the usual remedy proposed - to means test the threshold - can 
involve a structure of effective marginal rates which is rather strange, involving a middle income zone where 
such rates are higher than at high incomes.
80 In the New Tax System literature.
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Hence individuals, couples and families on quite low incomes are presently required to pay 
income tax. One reason for wishing to reduce their tax burden is both to decrease 
interactions between means tests and income tax, and to increase the rate at which the 
incomes of social security beneficiaries “converge” with the incomes of those who have no 
categorical eligibility. The issue of convergence is discussed later in this Chapter. In that 
section I conclude that one option for full tax-social security integration requires that tax 
thresholds be set at the cutout points for receipt of basic benefits, and that -  as a matter of 
financial necessity - beyond those points quite high tax rates should apply.
6.3 Integration of tax and social security
Integration has great theoretical attraction, as stressed, for example, in the Report of the 
Taxation Review Committee (Asprey, 1975). It is based on the question of whether it 
necessary to maintain two separate administrative systems, each with their own rules, 
definitions, and procedures, and each charged with a very similar function: ie, to 
supplement or reduce net disposable income according to some measure of need.
"If the net value of social security benefits could be withdrawn through the positive tax 
system, administrative burdens on the DSS could be reduced, compliance facilitated, and 
ease of understanding greatly improved" (Ingles 1985). In a like manner, Dawkins et al 
argue that “Part of the complexity of the tax transfer system arises simply because taxes 
and transfers are administered separately” (1998a p240).
While the NIT is one approach to integration, there are others. In Ingles (1985) I showed 
how integration broadly based on the current system might proceed. Separate social 
security means test would be abolished and replaced by special tax scales for those in 
receipt of a social security payment. The scales, which could be designed to broadly 
replicate the effective tax rates now applicable, would be applied to the joint income of 
pensioner and allowee couples, as under the current system.
The Asprey Committee was favourably disposed to eliminating social security means tests 
in favour of relying on the positive tax system to modulate net benefits according to need. 
The report envisaged the use of a separate rate scale superimposed on the standard rate 
structure, noting that while such an arrangement would be a .. .’’complicating element in the 
administration of the normal tax system .. .it would allow a simplification of the public 
finances as a whole by the abolition of the existing complicated means tests” (Asprey 
1975, p.179).
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The Meade Committee, which studied options for taxation reform in the United Kingdom, 
was similarly attracted to the possibility of dispensing with separate social security means 
tests in favour of reliance on the general tax system, suitably modified, to claw back net 
benefits as private incomes rose (Meade 1978, pp.269-307). A member of that Committee 
subsequently collaborated in a book proposing a wholesale reform of the United Kingdom 
social security system based on use of the refundable tax credit mechanism. That proposal 
also involved amalgamation of taxation and benefits payment administrative systems 
through combined local offices (Dilnot et al. 1984), similar to the new Family Assistance 
Office set up to administer the FTB in Australia.
The Poverty Inquiry had argued that, short of a full GMI, taxation and means test arrange­
ments should at least be consistent. While they felt that capital gains should be taken into 
account for pension purposes, “pension practice should seek to follow changing income tax 
definitions in this matter”.
While the practice of 'income rigging' eventually moved the Government to re-impose an 
asset component in the means test, it could well be argued that the problem being 
encountered in the pensions area were only a reflection of more general problems in the tax 
treatment of capital incomes. It is far from obvious that the test of'ability to pay’ in the tax 
system should differ from the test of 'need' in the pension system, when in fact the different 
tests apply to so many of the same people, and interact over the same ranges of income.
Different definitions of resources are thus one obstacle to integration of tax and means 
tests. Other problems are the different assessment units (the social security system 
generally combines income of spouses) and differences in the time period to which 
assessments apply - whether that be the financial year (tax), the anniversary of take-up 
(pensions), or the fortnight (unemployment and sickness benefit). Clearly, these differ­
ences are major obstacles to integration. That is not to say that they are insuperable.
In early papers on this issue, Dixon and Foster of the then Social Welfare Policy 
Secretariat (1983a and b) argued that full integration was not then feasible and may in fact 
be undesirable because of the different redistributive objectives of the tax and social 
security systems. Also, there would be objections to changing the tax system from an 
individual to a family unit basis and the alternative - changing the social security system to 
an individual basis - is not likely to be feasible in terms of cost. It would imply, for 
example, access to unemployment benefits for many married women presently precluded
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by their husbands' income. Dixon and Foster concluded that it was more feasible to 
consider arrangements under which pensioners who are subject to means tests are not also 
subject to personal income tax.
6.3.1 The case for full integration
While the Dixon-Foster proposal does achieve significant reduction in administrative 
overlap and effective tax rates, it is not intended to achieve full integration with the tax 
system. Indeed, its basic logic is to achieve full separation. While this may ultimately 
prove to be a suitable direction for reform (see next section), it would seem desirable that 
the possibilities for full integration at least be explored, since the attractions, at least in 
theory, are considerable. The social security and taxation systems can easily be seen as two 
sides of the same coin - we seek to support those who need it, and to finance that support 
from those who have the capacity to pay. Withdrawing benefits as incomes rise is similar 
in its incentive and distributional effects to taxation. There may be good reason, therefore, 
to standardise our tests of 'need' and 'ability to pay' in a single coherent system.
In considering similar proposals for reform in the United Kingdom, Dilnot et al (1984) 
suggest: 'In Britain and elsewhere, the two systems grew up separately because they 
operated for two essentially distinct groups of people. One class of people paid taxes, and 
another received benefits. The two administrations developed in different buildings and in 
different styles. If it had been envisaged that one day most people would be both taxpayers 
and benefit recipients, it is inconceivable that things would have developed this way . . . 
The school-leaver obtaining his first job, the newly redundant worker, the person planning 
to retire, the newly bereaved widow, will provide the same information and answer rather
O 1
similar questions for both the Inland Revenue and the DHSS ...' (p.86).
The situation in Australia is not very different. In relative terms tax liability now extends 
much further into the income distribution than it did in the formative years of social 
security. The extent of overlap between taxpayers and social security recipients is 
considerable and will continue growing under the impact of the NTS measures. Quite 
apart from it being cumbersome, many find onerous the necessity to pay even small 
amounts of income tax when their benefits are already being means tested.
The case for some degree of integration would appear therefore to be strong:
81 The UK Dept of Health and Social Security
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• administrative duplication could be eliminated in payments and assessment systems;
• compliance costs could be eased for clients of the system;
• enforcement would be facilitated by concentrating the resources of the two systems;
• ease of understanding would be facilitated; and
• current difficulties in defining the period of income assessment might be reduced or 
even eliminated.
Overall, a much cleaner and fairer system could be expected to eventuate: Chart 6.1.
In the proposal that follows, emphasis has been placed on more or less replicating the main 
incentive and distributional features of the existing system, not because these are 
necessarily appropriate but so that the issues of administrative reform can be clearly sepa­
rated from the substantive policy issues of the appropriate means test structure. Nonethe­
less, some changes are incorporated into the proposed system simply because it would be 
almost impossible, administratively, to structure a sensible integrated system around all the 
diverse characteristics of the present system. Where possible, current schedules of effective
Chart 6.1: Integration
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6.3.2 Details of the full integration proposal 
6.3.2.1 Pensioners
Separate social security income tests would be abolished and replaced by special tax scales 
applicable to those in receipt of a social security pension. For those on pension for less 
than the full financial year, a special part-year tax system would be adopted, along the lines 
of Dixon and Foster's (1983b) proposal. The normal tax system would apply on a pro-rata 
basis for that part of the year when not in receipt of pension; the special pensioner rate 
would apply, also on a pro-rata basis, for the remainder of the year. These scales would be 
applicable to the joint income of pensioner couples, as under the present income test.
Pensions would be entirely freed from tax. This is not essential to the proposal but is 
administratively convenient, since it means that the special scales need not be altered each 
time there is a general rate increase.
The special pensioner tax scale is as follows. For each dollar of non-pension income above 
$2,756 a year, a tax rate of 60 cents would apply. For couples, the first step would be 
$4,880. These limits correspond to the current pension 'free areas'. The tax rate of 60 cents 
in the dollar is higher than the 40% pension taper and, indeed, than the top marginal rate of 
personal income tax. But as Chapter 5 showed, it is in fact reflective of the rates applicable 
over wide ranges of pensioner incomes, under the NTS.
These withdrawal rates would result in break-even points, where there is no further 
advantage in remaining on the pension, at levels of income broadly similar to the pension 
cutouts now applying. At these points, the pensioner would be automatically transferred 
back to the normal taxation system. There would be end-of-year tax reconciliation, so no 
pensioner would be advantaged or disadvantaged by failure to transfer back to the tax 
system at the appropriate time. Most pensioners, once on the system, would simply remain 
on the special rate scale over the full financial year.
Centrelink would act as a withholding agent for the Tax Office, by deducting appropriate 
amounts from the pension on the basis of compulsory income declarations. (This is in fact 
possible under the present system, but declaration is not compulsory and few pensioners do 
declare.) The Tax Office would be responsible for end-of-year reconciliation, enforcement 
and compliance.
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There will clearly be occasions where pensioners under- or over-declare income, or simply 
do not know what their taxable income is likely to be. (This also occurs under the current 
system.) In order to avoid large end-of-year reconciliations, withholding should be based 
on cumulative adjustments, in a similar manner to the present pension system.
6.3.2.2 Possible problems
For FaCS/Centrelink the administrative task would not be all that different to the current 
one, except for the need to liaise with the tax office to effect end-of-year reconciliations. In 
general, these would not be large. For full-year pensioners, the system should have 
withheld appropriate amounts on the basis of the cumulative assessment procedure.
There will be a problem in allocating income between periods on and off pension. In 
general, income subject to PAYE withholding will be allocated to the pay periods over 
which it was earned. Other income (eg. from capital) will need to be spread over the 
special and normal tax periods on a pro-rata basis.
This may appear to be an unnecessary complication. An alternative procedure would be 
simply to apportion total annual income between the special and normal tax periods on a 
pro-rata basis. This would have the considerable advantage of being even-handed as be­
tween part-year and part-time earnings - the latter being discriminated against under the 
current system. But there would also be important problems. Those coming onto pension 
after being in the workforce for part of the year might find themselves with little residual 
entitlement. Those leaving pension to take up work would find themselves having, in 
effect, to pay back part of the pension already received, since many in this position would 
find themselves with a large end-of-year tax liability. Hence the use of only the financial 
year basis of assessment may not be feasible.
The need to administer a joint tax unit may cause some problems for the Tax Office. 
However, it is not a complete departure from previous practice, since such a unit now 
applies for assessing eligibility for the dependent spouse rebate and the Medicare levy.
Some of these difficulties might be resolved by a more thoroughgoing integration of the 
respective roles of social security and the tax office. Dilnot et al. propose, for the United 
Kingdom, that the tax office be integrated with benefits administration so that the local 
office of the joint organisation would be the normal point of contact with the tax or benefit 
system for the average person. In Australia a similar system has been established for the
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new body (the Family Assistance Office - FAO) which now administers family payments.
It may be, however, that this degree of integration is not necessary to substantially achieve 
the potential administrative advantages.
While the administrative obstacles appear to be superable, a significant obstacle to 
integration is the differences in the tax and social security income definitions. In general, it 
would appear to be desirable to standardise to the tax definitions, although widening of the 
tax base would clearly improve the equity and effectiveness of the joint system. The 
desire to maintain a separate assets component in the social security system is an important 
reason for preferring the full separation option described in the next section.
6.3.2,3 Allowances
Unemployment (Newstart) and Sickness Allowance would be subject to essentially the 
same system as pensioners, the only difference being that the 60 per cent tax rate would 
apply beyond $31 a week of private income for both single and married beneficiaries, and
o *3
an 80% per cent rate beyond $71 a week. These tax rates broadly preserve the existing 
structure of net benefits, although there might be a case for some easing of the 80 per cent 
rate in the light of the other features of the system - see below.
As in the case of pensioners, it would be inappropriate for Centrelink to pay benefits on the 
basis of cumulative income over the financial year to date of application, since needs are 
likely to be immediate when the event giving rise is unexpected. Rather, entitlement will 
need, as now, to be based on a fortnightly income assessment, and a part-year tax scale 
would apply for periods on and off benefit.
As Dixon and Foster (1983b) have shown, adoption of the part-year tax assessment basis 
can imply an offset to the value of unemployment benefit received if the recipient returns 
to work. In the extreme case where a high rate of income is earned over a short period of 
time - as in the case of some seasonal workers - the full value of the benefit would be 
progressively withdrawn so that it became more akin to a loan.
This feature may not be unattractive, and is in part replicated in current eligibility rules for 
seasonal workers. Dixon and Foster note that under the current system an individual can
82 Some problems also attach to the different treatment of maintenance payments and compensation payments 
in the social security system.
83 The system could be designed to replicate the partial individual basis o f the current system.
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receive both the value of the tax threshold and the progressive rate structure, as well as any 
person or benefit received in the year. Under this alternative treatment, they can access 
only one of these forms of 'income support' at any one time.
These arguments are similar to those put forward in the report of the Taxation Review 
Committee: ‘in the cases of those social service payments that are normally of a short-term 
character, especially sickness, retraining and unemployment benefits . . .  needs may be 
urgent and substantial, the poverty very great but essentially temporary. The recipient may 
well be out of it again before very long. Over a year in which he had months of acute need, 
fully meriting assistance on equity grounds, he may prove retrospectively to have had an 
acceptable total income. The community might be prepared to give temporary assistance 
more promptly and writh a less sparing hand if, when the recipient is subsequently restored 
to financial comfort, he repays via the tax system some or even all the help.' (Asprey 1975, 
p. 179)
As in the case of pensions, this procedure should not give rise to large end-of-year 
reconciliations. The current system tends to result in tax refunds for those who are 
unemployed for part of the year, since the PAYE procedures tend to over-deduct for part- 
year income earners. By contrast the part-year tax system would result in more exact 
deductions. However, some form of compensation might be justified for the harsher 
treatment of part-year earnings, along the lines of Asprey's argument that the community 
can be more generous if the 'loan' is repayable. Such compensation could take the form of 
higher basic rates, or an eased income test, or both.
The current system treats part-week earnings while on benefit rather harshly, part-year 
earnings (while off benefit) much more liberally. There would appear to be much to be said 
for a more even compromise between these two extremes, even if that is a perhaps uninten­
tional side effect of the desire to achieve greater administrative integration with the tax 
system.
6.3.2.4 Family payments
Under the NTS, family payments have been integrated into the tax system. There would 
appear to be a number of potential benefits: the relationship of benefits to income will 
become more certain and more immediate, and the extensive resources of the tax system 
can be used to check and facilitate compliance. Entitlement to family payment is based on
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the estimated joint income of the parents for the current financial year, using such 
information as pay notices and previous year tax returns.
Assessment based on income over the full financial year is more feasible in the family 
payment system because it is meant only to be an income supplement; it is not designed to 
provide full support for a family. However there will still be cases where a family, 
previously on a high income, suddenly has need of a benefit and where it may not be 
desirable to reduce supplements for family needs on the basis of previous high income.
For these sort of reason the current situation that a family on an allowance receives the full 
rate of FTB(A) automatically will continue.
Such income support recipients are quarantined from the full end-year reconciliation. 
Otherwise, they could find themselves not only with high EMTRs on moving into the 
workforce - which would be dependent on what point of the financial year they made the 
move - but also (depending on income while in work) a potential liability to pay back some 
and perhaps all the family payment they had received while on income support. It would 
be easy to incur a net tax debt in these circumstances, even taking into account the over­
withholding of PAYE tax that occurs for part-year earners.
While this could be regarded as horizontally inequitable as between part-year income 
support receipt and part wages, versus low full-year wages, the alternative of full 
reconciliation would likely lead to even worse problems.
The most radical option is application of the full 'tax credit' principle whereby benefit 
entitlement would offset any tax liability so that only the appropriate net benefit would be 
paid to, or tax be paid by, the recipient unit. This is the approach adopted in the new UK 
Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) system. The obvious advantage is that running 
adjustments as incomes change will be made by employers through the PAYE system. A 
major disadvantage, however, is that it becomes more difficult to direct assistance to 
mothers if they are not working. There could also be high compliance costs for employers, 
a problem in the UK.
The full separation proposal in the next section deals with this issue in neat manner by 
ensuring that people are either in the benefit system -  in which case they receive the 
appropriate amount as a direct payment -  or in the tax system, but not both. Problems only 
arise in the case where a family is close to the edge of one system, and crosses over to the
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other from time to time. This problem is addressed by the imposition of a special part-year 
tax rate.
6.3.3 Conclusion - integration
The proposal demonstrates that the obstacles to integration of pension and tax are not as 
great as have sometimes been thought. In particular, differences in the period of 
assessment and the income unit need not stand in the way of reform. However the 
compromises necessary in order to achieve full integration might reduce the apparent 
attraction of going down this road and Centrelink, in taking over the function of 
withholding the correct cumulative amount of tax, may be embarking on a task not all that 
different from that it now undertakes in administering pension and allowance means tests.
A particular problem, not so apparent at the time of writing my 1985 article, is the very 
different income definitions prevailing in the two systems. It can be questioned whether 
such definitions have now diverged so greatly that the integration option is no longer 
practicable.
These differences include the inclusion of imputed asset income in the social security 
means test, the disallowing of negative property incomes, and the inclusion of certain 
work-related hinge benefits. Returning to a tax definition would amount to the abolition 
of the asset test and the income deeming provisions resulting, in effect, in a test of income 
only. This proved completely unviable in the late 1970s and early 1980s. If the tax 
dehnition of income were to become more comprehensive (say, by including a deemed 
income component as a sort of minimum tax on capital income -  see Dixon 1985), then the 
full integration proposal might be worth looking at again.
The asset test issue aside, the compromises necessary to achieve administrative feasibility 
may reduce the apparent attractions of going down the full integration road. In part, these 
reflect the aim, in this exercise, of replicating the distributional effect of the current system 
and might be eased by adoption of a more uniform withdrawal rate. This helps address 
both the part-year tax scale issues, as well as the issue of how to deal with different income 
splits within the family. With a fully proportional NIT system these issues disappear 
entirely.
I conclude that a fully integrated system is the ideal we might aspire to over the long term, 
but its effective implementation would require a degree of tax base reform that is not 
currently conceivable.
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6.4 Full separation
Full separation, while theoretically less attractive than full integration, may be a more 
feasible option at the current time. Dixon and Foster (1983b) provide a detailed proposal, 
the objective of which is to ensure that pensioners subject to the pension income test are 
not also subject to taxation. To reduce the net benefit to higher income pensioners, the 
taper rate would be increased to, say 60%. The special rebate would be withdrawn beyond 
the pension cutout points. The rebate abatement rate can be designed such that, combined 
with the normal rate of income tax, the ETR of 60% applies until the rebate is fully abated 
(Chart 6.2).
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As with the integration approach described above, a special part-year tax system could be 
applied to those entering or leaving the pension system in any year, in order to simplify 
administration and to prevent a high income in part of the year prohibiting assistance at 
other times when it is needed.
The previous government contemplated a similar system, when they promised that age 
pensioners would be totally removed from the tax system by 1995. The mechanism for 
doing this is fairly simple, involving extension and modification of the special tax rebate 
for pensioners.
The Aging Agendas' Review of the pension means test (Barber et al 1994) recommended 
against the Government's promised move, finding that it would create incentives for
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current non-pensioners to become eligible for pension; be inequitable in relation to those in 
the workforce with similar incomes to pensioners; and be expensive. However these 
comments were in a context where there would not be offsetting changes to income test 
tapers, and would not be relevant if the taper rate were raised as under the Dixon/Foster 
proposal.
6.4.1 Separation applied to all additional payments
This refinement is not in the Dixon/Foster proposal, but would appear to be a logical 
extension of their idea.
Additional payments for families (FTB and Youth Allowance) and for rent would be added 
to basic benefits and also tapered at 60% beyond the benefit cutout points. There would be 
matching tax credits in the income tax system, which would start to reduce at a rate of 30% 
once entitlement to all additional payments was exhausted. The combination of 30% 
income tax (the standard rate under the NTS) and 30% loss of rebate would maintain the 
ETR at 60% until the net benefit to each family type was entirely exhausted. All such 
rebates would be withdrawn sequentially.
This system would virtually abolish churning (see below). It would also have the 
advantage that additional payments for children and rent would become subject to the 
tighter social security definition of income, which includes imputed asset incomes. Thus 
full separation becomes a very effectively targeted system.
6.4.2 Details of operation
There are two alternative ways of operating the scheme. The first is to utilise special rate 
scales but allow people to flip back to the normal scale once that were to their advantage. 
The second, as described above, is to use special credits. The following discussion uses 
the first procedure -  special tax scales - since it avoids a lot of practical difficulties that 
arise because tax obligations depend on income splits within the family.
As with the integration proposal, where a client was on the system only part of the year, 
income for the year would be pro-rated and the special and ordinary tax scales would apply 
in that proportion.
Proposed cutouts ($pa)
Single allowee 13,759
Allowee couple 25,147
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Single pensioner 19,859
Pensioner couple 33,210
There would be higher cutouts for those with children and/or those renting privately. Note 
that these cutouts are lower than those currently prevailing. However clients are not 
disadvantaged thereby, since they are not paying tax. If their income are just above the 
cutouts they are paying reduced tax by virtue of the special income tax rate scale.
Special tax scales
For pensioners, the special tax applies at the rate of 60% above thresholds equal to the 
cutouts calculated above. For allowees without children, the special rate is, say, 75%. The 
allowee or couple would have recourse to the ordinary tax scale as soon as this was to their 
advantage; the Tax Office would make this calculation automatically84.
The effect of the special rate scale is to have a family unit of taxation at lower income 
levels. At higher levels, taxpayers revert to the quasi-individual unit. It would be 
consistent to do this in a more whole-hearted manner; that is, to abolish the dependent 
spouse rebate both for those with, and those without children. Only low-income earners 
would continue to benefit from the de facto DSR implicit in the higher tax threshold for 
couples and families. This has the additional advantage of creating some savings for use 
within the restructuring package.
The special tax scales would be modified where there were dependent children, or where 
rent assistance was payable. In these cases the scales would have a higher threshold,
o c
calculated as follows .
84 These levels are estimated by calculating the tax that would otherwise be payable at the cutout income 
levels (assuming no special rebates), dividing this by the required additional withdrawal rate (ie the
difference between the special and the ordinary tax scale), and adding this figure to the cutouts.
85 Note that this proposal in effect amalgamates the proposed new FTB(A) and FTB(B) by providing a maximum rat< 
equivalent to the maximum provided under these two payments if the wife is not working. The combined payment is 
then tapered on the basis of the joint spousal income, unlike FTB(B), which is independent of the income of the 
primary income earner. This scheme is therefore better targeted, albeit that it is more generous to families where thei 
is a secondary income earner and young children.
The maximum rates envisaged are generous to families with young children, compared to estimates of 
relative costs provided by equivalence scale studies. They thus in effect provide some compensation for 
some of the indirect costs as well as the direct costs of young children, of the sort associated with childcare 
and the like. Tax package is similarly generous where the mother does not work, but withdraws assistance 
very quickly when she does (due to the “stacking” of means tests for FTB(A), FTB(A) and possibly 
Parenting Payment. Economic theory, and estimates of relevant net wage/labour supply elasticities tell us that 
it is necessary to provide reasonable workforce incentives for secondary earners such as mothers with 
children.
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For each child
Add $ pa
0-4 7805
5-12 6568
13-15 7928
Similar calculations would need to be made, and higher thresholds apply, where there were 
Youth Allowance children.
Where rent assistance was payable, the special tax scales would rise using the same 
formula, thus allowing all Rent Allowance to taper before taxation commenced. This 
formula has the effect of detaching rent assistance from basic allowances, and paying this 
as an in-work benefit to all low-income earners paying higher levels of private rent. (I 
have argued for this elsewhere as a means of improving work incentives and incomes for 
low wage earners -  see Ingles and Oliver 1999a.)
6.4.3 Integration with the normal tax system
Note that some people have incomes too high to receive pension (albeit below the 
breakeven points), but would otherwise be eligible. The answer here is that, in the case of 
pensioners, the special rate scales should apply to the whole of the potentially eligible 
group: all those aged over 65, for example (and residentially eligible for pension?), and all 
sole parents.
For working families to receive the benefit of the special tax scale at least one of them 
would need to be assessed by Centrelink as unemployed, disabled or sick, notwithstanding 
that their spouse’s income may preclude them from eligibility for any direct payment.
There are administrative and other costs associated with this part of the proposal. In effect 
Centrelink would need to test eligibility not only for its own clients, but also for putative 
clients in the borderland between part-rate eligibility and the income breakeven points for 
the special rate scale.
However the magnitude of this task should not be overstated. These are the same people 
who would otherwise continue to receive a part-rate payment under existing tapers. The 
special tax scale ought to be regarded as really an extension of the welfare system, and
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worthy of attention in its own right as looking after the all-important work/social security 
interface.86
To summarise, the above issues with the separation option, while soluble, do illustrate the 
difficulties involved in having two different definitions of means in the tax and social 
security systems. The integration option, by contrast, has a single definition of means and 
therefore avoids the ‘grey area’ of people who are ineligible for social security, but not 
liable to tax. It follows that integration should be regarded as the most satisfactory long- 
run solution to these problems. Separation provides a good interim solution while leaving 
open the possibility of a more substantial integration of the two systems at a later stage.
6.4.4 Abolition of churning
"Churning" is the phenomenon whereby some beneficiaries also pay tax, and some 
taxpayers receive benefits. In economic terms churning may not be all that important. If 
we net out all tax transfers in a single negative or positive tax payment, the marginal 
incentives facing people will be unchanged. An extreme example is the choice between a 
demogrant, combined with a linear tax, compared to a NIT with the same level of 
guarantee and same linear tax rate. Government expenditure would be much lower under 
the NIT option, notwithstanding that all average and marginal tax rates would be 
unchanged.
Nonetheless the appearance, under systems which involve churning, that people are paying 
a lot of tax may be economically important. Economists tend to give perceptions much 
less importance in tax policy discussion than they perhaps deserve. For this reason it 
would appear desirable to avoid churning to the extent that it is administratively 
convenient.
Churning is not easy to measure accurately. The OECD measures churning in Australia as 
6.5% of private income - almost the lowest for the whole of the OECD area. This measure 
is based on the Household Expenditure Survey 1993-94. For each decile of households, 
transfers are compared with direct taxes, and whichever is lower is then calculated as a 
percentage of private income in that decile (in fact the correctly weighted figure is 4.5% - 
see Whiteford 1998). Using the same procedure, but calculating churning as a percentage
86 In the long term, the real solution here is to align the tax thresholds with the allowance cutouts, and have a 
high initial marginal rate (in order to quarantine the benefits to those with modest incomes). This approach, 
which in effect creates a categorical GMI, is outlined in the Section on Convergence.
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of total transfer expenditure, rather than income, I find it to be almost one-third (32.5%): 
some $16 billion pa.
This is a large over-estimate. In essence it assumes that there is one income unit in each 
decile. In fact each decile comprises a huge variety of different household types, including 
some which combine several income units. An accurate measure of churning would 
require the use of a full micro-simulation model, and compare direct taxes and transfers for 
individual income units. A fully comprehensive measure would also include indirect taxes 
and benefits. Further, even if churning could be entirely eliminated on a current income 
basis, there would still be churning as measured on an annual basis as beneficiaries move 
into the workforce and become taxpayers, and visa versa.
But the main point is that even if avoidable churning is, say, 7-10% of total transfers, this 
corresponds to a huge dollar expenditure in the Federal budget: around $4-5 billion 
annually. If this could be eliminated, there would be a large reduction in the apparent size 
of government. This may be of particular importance in an environment where the 
increase in indirect taxation will see a big rise in government transfer expenditure just to 
maintain the current real value of transfer benefits.
Churning is entirely avoided by the combination of full separation of basic benefits and of 
additional payments described in the previous section. Further, because the asset test 
operates over the whole of the payment system, the combined system is more effectively 
targeted than any of the other proposals in the chapter.
6.4.5 Similarities with NIT and Keating/Lambert proposal
This scheme has many similarities with the Dawkins et al (1998a) scheme for a categorical 
GMI with a higher (60%) tax rate on social security clients. It is also very similar to the 
Keating and Lambert (1998b) scheme for rationalising tapers on benefits and family 
payments. This scheme envisaged amalgamating all additional payments for children, rent 
and students (and possibly childcare) and tapering them sequentially at a common 30% 
rate, thus avoiding overlapping tapers. It should really be regarded as an alternative means 
of implementation. However, it has several advantages compared to K&L’s plan and also 
the Dawkins et al modified (categorical) GMI, viz:
1. Rather than EMTRs being a somewhat unpredictable outcome of tax interactions (in 
K&L), they become a single designed rate.
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2. “Churning” is abolished. Those who receive welfare transfers do not pay tax; those 
who pay tax do not receive transfers. This would result in a considerable reduction in 
the apparent level of government transfer spending.
3. The system is very effectively targeted, since for those who receive net payments it 
relies on the social security definition of income, which is tighter than the tax one, and
0 7
includes an asset test .
6.4.6 Convergence: using separation to achieve a categorical GMI
The basic idea underlying the non-categorical GMI is that all those on similar low incomes 
are similarly in need of assistance. Convergence is a less extreme form of the same idea.
By convergence, I refer to the reduction in the gain from being in a categorical group as 
income rises. Achieving rapid convergence is one way of reducing the distortions brought 
about by categorisation, and thereby achieving better horizontal equity as between people 
on similar incomes. In general, a means-tested system like the Australian one achieves 
convergence at the benefit cutout points. The current system achieves fairly rapid 
convergence for allowees, but much less so for pensioners (the cutout point for a pensioner 
couple under the NTS is in excess of $45,000 pa). My comments on convergence apply 
mainly to the workforce aged; in the case of age pensioners different considerations such 
as savings incentives apply.
Convergence can be maximised by (a) abolishing free areas, (b) maximising benefit tapers 
and (c) minimising tax on non-categoricals with incomes less than cutout points. At the 
extreme this would imply having a 100% taper on benefits, and setting tax thresholds equal 
to cutout points . Clearly, there is a trade-off between the objectives of rapid convergence, 
and those of work/saving incentives.
A less extreme form might have a taper of say 75%, and tax thresholds correspondingly 
higher ($15,371 pa, single, and $25,147 pa, couple). This could be partly financed by an 
increase in the initial and second marginal tax rate, which (for revenue neutrality) would
87 Note that this scheme would re-introduce an asset test for family payments, which was abolished with the 
introduction of Family Tax Benefit in the July 2000 new Tax System.
88 Kesselman and Garfinkel (1978 p i86) actually call this a ‘fully integrated’ system: “This approach sets the 
personal exemption in the positive tax equal to the break-even income level in the NIT”. By contrast the 
earlier proposal on separation is what they call an ‘overlapping’ system: “This approach sets the personal 
exemption below the break-even income level.. .The overlapping scheme has been popular in articulated NIT 
proposals, because it does not carry the large revenue cost of raising personal exemptions to the desired 
break-even income level” (pi 87), but “...distortive efficiency depends upon a host of empirical magnitudes.”
(p201)
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need to become something like 35 or 40%. (Another financing option is increased indirect 
taxation.) In this manner the proposal for full separation can be made into a categorical 
GMI with a three-rate effective tax structure: eg. 75-35-50%. Unlike previous GMI 
proposals in Australia there would be no lower-tier GMI for non-categoricals, the high tax 
threshold serving the same purpose.
This proposal, to be fully effective, would require either a partial family unit tax system, or 
an increased spouse rebate -  which would need to again become available to couples with 
children. Some will be horrified at the proposal for an increased spouse rebate or a partial 
family unit tax system. However it is a logical consequence of greater tax/social security 
integration. Currently the tax system is based predominantly (but not wholly) on the 
individual; the social security system mainly on the couple. Since an individual basis of 
entitlement is not possible in the social security system - it is not affordable89 - the two 
systems can only be made more compatible by moving the tax system at least partially 
towards a family basis. As suggested under the Section dealing with Separation, the 
spouse rebate could be clawed back with rising family income in the same manner as 
proposed for other special tax rebates, so that at higher income levels that tax system 
would revert to an individual basis.
One ameliorating feature is that, with more uniform tax rates, the differences between the 
two approaches become less significant. It should also be noted that the spouse rebate in 
this proposal is the exact analogy of the NIT payment for a spouse under the Dawkins et al 
proposal.
The nicest feature of this means of implementing a categorical GMI is that those outside 
the social security categorical groups, while not gaining access to a payment, would benefit 
from very substantial tax-free areas. This would greatly improve equity between those 
low-income earners with and those without categorical eligibility.
This proposal, while theoretically interesting, shares some of the drawbacks of the 
Dawkins et al and other NIT options. Because it is highly redistributive, it has the 
potential to have negative implications for work incentives and tax evasion. In other words 
convergence -  horizontal equity -  is achieved at the expense of efficiency.
89This is not strictly true. One could design, for example, a system o f individual tax credits and a 
proportional tax (possibly involving supplements for those living alone). However, the tax credit for the 
second earner in any couple would be the de facto equivalent o f the DSR, and has all the same distributional 
implications.
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This trade-off might, at least on the face of it, be ameliorated by use of heavier indirect 
taxation. But ultimately, indirect taxes are just as much a part of the tax ‘wedge’ as direct 
taxes. Marginal incentives ought really to be measured by reference to both the direct and 
indirect tax systems. It follows that a strategy of increasing indirect taxes only reduces 
EMTRs by virtue of the partial and incomplete way in which these are measured in our 
conventional tax/benefit models, which confine themselves to direct taxes (as used in 
Chapter 5). Ultimately, in assessing the utility of tax mix changes, one confronts the same 
trade-offs that characterise the optimal tax/taper problem.
The same effect as an increase in indirect taxation could be implemented directly by a 
continuation of a low income tax rate coinciding with the taper range -  in other words, 
pretty much what we have now, with a lowered rate for couples as proposed below. 
However the tax mix change option has two advantages:
• the (direct) tax/benefit system starts to look more logical
• heavier use of indirect taxation may help lower the perceived burden of taxation, and 
perceptions are not unimportant in peoples’ behavioural responses to taxation.
A program of tax threshold and bracket increase on a family unit basis provides one 
solution to problems of social security and tax integration. Certainly it might provide a 
neater solution than the use of ad hoc devices such as the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), although one advantage of the EITC is that -  at least on the US model -  it 
introduces a form of family unit taxation90.
A disadvantage of raising tax thresholds and marginal rates together is that any gradual 
process will actually exacerbate high EMTR problems for allowees on the run-out of the 
allowance taper. Only if the tax thresholds are completely aligned with the allowance 
cutouts is this problem avoided. It follows that any gradualist program of change needs to 
focus on the family unit issue, with priority to be given to the combined income range 
where really high EMTRs occur: $20,000 pa to $29,000 pa. Specifically, for couples the 
17% tax bracket could be extended from $20,000 pa to $29,000 pa, providing tax 
reductions for the couple of up to $1,170 pa - $22 a week. This would provide interim 
relief from EMTR problems, pending more substantial structural change.
90 For a discussion of EITC issues see Ingles (2000d).
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Ultimately a categorical NIT based on full separation of tax and social security and reform 
of the income tax rate structure to reduce income taxes on low-income families, is my 
preferred medium-term model for reform.
6.5 Harmonisation
In some ways this is the least difficult of the four main reform options considered here, it 
being less of a departure from current arrangements than either full integration or full 
separation. In essence, pension tapers and tax would continue to operate as at present, but 
they would be coordinated in such a way that the combined withdrawal rate comprised a 
rational whole (Chart 6.3).
It should be noted that harmonisation is not as well targeted as full separation. The reason 
is that the pension means test, with its broader base, does all the initial work under the 
separation option, whereas it combines with the tax system under the harmonisation option. 
Further, harmonisation is administratively more cumbersome. That said, harmonisation 
might be an acceptable second best. The reform options discussed in Part 1 of this set are 
all forms of harmonisation.
6.6 Conclusion
The proposals contained herein indicate that a large smorgasbord of options exist for 
rationalising tax and social security interactions. It is important that they be rationalised, 
because the current system doesn't always make a lot of economic sense and in all
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likelihood has profound implications on incentive to work and save for some, perhaps 
many, people. However, the "iron law" of income redistribution is such that rationalisation 
will involve some very hard decisions.
The basic problem is that peaks in EMTR schedules can only be levelled by imposing 
higher EMTRs in income ranges and on taxpayers whose EMTRs are currently low. 
Moreover, the lower the income ranges where EMTRs are being "levelled up", the more 
effective is this process. Moreover, horizontal equity and the aim of convergence require 
that average tax rates not be increased (and preferably fall) for those not categorically 
eligible for any payment, yet below the cutout points.
The Government’s NTS Package achieves substantial benefits in relation to EMTRs for 
many low income (and some high income) families, and for pensioners. However 
considerable problems will remain, which, while they can be addressed in part by further 
incremental reform, preferably require redress through broad systemic change. While 
Keating and Lambert have put forward one possibility, and Dawkins et at another, my own 
preference is for a system not too greatly different to the modified GMI set out in this 
Chapter, based on full separation of tax and social security basic payments, combined with 
dramatic increases in tax thresholds -  to the allowance cutouts - and (unavoidably) in the 
initial and second marginal rates.
If this system were thought to involve too severe an increase in the effective progressivity 
of the tax system, this could be mitigated by either retaining a low rate of income taxation 
on incomes below the cutouts (utilising a family income unit) or by an increase in the 
relative weight of indirect taxation, utilising the GST. I recognise that the latter option is 
not one currently favoured by either political party.
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7 CHAPTER 7: OPTIONS FOR ASSISTING LOW WAGE
EARNERS 
7.1 Introduction91
Low wages are a concern partly because of the widening dispersion of earnings in 
Australia, which has tended to cause a shift in poverty away from previously vulnerable 
groups (such as the aged) and towards low-income earners.
Several proposals for reducing unemployment in Australia argue for cuts or freezes in 
award wages which, by reducing the aggregate wage bill and creating more flexibility in 
the dispersion of relative wages, are meant to increase employment. Typically, such 
proposals include (often vague) proposals to offset some of the distributional consequences 
by top-ups or other adjustments to the tax/transfer system. The best developed of these 
proposals is that of Dawkins and his collaborators (1997, 1998a), which envisages the 
introduction of a negative income tax (NIT). More recently, Keating and Lambert (1999a 
and b) have developed an earned income tax credit (EITC) as an adjunct to their wider 
welfare reform proposals.
Apart from the NIT, there are other possible options to assist low wage earners. These 
include an EITC as used in the United States; other forms of wage subsidies (eg removal of 
payroll tax from the low-paid); changes to existing social security parameters to reduce 
tapers (and improve replacement rates for the unemployed), reductions in the income tax 
faced by the low paid (eg through increases in the tax threshold, or increases in the low 
income rebate); and perhaps new social security supplements.
This Chapter examines the available options and concludes that, given the current structure 
of the social security system, there are serious obstacles to the most common ones such as 
the NIT or the EITC. There is a case for further reducing tax burdens on low wage earners, 
but options in this area tend to be very expensive and/or require targeting on a family needs 
basis. Reducing the tapers on Newstart and Parenting Allowance would help low wage 
families in a very targeted manner, but -  as argued in Chapter 4 - the general use of such 
allowances as forms of wage subsidy introduces contentious issues, and would also have
This Chapter is based on a Paper presented at the National Social Policy Research Conference, 21-23 July 
1999, Sydney, by David Ingles and Ken Oliver (1999a), an edited version in the Conference Proceedings 
(Ingles and Oliver 1999b) and Ingles 2000d.
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potentially significant cost implications for family and youth payments, if means test 
“stacking” is to be avoided.
Instead, a strategy of targeted reductions in income tax is preferred, which might be payed 
for either by rises in the ‘standard’ tax rate or by an increase in the weight of indirect 
taxation. These cuts should take the form of large rises in tax thresholds targeted on a 
family unit basis, consistent with the main options discussed in Chapter 5.
7.2 Trends in poverty and the distribution of income
In general, the pre-tax/transfer income distribution in Australia has tended to become more 
unequal over the last 15-20 years, a trend also observed in many other OECD countries (eg 
Gregory 1993). However, measurement and conceptual difficulties make it hard to be 
precise about the exact dimensions of this trend.
Other trends in labour markets -  casualisation and part-time work, women’s labour force 
participation, dual-earner families, and increasing unemployment (especially long-term) -  
have also tended to impact adversely on the distribution of market incomes. This would 
normally have been expected to increase poverty, other things being equal. It appears, 
however, that in Australia the widening dispersion in market incomes has been offset at 
least partly, and possibly wholly, by changes in the tax/transfer system which have tended 
to make this system more progressive (Harding 1997a). In particular families with 
dependent children have been considerably protected by improvements in the family 
payment system (Harding and Szukalska 1999, 2000). This is particularly so if non-cash 
(“social wage”) transfers are included in the calculation (Johnson et al 1995).
Policy changes have had a particular emphasis on child poverty. Harding and Szukalska 
(H&S 1999) estimated, using a relative poverty line, that child poverty in Australia fell by 
about one third between 1982 and 1995/6. This reduction is mainly attributable to a 
halving of the chance of a child being in poverty, if there were no parental income earners, 
from 70 to 35%. This in turn reflects large increases in social security benefits for those 
with dependent children in this period. However, the poverty risk with one or two earners 
in the family, at 9% and 8 % respectively, was virtually unchanged over the same period 
(see H&S 1999 figure 8 p22).
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More recently, H&S (2000) updated these estimates to 1997/98. Depending on the poverty 
line utilised -  all relative -  child poverty fell by about one-third over 1982 -  1997/8, but 
may have risen slightly in the post-1995/96 period. Notably, there is an increased 
likelihood of children in a (wage or salary) working family being in poverty in the latest 
period, up from 3.6% in 1995/6 to 5% in 1997/98. Such children represented almost a 
quarter of all dependent children in poverty in 1997/98.
(I here use “poverty” as a shorthand for “relative low income”, which -  consistent with 
H&S - is a measure of a family’s equivalent income relative to median household income. 
Families with equivalent incomes less that 50% of the median (or average) are defined as 
poor, consistent with OECD and international practice. Practitioners in this field, though, 
recognise that poverty measures are inevitably somewhat arbitrary.)
On H&S’s measures poverty after housing costs has fallen much less sharply, being fairly 
steady at around 21-22% over 1982 to 1997/98. While it is possible that rent assistance 
recipients now rent better accommodation, or that some part of the benefit of higher RA 
has been shifted to landlords, the data do not indicate that these have been large factors. 
Rather, “.. .there appeared to be a compositional shift in the characteristics of children in 
after-housing poverty, with children living in self-employed and social security dependent 
households moving out of poverty and those living in wage earning households moving in” 
(H&S 1999 p25). The same conclusion is repeated in H&S (2000), with the caveat that the 
strong growth in average incomes in recent years is not reflected in allowance rates, which 
are tied to prices, not incomes: “The incomes of unemployed families with children fully 
dependent upon social security increased by much less than both average and medial 
community incomes during this [1995/6 -  1997/8] period...” (H&S 2000 p31).
Children living in wage earning households had experienced far greater increases in their 
housing costs than children living in other types of families, primarily because their 
families were purchasing their homes and grappling with relatively high mortgage
92 The lines used are the Henderson line, and the Henderson equivalence ratios applied to half average 
income and half median income, and the OECD line, which also uses half median income but a different set 
of equivalence ratios. Child poverty increased on the Henderson line, but this line -  which is indexed to 
household disposable income per capita - grew as a proportion of both average and median incomes.
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repayments” (H&S 1999 p32). While to some extent this may reflect burdens voluntarily 
assumed it is nonetheless cause for concern.
The studies cited have concentrated on child poverty. In general there has been an implicit 
assumption that single people and couples without children are able, if working, to sustain 
themselves adequately from their wage income.
With current trends in income distribution, it may be a matter of having to keep “running 
harder” for redistribution policy to keep up. In the future, it is possible that we will see a 
continuing decline in the relative position of low wage earners, alongside a continuing de­
regulation of the wage (ie: industrial award) system. While safety net adjustments granted 
by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) in recent years may mitigate 
such trends in the short run, their long-run sustainability is open to question if they push 
against market forces. Indeed, there are pressures from academic economists for reducing 
growth in award wages as a means of reducing unemployment. Typically, such 
economists are also concerned to offset the impact on low-income earners by social 
security and tax policies. This Chapter discusses possible policies for achieving this 
outcome.
7.3 Proposals for wage/tax trade-offs
The “five economists” in an open letter to the Prime Minister suggested a 4-year freeze on 
awards, the impact of which was to be offset by a new tax credit (Dawkins et al 1998b). 
They expected this to reduce the aggregate growth in real wages by some 3-4%; and 
reduce the level of unemployment by 1.5 to 2 percentage points to about 5 to 5.5%. 
However, the ACTU dispute the effect on aggregate wage growth of a freeze -  see pp50- 
51 of Dawkins (1999).
Dawkins et al propose that new tax credits be introduced to compensate low-income 
families. However, they give no details as to how the proposed credits would operate, or 
what they might cost. Alternatively, they suggest that a NIT might be introduced. This 
approach is analysed in some detail in Dawkins et al 1997, 1998a. In its most recent form 
(Dawkins 1999), the NIT is to be combined with an EITC. The EITC achieves the
93 Given the long-term lock-in a mortgage-financed home purchase represents, this finding, based on the 93-
94 SIHC, may be a product of shorter-term movements in interest rates. An alternative explanation is that 
people were ‘caught’ by the sustained high nominal interest rates of the 1980s and early 90s.
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immediate objective of compensating low wage earners; the NIT the long-term objective of 
reducing EMTRs.
Obviously, the wage-tax tradeoff proposal depends on estimates as to the elasticity of 
labour demand with respect to real wage levels, and particularly on the demand for less 
skilled people (see below). Irrespective of one’s position on these issues it seems likely 
that proposals of this sort will continue and, irrespective of government policy in this area, 
developments such as globalisation will continue to put downward pressure on wages at 
the low-skilled end of the spectrum. Policies for supporting the incomes of low wage 
earners will therefore continue to be in the public attention. A particular aspect of this 
problem is to retain adequate incentives to work for those whose incomes are not far above 
basic rates of social security payments.
7.4 Incidence of low pay versus the incidence of unemployment
It is now well understood that regulation of wages is a blunt instrument for addressing 
poverty and inequality. The reason, as Richardson and Harding (R&H 1998b) have 
pointed out, is that people receiving low wages are often part of families that are not so 
badly off. “People receiving low wages are well spread through the distribution of family 
incomes. This makes Living Wage adjustments a very blunt equity device” (Dawkins et al 
1998b).
The R&H study finds that the low paid in 1994-95 are evenly divided between the sexes, 
spread across the age groups, have no formal educational qualifications, and are probably 
married. One third have dependent children (p9). About one-quarter of low wage men are 
non-students still living at home; R&H note that their income may not provide a useful 
measure of their real living standards94.
A substantial proportion of low wage workers live in families in the upper half of the 
equivalent income distribution -  generally because they live in a family where another 
person also earns an income. Low waged workers are distributed fairly evenly throughout 
the distribution of equivalent disposable income. While a disproportionate number are 
found in the bottom three or four deciles, substantial numbers are also found in all but the 
highest decile. “The comparison with the 1980s does not give much grounds for concern 
that low wages are increasingly precipitating families into the bottom of the income
94 Of course, they may be living at home precisely because they are low paid.
214
215
distribution. Low wages are modestly linked with low family income, but no more in 
1994-95 than in 1986” (R&H 1998b p i3).
Many low earners are in families with relatively high-income (pi 5); receipt of multiple 
incomes (mainly involving a spouse) is an important reason for this. Another reason is that 
many are not supporting children. A single person who receives the minimum wage for a 
full week’s work will be located in the middle of the equivalent income distribution.
Nonetheless, families with a low wage earner are about twice as likely to be “in poverty” 
(14.3%) as wage and salary earners generally (6.7% - p23). The poverty risk increases 
only slightly if there are children -  indicative of the effectiveness of strategies to combat 
child poverty in the late 1980s (Harding and Szukalska 1999). Poverty rates are very high 
for low wage earners aged less than 21, (33%) but many of these are non-student children 
living at home with their parents, and presumably benefit from the totality of resources 
available to the family. The families most likely to be in poverty are those with no earners 
at all. On the statistical picture presented, no pay is a greater contributor to poverty 
than low pay.
This is confirmed by Harding and Richardson (H&R 1998) in their study of unemployment 
and income distribution. They find that the unemployed have much lower personal and 
family (equivalent) incomes than their wage and salary earner peers -  on average, around 
40%. This reflects the fact that the unemployed, and especially the long-term unemployed, 
rely overwhelmingly on government cash benefits. Only one-fifth of the unemployed live 
in families which rely mainly on wage and salary income. (H&R 1998 p i45) Conversely 
people who are employed, even part-time, overwhelmingly live in families which support 
themselves from their own earnings. This indicates a problem of ‘workless families’, one 
specifically identified in the McClure Report on Welfare Reform (Welfare Reform 
Working Group 1999, 2000)
Whereas H&R calculate a poverty rate for all adults of 8% (or 12% if the higher poverty 
line for those in the labour force is used) for unemployed adults the poverty rates are 28% 
and 45% respectively. The poverty rate among families that declare at least $1 of wage 
and salary income is only 2%, or 4% using the higher line. Similarly, whereas poverty is 
very low among children living in families with some wage and salary income, at 3 or 6%, 
this rate jumps to 27 or 50% among dependent children in unemployed families. These
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rates may be overstated to the extent that twenty percent of the unemployed live at home 
with their parents -  though not perhaps by choice.
The unemployed, unlike the low-waged, are clustered very heavily at the bottom end of the 
equivalent income distribution. Just over two-thirds of male unemployed, and over half of 
female unemployed, were in the bottom two deciles of equivalent disposable income in 
1994-95. This picture is very similar for the long term unemployed, suggesting that “
.. .the big difference in income is associated with movement between employment and 
unemployment, rather than the duration of unemployment” (H&R 1998 pi 54).
The overall impression one gets is that low wages per se are not an overwhelming social 
problem, whereas unemployment is. Unemployment is more strongly associated with 
poverty than is a low wage; “It follows that a redistribution from low wage earners to 
unemployed people would make the overall distribution of income more equal.” (H&R 
p 160) This is an uncomfortable conclusion for some social policy analysts. However, it is 
not at all clear whether reductions in minimum wages would necessarily effect such a 
redistribution.
The OECD (1998) also concludes that the distributional case for minimum wages is weak. 
“The fact that low paid workers are not highly concentrated in poor households suggests 
that increases in minimum wages, in most cases, are likely to have a limited impact in 
cutting overall family poverty rates” (p.viii). However, the OECD goes on to note that the 
balance of evidence suggests that the minimum has no significant effect on overall adult 
unemployment, but there is some effect on youth unemployment. Overall, the OECD 
suggest that “If minimum wages are set carefully, they can improve the material well-being 
of some low wage workers, have some positive effect on work incentives and limit the 
extent of earnings inequality.. .But minimum wages are not the solution for family 
poverty... ”(p.ix).
It is important to be careful in interpreting the Australian income distribution statistics. 
While unemployment is associated with a high probability of low income, there are lots 
more wage earners than there are unemployed. Thus, only 18% of the people in the 
poorest three deciles (ranked by equivalent family income) are unemployed, while 60% of 
those in these deciles are entirely outside the labour force, 15% have jobs, and the balance
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(7%) are self-employed.95 In other words, there are more poor people with jobs than there 
are unemployed poor. A transfer of income from poor people with jobs to poor people 
looking for work may not improve overall income equity.
A related issue is the extent to which those on low pay cycle in and out of unemployment, 
and visa versa -  perhaps implying that the unemployed may not be net gainers from 
reducing low pay levels. Also, given mobility into and out of low paid employment, 
incidence rates for a single cross-section understate the proportion of the population that is 
affected by minimum wage policies (OECD 1998b p54).
While acknowledging that minimum wages are not as well targeted at reducing in-work 
poverty as means-tested in-work benefits, the OECD note some problems with the 
approach of relying on in-work benefits alone: “...means-tested benefits ... may lead to a 
fall in the wages of low-paid workers; and they can be very expensive. This suggests that 
there may be some scope to complement in-work benefits with a national minimum wage” 
(OECD 1998 p32 and pp55-56). In particular, both minimum wages and in-work benefits 
can reduce the “unemployment trap” by raising the rewards of work relative to 
unemployment income (ibid p57).
The issue, it seems, is not whether there should be complete de-regulation of minimum 
wages, but rather what level they should be set at, and what complementary tax/transfer 
policies should be implemented. I do not, in this Chapter, seek to take any position on the 
debate about the wage/tax tradeoff. However, it does seem likely that, on present trends, 
low wages will increasingly become an issue for the social security system and for our 
society in general, irrespective of any explicit decision to freeze or slow the growth in 
awards. And while our current system is, on the analysis contained in here, surprisingly 
resilient to such trends, there are areas where there are reasonable grounds for concern. 
For this reason an explicit policy response -  or approach - appears to be very desirable.
95 These figures are from Harding and Richardson (1998). Their analysis is based on comparing the 
unemployed and low paid and their position in the total income distribution. An alternative methodology is 
to compare the position of these groups with the workforce age population. This approach also suggests that 
low pay and unemployment are both important contributors to low income. Thus, those not in the labour 
force make up 37% of the poorest working age income decile, with 34% of that decile being employees, 19% 
being unemployed and 10% self-employed.
217
218
7.5 Main options for directing additional assistance to low wage 
earners
7.5.1 Current assistance for low wage earners
It is not always recognised that Australia already has in place a substantial system of in­
work assistance for low wage earners with family responsibilities, as detailed in Chapter 2.
In contrast, single low wage earners who do not have dependent children receive relatively 
little or no cash assistance under the current system. The implicit assumption is that single 
people without child dependents, and who are employed full-time, are able to support 
themselves from their earnings. A single adult’s full-time wage would need to be below 
about $270 pw for them to be eligible for payment under the allowance income test. 
Currently, the Federal Minimum Wage is $400.40 a week.
In the case of a couple without children, there can be some access to cash assistance if one 
or both members are categorically eligible for Newstart allowance. The July 1995 changes 
introducing a partly individual basis of assessment mean that, where one partner is in a low 
wage job, the other can get assistance (subject to the means test) if he or she is prepared to 
seek full-time work. This means that the social security system can supplement the income 
of the couple, through that partner, up to the point where their total earnings is $28,000 pa - 
around $550 a week -  or higher, if Rent Assistance is payable.96 If a low waged couple 
have children, one may be eligible for Parenting Payment (Partnered), irrespective of the 
other’s possible eligibility for Newstart allowance.
The bottom line is that the social security system already provides substantial in-work 
assistance to those low wage earners most likely to be at risk of poverty, and there are 
options to further develop the existing system in ways supportive of low-waged work.
The following are the main options considered in this Chapter:
1. the negative income tax
2. earned income tax credits
3. wage subsidies for low wage earners (including reductions in payroll taxes, and hours- 
conditioned in-work payments)
96 Note that for a couple where one is on payment, RA is payable at the full rate for the couple.
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4. changes to social security parameters (including major reforms to rationalise EMTRs) 
and to rent assistance, and
5. reductions in income tax burdens on the low-paid.
It should be noted that these are not always mutually exclusive approaches -  for example, 
Gamaut, one of the ‘five economists’ proposing an earned income tax credit, sees this as a 
transitional instrument in the path to a full negative income tax system (Gamaut 1999, 
pp9-10).
7.5.2 The Negative Income Tax (NIT)
As noted in chapter 5, the NIT in its pure (ie non-categorical)97 form has a number of 
significant problems, as well as its well-publicised advantages. These problems include:
• the very high marginal tax rates required across the whole population if the basic 
income guarantee level is to be at the same rate as existing categorical payments (this is 
estimated as 57% by Dawkins et al 1997);
• the consequent possibility of a more general work and saving and/or tax avoidance 
response;
• the apparent extension of assistance to those whose need may not be great, such as 
those voluntarily not in the workforce, or those self-employed who are able to declare 
artificially low taxable incomes; and
• if the tax definition of income is adopted in the unified system, as proposed by 
Dawkins et al, the social security system loses the ability to distinguish those with 
substantial assets.
Chapter 5 makes the point that it is very difficult to avoid most of the issues that underlie 
difficulties in the existing system if any new system is to be socially, politically and 
economically acceptable. Given this, it might seem preferable to stick with the current 
system and adopt an incremental approach, albeit paying particular attention to low income 
earners.
^^"Non-categorical" implies that the full negative income guarantee would be available to all those with 
sufficiently low incomes, without reference to their eligibility under categories such as the aged, invalid, 
unemployed etc.
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7.5.2.1 Conclusion on the NIT
The NIT is probably not practicable in its pure form. However in the modified form which 
retains categorical tests of eligibility and a higher initial tax rate, the NIT is a very 
attractive concept, and one that is not greatly different in its effects to the current 
tax/transfer system, assuming that it were to be reformed to rationalise tapers and tax 
interactions. In particular the modified NIT could achieve many of the same objectives as 
the single workforce age payment (SWAP) proposal, which is designed to remove 
unwonted differences between payments, and reduce incentives to access favoured 
payment categories.
That said, there are also serious difficulties to even the modified NIT (as modified by 
Dawkins et al) approach to reform:
• It doesn’t handle the issue of capital incomes very well, unless there is a wholesale 
reform of the income tax base (eg, including deemed income from capital).
• It is not clear how the administration would be handled in practice, especially the 
transition from the negative to the positive tax system. (The simplest system, of a 
universal demogrants and uniform tax rates, is the NIT least likely to be achievable, 
and in any case does not sit well with the ‘mutual obligation’ philosophy that now 
underpins much thinking about welfare reform.)
• It is hard to find a single definition of income that simultaneously allows the credit to 
effectively address current need while preventing manipulation of the timing of 
earnings to maximise entitlement.
In addition it is not widely understood that the modified NIT also has drastic implications 
for the structure of income tax rates. As discussed in Chapter 6, the necessity for the 
situation of categoricals and non-categoricals to ‘converge’ implies that for non- 
categoricals the tax threshold should equal the break-even income levels for categoricals 
(ie, around $15,500 for singles, if the initial tax rate is 60%), and that the tax rate above 
these levels should be the “standard” rate -  ie, around 45%.
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7.5.3 Earned income tax credits (EITCs)
Earned income tax credits have been advocated in Australia by the ALP in the 1998 federal 
election (see above), by Keating and Lambert (1998a and b), and by some economists who 
see these as a useful trade-off for restraint in award wage growth. They have been 
advocated or adopted in several OECD countries as part of measures to “make work pay” 
(see Kalisch et al 1998 Table 5.8). However, the US EITC remains by far the largest 
scheme of this sort.
The principle features of an EITC which distinguishes it from a conventional tax credit are, 
first, that it is based on earned, not total income, and second that it is not simply a 
maximum payment which abates as income rises beyond the threshold. Rather, it rises 
over some earnings range, before being phased out. For this reason I do not regard the new 
Working Families Tax Credit in the UK nor the NZ Independent Family Tax Credit as 
EITCs, although they do have some incentive features such as (in the UK) the 15/30 hours 
of work rule (see 2.4.2 below).
7.5.3.1 Opposition Election Proposals
In the 1998 election, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) proposed a set of income tax cuts 
using credits, the value of which reduced as income rose. These are very similar in effect 
to an EITC (“A fairer tax system with no GST’ -  ALP 1998). Labor proposed a “tax credit 
for working families” worth up to $3,300 pa for a family with two children. The credit 
was to be restricted to earned incomes.
This credit is broadly modelled on the US EITC (see below for details). It was to phase in 
at the rate of 10 cents in the dollar, up to a maximum income of $30,000 pa for one child, 
plus $3,000 for each extra child up to four. Maximum credit would apply over a plateau 
range of $ 10,000 pa (ie up to $40,000), and then phase out at a rate of 15 cents in the 
dollar. Thus, it would fully phase out at roughly $60-75,000, depending on the number of 
children present.
By way of comparison, the US EITC pays 40 cents in the dollar up to an income of about 
$15,000 pa, ($AUS equivalent) reaching a maximum of $6,000 and phases out at the rate
98 The NZ CTC is a payment given on the basis that there is no benefit income and is not an hours of work 
incentive as such. Its existence is highly contentious as its exacts a punishment on families -  especially 
larger families -  who are forced on to benefit by unemployment, sickness or the like.
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of around 20 cents above $20,000. The EITC is fully abated when the family income 
reaches $50,000.
It can be seen that the ALP proposal was pitched much more to the middle income group 
than is the US EITC. This reflects the anti-poverty focus of the US measure, whereas this 
focus is catered for in the Australian context by direct cash benefits. The ALP proposal 
can be clearly discerned as a means of focussing tax cuts on a particular target group.
7.5.3.2 Keating and Lambert proposal for EITC
This proposal accompanies the K&L (1998a) plan for a major revision of income tests, 
which would lower EMTRs for allowees and families. As explained earlier, the main part 
of the plan involves grouping all family assistance payments, Rent and Youth Allowance, 
and tapering them sequentially at a 30% taper. With the EMTR for allowees and low 
income families coming close to 60% (taking account of the 30% marginal income tax 
rate) the overall effect of the K&L scheme is actually very similar to the modified 
categorical NIT proposed by Dawkins et al.
K&L note that an earnings credit implies an increase in EMTRs over the income range 
where it is phased out. In their plan, this is addressed by incorporating the credit within the 
group of family payments that are phased out at the common 30% rate. The earnings 
credit would be introduced at a low rate initially and gradually increased over 3 or 4 years,
. possibly as a trade-off for economic reform and/or wage restraint and to offset any 
drift towards greater wage dispersion and inequality” (p i5). In the first year it would be 
equivalent to 2% of a low-paid employees earnings, or a little over $ 10 a week tax-free. It 
would be paid in full up to the same threshold as for Family Payments, $28,200 pa.
Because the earnings credit would be combined with family assistance payments, the level 
of income at which it was tapered would vary according to the size of these other 
payments. For single individuals and couples without children, there are no such payments 
so the cutout (on the latest version") would be $28,200 pa. Beyond that the credit reduces 
at a taper of 30%. This level of threshold avoids the taper overlapping with social security 
allowance tapers.
K&L calculated that 2.4 million low wage earners (out of a total of 9.3 million) would 
benefit from this earnings credit if it were combined with the other elements of their
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proposed new system. The estimated cost is just over $1 billion pa, or about 0.4% of the 
total wage bill. The cost would rise in subsequent years if it were to be raised as part of a 
4-year program of wage restraint, reaching $4.5 billion in the fourth year.
If confined to families with dependent children, in the first year an estimated 860,000 
families would benefit at a cost of $460 million. By the fourth year the cost trebles to $ 1.4 
billion. However, limiting the credit to families with dependent children would undermine 
its credibility as an offset to any award wage freeze.
The proposed credit is very similar to a cut in the first marginal rate of income tax, partly 
financed by an increase in tax on incomes above the allowance/family payment cutouts. 
However the cut, and increase, are on a family unit rather than an individual basis.
The K&L EITC proposal is an interesting add-on to their main welfare reform agenda. 
However it is difficult to implement if the rest of their reform agenda is not in place.
7.5.3.3 The US Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
The US EITC was originally introduced in 1975 as a way of relieving the burden of social 
security payroll tax on low-wage working parents (Sholtz 1996). It has grown 
substantially since its inception, and in 1997 cost the federal government $US27 billion 
(about 2% of total federal receipts). In Australia this would be equivalent to around $5 
billion pa. The recipient population is over 20 million families. The EITC has been 
described as the “cornerstone of the Clinton Administration’s welfare reform agenda” 
(Dickert et al 1995 p42).
The EITC is a refundable credit against the Federal income tax. Its distinctive feature, as 
opposed to more common forms of welfare, is that at low income levels the credit 
increases with earnings.
Between 1990 and 1996 the maximum EITC increased from $1,023 to $3,200 (1992 
dollars) for a family with two children. Following cuts to welfare and related payments to 
sole parent families100, it now costs almost twice the $16 billion spent on traditional 
‘welfare’.
99 Australian Financial Review 16.11.98
100 Formerly Aid for Dependent Families (AFDC), now a much more restrictive program as Temporary Aid 
for Needy Families (TANF).
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Currently, three separate schedules apply: one for taxpayers aged 25-64 with no children 
(this is relatively minor, at $306 pa), one for taxpayers with one child and one for those 
with two or more children. The credit rate for a taxpayer with two children is 40 cents in 
the dollar up to an income of $US 8,900 pa, reaching a maximum of $US 3,556, and 
phases out at the rate of 21.06% above $US 11,610. By the time the family income 
reaches $US 28,495 the EITC is fully abated.
The maximum weekly benefit is $US6.21 for taxpayers without children; $41.38 for those 
with one child, and $68.38 for those with two or more children. About 18 million single 
individuals and families receive the credit, but some 2 million of these receive no tax 
refund since the credit serves to partially offset their tax liability.
Thus the scheme acts as a marginal earnings subsidy: the effective tax rate on low incomes 
is negative. Within the phase-in range, an extra dollar of earnings brings in $1.40 to the 
household. Another feature of the scheme is that it applies to family income, and there is 
no differentiation between couple and sole parent families. The effect is that it is relatively 
generous to sole parents, and indeed they comprise the bulk (60%) of beneficiaries. This 
also reflects the low earnings prospects of this group, which, in the US, is 
disproportionately black, Hispanic, and/or poorly, educated.
Another interesting feature of the scheme is that the bulk of benefits are paid as an end-of- 
year tax refund. Since 1979, eligible taxpayers have been allowed to receive a proportion 
of their credit in advance of annual filing of tax returns; however, this option is taken up by 
less than 1% of claimants.
For poor families, this gives rise to what might appear to be a significant cash-flow 
problem. This is partially addressed by the availability of food stamps, which are paid 
monthly. “In the US, food stamps are the most important source of immediate income 
supplementation for the working poor; ...in practice the EITC acts more as an end-of-year 
reward than a real-time incentive for undertaking a few more hours of work” (Walker and 
Wiseman 1997 p412-3).
7.5.3.4 EITC is su e s
The US EITC has been analysed in terms of a number of issues. These include 
1. Do marginal earnings subsidies have any role in optimal tax/transfer schemes?
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2. Does it reduce the wage paid by employers?
3. What are its incentive effects?
4. Does it create a too-severe “marriage penalty”
5. Is there potential for fraud?
6. Involving the tax office in the assessment of “need”
7. Should benefits be delivered through the tax or the welfare system?
8. How effective is the EITC in combating poverty?
Detailed examination of these issues is in Ingles 2001. The findings are summarised
below.
1. Do marginal earnings subsidies have any role in optimal tax/transfer schemes?
• The answer here is that such subsidies reduce EMTRs arising from the interaction 
of tax and social security benefits. If such reductions are required, an obvious 
alternative is to do this directly through one or both of these systems.
2. Does it reduce the wage paid by employers?
• The answer is that it may do, but this can be helpful if wages would otherwise be 
above their market clearing levels.
3. What are the incentive effects of the EITC?
• This is a complicated question. While an EITC reduces EMTRs in the phase-in 
range, it reduces average (but not marginal) tax rates in the plateau range, and 
increases EMTRs in the phase-out range. Its overall impact on work effort is 
theoretically indeterminate. Empirical studies have tended to find that the EITC 
creates a strong participation effect which brings in additional (mainly sole parent) 
workers, which is offset partly but not wholly by a substitution effect on existing 
workers (mainly mothers) operating in the opposite direction - that is, to reduce 
labour hours.
4. Does it create too severe a “marriage penalty”?
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• It seems not. The marriage penalty created by the US EITC has not been proved to 
affect behaviour. In any case, it is no greater than that created by normal welfare 
schemes assisting sole parents, such as the Australian Parenting Payment 
(Unpartnered).
5. Is there potential for fraud?
• Fraud has been a serious problem with the US EITC, with overpayments of some 
25-30% of total program spending. It is not clear whether recent efforts to stem the 
overpayment problem have been successful. Canada has abandoned its small EITC 
program partly because of compliance problems.
6. Should the tax office be involved in the assessment of “need”?
• Using the Tax office to run a welfare program creates several difficult issues. The 
inability to means test against assets is one example. Another problem in the 
Australian context is that an EITC based on family income would necessarily have 
to treat de facto and married couples in the same manner. In one sense, this is not a 
problem in the US system, since only a formal definition of marriage applies.
7. Should benefits be delivered through the tax or the welfare system?
• The main effect of an EITC in Australia would be to reduce effective marginal tax 
rates on low-income earners. This points to the possibility, if such an effect is 
desired, of effecting such reductions directly through modifications to extant 
tax/transfer policies.
8. How effective is the EITC in combating poverty?
• The US EITC takes about 1 million families out of poverty, and raises the incomes 
of another 6 million poor families. It is therefore reasonably effective; doubts 
revolve around how efficient it is. Many of the recipients of the EITC have incomes 
that place them above the (admittedly meagre) US poverty line, even before receipt 
of the credit. The breakeven income in the EITC is well above the poverty line for 
most families. It has been estimated that approximately half of total EITC 
payments go to households with incomes above their poverty lines. The fraction of 
total EITC payments that directly reduce the poverty gap is just over one-third.
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Thus, it is clear that the EITC is not nearly as well targeted as traditional anti­
poverty programs. This is exacerbated by non-compliance (see 5 above).
7.5.3.5 Conclusion on the EITC
The EITC is essentially a device to increase the progressivity of the tax/transfer system for 
families, and to encourage work by reducing (or even make negative) effective tax rates on 
low-income families. In the Australian context, both of these results might be achievable 
by changes to social security tapers and/or changes to the income tax rate structure, and 
indeed the NTS has already moved us down this path.
Australia, unlike the US, already provides very substantial assistance to low income 
earners with dependent children. Indeed, it has what might be described as a full 
guaranteed minimum income (GMI) for sole parents, and a partial GMI for couples with 
dependent children. A country operating a welfare system substantially based on the GMI 
principle might not want or need an EITC, since most relevant objectives can be achieved 
by manipulation of the GMI parameters.
That said, the issue of work incentives for those at the bottom of the income distribution 
has attracted increasing comment in Australia in recent years. Reducing tapers on 
allowances would extend recent developments for the Australian social security system to 
provide extensive cash assistance to low income families, and has the potential to assist 
low earner couples (and to a lesser extent individuals) without dependent children. But an 
extensive system of in-work cash benefits might appear strange, if many of the same 
people who receive benefits are also paying income tax. An alternative direction for 
reform is one of targeted reductions in income tax. As argued in Chapter 6, this also helps 
to address tax/taper interactions.
I conclude that the EITC may be good policy in the US, which lacks a comprehensive 
welfare safety net. In countries which do have such a net -  like Australia -  the case for 
such a credit is less clear-cut and alternative policies are available to reduce EMTRs on, 
and increase the incomes of, the working poor. If it were nonetheless desired to proceed 
down this track, it would be possible -  and important - to design it with current EMTR 
issues very much in mind.
One difficulty with income tax cuts as an alternative to an EITC is that, as noted earlier, 
most low wage earners are not in poor families. This means that simply raising the tax
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threshold, for example, is a poorly targeted strategy101. The aim might be to reduce tax on 
a family income basis but this might require some sort of family unit tax base, at least at 
the low-income end of the scale, with additional threshold increases where there are 
dependent children.
From this perspective, a virtue of the EITC is that -  on the US model -  it would have a 
family unit basis. It could also be a step in the direction of a more sustainable structure of 
EMTRs in the Australian tax/transfer system.
However, the long-term role of an EITC is less clear. It might only be a matter of time 
before any new credit was scrapped and its effect embodied in the formal structure of 
income tax rates. This would be more likely if there were a sustained effort to rationalise 
tax/social security interactions. The outcome of such an effort would see a designed 
structure of marginal rates on welfare recipients and low wage earners; in such an ideal 
system -  of which the negative income tax is one of several options - an EITC would have 
no obvious place. Indeed, its effect would be to disturb that designed structure of effective 
tax rates in perhaps anomalous ways.
7.5.4 Other wage subsidies 
7.5.4.1 Wage rate subsidy
The wage rate subsidy was widely discussed in US policy circles in the 1970s (see 
Browning 1973) and, inspired by other US welfare reforms, and has now been revived 
somewhat (see for example Phelps (1997) and Layard (1996)). Under this approach, wage 
rates would be supplemented by, say, one half the difference between some target wage 
rate and the recipients market wage rate. This increases the net wage rates of all recipients 
by declining amounts as the market wage approaches the target wage rate. In effect, the 
wage rate subsidy creates a reduction in EMTRs that diminishes as the wage rate 
approaches the cutout point. This can be shown to have advantages in terms of work 
incentives.
Browning (1994) argues of the wage rate subsidy that “.. .it produces results just like the 
phase-in range of the EITC, but without the disadvantage of a phase-out range”. However,
101 The claim that low wage earners are in high-income households and therefore we don’t have to worry 
about them is contentious. It implies a degree of income sharing which may not occur in practice, and 
possibly undesirable dependence -  eg when low income children cannot afford to leave home,
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he also notes of the earlier literature on wage rate subsidies that “...the general conclusion 
seemed to be that it had severe enough defects to make it undesirable. These defects 
included administrative problems and the difficulty of targeting benefits on those with low 
incomes” (p42).
Despite its theoretical advantages, the wage rate subsidy has a serious practical obstacle, 
that its calculation requires knowledge of not only the employees’ pay but also the hours. 
Whereas pay is relatively easy to verify, hours are not. A more administratively 
convenient form is a simple subsidy against pay, but this is no different to an EITC (albeit 
one based on the individual earner rather than the family).
A low wage subsidy has resurfaced in a back door way in the current Australian policy 
debate, in the form of proposals to remit payroll tax on low income earners (see eg Debelle 
and Borland 1998, p357) . Presumably this policy means that, instead of payroll tax
thresholds/exemptions being based on the aggregate size of the firms payroll, they would 
be based on the fortnightly or annual pay of the individual employee.
Such reform proposals could involve administration and compliance problems, similar in 
some ways to the problems with wage rate subsidies already alluded to by Browning 
(albeit that the problem of determining hours worked would not arise). Whereas current 
state payroll taxes provide an incentive to firms not to grow above the exemption limit, the 
proposed alternative would provide an incentive to part-time work.
That said, the proposal is no different in principle to the low earnings thresholds embodied 
in many or most social insurance contribution rate structures. Many countries are looking 
to reduce payroll tax burdens on low wage earners, it being widely accepted that the real 
incidence on such taxes is on the net pay of those workers (OECD 1999 p97). In Australia 
there is already a similar implicit threshold of $450/900 per month under the 
Superannuation Guarantee. Those with income under this are not compelled to make SG 
contributions.
102 A potentially important difference is that the wage rate subsidy might be paid direct to the employee, 
whereas the payroll tax remittance benefits the employer. Economic theory predicts that both approaches 
have the same long-run behavioural implications, but the differences might be important in the short run, 
especially where interaction with an existing minimum wage is an issue. Where there is a minimum wage (as 
in the US and Australia) there may be merit in seeking to mitigate its potentially adverse employment effects 
by an accompanying payroll subsidy. In effect, this argument sees the subsidy as a sort o f compensating 
distortion.
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There is no barrier in principle to making the general structure of payroll tax more like that 
of a social security contribution with an explicit low-pay threshold. Indeed, it would seem 
likely to be a considerable improvement on the current situation, though it may have 
administrative disadvantages.
It should also be recognised that the low wage exemption proposal limits the available net 
cuts in taxes to 5-6%, which is the existing payroll tax rate (it varies slightly between 
States, as do the exemption levels). That said, however, the policy does offer the 
possibility of a substantial short-term cuts in the cost of employing low wage earners. By 
setting an appropriate low pay threshold, it could yield the same revenue as current payroll 
taxes. If the proposal were revenue-neutral, many firms would face approximately the 
same aggregate payroll tax burden as they now do. Firms with disproportionate numbers 
of low wage or short-time workers would benefit, whereas small firms with well-paid 
workers would be disadvantaged.
Overall, the drawback of the scheme (after the initial structural impacts are 
accommodated) is that it creates an incentive for part-time work, and many part-time 
workers are part of well-off families. That said the existing structure of the payroll tax has 
no particular economic rationale so, on balance, I believe the approach suggested is both 
feasible and likely to be effective.
7.5A2 Employment or hours-conditioned in-work payments
These are used in the UK and Ireland (see OECD 1999 p96), and have been experimented 
with in Canada. Eligibility for an in-work income supplement such as those for children 
depends not only on low income, but also on working a certain minimum number of hours. 
For example, the UK Working Families Tax Credit is paid only to families who work at 
least 16 hours a week. In addition, there is a further program aimed at encouraging nearly 
full-time work, defined as 30 or more hours a week.
At first glance it may seem an unnecessary complication to vary payments according to 
hours as well as income. After all, the one is reflected in the other. That said, there might 
in fact be economic benefits. The reason is that the introduction of an hours criterion 
makes a welfare payment more akin to a wage subsidy. The hours requirement virtually 
turns the supplement into a wage rate supplement. This has the work incentive benefits 
already discussed in the previous section. Further, it helps draw a clear line between
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unemployment payments and in-work benefits. This may reduce any stigma associated 
with the latter (while possibly worsening that associated with the former), providing 
further incentive to work.
In Canada, the Self-Sufficiency Project begun in 1992 tests the use of time-limited 
earnings supplements to help lone parents leave welfare. The earnings supplement equals 
half the difference between the earnings of a lone parent and a reference income level 
(around $Can30-37,000). That sounds very much like a NIT. The difference is that 
eligibility for the supplement is also subject to an hours requirement, so that plan members 
have to work at least 30 hours per week. This “...prevents those who were already working 
full-time from substantially reducing their work hours (an effect that some earlier financial 
incentive programs had)...” (Lin et al 1998). It might be added that it also prevents new 
participants from combining supplement receipt and income from part-time work
This Canadian experimental project has apparently been quite successful. The proportion 
of lone parents working full-time (who are in the experimental group) has doubled after 
eighteen months; it has raised the average income of the group by $178 per month 
(compared to an expenditure increase of $55 per month), and it has reduced the fraction of 
families below the ‘low-income threshold’ by 12 percentage points.
The issue for Australia is whether we wish to stick with the (hoped for) simplicity of our 
GMI approach, or supplement it with new tools such as employment conditioned benefits. 
Such tools probably make more sense, in our system, if allowance taper rates continue to 
be high. The alternative is to go down the road of reducing EMTRs within the existing 
framework.
7.5.5 Changes to social security parameters
If assistance was reduced more gradually and predictably with increasing private income, 
the system would become much friendlier to low income earners. At the same time 
earnings replacement rates when on benefit would improve: that is, become lower.
7.5.5.1 Means Test Tapers and Effective Marginal Tax Rates (EMTRs)
High ETRs arise from both tapers and payment of income tax. Although an EITC is 
therefore a possible means of addressing this issue, another response is to reduce the taper
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on allowances, from its current 70% (beyond an initial free area and 50% taper zone). Yet 
another is to reduce income taxes on low-income recipients generally.
As argued in Chapter 4, there are theoretical and practical reasons for believing that a 
single linear tax rate, or at most a two- or three-part tax, would be a better way to achieve a 
roughly similar distribution of net benefits to the current system. It can be shown that, if 
benefits are withdrawn at a moderate rate, a low income earner will always be better off 
working than on benefit, provided he or she can combine work and benefit income.
This is so even under the high ETRs that characterise the current system. An allowee 
couple (renting) is entitled to maximum payment of $364 a week. If one partner is able to 
earn the minimum wage set by the Commission ($413pw) a naive calculation of 
replacement rates gives a figure of 88%. In fact this couple is potentially eligible for a 
part-benefit giving them a disposable income of $474 pw, and their actual replacement 
rate is 77% - still high, but not unsustainably so, particularly since the part-benefit has an 
activity test attached to it. Current earnings replacement rates at the minimum wage are 
detailed in Appendix A.
For such a couple, the impact of a large fall in the minimum wage would be drastically 
attenuated by the increase in part benefit that flows out of that fall (provided that the 
spouse is eligible for an allowance). Only single beneficiaries would not benefit from this 
mechanism.
A reduction in allowance tapers to, say, 50% would reduce ETRs for allowees to roughly 
65% and improves the ERR for the minimum wage couple to 69% (compared with 75% 
under the current system). With a 20% lower minimum wage the ERR becomes 72% 
(compared with 79% under the current system).
This also illustrates the down side of using the unemployment benefit system as a general 
system of low wage support. That is, it is relatively inexpensive for clients to reduce their 
hours of work. If the client in the above example were able to halve his hours, while his 
wage would fall from $413 to $206, the couple’s disposable income would fall by only 
$44, from $474 to $430 pw. This problem, that the system may become a subsidy for part- 
time work, can be partly addressed by reducing the EMTR. Thus, with a 65% taper, the 
fall in disposable income on working only half time increases to $70pw.
103 Assuming that the non-working partner is willing to seek work, or has dependent children.
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As argued in Chapter 5, one problem with a relaxation of allowance tapers is not so much 
the direct cost -  likely to be under $500m -  but the flow-on cost if the family payment 
threshold is to be lifted sufficiently to prevent “sudden death” loss of automatic full-rate FP 
on coming off an allowance. The other problem is that of horizontal equity between 
allowees and those outside of the categorical system, a problem that I suggest creates a 
strong argument for income tax cuts rather then taper cuts. The improvements to ERRs 
flowing from ETR decreases are the same whatever the source of those decreases.
7.5 .5.2 Rent assistance options
Another option might be to reform the Rent Allowance (RA) means test to extend RA 
further into the income distribution. RA for families currently tapers after all FP is lost, 
and at the same rate: 30%. By contrast, RA for allowees tapers, once the basic allowance 
is lost, at the allowance taper rate of 70%. If this were reduced to the same 30% rate 
proposed for families, and provided free of activity test RA could be transformed from a 
benefit essentially restricted to our categorical clients, to one which is a general form of in- 
or out of-work assistance to low income earners facing high rental costs.104 There would 
also be an improvement in earnings replacement rates for such people. Other options for 
improving RA were discussed in Chapter 5.
7.5.6 Income tax rate structure
In general, the effect of an EITC is to increase the progressivity of the tax/transfer system. 
It reduces EMTRs on low-income earners (including those currently affected by high 
EMTRs under the allowance tapers), and increases them on those further up the income 
scale. Given the current pattern of EMTRs on low-income earners, this may be desirable.
Looking at the Keating and Lambert plan, their proposed tax credit is very similar to a cut 
in the first marginal rate of income tax, partly financed by an increase in tax on incomes 
above $28,200. However the cut, and increase, is on a family unit rather than an individual 
basis. Further, the tax rate increase is at income levels dependent on the size of the family.
104 A logical extension of this principle would be that assistance should become available to low income 
earners with high housing costs, whether they be for rent or for repayment o f a mortgage. However, it should 
be noted that the government has already foreshadowed a new scheme of homebuyer assistance as a means of 
compensating for the price impact of the GST. It should also be noted that homeowners are generally tax 
favoured as compared to renters -  although this is not true of those with very low levels o f equity in their 
home.
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In the US the EITC is mainly confined to families. This restricts the cost. However, this 
might not be possible in the Australian context if the goal is to fully offset the impact of 
cuts in real award wages, which would fall across the board. That said, however, there 
might be some groups we would not wish to compensate. Low wage earners are found 
right across the distribution of equivalent family incomes, and include for example young 
people still living at home with their parents, and second income earners in relatively well 
off households. Whereas the latter group is automatically excluded by the family basis of 
the EITC, (on the US model) the former is not.
Another issue is that if compensation were limited to earners, those on low capital incomes 
might well be aggrieved. Pensioners and the like are already finding their incomes reduced 
by declining interest rates.
This leads to the question of what might be done using the current system in order to 
achieve roughly the same impact as an EITC.
There is certainly a case for reducing income tax burdens on low wage earners. Many 
individuals and families with relative low incomes are required to pay income tax. For 
families with children, their incomes are then supplemented by direct family payments and 
rent assistance. This sort of “churning” seems to be inefficient105. While an EITC is one 
means of addressing this inefficiency, there may be other approaches.
If we wish to direct additional assistance to those not in the social security system but with 
earnings below the existing tax thresholds, then the refundable tax credit approach may be 
required. However, it is arguable that our main concern should be the deteriorating 
position of those on low full- or nearly full-time earnings - ie, with incomes well above the 
current tax thresholds (details are below).
7.5.6.1 Current tax thresholds
The NTS has increased the tax threshold to $6,000, or an effective $6,882 inclusive of low- 
income rebate of $ 150 pa. Single income families with a young child now have an 
effective tax threshold of $13,882, made up of the new $6,000 threshold plus the 
equivalent (through FTB(B) cash benefits) of $2,000 for one dependent child and a further 
$5,000 for single income families with a child under 5 years of age, plus $882 from the
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low income rebate. The fact that FTB(A and B) are refundable tax credits complicates 
these tax threshold calculations. In practice positive EMTRs commence at familial 
incomes below the calculated tax threshold. The loss of Basic Parenting Payment as 
spousal income rises beyond SI560 pa, combined with the loss of FTB(B) as her income 
rises beyond $4587 pa, has a similar effect.
What this means is that the effective tax threshold for a family varies greatly, depending on 
the distribution of income within the family.
7.5.6.2 Possible policy options
Raising the tax threshold is expensive. With almost 8.5 million taxpayers, a $1,000 pa 
increase in the threshold costs about $1.5 billion. This could be partly financed by 
imposing a higher initial marginal rate (currently 17%). The effect of the higher initial rate 
is to quarantine the benefits of the threshold increase to low income earners. For example, 
a $5,000 pa threshold increase could be recouped by the first rate step ($20,000) if the 
initial marginal rate were raised from 17 to 26.4%.106 Only those with incomes between 
$6,882 and $20,000 would benefit, with the maximum gain being $850 at the new 
threshold level of $11,000.
Juggling the parameters allows the gains to be extended to any desired income level. For 
example, the first marginal rate might be 30%, and the threshold becomes $12,067 pa.
One objection to raising the tax threshold is that this is not target-efficient, because it 
benefits high-income earners, secondary earners, income splitters and the like. This 
objection is partly addressed by the proposal to raise the initial marginal rate, although it 
remains true that many low-income earners who would benefit are in families with high 
incomes. However, working spouses are less advantaged, through the loss of DSR or 
family payments as their income rises.
Another reason for wishing to raise tax thresholds is to decrease interactions between 
means tests and income tax. However, tax thresholds apply to individual taxpayers. If the
105 Although it can be defended as a means of intra-family income redistribution -  the tax is taken from the 
principal earner and paid to the principal carer (that is, transferred ‘from wallet to purse’).
106 Note that this policy is not revenue neutral. Rather, it is designed to confine any net benefit to those 
taxpayers below the designated income point.
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emphasis is to be on greater assistance for low-income families (including couples) our 
options become more difficult.
Extra assistance equivalent to an increase in the family tax threshold could be achieved 
through increase in the spouse rebate or its social security equivalent, Basic Parenting 
Payment (BPP). The problem with the latter is that it extends benefits right to the bottom 
of the income scale, and so does not improve incentives. In practice there would need to 
be an offsetting decrease in the main (income support) component of Parenting Payment. 
The practical effect would be to decrease that component of PP subject to familial means 
testing, and increase that component which is only means-tested on the spouse’s income.
A problem with both approaches is that they confer additional benefits right up the family 
income scale if there is a non-earning spouse.
In Ingles (1998a) I suggested that there is a case for a partial family unit basis to the 
income tax. The aim is to smooth tax and transfer interactions; since the transfer system is 
necessarily based on the family unit (the alternative being too expensive and perhaps 
inequitable)107, this forces the tax system to adopt a similar unit, especially at the bottom 
end. This is already the case with the Medicare Levy, whose ‘shade-in’ provisions take 
into account income by the taxpayer’s spouse .
If the spouse is not working then using the DSR to achieve the higher threshold for a 
couple spreads assistance all the way up the family income scale. An alternative approach 
would be to change the low-income rebate (LIR) so that there was a separate, higher rebate 
for a couple (compared with a single taxpayer) and a separate, combined income 
withdrawal threshold. The rebate could be quite large, or at least could be phased in so 
that it became large. This would be a back-door means of implementing a family unit tax 
structure for low-income earners.
107This is not strictly true. One could design, for example, a system of individual tax credits and a 
proportional tax (possibly involving supplements for those living alone). But the tax credit for the second 
earner in any couple would be the de facto equivalent of the DSR, and has all the same distributional 
implications.
108 The peculiarity and complexity of the Medicare levy shade-in provisions is a good illustration of the 
difficulties of reconciling a family-based welfare system with an individually based tax system. When the 
levy was introduced it had to be designed in this way because a principal aim was to exempt from the levy 
any group which got free medical services before the introduction of Medicare. This included those with 
social security concession cards whose eligibility depended on their joint income.
In the current benefit system, the rate for a couple is roughly 165% of that for singles. Applying this ratio 
implies that if the threshold for singles is $6882, that for couples should be $11,470.
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Suppose, for example, that the LIR for singles was not $150 pa but $1,000, and that for 
couples was $2,000. The effective tax threshold for singles would become (6,000 +
1,000/. 17 = $11,882; and for couples with one earner, (6,000+ 2000/. 17) = $17,765 (or 
$23,764 with two earners). However the revenue costs of this proposal are likely to be 
considerable109, and it would exacerbate some high EMTRs over the Newstart 
allowance/PP taper range.
To implement a family unit tax system more thoroughly, the tax threshold could be 
abolished and replaced entirely by low income rebates of, say, $2,000 for singles and 
$3,000 for couples. This would produce tax thresholds of $11,765 and $17,647 
respectively: amounts approximating the respective at-work poverty lines for such 
families.110 If it were further desired to reduce the benefits of a family tax base at higher 
income levels, this could be achieved by abolition of the DSR. This would still leave the 
issue of families with children gaining equivalent benefits through Basic Parenting 
Payment. Perhaps this, too, could be abolished, by integration with FTB(A) (as suggested 
in Chapter 5). The effect would be to have a fully family-based tax system at the low- 
income end, a transition through the middle income ranges, and a fully individual basis at 
the top end.
Some will be horrified at the proposal for an increased spouse rebate or a family unit tax 
system. However it is a logical consequence of greater tax/social security integration. 
Currently the tax system is based predominantly (but not wholly) on the individual; the 
social security system mainly on the couple. Since an individual basis of entitlement is not 
possible in the social security system- it is simply not affordable - the two systems can only 
be made more compatible by moving the tax system at least partially towards a family 
basis1 n . And while the EITC is one means of achieving this, there are advantages in 
seeking a more systematic set of design changes.
109 The LIR will shade out above a threshold of $20,000; there would appear to be logic in setting this 
threshold lower for singles (say, $12,500). This would create some savings. For singles, this has the effect 
of increasing the marginal rate beyond the LIR threshold from 17% to 21%; for couples with one earner over 
$20,000, the marginal rate increases from 30% to 34%.
110 $12,659 for the single person, and $16,934 for the couple. This is not to endorse the Henderson lines, 
which have well known deficiencies, but they are the only ones in common use which provide for costs of 
working.
111 This is a matter of some contention. There have been moves to partly individualise the allowance means 
test in Australia, and in NZ the National Superannuation pension has the individual as the unit for 
entitlement. This is both popular and considered affordable.
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A complication is that the Tax office would need to assess who is and who is not a couple, 
lest individuals living together are advantaged relative to married couples. This is already 
a contentious area in income support policy. It requires a degree of intrusion into people’s 
domestic arrangements that may not be permitted to the Tax office.
Another reason for wishing to raise tax thresholds is both to decrease interactions between 
means tests and income tax, and to increase the rate at which the incomes of social security 
beneficiaries “converge” with the incomes of those who have no categorical eligibility.
The issue of convergence was discussed in Chapter 6.
7.6 Conclusion
Low wage earners can be helped in many different ways. A lot depends on the objectives 
we are seeking to achieve, and whom we wish to help.
If we wish to ensure that low pay does not result in poverty then the present system, with 
minor refinements, is probably adequate to this task (Option 1). For families with 
dependent children, substantial in-work assistance is already provided to low wage earners, 
and this system has been extended under the NTS. In addition, low-wage couples can 
receive unemployment assistance if one of them is willing to seek full-time work. For the 
medium term future, low pay is unlikely to cause poverty for single individuals, so the lack 
of social security supplements for these groups is not an immediate issue. For working 
couples without children, supplementation is available through Newstart allowance if one 
is on the minimum wage and the other is willing to actively seek work. If further 
supplementation were required, it should relate in the first instance to those with high 
housing costs. Hence the option discussed earlier to change the rental assistance scheme.
Although the current system addresses poverty, any reductions in real minimum rates of 
pay may start to cause problems of earnings replacement rates, notably for couples. The 
answer here (I exclude the “solution” of cutting benefits) is to ease EMTRs for those on the 
margins of the welfare system. This is already being done for family assistance, under the 
NTS. For couples coming off allowances, EMTRs are currently very high. Two 
approaches are possible. One is to directly reduce allowance tapers (Option 2). A problem 
with this strategy is that, while not expensive in itself, it pushes out the necessary threshold 
for the family payment means test and therefore has significant flow on costs.
238
239
Another possible problem is that it creates a whole class of people receiving a part- 
allowance, and this may not be a desirable development from either a policy or an 
administrative view. Easing allowance tapers would extend already-existing trends for 
them to become in-work supplements for low paid workers. This would require a new 
philosophy as to the role of unemployment payments in particular, which have not hitherto 
been (widely) seen as a form of low wage subsidy.
The alternative solution is to reduce income tax payments for those on the welfare margin 
(Option 3). This has the advantage, compared to Option 2, of keeping people out of the 
welfare system. It also helps in terms of tax/welfare interaction generally, which cause 
significant EMTR problems. Many of those who would benefit from easier tapers also pay 
income tax; often in substantial amounts. Reducing income tax on the low paid will 
therefore reduce churning, compared to the easier taper option, and it also helps those 
outside of the formal social security system, thus aiding horizontal equity. However it is 
likely to be considerably more expensive than reducing allowance tapers, as it is more 
difficult to confine the benefits to a small target group.
The EITC is one version of this strategy (Option 3a). It can be tightly targeted if it is based 
on the family rather than the individual. But it may be better to explicitly change the tax 
unit -  particularly at the low-income end -  to reflect relative needs of families. A number 
of approaches for doing this were explored in Chapter 6. The most thoroughgoing reform 
involves setting tax thresholds at the allowance cutouts. This involves differential 
thresholds for single, couples and families.
Another problem which policy might seek to address is that of increasing inequality, rather 
than poverty (the two are related, but not identical). However the policy response to this is 
not likely to be greatly different to Options 2 and (especially) 3. Once we move from a 
focus on poverty alleviation to one where we are concerned about work incentives for 
those on the margins of the welfare system, we inevitably end up giving extra assistance to 
those on relative low to middle incomes, and this may need to involve an increase in the 
effective progressivity of the tax/transfer system.
A third possible objective is to “buy” award wage restraint before the Industrial 
Commission. In this context, a virtue of the EITC is that it would be a highly visible and 
saleable offset to any scheme of award wage restraint, and might make such a scheme 
more publicly acceptable. However, it might only be a matter of time before the credit was
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scrapped and its effect embodied in the formal structure of income tax rates. (In saying 
that I acknowledge that I would have made the same comment about the Medicare Levy, 
twenty-five years ago, and the Low Income Rebate, six years ago, and been completely 
wrong!)
A problem with an EITC as a compensation mechanism is that it limits compensation to a 
sub-group of the affected population. Indeed, this is precisely its point (from a cost 
perspective), but it is a serious weakness from a political perspective. In particular it 
implies that the union movement would be extremely unlikely to support the wage/tax 
tradeoff as currently envisaged by its proponents.
I conclude that the preferred policy approach, over the longer term, is to totally integrate 
the tax and social security systems by a policy of setting tax thresholds at the allowance 
cutouts, with different thresholds for individuals, sole parents, and couples, along with 
differential thresholds where there are dependent children. Thus, all social security 
payments would taper out before tax applied (full separation). Beyond the thresholds quite 
high tax rates of around 45% would need to apply; if this were thought to involve a too- 
dramatic increase in the progressivity of the tax/transfer system the available options are to 
either increase the weight of the GST, or to maintain a fairly low income tax rate below the 
thresholds, preferably not more than, say, 10%.
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7.7 Appendix A: Earnings Replacement Rates
The replacement rate is a concept applicable to a particular or a representative individual. 
The gross replacement rate is the ratio of the gross income he or she would receive on 
benefit, compared to his current or prospective wage income. The net replacement rate 
(NRR) is the ratio of disposable income on benefit to disposable income while receiving 
that wage. The disposable income concept can be further refined to include the value of 
any fringe benefits that might be received in and out of work.
Prospective income is a dynamic concept which should ideally take account of the 
likelihood that income will rise over time due to on-the-job training and skills acquisition. 
This means that static RR calculations are usually overestimates.
Typically replacement rates are calculated for representative individuals receiving the 
minimum wage, half of average earnings, and the like. A recent publication is Redmond 
(1999).
A number of macroeconomists have modelled Australian unemployment since the early 
1970s and suggest that the “raw” (or naive) NRR -  the relation of maximum benefits to 
average net wages -  is what has set a ‘floor’ to the rate of unemployment. There are some 
technical problems with this approach -  in particular results are often driven by the use of 
an inappropriate and untypical NRR -  that for privately renting single people.
The group with the highest NRRs (families with children), and who therefore are the group 
most likely to have an incentive problem, have been given ever-more generous in-work 
benefits over the 80s and 90s. In fact the major purpose in giving these in-work benefits 
was precisely to prevent increases in NRRs for this group. The design of these benefits has 
arguably created other incentive problems (see Ingles 1997) but it has prevented, or at least 
limited, the ‘unemployment trap’ for this group.
The Tables below show some indicative NRRs for a family where the head receives the 
minimum wage and the spouse is not working. In each case it is assumed that the family 
receives its maximum social security entitlement. This means that the spouse either 
receives a part-parenting allowance or, if there are no children, applies for Newstart in her 
own right and receives a part-payment.
241
242
re p la ce m en t rates June  2000, p rio r to  the NTS, no RA
basic
paym en t
m in im um
w age
ra tio
N S A /P G A S IN G LE 168 334 0 .50
C O U P LE 304 411 0 .74
1 Child 369 461 0.80
2 ch ild ren 424 516 0.82
3 ch ild ren 521 650 0.80
so le  pa ren t 1 ch ild 276 472 0.58
2 ch ild ren 331 531 0 .62
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July 2001
Earnings replacement rates for minimum wage earners
with rent allowance no rent allowance
disposable disposable
Max.
benefit
income ERR Max.
benefit
income ERR
singles 223 355 0.63 179 355 0.50
single with one child 363 569 0.64 312 517 0.60
single with two children 422 630 0.67 370 578 0.64
couple 364 474 0.77 323 432 0.75
couple + 1 child 443 574 0.77 392 523 0.75
couple + 2 children 501 632 0.79 450 581 0.77
couple + 3 581 712 0.82 529 660 0.80
couple + 4 676 807 0.84 625 756 0.83
Note: minimum wage is $413.40 in July 2001;
One child under 5, second child 5-12; third child 16-17 on YA; 4th child 18-25 on YA 
Benefit parameters are under the NTS; July 2001 rates.
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8 CHAPTER 8: INTERACTION OF THE AGE PENSION MEANS
TEST AND THE TAXATION OF SUPERANNUATION 
8.1 Introduction
It is argued in earlier Chapters that the Australian social security system is probably the 
closest in the world to a negative income tax (NIT) or guaranteed minimum income (GMI). 
For a believer in the (categorical) NIT or GMI principle, the retirement income system in 
Australia presents something of a conundrum. Why have a contributory tier, and 
associated superannuation tax concessions? Clearly, there is a difficulty in reconciling a 
pure NIT solution directing assistance to the most needy with the desire to encourage 
retirement savings generally and enhance living standards of the retired.
In the UK debate, echoes o f the old poor law and the twenties “dole” (with its associated 
family means test) continue to persist in the remarkable academic and public disquiet with 
any suggestion of a major role for means tested benefits. For example, LeGrand has 
argued that means testing promotes “knavish” behaviour... “which is at once both rational 
and, from society’s point of view, irresponsible.. .It would clearly be disingenuous for the 
government to simultaneously exhort people to save while operating a policy which 
penalised them for so doing” (1997, cited in Agulnik 1999 p9). Yet retirement income 
policy in Australia could be described exactly thus.
The problem with the current means test can be stated as follows:
• it can induce moral hazard by making the cost of not saving for retirement relatively 
low (at least for some people over some ranges and types o f assets);
• it distorts savings into exempt or well-treated forms like the owner occupied home; and
• it can make early retirement cheap, since for some, running down assets may have little 
impact on living standards on attaining pensionable age.
The economic cost of means testing can be reduced by making the means test more 
gradual. It is interesting to note that for the aged in Australia, the ETRs in place after the 
implementation o f the New Tax System (NTS) and the 2001 budget changes112 average out 
at around 55% over a wide range of incomes (figures 8.1 and 8.2). Is a further reduction in
112 These raised tax thresholds for the aged to $20,000 pa (singles) and $32,612 (couples). The value of 
pensioner rebates phases out beyond these levels so that the value of the extra tax threshold is progressively 
withdrawn as income rises further.
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taper (from 40 to say 25%) justified? It would create an ETR of around 50% for the aged 
(figures 8.3 and 8.4). Different income splits within couples affect the ETRs but not 
dramatically (figure 8.5).
I argue in this Chapter for such an approach. The further step of means test abolition may 
be attractive in conjunction with certain proposals for the heavier taxation of 
superannuation but may not otherwise be warranted. Payment of a universal pension in 
New Zealand has generated considerable policy instability (St John 2001). Politicians find 
it hard not to see a means test free pension as an affront to budgetary and commonsense 
logic. This would also be the case in Australia with its long history -  and public 
acceptance -  of means testing and the strains likely to be imposed by the demographic 
ageing of the population. Further, there are ‘optimal tax’ arguments for an effective tax 
rate on pensioners at around the 50% level.
A 50% tax rate may sound high, but this is inevitable on the maths of the NIT approach. 
Dawkins et al have shown that a linear NIT paying the same maximum benefits as at 
present, and retaining categorical eligibility, would require a uniform tax rate at around 
50% for the whole population. To this extent, the British (and continental) arguments for 
universality are based on a misconception. As tapers reduce, general taxes rise, so that 
ultimately selective and universal benefits become exactly the same. The necessary linear 
tax rate is a simple mathematical consequence of the general level of other government 
expenditure, the rate of pension and its relativity to the general level of taxable incomes.
NZ has what is essentially a GMI scheme for the elderly, one which under the previous 
surcharge arrangements could easily be rationalised as a NIT (as has been argued, for 
example, by St John 1991). In Periodic Working Group (1997) a tax credit option to 
rationalise the tax/surcharge treatment of NZ superannuation was proposed.
I also argue that the means test could be further rationalised by abandoning the separate 
assets test and returning to something more like the “merged means test” that prevailed in 
Australia up until the mid-1970s, modified to reflect current costs of annuities.
8.1.1 The means test
The age pension means test is at the centre of many criticisms of the retirement income 
system. It should be said in its defence that it reduces age pension expenditure by over $4 
billion pa (but less, net of income tax that would be clawed back), and also that it helps
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improve horizontal equity as between the aged and low-income workers. That said, it 
probably imposes considerable costs in terms of its behavioural effects, and its impact on 
retirement savings incentives may be the opposite to that which superannuation tax 
concessions are meant to achieve.
Ross (1997), in a thoughtful article, has pointed to a number of adverse behavioural 
consequences of the current superannuation system and its interaction with the age pension 
means test. These include:
• confusion and uncertainty about the way the system works;
• the creation of a new planning and advisory industry because of the complexity of the 
rules surrounding both systems and the frequency of changes to them;
• widespread perceptions of unfairness due to the opportunities for double dipping and 
the high effective tax rates over some ranges of pensioners’ income and assets;
• the expenditure of considerable time and effort to minimise the amounts which fall 
within the definition of income and assets for means test purposes;
• questionable value of superannuation saving for some people; and
• a general lack of security about what retirement benefits will turn out to be.
This last is a general feature of defined contribution plans. Burtless (2000) demonstrates 
for the US that pensions under private plans (as an alternative to US Social Security, a 
generally unfunded system) would generally have been adequate but varied markedly 
depending on the year of entry and retirement. Potential pension outcomes varied from 
20% to 110% of earnings. Inflation risk was also marked. In Australia this potential 
variety of outcomes, while an inherent feature of our private superannuation system, is 
heavily circumscribed by the age pension system. In this respect, at least, high EMTRs act 
to mitigate the potential range of outcomes inherent in our private superannuation system.
Ross further argues that the existence of the test creates a generally negative effect on 
attitudes to retirement saving, and leads to investment decisions which are driven by the 
aim of maximising the pension rather than allocating assets appropriately - for example, 
older single people may remain in inappropriate housing because of the effect on their 
level of assets were they to sell up.
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8.1.2 Inconsistency between means testing and tax concessions
Ross concludes ... "Fundamentally, we have:
• Two complex systems (age pension/social security and superannuation) which have 
conflicting effects - the means test... discourages saving for retirement, while the 
superannuation system is designed to encourage it.
• A compulsory superannuation system ... which encourages the use of lump sums before 
entitlement arises to the means-tested age pension." (1997 p9).
The Institute of Actuaries makes the same argument: “At present there is a basic conflict 
between the two pillars of the system. The superannuation system is designed to 
encourage saving for retirement. In contrast, saving is discouraged by the age pension 
system...” (1998 pi).
Knox et al argue that..."there exist considerable horizontal inequities within the system ... 
the relationship between lifetime earnings and net retirement income is not progressive in 
some cases, and in other circumstances is actually regressive. The major cause of this 
problem is the very high effective marginal rates faced by many retirees caused by the 
combination of means test and income taxation" (1997 pi 3).
In Ingles et al (1982) it was suggested that the policy of combining superannuation tax 
concessions with a means-tested age pension system had inherent inconsistencies, and that 
for the same total expenditure a means-test free age pension, combined with reduced tax 
concessions, would be much more neutral both in relation to the income tax system and 
also the treatment of the retired -  while leaving net incentives to save for retirement 
unaffected.
The Institute of Actuaries has argued for a somewhat similar approach. Its proposal is 
designed to be revenue-neutral. It removes the age pension means test and offsets the cost 
by “increasing the taxes payable by middle and higher income earners on superannuation 
benefits and on income after becoming an age pensioner... equity would be maintained 
because those who pay the additional taxes would receive higher age pension income” 
(1998 p2). This last point is demonstrated formally in simulations by Atkinson, Creedy 
and Knox (1995 and 1997).
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In a later article, Ross (1999) argues that having a tax system that encourages retirement 
savings and a means test system that discourages it means that the systems are not 
complementary, but competing. Ross calls for a means test free pension, financed either 
by a tax clawback on higher income earners [surely just another and possibly inferior form 
of means test!] or by reducing the value of tax incentives for higher income earners by 
changing tax rates or reducing reasonable benefit limits. The Senate Standing Committee 
on Community Affairs (1988) advocated a very similar policy. In fact, the Government’s 
NTS implicitly moved policy in this direction by reducing pension tapers and reducing the 
value of tax concessions (this is automatic when income tax rates fall).
8.2 Options for modifying the age pension means test
In an article in the AFR of 15.9.99, Creedy and Dawkins pointed to possible benefits from 
abolishing the means test, and suggest that the economic efficiency gains would dominate 
the revenue costs. This issue -  which has been a hardy perennial in Australian politics - 
will not go away; on the contrary it will become more cogent as the SG brings more and 
more retirees into income ranges affected by the pensions means test.
Another concern with the means test, in the context of an ageing population, is that it may 
contribute to early retirement. For many people the means test makes early retirement 
relatively cheap, in the sense that they can use up some of their superannuation assets prior 
to pensionable age while making relatively little sacrifice of their consumption standards 
on attaining pensionable age. With the predicted demographic ageing of the population, 
Australia can ill afford losing productive workers to early retirement (see Ingles 2000a).
8.2.1 Cost of means test abolition
Abolition of the means test is expensive, with a gross cost of some $4 billion pa. With a 
likely tax clawback of around 30%113, this translates to some $2.8b net114. It could also be 
argued that women aged 61-64 should not benefit from means test abolition, which would 
further reduce the current cost. On the other hand, over the longer term the cost becomes 
much higher, due to the ageing population. RIMU have projected that a universal pension
113 Many of those who would benefit from abolition would be on higher marginal tax rates.
114 The cost of various State government concessions might also need to be included.
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would cost an additional 2% of GDP by 205011 . In other words, the long-term cost of ai 
universal pension is roughly double that currently prevailing.
If we assume that each 10-percentage point reduction in taper costs a bit less, and that 
women under 65 are not included, an illustrative cost schedule for taper reductions might 
be as in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: cost of age pension taper reductions
Taper to (%) Gross $m Net $m
30 1300 1000
20 1100 800
10 900 600
0 700 400
totals 4,000 2,800
The cost of a 25% taper -  which I argue might be an appropriate objective -  would now be 
around $2 billion gross, or about $1.5 billion net. However, as noted above, these costs 
will rise markedly over time. (I emphasise that these are “ballpark” figures, and also they 
assume pro-rata reductions in the severity of the asset test.)
It is interesting to note that, while it was estimated prior to the NTS on July 1 2000 that 
some 40-60,000 new age pensioners would be brought into the system by the 40% taper, in 
practice this has turned out to be less than 15,000 to date -  of whom almost half were 
already eligible. It appears that data on pensioners’ assets and incomes is incomplete, and 
also that extrapolation based on ‘normal’ distributions gave misleading results. In practice 
it may be that those who were previously just outside the cutouts had already organised 
their affairs so as to become eligible, thus causing a ‘hollowing out’ of the income 
distribution just outside the old cut-out points. If so, this appears to substantiate claims
115 In current dollars that would be $ 12b, and on a net basis, $8 billion pa. This estimate pre-dates the 40% 
taper and would now be some 25% lower.
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that the means test has a good deal of influence on the ways in which pensioners organise 
their affairs.
8.2.2 Issues in means testing
Means test taper reductions are economically sensible if the cost of saving a marginal 
dollar is greater than the cost of raising a marginal dollar through the tax system, and 
should be pursued up to the point that these marginal costs are equivalent. While the 
marginal (economic) cost of means testing is undoubtedly very high -  in terms of the 
behavioural distortions it gives rise to - so to is the marginal cost of taxation, at least as 
estimated by various studies documented in Chapter 3.
I here consider the option to further reduce the age pension taper to, say, 25%. On the one 
hand this reduces ETRs for pensioners to around 50%, at a net cost of around $1.5 billion. 
On the other hand it can easily be inferred that raising this amount from, say, the income 
tax, would require a very small addition to marginal rates on 8m taxpayers, compared to 
the very significant reductions it confers on marginal rates for some half-million 
pensioners likely to be affected.116
Unfortunately we have no ‘cost of means testing’ studies which would allow us to evaluate 
these costs, relative to the cost of raising a marginal dollar of tax revenue. However we do 
know that economic distortions are minimised where the marginal effective tax rate is 
everywhere the same, save that it should be lower where behaviour is most responsive to 
changes in the tax rate. In the case of the aged, whose workforce participation is very low 
(under 10%), the behaviour in question is the elasticity o f investment in assessable assets 
with respect to the effective tax rate on them.
While there is no consensus in the literature about the elasticity of total saving with respect 
to the net interest rate, there is a strong consensus that there is a very substantial elasticity 
in relation to the allocation of assets to taxed and untaxed (or lightly taxed) classes. In 
other words, economic theory might provide a justification for lower effective tax rates on 
retirees than on workers.
116 While there are just over 2 million age/service pensioners, 2/3 of these have incomes under the current 
free area and are not affected by taper liberalisation. There is another small group of people who would be 
brought into the pension system; this would number less than 100,000.
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Leaving aside this possibility, and assuming that we are seeking to equalise marginal rates, 
does not necessarily mean means test abolition. As noted in Chapter 5, Dawkins and his 
associates have estimated that, under a categorical NIT providing the same basic benefits 
as the current system, the required marginal tax rate on all income is 50%. In other words 
if retirees face effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) of less than 50%, the working age 
population must face higher rates. Dawkins’ advocacy of a means test free pension is 
apparently inconsistent with his advocacy of a NIT, and resolution of this inconsistency 
requires that an EMTR of 50% be sought for the aged.
Modelling shows that such a tax rate is not difficult to achieve. Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show 
EMTRs with a 25% pension taper. In all cases, it appears that the effect is very similar to a 
50% effective tax rate. (The exact rate depends on income splits within the couple -  see 
Figure 8.5. Another complication is the treatment of assets, which I will come back to.)
The cost of around $1.5b net is not a large amount in the context of total age pension 
expenditure. It could be financed by a relatively small addition to marginal income or 
consumption tax rates, a fact which underscores the likelihood of net economic efficiency 
gains overall.
It should be borne in mind that even if there is no explicit means test the ETR on
117pensioners beyond the tax thresholds is still at or around 45%, reflective of the income 
tax clawed back. This is illustrated in Figure 8.6.
It should also be noted that most of the efficiency gains from reducing EMTRs come from 
the first tranche of reductions. This reflects Harberger’s classic (1968) finding that 
efficiency cost of taxation is a function of the square of the tax rate. In other words 
reducing the means test taper by half is likely to yield up to three-quarters of the potential 
efficiency gains, compared to those from abolishing it entirely. Indeed, if elasticities of 
saving and working are equal, there may be no gains to be had from reduction in pension 
EMTRs below 50%, entailing as they would relatively higher taxes on wage earners.
In an earlier paper on optimal tapers (Ingles 1998b), I suggested that there were no obvious 
reasons for maintaining different tapers on pensions and allowances, given that evidence of 
savings vs work elasticities was tentative and elusive. Taxing saving creates a distortion 
between current and future consumption; taxing work creates a distortion between work
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and leisure. Economic (“optimal tax”) theory does not provide a clear case for favouring 
the one over the other, and empirical work has yielded mixed results.
In Chapter 4 ,1 modified my view on the desirability of maintaining equality between 
pension and allowance tapers. The reason is that a high taper on allowances maintains a 
situation where most workers earn incomes beyond the cutout points in the allowance 
system. This is not true of pensioners, and the argument for a single marginal rate right 
through the pensioner income distribution is, in my view, much more persuasive.
It is not obvious that equity is furthered by reductions in the pension taper. The people 
who would benefit are on average reasonably well off, and probably better off than many 
working families who would be paying the taxes to finance this reduction. There are ways, 
however to address this issue. It should be noted that it is a transitional one - if current 
retirees had paid higher taxes all their working lives to finance a universal age pension, no 
one could complain when they themselves come to receive it. One option is to finance the 
taper reduction by reductions in superannuation tax concessions, such that future retirees 
are not, on average, gainers from the reform. However, there are difficulties with this, as 
discussed later in this chapter.
8.2.3 Alternative means for implementing a 50% effective tax/taper rate
In Chapter 6 ,1 discussed three alternative approaches to tax and social security 
interactions: hannonisation, integration, and separation. The 25% taper proposal is an 
example of harmonisation, whereby tax and means tests are designed to dovetail to achieve 
the EMTR result sought. The disadvantages of this approach are that it falls short of 
achieving a fully linear EMTR structure; it requires duplication of administrations, and it 
continues to involve different income and related definitions. The other two approaches 
avoid these problems.
Integration could be achieved by jettisoning the means test entirely and imposing a 25 
percentage point tax surcharge on non-pension income beyond the free area. While I am 
attracted to the simplicity of the concept, in practice it would lead us back to a situation 
similar to that prevailing after the abolition of the assets test in 1976, with the same 
opportunities for avoidance and the like. Put simply, the current income base is not a
117 The pension is taxable income, so that tax thresholds applying to private income are less than 
$20,000/$32,612. Those on such incomes would be receiving a substantial part-rate pension.
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sufficiently sturdy platform for operating tax rates of around 50%, a problem exacerbated 
by changes to the taxation of capital gains. This was also the NZ experience when there 
was a tax surcharge on ‘national superannuation’ pensions in that country.
Separation is a more attractive option at this time. This would involve returning to a 
pension taper of 50%, but raising pensioner tax rebates by sufficient to prevent any income 
tax liability arising while in receipt of a part-rate pension. Rebates would then phase out at 
a 20% rate so as to maintain an EMTR of 50% until they were fully exhausted. One 
advantage is that the tighter pensions income and assets test operates over the whole of the 
low to middle income range, so maximum targeting is achieved.
The rebate system, however, has some problems in its application and my preferred 
solution would be to provide for special age-related tax scales. For those aged over 64 
these would have thresholds equal to the revised pension cutouts (recall that they will fall 
somewhat under the proposed 50% taper), a couple basis for assessment, and a tax rate of 
50% beyond the thresholds. Pensioners would revert to the normal individual tax scale as 
soon as this was to their advantage; this point would be dependent on the income split 
within the couple. These special tax scales would be available to the whole of the 
(residentially qualified) population aged 65 and over, so as to avoid discontinuities for 
those at the pension/tax interface.
8.2.3.1 Should this plan be financed from general tax increases or reductions in
superannuation tax concessions?
There are obvious attractions in financing taper reductions from superannuation tax, but 
quite large practical difficulties. The attractions arise from a simple theoretical argument. 
Suppose that the marginal rates of tax on savings and earnings were initially optimised. 
Suppose we then lower the effective tax on saving by reducing the pension taper. This 
implies that the mix of tax would no longer be optimal, and that some higher tax on 
savings is required in order to restore the initial, optimum tax mix. Superannuation saving 
is the obvious place to make such an increase, since it is specifically benefited by pension 
taper changes.
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Further, the maths appears favourable to a tax/means test trade-off. The cost of tax 
concessions for occupational superannuation was estimated at $9.4 billion in 1998-99118, 
falling to an estimated $8.7 billion for 2000-2001 (reflective to the reduced income tax 
rates under the NTS). However there are difficult issues in costing this particular "tax 
expenditure" (see Bateman and Piggott 1992b, and Clare 1998) and this figure may be on 
the high side. Nonetheless, it is clearly more than adequate -  if it could be had -  to finance 
a taper reduction with a net cost of $1.5 billion. Another advantage of this source of 
funding is that it will automatically rise in the future, and thus offset part of the rising cost 
of taper reduction.
There are two theoretically pure ways of taxing capital income, including superannuation. 
Either would require a radical upheaval of existing arrangements. One is the expenditure 
tax (ET), which as explained in Appendix 2 to this Chapter effectively exempts capital 
income from tax. The other approach is the comprehensive income tax (CIT), but for this 
to work properly it requires that capital income be taxed on a fully inflation-adjusted 
accrual basis. For example, capital gains should be taxed each year, at the individual’s 
marginal rate, on the difference between the start and the end values of the relevant assets, 
adjusted for inflation. Further, income should be imputed to items in use; the owner 
occupied home is the most important example.
Economic theory is not decisive as to which of these approaches are to be preferred. 
However it does suggest that intersectoral allocation of resources is improved if the one 
approach is applied to all forms of capital income.
All tax systems in practice employ mixtures of expenditure and income tax concepts. The 
ET approach is typically applied both to owner-occupied homes, and also to 
superannuation, in most other countries. Many theorists have therefore argued that 
efficient asset allocation would be furthered by applying an ET regime more widely, and in 
particular to superannuation savings. Others have argued that this would have an 
unacceptable impact on the distribution of income and wealth. This is precisely the 
problem that would arise if the ET concept were pursued more wholeheartedly in the 
superannuation arena in this country.
118 1999-2000 Budget Paper No 1 “Budget strategy and outlook 1999-2000”, Appendix B pp6-20.
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If on the other hand we assume that the CIT rather than the ET is an appropriate basis for 
taxing superannuation, there is still the question of whether we can actually find another 
$ 1.5b -  that is, in addition to the $5b pa currently reaped - from the superannuation ‘honey 
pot’? One problem is that the Treasury Tax Expenditure methodology assumes that 
people’s behaviour is not different under alternative tax treatments. It also assumes that 
the alternative to investing in superannuation is to invest in alternative, fully taxed 
investments. Clearly, this is unlikely.
Another problems is that, under the current superannuation tax structure, the main options 
are an increase in contributions and/or fund earnings tax, at 15%, or in lump sum tax 
(16.5% on amounts over $90,474). The problem arises mainly at the bottom end of the 
income distribution, where the 15% tax on superannuation contributions and fund earnings 
is only just below the 17% marginal tax rate which applies, since 1 July 2000, below 
$20,000 pa of taxable income.
Hence for some low-income earners superannuation saving is only very slightly tax- 
advantaged and -  because it is locked away for so long - is therefore a very unattractive 
alternative to other uses for the money. Increasing the tax at any of the points identified 
above could exacerbate this problem. Rothman’s (2000) analysis clearly suggests that 
concessionality mainly applies to middle and higher income earners. For them, some 
increase in superannuation tax might be possible, but this runs into an area already 
complicated by the introduction of the superannuation surcharge. One option discussed in 
Appendix 2 is to raise additional revenue from the surcharge itself. Another is to raise tax 
rates on end-benefits, but it is hard to do this in an equitable manner while superannuation 
contributions are also taxed.
A further problem with clawing back the cost of taper reductions through superannuation 
tax is that it cannot be assumed that the initial tax rates on savings and earnings are in fact 
optimal. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that taper reductions should optimally be 
financed from raising taxes on wage incomes, not just retirement savings.
The bottom line is that while there may be a theoretical argument for financing taper 
reductions from changes to superannuation tax, easy options are not available. Questions 
about equity are also important, although from a lifetime equity perspective it may not 
matter very much if one pays slightly higher taxes while working, if you then receive
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higher benefits while retired. On the other hand, there may be little point in handing out 
windfall gains to the better off among the current generation of retirees.
Ultimately, while economic theory might point in the direction of lower EMTR on age 
pensioners, it provides little guidance on whether that should be financed from general tax 
increases, or higher taxes on superannuation.
8.2.4 Treatment of assets
The NTS reduction in the pension taper has increased the tension between the pension 
income test and its associated “deeming” regime, and the separate assets test. The deeming 
regime affects all financial assets, but applies at a relatively low rate (now 5% up to 
$30,000, and 5.5% beyond) which varies with the general level of interest rates -  one 
which pensioners find is easily achieved or even exceeded. The assets test has a high 
threshold but in effect deems income from both financial and non-fiinancial assets at a very 
high rate. This is because the asset test takes the form of a fixed deduction in pension - $3 
per fortnight - per $ 1,000 of assets held.
With a 50% taper the assets test in effect imputed a marginal return of 15.6% on affected 
assets. With the taper having fallen to 40% but the asset test being unchanged, the implicit 
deeming (imputation) rate rose to 19.5%. With a taper of 25%, the implicit deeming rate 
would double, to 31.2% pa. While apparently draconian, it must be emphasised that these 
are marginal rates, and average rates -  taking into account the large asset thresholds -  are 
much lower. Nonetheless, it is the marginal rates that are likely to cause behavioural 
effects for people with asset holdings above or close to the thresholds.
Since a neat alternative exists, there seems to be no real reason to persist with a separate 
assets test. That alternative is a return to the “merged means test” that existed prior to 
1976. Under that test, all financial and non-fmancial assets were in effect deemed to earn 
at a rate of 10% pa; that amount was added to any earned or pension income and the 
pension taper applied to the total. The 10% rate was originally based on the cost of an 
annuity for a man aged 65; I argue below that on the same logic this rate should now 
become 6-7%. But while the marginal rate would thus be much lower than the 19.5% 
imputed by the current asset test, the average rate for many would be higher; there would 
be no separate asset thresholds but rather, imputed asset income above the income free 
areas would be fully assessed. Thus, the change is likely to yield net savings.
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There is an inconsistency at the heart of current deeming arrangements; that is, the 
deeming rate drifts up and down from time to time reflective of general interest rates, 
which are themselves in part a product of variations in the actual or expected rate of 
inflation. In real (inflation adjusted) terms, investment earnings follow a much narrower 
band. Put another way, pensioners are actually disadvantaged by combinations of high 
interest cum-deeming rates and high inflation, and advantaged by the reverse combination. 
This does not show up in the short run (with higher interest more than compensating for 
reduced pension), but becomes very clear over the long run as pensioners’ real assets 
reduce. Taxation accentuates this effect.
Instead, I propose the introduction of what would amount to a revitalised merged means 
test. The deeming rate would be fixed at the average cost of an indexed life annuity for a 
person aged 65. This would give a rate of around 6-7%119. This could be applied to all 
assessable120 (financial and non-financial) assets in the manner of the old merged means 
test, and would be invariant to the general level of interest rates and the rate of inflation. 
The separate assets test would be abolished. An ancillary advantage is that it would make 
quite explicit the Government’s desire to direct people into income stream investments. A 
final advantage is that it would yield savings, which could partly finance the reduced 
pension taper proposed.
8.2.5 Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP) scheme
This is another interesting route to means test abolition. In its ‘classical’ form the basic 
idea is that benefits from the compulsory superannuation tier would have to be taken in 
income (life annuity) form, and the GMP would top this up to an acceptable basic standard. 
The implicit means test in the classic GMP involves a 100% taper and would be restricted 
in its application to income from the compulsory superannuation tier (Ingles 2000c).
The main modification I make to this ‘classic’ proposal is to extend the recommended 
system to all superannuation benefits (excluding undeducted employee contributions), not 
just the SG tier. Also I am not sure that there is any case to tighten the implicit means test 
structure (ie beyond the 40% taper in July 2000). Tightening certainly reduces costs, but at
119 The 6% rate is more relevant to females, 7% to males. Annuity costs vary from time to time; the options 
are either to take an average or to allow for fluctuations to be reflected in the deeming rate. For indexed 
annuities cost variations are relatively small.
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the expense of reducing the net return to superannuation investments. Return to 
investment becomes more important if non-compulsory superannuation is included in the 
proposal.
In Ingles 2000c, I conclude that the GMP idea has merit, but there would need to be 
resolution of a number of practical and conceptual difficulties. One attractive variation on 
the basic proposal would require retirees to “purchase” their (universal) age pension by 
paying an up-front sum of a proportion of their retirement benefit. This overcomes a lot of 
the problems involved in requiring SG recipients to take up annuities (see Appendix 3). A 
further variant of this proposal is simply to combine a higher tax on superannuation end 
benefits with means test easing or abolition.
In a tax policy sense higher taxes on end benefits are best achieved in a context where the 
superannuation contributions tax is abolished, and all superannuation contributions by 
employees become fully deductible. The simplest approach is a full EET tax regime. If 
this were not thought appropriate -  and see the problems discussed in Appendix 3 -  a sub­
option is to also tax fund earnings. This puts superannuation taxation on a footing 
somewhere between the comprehensive income and the expenditure tax base.
Any combination of reduced taper and higher (superannuation) benefits tax overlaps with 
the GMP approach in terms of lifetime redistributions. Introduction of a 25% taper and 
financing it by higher taxes on end-benefits could be phased in such that only new cohorts 
paying the heavier end-benefit tax would be eligible for the eased taper, so there would be 
no net costs to the budget. In a distributional and efficiency sense, the outcome is very 
similar to the GMP idea, while retaining some internal consistency within the social 
security system as a whole.
I am less attracted to the GMP approach of a full-fledged universal pension financed by an 
even heavier final benefits tax, although I would nonetheless see it as a great improvement 
on the current system. In this latter approach, phasing-in is very straightforward, with only 
those paying the higher tax to receive the universal pension entitlement. Phasing in might 
be on the basis that for each of 40 years, an additional 1/40 of the age pension would be
1201 assume that the owner -occupied home would continue to be exempt, although I agree with the late Prof. 
Fred Gruen -  in his 1986 asset test report - that it should not be (and all pensioners, not just renters, would 
receive a pension rate designed to cover reasonable housing costs).
121 Exempt contributions, exempt earnings, and tax benefits at full marginal rates.
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paid free of means test. In this manner the means-tested component would eventually 
reduce to zero.
8.3 Conclusion
The GMP idea makes it possible and affordable to abolish the age pension means test. 
However it is not clear if the pension taper should be reduced below, say, 25%. Most of 
the efficiency gains are achieved by the first tranche of taper reduction. Optimal taxation 
of superannuation-cum-retirement savings necessarily involves integration of tax and 
means test provisions. It does appear reasonable to trade-off pension taper reductions for 
higher end-benefits taxation of superannuation, but there will be substantial transitional 
issues in moving to any new system.
In the longer term we should look for a solution where the taxation of superannuation is 
reformed as part of a comprehensive reform of capital income taxation. However the 
changes likely to be necessary are so radical -  whether that be a full ET or a full CIT - that 
it is unlikely we will see anything like this for some considerable time to come. But 
irrespective of any such developments, there is a good economic case for changing the age 
pension means test to implement a 50% ETR, and if such a change were effected it would 
also provide a good opportunity to tighten the existing taxation of superannuation benefits 
such that the changes could be defended as preserving, on balance, net incentives to save 
for retirement.
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8.4 Figures
Figure 8.1: Single Age Pensioner - Rates at March 20, 2001 
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Figure 8.2: Age Pension couple 
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Figure 8.3: Single Age Pensioner - Rates a t March 20, 2001 
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Figure 8.4: Age Pension couple, 25% taper 
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Figure 8.5: Age Pension couple 
25% taper, No children, paying no rent,
100% of private income to head, Rates at March 20, 2001
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Figure 8.6: Age Pension couple 
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8.5 Appendix 1: taxation treatment of superannuation122
Contributions
Contributions to complying superannuation funds are fully tax deductible to employers up
123to the age based deduction limits set out below :
Age of employee Deduction limit
Under 35 $10,929
35 to 49 $30,356
50 and over $75,283
‘Self-employed persons’ (whose income from an employer is less than 10% of their total 
income) get a full tax deduction on the first $3,000 of contributions plus 75% of the 
remaining contribution up to the age based deduction limits.
Taxation
Employer and tax-deductible personal contributions are included in a complying 
superannuation fund’s income and taxed at a nominal rate of 15%.
Surcharge on contributions
All employer, certain ‘golden handshakes’ and tax deductible personal superannuation 
contributions made by or for high income earners are subject to a surcharge of up to 15%. 
The surcharge is phased in over the income levels of $78,208 to $94,966 effectively 
increasing by 1% for each additional $1,118 of income from $78,208. These limits are 
indexed annually to movements in average weekly ordinary time earnings.
Taxation of superannuation fund earnings
The earnings of complying superannuation funds are taxed at a nominal rate of 15% (non­
complying funds are taxed at a rate of 47%). Company tax imputation credits are available
122 This appendix is adapted from DFaCS (1999) Appendix B. The amounts cited are indexed and would 
now be somewhat higher.
123 These amounts apply from July 1 1999 and are indexed annually.
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to funds, and they also benefit from a 10% capital gains tax on assets held longer than I 
year. Hence, the effective rate can sometimes be much less.
Reasonable Benefit Limits
The amount of concessionally taxed superannuation benefits a person is allowed to receive 
over his or her lifetime is limited by Reasonable Benefit Limits (RBL). The table below 
shows the lump sum and pension RBLs. The pension RBL is available provided at least 
50% of the total benefits received by a person are taken in the form of a pension or annuity 
satisfying the pension and annuity standards.
Reasonable Benefit Limits (Amount) 2
Lump sum RBL $485,692
Pension RBL $971,382
Eligible Termination Payments
Eligible Termination Payments (ETP) are lump sums usually paid on retirement or 
resignation from a job and include ‘golden handshakes’, payments from superannuation 
funds, Approved Deposit Funds and Retirement Savings Accounts. ETPs are taxed 
differently from other income. They are broken down into several components (although 
not all ETPs have every component). Each is taxed in a different manner and subject to 
various rebates.
124 These limits are for 1999/2000. They are indexed annually to average earnings. For pensions and 
annuities, the RBL relates to the capital equivalent value.
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ETP C O M PO NENT M axim um  Tax Rate
(including 1.5% 
M edicare levy)
Post June 1983 com ponent -  refers to superannuation benefits accrued 
w ith respect to em ploym ent or fund m em bership after 30 June 1983.
This com ponent is the am ount o f  the ETP reduced by  the total am ount o f  
all the other ETP com ponents. These benefits are taxed according to 
w hether the fund earnings w ere taxable and the age o f  the benefit 
recipient, as follows.
Person less than age 55:
• Taxed element: a post-June 1983 com ponent is a taxed elem ent i f
the payer is subject to 15% tax on investm ent earnings o f  the fund 
(ie. M ost superannuation funds).
21.5%
• U ntaxed element: a post-June 1983 com ponent is an untaxed 
elem ent i f  the payer is not subject to 15% tax on investm ent 
earnings (eg. som e governm ent superannuation funds and golden 
handshakes for em ployees).
Person 55 years or over:
• Taxed elem ent:
from  $0 to $93,731
31.5%
balance 0%
• U ntaxed elem ent:
from  $0 to $93,731
16.5%
balance 16.5%
31.5%
Pre Ju ly  1983 com ponent - the am ount o f  an ETP that relates to 
superannuation benefits accrued w ith respect to em ploym ent before 1 
Ju ly  1983.
5%  o f  am ount is ta* 
at m arginal tax rati
U ndeducted  contributions -  m em ber contributions (since 1 July  1983) 
not subject to a tax deduction (not included for RBL purposes - see 
below ).
Exem pt
C apita l Gains Tax (CG T) exem pt com ponent -  an exem ption from  
C G T (on a total m axim um  capital gain o f  $500,000) can be claim ed on 
the sale o f  a sm all business w here the proceeds are used for retirem ent.
Exem pt
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Concessional component - until 1 July 1994, this included any approved 
early retirement scheme payment, bona fide redundancy payment or 
invalidity payment. From 1 July 1994, ETPs no longer have a 
concessional component, except where an ETP with a concessional 
component was rolled over (transferred to) a complying superannuation 
fund before 1 July 1994, and subsequently paid out by the fund.
5% of amount is tax< 
at marginal tax rate
Post June 1994 invalidity payments - the recipient’s disability must be 
verified.
Exempt
Non-qualifying component -  that part of an ETP that represents Full amount taxed £
investment income accruing between the time of purchasing an annuity 
(other than by a rollover) and the time of payment.
marginal tax rates
Excessive component -  the amount of an ETP in excess of a person’s 
RBL.
48.5%
Rebates
Low income superannuation rebate
An employee who receives any form of employer superannuation support (but is not a ‘self 
employed person’) is entitled to a tax rebate of up to $100 for personal contributions made 
to a complying superannuation fund, provided the employee's assessable (ie, gross) income 
is less than $31,000. The tax rebate is 10% of the lesser of: $1,000 reduced by 25 cents for 
each dollar of the taxpayer's assessable income over $27,000 or the amount of the 
contribution actually made. These amounts are not indexed.
Low income spouse rebate
A contributing spouse is entitled to receive an 18% rebate for contributions up to $3,000 a 
year to a superannuation fund or RSA of a spouse with assessable income below $10,800 a 
year. The rebate phases out on a dollar for dollar basis, so it is no longer available where 
the low-income spouse’s assessable income is over $13,800 a year. These amounts are not 
indexed.
Pension and annuity rebate
Where a person receives an ETP annuity or pension from a taxed superannuation fund and 
the person is 55 or more years of age, the person is entitled to a tax rebate, at 15%, on the 
assessable part of the annuity or pension payment that is not in excess of the person’s RBL.
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8.6 Appendix 2: taxation issues in superannuation
8.6.1 Introduction
New Zealand and the Czech Republic are the only OECD countries without tax 
concessions for superannuation savings, and even in New Zealand that policy is under 
periodic attack. However, is has been argued by a number of commentators that a policy 
of reducing superannuation tax concessions and paying a means test free age pension 
would have several major advantages:
• "double dipping" would cease to be an issue;
• the incidence of net government benefits for retirement incomes would become flat 
across income classes, or mildly progressive taking into account the tax on age 
pensions;125
• the tax treatment of superannuation could be simplified; and
• the overall tax treatment of savings could be made more neutral.
However, although governments have moved to reduce superannuation tax concessions 
over the last 15 years, and the current Government has eased the pension taper to 40%, this 
last step is at odds with Australia’s preference for means testing. Another issue is the 
potential for unwarranted windfall gains to existing pensioners, some of whom have 
benefited from substantial superannuation tax concessions in the past.
Nor is it without new complexities on the tax side (including transitional issues), and 
possible implications for the aggregate volume of saving. It should be noted, however, 
that now that a growing slice of superannuation is compulsory, some observers have 
suggested that the argument that tax concessions are needed to induce private provision has 
lost some of its economic logic (see references in Edey and Gower 2000).
Complexity is endemic in the current system. The tax on contributions comprises three 
different systems: employer (15% tax), employee (not deductable) and self-employed 
(rebateable up to a limit of $3,000 pa). There are additional rebates for spouses and low
125 Even a flat rate benefit is progressive, measured as a proportion of incomes.
126 Although if such a policy change were cost neutral, it seems likely, prima facie, that it would be neutral 
with respect to the aggregate incentive to save for retirement. This argument is qualified however by the 
possibility that governments have different rates of time discount to individuals.
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income earners. Investment income is taxed two different ways (complying and non­
complying) and there are thirteen different ways of taxing benefits, depending on how and 
when they were originally financed, and/or how they are taken (see Appendix 1).
For those actually retired, tax is equally complex. Superannuation pensions and annuities 
financed by “rolling over” lump sums enable investors to defer lump sum tax, and the 
investment earnings that back these income steams are tax free. Further, a significant part 
of the income stream carries a 15% rebate. In some cases investors find that it pays them 
not to ‘roll over’ retirement lump sums into an income stream product but rather to pay the 
lump sum tax in the first instance, in order to benefit from a tax-free component from 
undeducted contributions. This is more likely if they have some pre-1983 component in 
the lump sum -  only 5% of this is taxable.
8.6.2 Ideal tax benchmarks
There are two possible theoretically pure tax treatments of superannuation. One is the 
comprehensive income tax (CIT) ideal, which is the basis for the Treasury Tax 
Expenditure Statement (TES). This treatment involves taxing superannuation as if it were 
personal income, at two stages: when contributions are made either by or on behalf of the 
employee, and when income is earned in the fund. In both cases, the tax rate theoretically 
applicable is the marginal rate of the individual. Tax having been levied at these stages, 
there is no case for taxing end benefits.
The other theoretically pure treatment is the cash-flow expenditure tax (ET), under which 
taxes are levied neither on contributions nor on income, but end benefits are fully taxed, 
when payed out, as income to the individual. If benefits are payed as a lump sum but 
rolled over into another account, tax should be deferred until the benefits are actually 
withdrawn. Taxing final benefits is much more favourable to the saver than the CIT, 
because (assuming constant tax rates) tax deferral raises the real return on saving . One 
advantage of the ET is that it provides a consistent treatment across both funded and 
unfunded superannuation.
127 Other assumptions (such as differential discount rates between the states and consumers) are required to 
prove a net social benefit from such a switch, holding discounted revenue constant.
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Although the CIT has been the conceptual benchmark for major tax reform exercises in the 
past (eg Asprey 1975) it has proved impossible to implement in practice, since it would 
need to involve
• full taxation of capital gains on an annual accrual basis;
• full inflation adjustment (only real income/gains to be included); and
• full adjustment for economic depreciation of the underlying assets.
By contrast a full ET should in theory be easier to implement, since it can be approximated 
either by
• taxing only earned income (eg a payroll tax), including any superannuation 
contributions made by an employer on an employees behalf; or
• taxing on a cash-flow basis (ie, the CFET): savings such as superannuation fully 
deductible; consumption of savings brought fully to account at the individual’s 
marginal rate.
I will not try and prove the economic equivalence between a payroll tax and a cash-flow 
ET; this can be found in any text on the subject'28. But the important point is that under an 
ET the returns to saving are equal to the underlying economic returns on the asset those 
savings purchase. Suppose the real interest rate on superannuation fund investments is 6%, 
and the income tax rate 30%. The real return to the saver under an ET will also be 6%; 
under the CIT, 4.2%. While this difference may appear slight, it makes a huge difference 
to the lump sum accumulated over a lifetime.
Economic theory is not decisive about whether the CIT or the ET approach is preferred as 
the ‘touchstone’ of an ideal tax system. The Asprey Committee (1975), for example, 
adopted the CIT as the benchmark for their ideal tax system but also saw merit in the ET 
approach in relation to long-term savings such as superannuation. The 1993 Fitzgerald 
report on National Saving agreed that the “ideal benchmark for a pro-saving tax regime” 
was an ET, but the costs to revenue were such that it “should only be pursued after the 
government had lifted the saving performance of the public sector”.
128 In fact the equivalence is not complete, and depends for example on exempting from the ET expenditure 
financed from the sale of assets held prior to its introduction. Otherwise, it also acts as a form o f lump sum 
tax on assets. Another difference is that the CFET taxes ‘pure’ profits.
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As a practical matter, the CIT can be implemented through a regime taxing superannuation 
contributions and earnings at the individual’s marginal rate, and exempting end benefits. 
This approach is known by the shorthand appellation of TTE (Tax contributions, Tax 
earnings, and Exempt benefits). The ET, by contrast, can be implemented by an EET 
regime, where T is at the individual’s marginal rate. (EET and ET should not, however, 
be confused.)
An EET regime has very significant practical advantages, in avoiding all the problems 
associated with measuring individuals' marginal rates at the time contributions are made 
and earnings received, as well as avoiding problems of imputation for defined benefit 
schemes. TTE, by contrast, has the advantage of yielding revenue more immediately. 
Whether it yields more revenue overall is a moot point, and this depends on the elasticity 
of superannuation savings with respect to the effective superannuation tax rate. Our 
current system combines elements of both approaches by taxing at all three points (TTT) 
but taxing concessionally at each point and, overall, much more concessionally than a pure 
CIT. This is reflected in the Treasury’s $8.7 billion estimate of the cost of this ‘tax 
expenditure’.
The ET is more neutral with respect to the savings/consumption choice but, in effectively 
exempting capital income from the tax base, forces the imposition of higher tax rates on 
earnings which themselves distort the work/leisure choice. This tradeoff between 
competing distortions can only be resolved by recourse to “optimal tax” methodologies; 
they have not been found to be decisive for either tax base.
The practical (or ‘second-best’) arguments for an ET is that we already exempt a large slab 
of capital income through the exemption of imputed rent on owner occupied housing (and 
other forms of tax reduction such as gearing129); exempting superannuation yields therefore 
makes the inter-sectoral allocation of savings and capital more neutral. Bateman and 
Piggott (1999 p i9) argue that “If housing is granted tax preference, as it is in most 
countries, including Australia, it is especially important that superannuation savings be 
offered equivalent tax preference, otherwise distortions between assets are introduced and 
these can be very damaging to economic efficiency". The ‘second best’ counterargument 
is that we (attempt to) tax most forms of financial assets with the CIT approach, and
129 Gearing is not inherently concessional. Problems arise because we tax capital income using a mixture of 
accrual and realisation concepts, and exclude half of capital gains.
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exempting superannuation distorts saving into this particular institutional form. It also 
creates horizontal inequities between those with, and those without, access to employer- 
sponsored superannuation, this being the most tax-sheltered form .
It is a strange feature of the public debate on superannuation tax that relatively little 
attention is paid to the age pension means test. This is a very important component of the 
taxation of end benefits and ought to be part of any optimal tax “solution”. Since the 
distinguishing feature of an ET is that returns to savers are equated to economic yields on 
the real assets those savings finance, combining an ET with a means test on the pension 
immediately vitiates this identity and thus hopelessly compromises the whole economic 
case for having an ET in the first place. The two different approaches are simply not 
reconcilable; the reality is that any politically and financially feasible superannuation and 
pension system will reduce net returns to many if not most savers to some extent, and the 
only real question is “by how much, and for whom?” After this is answered, we can then 
consider alternative means to implement the desired distribution of effective tax rates.
Arguably, that ideal distribution of marginal net yields to retirement savings might look 
something like figure 5 below. In this figure almost a full economic yield (assumed to be 
6%) is achieved for low-income savers; for high-income savers, the end result is much 
closer to 3%, assuming a top marginal rate of 50%. Such an outcome could be 
approximated, for example, by a CIT combined with means test abolition. By contrast an 
EET combined with a means tested age pension results in a return profile which falls over 
the pension income test range, more steeply over the asset test range, but then slowly rises 
again once individuals have assets beyond the cutouts: Figure 5.
130 Which is the reason superannuation features in most ‘salary sacrifice’ arrangements.
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desired net returns to savers
income ($100 pw)
Figure 5 relates only to the marginal benefits from saving, whereas overall redistribution is 
a function of the average income received in retirement. Knox and Cornish (1999) propose 
that retirement benefits should be related to input (lifetime contributions or taxes), but that 
there should be progressive redistribution within the system. They suggest that this might 
be achieved by the combination of a universal pension together with a taxed actuarial 
pension (eg. the SG).
By contrast marginal yields under the current system (while still broadly progressive) are 
much flatter, with yields to low income earners affected by contributions and fund earnings 
tax, yields to middle income earners also affected by the age pension means test, and yields 
to high income earners by the superannuation taxes and surcharge (but not the means test).
One effect of neglecting to consider tax and means tests together is that some of the same 
people who call for superannuation tax to be made more concessional also call for 
measures (like compulsory annuities) to make the means test more effective - 
notwithstanding that the net effect of the two measures may simply wash out in terms of its 
impact on the budget and on disposable incomes in retirement.
Net returns to superannuation saving could be improved by moving to an ET 
superannuation tax regime or by abolishing or reducing the pension means test taper. The 
former may or may not improve the overall neutrality of capital income taxation; the latter 
certainly would. However, the latter option may cut across the basic guaranteed minimum 
income concepts presently underlying the current social security system.
8.6.3 Cost of tax concessions
The Treasury, in its annual Tax Expenditure Statement (TES) puts the cost of 
superannuation tax concessions at $8.7 billion in 1999-2000. These costing have been 
extensively criticised.
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The ground for criticism have been several:
1. that the CIT is not an appropriate benchmark, and the ET is;
2. that the costing does not take account of the likelihood that, if concessions were less, 
much superannuation saving would divert to other tax sheltered forms where revenue 
would not be greater (ie, they assume no behavioural effect);
3. that the costing does not take account of offsets from age pension savings; and
4. that the costing is on an annual cash flow basis only, and does not take proper account 
of future taxes that will accrue as a result of superannuation savings.
The answer to the criticisms, at one level, is that the TES costing does not purport to be 
more than what it is: ie, a point in time estimate of tax forgone using conventional tax 
expenditure methodologies, which don’t generally allow for possible behavioural change. 
However, this answer is trite, in the sense that it doesn’t help answer the policy questions 
surrounding the tax concessions.
Brown has noted that “we cannot interpret the TES estimates .. .as a time series of the cost 
of the tax concessions or project those estimates forward to assess the impact of the 
concessions in the future. This is because, even assuming no behavioural change, the TES 
estimates do not take account of the erosion of the initial revenue gain that would arise 
because of the higher taxation eroding the superannuation tax base” (1993a plO). In 
particular, this implies that “simply projecting the annual tax expenditures will overstate 
the ongoing revenue gains from abolishing the tax concessions” (pi 1).
Access Economics (1998) has prepared an alternative costing based on the ET benchmark, 
and taking account of savings on age pension expenditures. On their figures, 
superannuation, far from being undertaxed in 1996-97, was overtaxed to the extent of $775 
million. Access asserts that this over-taxation was likely to be growing. Interestingly, this 
total comprises over taxation of funded superannuation of $ 1,693 million, offset by under­
taxation of unfunded super of $917 million. (This suggests that there might desirably be 
some re-balancing of the two components, even if total revenue is to remain unchanged.)
Further, self-provision through superannuation was estimated to reduce pension 
expenditure by $924 million in that year. This was regarded as a conservative figure: “It 
excludes, for example, the increase in tax receipts from pensioners” (p5). Together, these
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two figures suggest that “superannuation was overtaxed to the extent o f ... $ 1,699 million 
in 1995-96” (Access 1998 p4.) ASFA has used these Access costings to justify their 
preferred EET superannuation tax regime.
If the over-taxation compared to a pure ET is only $775m, we are paying an enormous cost 
in complexity and economic distortion for very little revenue gain. This, on the face of it, 
would appear to be a compelling argument for moving to a fully-fledged ET regime for 
superannuation. But even if we did this, distortions arising from the age pension means 
test would still persist, so that it is not obvious that the system is optimised by having a 
liberal regime for superannuation savings accompanied by a tough regime for those non- 
super savings, and/or superannuation savings, large enough to impinge on the pension 
means test.
8.6.4 Inappropriateness of the ET as a benchmark for costing 
superannuation tax concessions
Much of the argument about the cost of superannuation tax concessions is based on the use 
of the ET benchmark. It can be easily shown that it is inappropriate as a basis for such 
costings. The reason lies in the economics of the “second best” and its practical 
application, optimal tax theory. This section concludes that the arguments for such a tax 
treatment are not sustainable in the context of a general effort to tax investment income on 
comprehensive income principles, but also that -  given the extent of departures from the 
comprehensive income ideal - theory does not provide precise guidance about the optimal 
taxation of superannuation (nor, indeed, about the optimal taxation of capital income in 
general).
It s true that the ET achieves theoretical neutrality between consumption and savings.131 It 
dees this by effectively exempting the return on savings from the tax base. Bateman and 
Piggott note that “As a proportion of revenue, capital income taxes are generally estimated 
to generate an efficiency cost of between 20 and 50 cents for every dollar of revenue raised 
at the margin” (1999 p22).
If a tax base comprising labour income only were non-distorting, then the ET would be 
idial. But it is not. The general theory of the second best tells us that the elimination of
13’Brown (1993a p9) notes that the ET benchmark is “..most appropriate if we wish to examine the 
effectiveness of the superannuation tax concessions in overcoming the distortion in savings decisions 
inierent in an income tax system”.
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one distortion in the economy, while other distortions persist, will not necessarily push us 
in the direction of an overall superior solution. In terms of our particular issue, taxing 
labour income distorts the work/leisure choice, whereas taxing capital income distorts the 
savings/consumption choice. Ironically, academic estimates of the marginal costs of 
raising revenue from taxes on labour are about the same order as those for capital taxation 
cited by Bateman and Piggott - see eg Campbell and Bond (1997a) and Bascard and Porter 
(1986).
The optimal mix of labour and capital taxation depends on the relative severity of these 
distortions. In particular, the optimal tax on capital income is highly unlikely to be no tax -  
that is, an ET. It can equally be stated, however, that the comprehensive income ideal is 
also highly unlikely to yield the optimal tax on capital income. This creates the economic 
rationale for, eg, the schedular tax systems used in some Scandinavian countries, where 
interest and dividend income is taxed at some flat rate which is less than the highest 
marginal rate of income tax (practical reasons are also important in choosing this 
approach). Our current tax regime for superannuation has elements of the schedular 
approach, but less so now that the surcharge has been introduced. A schedular approach 
applies to the investment income of funds, with a uniform 15% tax rate.
The question is further complicated by the presence, in the income tax, of selective 
exemptions such as those favouring owner-occupied housing. Such exemptions -  if we 
assume that the first-best option of abolishing them is unavailable -  create inter-sectoral 
distortions that push the optimal tax on capital income more towards the low end. But 
even so it is still unlikely to be zero. Moreover, whatever it is, it is prima facie likely that 
the optimal tax rate would be one that applies equally to superannuation and non­
superannuation saving. The presence of a means test, however, modifies this formula so 
that it might create a rationale for favouring long-term financial saving -  provided that 
could be guaranteed to produce a commensurate reduction in pension expenditure.
Whether this creates a case for preserving the current significant differences in the 
treatment of saving inside and outside of superannuation is, however, quite questionable. 
Further, the pension means test is not a given but rather a policy variable which needs to be 
jointly optimised with the superannuation tax regime.
Thus in a world characterised by second-best issues and partial use of the CIT in taxing 
capital income, the ET does not provide a useful or appropriate benchmark for a neutral
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superannuation tax system, and estimates of cost based on the ET benchmark are 
inherently defective.
By the same token the CIT does not necessarily provide a theoretically defensible 
benchmark either: unless the government has taken the approach that the correct balance 
between the two tax bases is implicit in the weights between income and consumption 
taxes in the total tax take. This is now a theoretical possibility, following the introduction 
of a GST, but may not be a practical one given the political limits to the base and weight of 
the GST.
I do not suggest that the current mix of GST and income tax rates reflects any deliberate 
optimising of the system. But it is true that the government is now -  at least in principle - 
able to change the mix between income and consumption taxation by changing the GST 
rate , and the further instrument of concessional taxation of superannuation could, over 
time, become redundant. This is one reason for paying little heed to the protests of the 
superannuation industry that the Government’s tax package has lessened the relative 
advantages of saving through superannuation (ASFA 1998). Since it has achieved this by 
increasing the relative advantages of saving generally, the answer to that is, “good”.
If one takes the view that the government is now able to optimally balance expenditure tax 
and income tax approaches within the macro-structure of the tax system, it might be that 
the Treasury methodology for estimating the costs of the superannuation “tax expenditure” 
becomes increasingly justifiable, particularly if it were further modified to reflect accrual 
accounting concepts and offsets to pension expenditures. I conclude that there is no 
general argument from economic theory, nor from the findings of empirical economics, 
supporting the ET over the CIT in the matter of taxing superannuation.
8.6.5 Cost/benefit analysis of superannuation tax concessions
The most thorough examination of the value (as opposed to the cost) of superannuation tax 
concessions is in Brown (1993a), although he leans a bit on Knox (1991). Brown’s work 
provides a useful conceptual approach to the whole issue. He suggests that we need to 
apply cost-benefit techniques to the super tax concessions in order to determine their 
worth. “Knox (1991) outlines an alternative discounted cash-flow methodology .. .by 
calculating the annual tax expenditures for an individual and offsetting the discounted
132 With the payroll tax being an auxiliary instrument.
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value of these expenditures against the discounted value of the tax on the retirement 
benefit” (Brown 1993 p7). Knox found that superannuation tax expenditure on this 
methodology was around two-thirds that calculated in the TES. Brown’s approach extends 
this, in particular to take account of the impact of superannuation savings on age pension 
outlays.
In the discounted present value methodology, the government’s discount rate enters as a 
crucial parameter in the calculations. If “the Government’s discount rate is higher than the 
fund’s earning rate, the tax concessions become a relatively expensive way of increasing a 
person’s retirement income, while if the Government discount rate is lower, the 
concessions become relatively more cost effective” (Brown 1993 p i2). Brown’s paper 
generally uses the 10 year bond rate (cost of funds) as the discount rate, but an alternative 
methodology is to use the Dept of Finance benchmark discount rate which is based on an 
opportunity cost concept, and is 8% real.
Another important parameter is the benchmark income tax rate. It is unrealistic to expect 
that ordinary savings be taxed at full marginal rates; Knox suggests that an average of 25% 
might be a reasonable compromise.133
The SG introduces another complication. Its presence implies that some superannuation 
savings would be consumed otherwise; a typical assumption is that half of SG savings are 
new, and half a displacement of savings that would otherwise have occurred in any case. 
The larger the offset factor assumed, the more likely is it that (concessional) 
superannuation savings merely replace other forms of saving, so that the net gain from the 
concessions is lessened. If we assume a 100% offset, “net policy gain” is almost zero 
(Brown 1993 p i9).
Brown calculates that, with a government discount rate of 2% (and a fund earning-rate of 
4%), superannuation tax concessions generate a net policy gain. The “superannuation tax 
concessions provide the individual with additional benefits equivalent to 23.7% of the 
person’s pre-retirement disposable income for a gain to government of 9.7%, implying a 
net policy gain of 33.4% of the value of the persons’ pre-retirement disposable income”
133 This may be too high; if we regard the main alternative long-term savings vehicle to be owner-occupied 
housing, the effective tax rate on it is nil. This assumption is also affected by the NTS income tax rate 
changes.
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(1993 p i6). With higher government discount rates the gain recedes but appears 
nonetheless to be positive on almost all assumptions.
Brown concludes that, with the net benefit results so sensitive to a number of assumptions, 
we need considerable further research in order to develop reasonable assumptions 
concerning the values we should use. For us, however, the important point is that there is 
at least a theoretical possibility that superannuation tax concessions will pay, or more than 
pay, for themselves -  even if we simply concern ourselves with net cost to Government. If 
we also add in net gain to fund members, the cost/benefit calculations are very likely to be 
positive.
This leads to the worrying possibility that the changes in 1988 which brought revenues 
forward by taxing contributions, and eased taxation on end-benefits, were actually counter­
productive, particularly in the context of an ageing population. “The tax on contributions 
brings forward revenue (in terms of the government’s immediate budgetary position) but is 
likely to reduce the value of total taxation over the longer term” (Atkinson et al 1999 
p201). A number of researchers have come to the conclusion that sensible superannuation 
tax reform is not possible without reversing this decision and concentrating tax on end- 
benefits.
8.6.6 Conclusion: future directions for superannuation tax reform
The key issue is whether the system is broke enough to need fixing.
One view is that it isn’t, and indeed that recent changes such as the superannuation 
surcharge have knocked a lot of the regressivity out of the system. Although the surcharge 
has been severely criticised by the industry for its very high administrative and compliance 
costs, some of these are start-up costs that will reduce in future years.
Another, and I think more valid view, is that the system still has quite serious faults. I 
would list these as follows:
1. its complexity
2. the discrimination between employer and employee contributions
3. the inconsistency between tax treatments at different income levels, with some low- 
income earners gaining little advantage from being in superannuation schemes.
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Bateman and Piggott (1999) argue that many of the difficulties in superannuation taxation 
lie in the concept of fund, as opposed to individual, taxation. Their preferred option 
involves deductible contributions and benefits fully taxable to individuals, at the relevant 
marginal rate: in other words, a cash flow ET. This was the situation that existed in 
Australia prior to 1936, when the (astonishing poor) decision was made to only tax 5% of 
final benefits.
Also consistent with this view is Solomon’s (1998) solution of a fully inclusive income tax 
base, plus a single rate of rebate for all employer and employee contributions. Total 
rebateable contributions could continue to be limited as per current age-related guidelines. 
A more comprehensive development of this idea is the matching contribution or tax rebate 
proposal of Agulnik and Le Grand (1998). This solution involves replacing tax 
concessions -  ie tax expenditures -  with direct government subsidies, with dollar limits. It 
does not necessarily involve net revenue gains. Rather, it redistributes some of the value 
of tax concessions from high to low income earners.
If a net revenue gain were sought, one solution also consistent with a redistributive 
objective is that of increasing the weight of the superannuation surcharge, this being the 
only tax element in the system which has a progressive impact. One option is to start the 
surcharge at a lower level in the income distribution and have a second, higher rate beyond 
some higher threshold. While the surcharge has had very high set-up and administrative 
costs in relation to revenue (Bateman and Piggott 1999), this will be less of a problem as 
surcharge revenues rise -  as they are already forecast to do.
The taxation of superannuation reflects the general mess in which we find the taxation of 
capital income. This is not just an Australian problem; it is found all over the world. 
However the Australian problem is exacerbated by the fact that we have a supplementary 
tax on capital income called the aged pension means test, and this interacts in complex and 
sometimes perverse ways with the rest of the income tax system.
One theoretically pure approach to taxing superannuation is the cash-flow expenditure tax 
proposal, involving exemption of contributions and fund earnings, and full taxation of end- 
benefits at the marginal rate applicable to the individual. If this concept were pursued, it 
would probably be necessary to retain and even tighten the pension means test in order to 
offset the inegalitarian consequences. However the means test can only operate as an 
implicit tax up to a certain point; beyond this the superannuation wealthy would enjoy a
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marked advantage. The means test has the additional disadvantage that it impacts alike on 
assets that have been taxed concessionally, and those that have not. This can contribute to 
marked horizontal inequities, as well as economic distortions. Finally, the means test 
undermines the whole conceptual basis of the ET approach and makes the exercise 
inherently flawed.
In consequence I do not favour that approach to reform. Rather, I would prefer to see the 
means test weakened, and I suggest that this could be partly financed by the re-introduction 
of a merged means test. Another source of finance is to further tighten the tax regime 
applying to superannuation.
The big problem here is that this cannot be easily done without potentially disadvantaging 
some lower income earners who already receive a fairly marginal benefit from investing in 
superannuation. The fact that some of their involvement is involuntary does not excuse 
this. And yet it is hard to design any tax increases that do not have adverse impact on 
some people’s incentives to save through superannuation. The current system is based on 
a balance of offsetting distortions, which is not easily pushed or pulled at any one point. 
One option noted above is to extend the superannuation surcharge.
Another set of options is the fuller taxation of end benefits proposed in various forms by 
Knox (1990, 1991), the Institute of Actuaries (1994, 1998), and Atkinson, Creedy and 
Knox (1997, 1999) combined with reduction or abolition of the annuity rebate. This would 
be combined with a more generous scheme of rebates for employee contributions, as also 
envisioned in these proposals. Ideally we would end up not discriminating in any way 
between employee and employer contributions, and the concept of undeducted 
contributions would disappear. The remaining ‘concession’ for annuities would simply be 
the purchase price deduction. However all these proposals encounter various technical and 
transitional problems.
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8.7 Appendix 3: superannuation lump sums vs annuities 
8.7.1 Use and incidence of lump sums
Some 80% of retirement benefits are taken in the form of lump sums -  or 90%, excluding 
public servants. It is difficult to state this figure exactly, since it includes some pre­
retirement benefits which are “rolled over” into other schemes, and also some benefits 
which are taken as lump sums but then used to purchase an “income stream” product 
which is treated in the same way as a life annuity by the social security and tax systems.
Some superannuation monies become available on changing jobs, prior to retirement. The 
scope for this to happen is being gradually reduced by compulsory preservation rules.
RIMU calculated that in 1995 about 65% of account balances were not preserved, but the 
July 1999 tightening of preservation rules, and the phasing in of age 60 preservation, will 
see this gradually change over time.
It has long been recognised that access to lump sums provides a potential means of 
benefiting from both tax concessions and the age pension -  so-called “double dipping”. 
However this problem may be more apparent than real: surveys indicate that most lumps 
sums are used for productive investment purposes, although some of those investments are 
in forms -  like paying out the remainder of a mortgage -  which do not reduce pension 
payable. In any case the size of the pension free areas means that, for a couple, financial 
assets would need to exceed $100,000 (at the current deeming rate of 5%) before their 
pension starts to taper.
In the year to September 1998 some $4.5 billion out of $5.6 billion in superannuation 
benefits (excluding transfers) was paid in lump sums. However analysis by RIMU (1995) 
indicated that among people with lump sums large enough to affect pension there were few 
“double dippers”. About half of lump sums are rolled over and used to purchase income 
stream products. The lump sums used in this manner are the larger ones. Other than this, 
lump sums are generally used to purchase or improve the individual’s home, purchase a car 
or clear outstanding debt. Only 3% is spent on holidays (Bames 1999, p233, FaCS 1999 
p43).
This information may or may not be reassuring. It does mean that most lump sums do 
improve people’s ability to sustain a standard of living over a long term. On the other hand
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it suggests that a substantial part of final benefits do not act to reduce pension 
expenditures.
It is also recognised that running down lump sums (or allocated annuities) provides an 
imperfect response to longevity risk. Individuals are rarely able to predict the time of their 
death, with the associated risk that they will consume their assets at either too slow or too 
fast a rate. This is also a risk for the surviving spouse, a risk that can be catered for -  at 
some cost - by including a reversionary benefit in an annuity.
Overseas pension schemes have generally imposed requirements that final benefits be 
taken in the form of life annuities. However countries differ greatly in the specific 
provisions applying. In the UK, for example, 25% of final benefit may be taken as a lump 
sum. In the US, 401(k) plans -  essentially DC pension accumulations -  benefits may be 
taken as lump sums or phased withdrawals. Only a tiny fraction of retirees convert 401 (k) 
accumulations to annuities (Mitchell 1999 p20). It appears to be a common phenomenon 
that where lump sum options are available, retirees will avail themselves of them.
8.7.2 Tax and social security treatment of annuities
In Australia, preferential tax and social security treatment is afforded immediate annuities 
(eg those purchased from a DC accumulation), superannuation pensions (from DB 
schemes) and phased withdrawals, called allocated pensions and annuities. Asset test 
rules have encouraged lifetime income streams and life expectancy products134. These 
must guarantee an escalated or CPI-indexed income stream for the life expectancy of the 
retiree at the time of purchase. There can be no commutation or residual capital value.
The tax system allows for both an exemption of the element of the annuity representing the 
return of undeducted capital (usually the employee contributions, but also including lump 
sums which have been taken out as tax paid ), and also allows a 15% tax rebate on the 
whole of the annuity income. This means that, for a couple, an annuity income up to or 
even over $45,000 pa can be tax-free. This has become an important selling point in 
advertising such products. A further tax benefit is that the income earned on underlying 
annuity assets is, in the hands of life companies, substantially tax-free.
127 This terminology is from Doyle and Piggott, 1999 p5.
128 It can pay to do this, rather than roll over a lump sum, if lump sum tax is light: either because there is a 
large pre-1983 element, or if the lump sum is small.
282
283
Life annuities as conventionally understood (single premium, payment at a fixed or 
indexed rate for the life of the annuitant, no residual value) are extremely unpopular in 
Australia. Much more popular are allocated annuities, whereby the investor selects a 
particular investment strategy and the value of the investment moves in line with the 
underlying value of the investment. Income payments must be made to the investor at least 
once a year; maximum and minimum payments are set such that the fund does not run out 
prior to age 80. It should be recognised that these are an investment product and offer no 
real protection against longevity risk. However they offer retirees considerable flexibility 
in managing their incomes, and in recent times have also offered good rates of return 
depending on the asset mix chosen (ie, subject to investment risk).
Social security rules recognise three categories of income stream product. “Short term” 
(fixed term of five years or less) products are subject to deeming, based on the assets value, 
and are also asset tested. “Long term asset tested” products -  mainly allocated pensions -  
are ones where the income stream is assessed, but is reduced by the amount of ‘exempt 
income’, which is the purchase price divided by the ‘relevant number’ -  that being either 
the life of a fixed term product, or the life expectancy of the purchaser. Such products are 
included in the asset test. “Long term asset test exempt” products, mainly life annuities, 
have the same income definition but are asset test exempt (FaCS 1999).
8.7.3 Proposals to limit lump sums
There are constant proposals in Australia to limit the availability of lump sums. There are 
several broad approaches possible:
1. increase the tax and means test concessions available for annuities;
2. increase the tax on lump sums, to make them less attractive ;
3. make annuities compulsory, with lump sums limited to a certain amount or proportion 
of the whole; or
4. change the reasonable benefit limits (RBLs) for lump sums, in essence combining (1) 
and (3).
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8.7.3.1 Increase concessions
Up to now, approach 1 has been favoured. There are however serious problems with this 
approach, notably that it is relatively costly, and has no potential to resolve the “double 
dipping” issue. Rather it extends the possibilities for double dipping more widely.
8.7.3.2 Increase lump sum tax
Approach 2 (increase the tax on lump sums) was tried in the early 1980s, but moved away 
from -  initially, when the then Government watered down proposed lump sum tax rates in 
order to make the change politically acceptable, and later, when it was decided to move 
revenue collection forward by taxing contributions. When contributions became taxable at 
15%, the lump sum tax was reduced by the same amount in order to avoid creating a 
disincentive to superannuation savings, especially those made later in life.
At the same time the lump sum tax was reduced, a 15% tax rebate was introduced for 
annuities (including some income streams). The intent was to preserve the relative 
incentive to take up annuities, and also to recognise the “pre-payment” of tax that had 
occurred within the fund.
Raising the lump sum tax would introduce problems of equity for low wage earners who 
currently receive little net tax advantage from investing in superannuation, as described in 
Appendix 2.
8.7.3.3 Compel annuity purchase
Compelling annuity purchase may not be a good option. There are several reasons for this. 
The most obvious one is political - it would be widely resented. There is also some 
evidence that annuities are relatively expensive, with load factors on actuarially fair quotes 
of between 15 and 20% - although this is subject to some debate - see below. Another
problem is investment risk. If one is required to purchase an annuity at a particular point in 
time, such as at retirement, it may not be a particularly suitable one if the retiree’s 
superannuation investment is going through a down period. Further, the returns from the 
annuity depend on interest rates, which may also not favour purchase at a point in time.
136 Mitchell et al (1997) cited in Doyle and Piggott 1999.
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This is a current issue in the UK, where purchase prices have been rising as interest rates 
fall.
Annuity investment tends to be based on underlying investment portfolio that is very 
conservative -  typically bonds. An allocated pension (income stream) by contrast may be 
more risky but, because of the equity premium , can hope for a net return over the whole 
period significantly greater on average than that permitted by the annuity. And while there 
is scope for annuity providers to invest in more risky and higher yielding assets, this has 
the potential to create losses for the institution if the market moves against them over some 
period.
Some academics have inferred from this and other problems with annuities -  such as 
selection bias -  that “a strong case can be made for state action on annuities, including, 
perhaps, provision either of the annuity itself, or an ‘annuity gilts’ constructed to average 
across interest rate fluctuations” (Barr 1999 p410).
Compulsion would eliminate some but by no means all of the problems referred to above. 
For example the load factors cited suggest that adverse selection is pervasive in private 
annuity markets, and this factor would be eliminated by compulsion.
Mandatory annuities immediately raise the question of what features such instruments 
should have. Decisions would need to be made on issues such as
• the required degree of indexation (and who would pay for it),
• would reversion to a surviving spouse be required?
• would rates be gender-neutral? (unregulated annuities are more expensive for women 
than for men, reflecting their greater life expectancy)
• what time period would be allowed after receiving a lump sum? (a longer period may 
reduce interest rate risk)
• what proportion of the retirement benefit would be subject to compulsory 
annuitisation?
• would there be a government guarantee of fund solvency?
137 The long run yield on equities is, on average, some 4-5 percentage points higher than that on bonds. 
There is some speculation that the equity premium may be reducing.
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Doyle and Piggott (1999) have argued the case for allowing some flexibility in any 
mandatory annuity scheme. They note the case for insurance against retirement risks 
(replacement rate, longevity, investment, inflation risk and so on), but also note that such 
insurance is expensive, with quotes on indexed life annuities indicating an underlying real 
interest rate of less than 1%. D&P suggest that . .regulations stipulating partial insurance 
may lead to social outcomes that are superior to those generated by a rigid full insurance 
regime” (p2).
For example, returns on annuity investments could be improved by variable or with-profits 
annuities, which adjust income to the yields on the underlying investment portfolio (which 
might include equities - D&P 1999 plO). Similarly term certain annuities offer 
descendants some protection against the risk of the annuitant’s early death. Escalated 
annuities partially address inflation risk.
D&P calculate the outcomes, in terms of expected utility, from a range of different annuity 
products in conjunction with the age pension safety net. “The first important message .. .is 
that a standard life annuity scores well across a range of risk aversion parameters... for 
those who are very risk averse, this is the preferred product. The variable annuity, 
however, delivers these same features, with a significantly higher rate of return. For those 
who are less risk averse, this is a preferred product. Further, expected public pension 
payouts are very low..” (p20). The authors conclude that “while a “standard’. . .life annuity 
scores well from both social and individual perspectives, products which offer only partial 
insurance against the major retirement risks -  longevity risk, investment risk, and inflation 
risk -  may dominate. There are therefore likely to be advantages in allowing some 
flexibility in mandatory annuity design” (p22).
Poterba and Warshawsky in their US study (1999) note that conventional life annuities can 
be quite attractive to individuals, even if -  as is likely - the expected present discount value 
(EPDV) is less than the purchase price. “Results on the utility gains associated with 
annuitisation for representative individuals, with plausible risk tolerance .. .suggest that the 
gains from avoiding uncertainty about length of life are sufficient to warrant purchasing an 
annuity, even if the EPDV is substantially below the premium amount” (plO).
The paradox here is that consumers who have a choice about it generally avoid purchasing 
life annuities. One reason put forward for this is myopia: the suggestion that individuals 
heavily (and even irrationally) discount the future in their decision making. Another
286
287
reason is lack of consumer understanding. Yet another is that tax/transfer systems may 
encourage individuals to favour immediate consumption. Mandating annuities is one 
means of overcoming these problems.
Diamond (1999) notes that mandatory annuitisation of individual retirement accounts 
might be accomplished in three different ways. First, the government could decide what 
benefits to pay for given accumulations, and bear the risk inherent in projecting mortality 
and selecting a portfolio.
Second, the government could contract with private providers to receive amounts from the 
government in return for paying the annuities. These annuities could be priced on a group 
basis, which reduces costs and avoids problems of adverse selection. The private providers 
could bear the mortality and return risks, although there would be a residual risk that a 
private company could not meet its obligations. The government would probably need to 
absorb that residual risk, possibly by way of commercial re-insurance.
Third, individuals could be left free to contract with insurance companies on their own. 
Costs with this approach are likely to be considerably higher than under the first two 
(Diamond 1999 p i3).
8.7.3.4 Change lump sum RBLs
RBLs have favoured pensions over lump sums for some time. However, this approach has 
been fairly ineffective because RBLs, even for lump sums, are high relative to the benefits 
most people could expect to receive. Currently a flat RBL of almost $lm applies for 
pensions, and half this for lump sums. Relatively few wage earners could expect to exceed 
the lump sum RBL on retirement.
If the changes were substantial the option looks very similar to the compulsion option, and 
has the same sorts of problems.
8.7.4 Annuity issues
One reason for annuities being costly in the private market is that people who buy 
annuities tend to have above-average longevity (World Bank 1994 p329), implying that the 
price will be unfair to those who expect to die sooner than average -  notably the poor. 
Governments can address this problem by making purchase compulsory, so that good and
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bad risks average out. However such a system continues to discriminate against those with 
poor life expectancies.
The World Bank proposes that this effect might be neutralised by offering a variety of 
contracts; people who have poor expectations of longevity would self-select contracts 
which provide a death benefit for survivors or that have a guaranteed payout period for 
retirees and their beneficiaries (1994 p329). Legislation may also be necessary to prevent 
companies from “creaming” good risks -  eg, by requiring that companies cannot exclude 
any class of consumer.
A mandatory scheme with a deadline -  such as date of retirement -  creates an investment 
risk, since the annuity price will depend on interest rates at that date. A possible solution is 
to encourage variable or participating annuities with returns related to the performance of 
an underlying asset portfolio. This has the disadvantage, however, of the annuitants 
sharing in the losses as well as the gains.
Governments may wish to prevent certain personal features from being entered into 
annuity contracts. In the US, for example, race and gender are not permissible categories 
for employment-related pensions or life insurance. The UK Government (1999) Green 
Paper proposes that men and women be able to purchase annuities at a gender-neutral 
price.
The World Bank concludes that “Clearly, private annuities markets must be heavily 
regulated, particularly if annuities become mandatory. At the very least, permissible risk 
categories must be defined, pools for bad risks created, survivor’s benefits required, 
standard contract forms used, consumer information provided by some impartial 
organisation, variable annuities offered, and a reserve fund created or reinsurance 
purchased by insurance companies to ensure that they will be able to meet their 
obligations.... The complexity of these problems probably limits the degree to which 
annuities should be made mandatory” (1994 p331).
8.7.5 Are annuity purchase costs reasonable?
This issue has been examined by Poterba and Warshawsky (1999) in the US. They find 
that the present discounted value of a policy in 1998 was around 85% of the purchase 
price, but the expected value of the payout rises if we use annuitant rather than population 
life tables, and falls if we assume a higher, riskier discount rate. This calculation assumed
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that the individual was subject to average population mortality, and that the risk free 
interest rate was appropriate. Both of these assumptions can be questioned.
Knox (1999), in an Australian study, notes that annuity issuers in Australia use mortality 
tables reflecting the longevity of voluntary annuity purchasers in pricing annuities, not 
general mortality tables. The lack of a developed annuity market means that no annuitant 
mortality table has been developed for Australia. Companies rely on tables developed 
from the UK.
There are ten life offices that provide regular quotations, including the largest six life 
companies. (p6) Knox finds that, for an investment of $100,000, the average income from 
a CPI-indexed annuity for a male age 65 is $6750, and for a female $5811. It is 
immediately apparent that these rates appear unattractive in comparison to, say, a property 
trust paying similar yields (5.8 to 6.8%) but where the value of the parent capital will be 
available to be passed on to heirs. A problem for life annuity providers is that they are in 
effect forced to invest relatively conservatively, in government bonds and the like, in order 
to be able to guarantee that funds will be available for payment as required.
Knox’s conclusion is that Australian prices are fair, with the majority of the Money Worth 
Ratios (MWRs) for level annuities in the range of 85-95%. The central estimate of 87.5%, 
based on population mortality and the term structure of government interest rates, is 
consistent with international figures for the US (85%) and the UK (86.1). “This suggests 
that the Australian market, although underdeveloped, is consistent with major international 
markets” (Knox 1999 p i6). Using possibly more accurate mortality assumptions -  with 
rising life expectancies - the MWR for Australia climbs to 95%.
“Initially, this suggests that the existing pricing structure is very fair and reasonable for the 
purchasers..” (ibid p i7). On the other hand the providers may be able to earn in excess of 
the bond rate which depresses the MWRs... “it is reasonable to assume that an annuity 
fund should earn at least 1% per annum higher than the long term bond rate.. .This would 
mean that the effective ratio for most purchasers of level annuities would be in the vicinity 
of 90% of the purchase price” (pi 8).
An interesting finding in both the US and Australia is the diversity of returns between 
providers, with highest and lowest returns varying by as much as 10%. This implies that
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information in annuity markets is not fully efficient -  which might be another reason for 
public intervention.
One way to improve annuity returns is through collective organisation of them. Poterba 
and Warshawsky consider annuity policies available to participants in the US 
Government’s thrift savings Plan. The annuity provider is selected through a competitive 
bidding process, which takes account of technical quality (eg credit rating) as well as cost 
factors. Because these policies are purchased through a large group retirement savings 
program, overhead (selling and administration) costs are lower and present values 
accordingly higher than in the individual annuity market. Payouts are about 5% higher 
than available in the private annuity market. “This may reflect cost reductions associated 
with selling a large volume of annuities of a specified type, or a weakened competitive 
position of the annuity provider when negotiating with the federal government” (P&W 
1999 pi 8).
Further , P&W describe the annuity products offered by TIAA-CREF, the retirement 
system for college and university employees. TIAA offers annuities with non-guaranteed 
elements, which have among the highest payouts in the individual annuities market, mainly 
due to superior investment returns and low expenses. CREF annuities offer valuable 
payouts that reflect, on an annual basis, the investment performance of various underlying 
equity, fixed income and real estate investment portfolios (P&W 1999 p3).
8.7.6 Conclusion: lump sums vs mandatory annuities
I conclude that while mandating annuity purchase needs to be given serious consideration 
in this country, there will be considerable obstacles to implementing such a policy.
A big part of the problem, with the wisdom of hindsight, was the 1988 decision to move 
superannuation tax revenues forward by imposing the 15% contribution tax and reducing 
the final benefits tax by a similar amount. A lump sum tax rate of 30% had the potential to 
move many retirees in the direction of taking up annuities; a rate of 15% probably does 
not. This decision cannot be undone without shifting revenues far into the future.
Current tax policy appears to encourage use of annuity “look-alikes” which, unfortunately, 
do not offer the full longevity insurance that would be expected from a classic life annuity. 
However these products do have other advantages, such as the potential for high returns, 
which are not inconsiderable.
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The other major problem with current policy is the use of carrots to induce take-up of 
income streams, as opposed to sticks. The exemption of annuities from the asset test is an 
example. The inevitable consequence is that the whole system becomes relatively generous 
and hence expensive to the revenue. It also becomes more inequitable in the sense that the 
greatest gainers are those who have the greatest retirement benefits.
There are attractions in the “minimum necessary annuity” approach: that is, requiring 
retirees to “purchase” their age pension, but not more than this. This at least ensures a 
minimum income for all retirees and no additional government costs, irrespective of the 
use to which the remainder of the lump sum is put. This is in effect the preferred option 
discussed in my GMP paper (Ingles 2000c): in other words an increase in end-benefits tax 
used to finance either a universal pension, or a substantial reduction in the means test taper.
Annuities can be made more attractive by facilitating collective provision at discounted 
rates, and by providing for investment options with greater risks and greater returns. One 
option would be for the Government to itself stand in the market as a provider.
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9 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
9.1 Is there a general problem that work does not pay in the 
Australian welfare system?
The short answer is no. Work does pay in most situations. However there are areas where 
it doesn’t, and some where it pays very little. The question then is whether these problems 
are sufficiently serious to require redress, and if so, if they are best addressed by focussing 
on system “hotspots”, or whether general systemic reform is needed.
Evidence on whether work pays is gained from 3 main sources
1. EMTR analysis using a hypothetical model
2. Evidence on the incidence of high EMTRs as gained from microsimulation
3. Calculations of earnings replacement rates
I briefly recapitulate each of these areas of evidence in turn.
9.1.1 EMTR analysis using a hypothetical model
This is the source of most of our information. Several ‘hotspots’ where EMTRs exceed 
90% are readily identifiable. These are
• On the runout of the allowance taper, where EMTRs at or over 90% can extend over 
significant ranges of income. This problem is most acute for couples. If there are 
dependent children, there can also be a “sudden death” loss of entitlement to the full 
rate of FTB(A). Such sudden death losses also affect pensioners, although few have 
dependent children. The disabled would be the main group affected.
• In the interaction of Youth allowance and Family Tax Benefit, where EMTRs can 
exceed 100% over some income intervals.
• In the interaction of means tested State housing rental rebates, Child Support and 
HECS with other social security means tests.
• Incentives for a second income earner are blunted not only by the allowance taper but 
also by the interaction between FTB(A) and (B).
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9.1.2 Evidence on the incidence of high EMTRs as gained from 
microsimulation
Work on the distribution of EMTRs by income class (eg Harding and Polette 1995, Beer 
1998) suggests that "only 6 per cent of the population, just over half a million people, face 
EMTRs in excess of 60%" (Beer 1998 p266). Beer and Harding (1999) put this figure at 
7%. On these figures, EMTRs may not be a burning issue.
However, Beer also notes that the figures are likely to be underestimates due to certain 
exclusions. These include childcare, HECS, and state housing rental rebates. Beer notes a 
high proportion of individuals with children in the high EMTR ranges.
A particular problem in interpreting work on the distribution of EMTRs is that we really do 
not know the extent to which the existing income distribution is already influenced by the 
EMTR schedule. Another problem is that such studies don’t pick up the effect of losing 
various allowance and concessions if income exceeds relevant thresholds. The loss of the 
Health Care Card, Rent Assistance and State Government concessions on energy, water, 
sewage, municipal rates and transport may be more significant in the decision-making 
process than any consideration of payment thresholds and taper rates.
9.1.3 Calculations of earnings replacement rates
The net replacement rate (NRR) is the ratio of disposable income on benefit to disposable 
income while receiving that wage. The group with the highest NRRs (low-wage families 
with children) have NRRs in the high 70s and low 80% range. They therefore are the 
group most likely to have an incentive problem, despite having been given more generous 
in-work benefits over the 80s and 90s. NRRs for low-wage couples without children are 
around the 75% mark, and those for single people stand at 50-63%.
These NRRs may appear high. However it can be shown that, if benefits are withdrawn at 
a moderate rate, a low income earner will always be better of by working than on benefit, 
provided he can combine work and benefit income.
9.2 Policy Options
On one view there is no pressing problem requiring intervention. In general a person 
facing an offer of full-time work will be better off by accepting that offer, and a Newstart 
allowee would gain from undertaking a few hours of work, especially since the recently 
announced Working Credit.
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However moving from a few hours part-time work to a substantial part-time workload (eg 
20 hours) may not be very remunerative for the allowee. They really only get ahead when 
they ‘jump right out’ of the allowance system. To the extent that part-time and casual 
work is becoming more the norm, a system based on the full time work principle may 
prove increasingly unsustainable in the years ahead.
There are two main classes of policy option if it were felt that action was needed to address 
work incentive issues. The first can be loosely classed as ‘piecemeal intervention’, the 
second as major systemic change.
9.2.1 Piecemeal intervention
Sudden death loss of FTB(A) can be addressed for allowee couples by further raising the 
income threshold to (approx) $29,000 pa. It is not feasible to address the problem for 
pensioners, since the blowout in the threshold required is very high. The long-term 
solution here might be the common workforce age payment, so that working age 
pensioners were pulled back to allowance conditions.
Interactions between YA and FTB(B) can be addressed by providing sufficient disregards 
in the YA system that all FTB(A) is tapered before the YA taper commences. It would 
also be necessary to re-introduce split tapers in the YA system so that YA for each sibling 
tapers sequentially rather than concurrently. A package of such measures has been costed 
at around $250m. The Keating-Lambert package (see Appendix 1) is another route to the 
same outcome.
Interactions of social security means tests with child support, HECS, and Housing rental 
rebates are a fairly intractable problem. About the best we can do is to ensure that EMTRs 
in our system remain sufficiently modest that interactions can occur without taking EMTRs 
over 100%. In the rent assistance area, a long-term solution would need to involve 
integration of state and federal rental assistance schemes, a move that would necessarily 
involve some substantial losers in the state schemes.
Spouse incentives can be improved by reducing the allowance taper (but see below) and by 
combining FTB(A) and (B).
In the allowance area, one option is to further reduce the 70% taper to say 50%. Keating 
and Lambert advocate such a reform. This blows out the allowance cutouts such that 
FTB(A) thresholds would need to rise to over $33,000 pa. While this involves extra costs, 
the total costs of the easier taper and the threshold rise are still well below the costs of, say,
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a tax credit having the same effect. The tax credit extends to all those in and outside the 
welfare system, whereas these measures confine extra assistance to this group.
But that is also a weakness of the proposal to reduce allowance tapers. It exacerbates 
existing horizontal inequities between low income earners in the social security system and 
those outside of it. One measure of this is the $3 billion pa cost of extending allowances to 
those low income earners now excluded by virtue of self employment and the like. A 
further problem is that it would tend to create a whole class of part-rate beneficiaries 
whose real problem is low or intermittent income rather than unemployment as 
traditionally understood and catered for in the Newstart system.
9.2.2 Major Systemic reform
A low income tax credit is one example of this approach. So too is the negative income 
tax advocated by Dawkins and his collaborators, and the “full separation system” 
advocated in Ingles (2000) (which is really a feasible approach to implementing a 
categorical negative income tax).
9.2.2.1 Low income tax credit
High EMTRs applying on the allowance runout can be reduced if less income tax is 
payable. If income tax liability were entirely removed then the result - an EMTR of 
exactly 70% - might well be regarded as a reasonable outcome. To achieve this requires 
that the effective tax threshold become $29,000 pa for a couple. For a single person, the 
threshold required is around $15,000 pa.
Such swingeing increases in the tax threshold are not affordable unless they are reclaimed 
promptly once incomes exceed the threshold. Keating and Lambert propose a clawback 
rate of 30%, and this seems sensible. Combined with the standard tax rate of 30% it results 
in an EMTR of 60%. However the cost of such high thresholds might also necessitate a 
rise in the standard rate of tax.
The threshold increase could be confined to those actually in receipt of an allowance. This 
cuts the cost considerably, but at the cost of exacerbating the horizontal inequities 
described in the section above. A further issue is that there is a sudden death loss of the 
rebate on coming off the allowance; this can be avoided only by creating a ‘grey’ class of 
those who would be eligible for allowance but for their income, and would need to be so 
certified by Centrelink in order for them to gain access to a partial tax credit.
295
296
I conclude that any tax credit used to address EMTR problems in the allowance system 
would best be designed as a general measure of assistance to low income earners both in 
and outside the allowance system. This means that the cost is necessarily in the order of $4 
billion-plus.
The tax credit approach has the potential to do some good, but at the cost of increased 
complexity in an already complex tax-transfer system, and more potential for confusion. 
The next two options avoid this.
9.2.2.2 Negative income tax
The negative income tax proposal of Dawkins and his collaborators is probably not a 
feasible option. In its ‘pure’ (linear tax rate, non-categorical) form it envisages a general 
tax rate of 57%. Even in its modified form which envisages a higher initial tax rate (60%), 
a lower general tax rate of 45%, and the continuation of some degree of categorisation, it is 
not feasible because it places too much weight on the tax concept of income. The use of a 
pure income test in the social security system in the late 1970s and early 1980s was a 
complete disaster.
9.2.2.3 Full separation proposal
Ingles (2000e) floats a proposal which addresses the major objections to Dawkins et al. 
Basically, it involves separating social security means tests from the tax system so that the 
tests cease to operate at the time taxation cuts in. This entirely abolishes ‘churning’: those 
who receive benefits do not pay any tax, and those who pay tax do not receive any 
benefits.
In its purest form this requires that tax thresholds be set at social security cutout points. 
The FTB(A) taper would be grossed up to 60%; correspondingly higher thresholds would 
apply for families with dependent children. Revenue neutrality then requires that the initial 
marginal rate be quite high -  in the order of 40-45%. There would need to be a family 
basis of assessment at the lower end, so as to dovetail the tax threshold for a family with 
the allowance cutout. At higher income levels taxpayers would have the option of 
reverting to a single income unit.
A number of sub-options within the separation proposal are detailed below.
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9.3 Full separation as a feasible version of the NIT
Although this thesis has discussed a number of piecemeal modifications to the current 
system, an underlying theme is that the route of piecemeal change has probably reached its 
use-by date and it is time for reform efforts to become more systematic. For this to 
happen, we need a vision of what a good system might be.
Academic reformers of Australian social security have had a tendency to come up with 
theoretically interesting but somewhat impractical reform agendas. The Negative Income 
Tax ideas of Dawkins et al are the latest example of this phenomenon. Such reform 
schemes are not always based on a thorough understanding of the existing tax-transfer 
system.
This is unfortunate, because the effect of Dawkins et al, like that of the Henderson Poverty 
Inquiry 25 years before, has probably been to convince most casual observers that the NIT 
idea is a complete non-starter. Who would happily contemplate a 57% tax rate right 
through the income distribution? Even Henderson’s 50% flat tax was completely 
unacceptable to the Government of the day.
Yet, reform of our present rather messy system is needed. In chapter 3 ,1 argued that 
financial incentives are important and do matter. That is not to say that they should be the 
be-all and end-all of any ‘welfare to work’ strategy. Rather, it is to suggest that we need to 
get the basic architecture of the system right. In this way, we can be sure that financial 
incentives in the system are at least helpful to, or at worst not destructive of, any other 
‘incentivizing’ strategies that we may be pursuing.
What I have proposed in this thesis are a number of modifications to the basic NIT idea, 
which provide a realistic means towards its implementation. These proposals are based on 
the understanding that the current system has already moved a substantial way down this 
path, if we would but recognise that. It follows that the further changes required are in the 
main relatively modest -  relative, that is, in the great sweep of these things. They may not 
appear modest to the politicians who would have to wear the flack of implementing them.
The ‘full separation’ scheme which I prefer recognises that several departures from purity 
are unavoidable, and these departures in turn have their own consequences that impact on 
design issues throughout.
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In particular, I have argued that we need to persist with:
6. Categorisation -  albeit with three, not 22, categories. These three are the aged (65 and 
over); the workforce aged who meet ‘mutual obligation’ requirements, and those who 
do not. The last group gets no income support from government, but in my proposals 
benefit from significant income tax cuts if their income is low.
7. Higher effective tax rates for beneficiaries than for those whose incomes exceed the 
benefit cutouts -  albeit that a linear tax schedule is proposed for the aged.
8. Different and more comprehensive income definitions for beneficiaries compared to 
taxpayers.
9. Different income periods for beneficiaries and taxpayers.
The consequence of the last three is that there must also be
10. Different income units for beneficiaries and taxpayers, albeit that the family unit 
preferred in the welfare system must be extended some way into the positive tax 
system in order to create a smooth transition.
The reasons for 1 -  5 are as follows.
(1) Categorisation is retained for the reasons adduced in Chapter 5:
a. we wish to be able to exert administrative discretions in order to exert pressure 
on the ‘workshy’, or to encourage some people to seek and participate in training; 
and
b. low income alone is not sufficient basis for providing income support, especially 
given the difficulties in measuring the real incomes of the self-employed.
(2) Higher taxes on beneficiaries are retained because -  as Chapter 4 notes -
a. ‘optimal tax’ theory suggests that this might be sensible
b. while this is an empirical conclusion, and may ultimately prove to be wrong, the 
evidence is not yet to hand to justify moving to a fully linear system
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c. this judgement is modified in the case of the aged; for them, I suggest in Chapter 
8 that linearity is probably sensible. (This nonetheless leaves the aged with EMTRs 
close to 50%).
(3) Different income definitions are maintained for beneficiaries (compared to taxpayers) 
because
a. the income taxes’ base definitions are so problematic -  compared to the 
comprehensive income (Haig-Simons) ideal -  that the assessment of ‘need’ cannot 
sensibly be built on them;
b. there is no immediate likelihood that this can be changed in a sufficiently 
comprehensive manner;
c. in particular the tax system is highly unlikely to include a material or sensible 
assets component such as the imputed asset income now included in (deemed) 
social security income;
d. in any case, the tax and welfare systems have different time horizons. Whereas 
the tax system is able to adopt an annual or even a lifetime perspective, (the latter 
being consistent with, for example, an expenditure tax138), the welfare system is 
inherently constrained to take a shorter-term view.
(4) This leads to point four, about timing. Even the annual basis of the income tax can be 
too long a period to base assessments when needs are immediate -  in which case the most 
relevant period is a week, a fortnight, or a month.
a. To some extent, the differences can be reconciled by devices like averaging (as 
applied to capital incomes) and income/transition banks (where unused free areas 
are accumulated over some period).
b. Nonetheless, the welfare system is unavoidably kinder to irregular, part-year 
earnings than to regular part-time earnings . The challenge is to mitigate this 
effect as much as possible consistent with the requirement that immediate needs be 
met as, and at the time, they arise.
138 See Kay and King 1984
1391 have not sought, in the text, to document this. However, it is simple to do, the output being in the form 
of a graph which shows various combinations of part-year and part-time earnings which result in the same 
total income over the course of the year.
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• The part-year tax system proposed under the preferred ‘full separation’ proposal in
Chapter 6 is one means of addressing this dilemma.
• The more linear the effective tax rates applied, the less the end-year reconciliation
required.
(5) retaining the family (couple) income unit in the welfare system, and extending it some 
way into the positive tax system, is probably one of the most contentious parts of the full 
separation solution suggested. However:
a. such a unit is inevitable so long as we retain a lower basic benefit for each of a 
couple than for singles, and so long as we wish to have a higher effective tax rate 
on beneficiaries;
b. while the family unit is used in the social security system -  which we do for 
reasons of cost and horizontal equity -  than some recognition of family 
responsibilities is desirable in the tax system in order to create a smooth interface 
between the one system and the other; and
c. the extent to which I propose a family based tax system is minimised by 
allowing people to drop back into the normal individual system as soon as it is to 
their advantage.
(6) The other main contentious issue in my preferred versions of the full separation 
solution (Options A and B below) is that of the very large increases in tax thresholds 
proposed for all low income earners, a proposal which has most effect on couples and 
families with children. This proposal is accompanied by large rises in the standard 
marginal tax rate (currently 30%) necessary to preserve revenue neutrality.
a. My analysis shows that this is the only comprehensive means possible of 
dovetailing the tax and welfare systems. Anything less results in on-going 
compromise. Thus, while full separation can be made to work with existing tax 
thresholds, Chapter 6 shows that it requires the creation of a special category of 
people who, while not eligible for a basic payment, are eligible for some reduced 
rate of income tax as a result of their belonging to the relevant categorical group.
b. If EMTRs are to be lowered on some groups, notably welfare recipients, they 
must be raised on others. The main groups where low EMTRs now apply, and
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where there is therefore scope for rises, are low and middle-income earners without 
children on incomes beyond the benefit cutouts.
c. There is an issue as to whether there should be some on-going low tax rate inside 
the new thresholds. This would be necessary if it were desired to avoid raising the 
initial marginal income tax rate to something like 40-45%. One option is to abolish 
existing tax thresholds and apply an initial tax rate of, say, 10%. The 30% rate 
would not then cut in until income reached levels equivalent to the allowance 
cutouts.
d. Alternatively, the same revenue provided by the initial 10% income tax could be 
implemented by GST base broadening and/or rate increases.
e. increases in the standard tax rate threshold combined with the opportunity to take 
up part-rate social security benefits are also the preferred all-round approach to 
further assisting low wage earners (Chapter 8).
9.4 Description of preferred system
I will first describe the full-fledged ‘ideal’ model as I conceive it. I will then describe a 
modified version, which might be more immediately achievable. In all cases I will assume 
that the decision is taken to divide the benefit system into age pensions and a single 
workforce age payment; this appears to me to be a desirable move irrespective of any other 
decisions on rationalising ETRs.
I also assume that FTB(A) and (B) are combined in a single higher rate of FTB(A) which 
(as described in Chapter 5), could logically become a constant amount independent of age 
of child, and that the new system would include a single continuous taper rather than the 
two-part taper now applying. I further assume that Youth Allowance for children aged 17- 
20 would be included in this new family payment system in order to rationalise rates and 
means test interactions (Chapter 5).
9.4.1 Option A (idealised model)
In general this system allows for reductions in ETRs across all social security clients, and 
comes close to a linear tax rate on all positive taxpayers. I assume in all cases that the top 
marginal income tax rate will stay at 47%, or 49.5% inclusive of 1.5% Medicare levy and 
1 % levy surcharge.
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The taper rates described are in some cases higher than existing tapers but ETRs are lower, 
reflective of the fact that under full separation no-one receiving a benefit will be liable to 
any income tax. For example the proposed age pensions taper of 50% is higher than the 
current 40% taper rate but lower than the (approximately) 60% EMTR now applying.
Option A utilises the existing allowance tapers of 50 and 70% and sets tax thresholds at the 
maximum allowance cutouts of $15,000 pa, single and $29,000 pa, couple . These means 
that the income tax scales are based on the family unit. The initial marginal income tax 
rate is set at 38.5%, or 40% inclusive of Medicare levy. (This rate is meant to make the 
scheme self-financing and might need to be varied slightly in practice.)
For families with children, the taper on child assistance is raised from 30 to 60%. 
Additional tax rebates apply for dependent children, raising family tax thresholds to the 
new cutouts. These tax rebates are reduced at a 20% rate beyond the benefit cutouts. This 
means that some family assistance extends into wide middle income ranges. The effect is 
that most working families, once off any unemployment or parenting payment, initially 
face a tax rate fairly close to 60% (except that Childcare Assistance tapers of 10% (one 
child) and 15% (2 or more children) are allowed to ‘stack’). This then drops back to the 
relevant income tax rate once the rebates are fully exhausted.
Rent assistance, whether for pensioners, allowees or families, is also tapered at 60%. New 
tax rebates are provided to renters, which move their effective tax thresholds out to their 
benefit cutouts, inclusive of rent assistance. These rebates are also reduced at a 20% rate 
but only after and child-related rebates are fully exhausted.
For age pensioners, the tax thresholds proposed for the working aged are not sufficient to 
prevent some overlap with the pension taper. Hence, special tax scales are proposed for all 
those aged 65 and over. These have thresholds equal to the pension cutouts of $ 27,870 pa, 
single, and $46,852 pa for couples, and a single linear rate of 47% (plus 1.5 or 2.5% 
Medicare levy).
An alternative to using special tax rebates is to utilise special tax scales, and this might 
have administrative advantages. These scales would have thresholds equal to the benefit 
cutouts applicable to the particular family type, and a standard tax rate of 60%. Whichever 
of the special rate scale or the ordinary tax scale produced the lower tax payable would 
apply.
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This is the most radical of the separation options, produces the ‘cleanest’ structure of ETRs 
(albeit falling short of full linearity), and is the most redistributive. A corollary is that it is 
also the most difficult to implement. It might be regarded as a medium-term goal.
9.4.2 Option B: full separation with minimal change in income tax rates
This is the least ‘clean’ of the options, and fails to achieve horizontal equity between the 
tax burdens of those in and those outside of the categorical system. It would nonetheless 
be a substantial improvement on the current system140. Age pension and allowance tapers 
would be grossed up as described in Option A. As with that option, special tax scales 
would apply to people aged 65 and over, with thresholds set at the pension cutouts and a 
tax rate of 47%.
For those in receipt of workforce age payments, special tax scales would apply from the 
allowance cutouts, with additions to the thresholds where there were dependent children 
and where the family was eligible for rent assistance. That is, no one in receipt of any of 
these benefits would pay income tax. A special income tax rate of 60% applies beyond the 
thresholds; families revert to the normal income tax scale where that is to their advantage.
This proposal, in contrast to the preferred option above, creates a ‘grey area’ of people who 
are not eligible for any payment but would benefit from the special tax scales if they were 
categorically eligible. As described in Chapter 6, they could apply for a Centrelink 
certificate of eligibility under some workforce age category, and supply this to the Tax 
Office to prove their eligibility for the special rate scale.
Because the special tax scales do not apply to low income earners outside the categorical 
system this option is much cheaper than option A. It follows that the required increase in 
the standard tax rate is much less.
9.5 Impact of the options
The analysis is figures 9.1 -  9.4 is meant to be indicative rather than a full modelling 
exercise. These figures compare the current system with that proposed, both in terms of 
EMTRs and disposable incomes. Figure 9.1 shows the impact on age pension couples of 
the linear tax regime and grossed up pension taper. Pensioners on private income of $500 - 
$ 1200 pw are modest net gainers, and EMTRs fall over the pension taper range.
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For single allowees (Figure 9.2), Option A improves net incomes in the range $100 - $600 
pw, but beyond this single taxpayers are modest net losers. This is also true for dual earner 
couples who are essentially in the same boat as two single individuals at middle to higher 
income levels. Thus, these groups support the net gains described for all other income 
units.
For allowee couples who cannot split their incomes (Figure 9.3), Option A provides for 
net gains at private incomes between $ 100 and $ 1,000 pw, maximised at the allowance 
cutout around $550 pw.
For couples with children (income not split), Option A provides for reductions in EMTRs 
and modest net income gains right through the income distribution (Figure 9.4).
In all cases the EMTR graph shows up as being more uniform than that currently 
prevailing, and the disposable income line rises more smoothly as private income rises. 
However the remarkable thing is just how small in percentage terms are the income 
movements relative to the current system, indicating that system which looks quite radical 
on paper is perhaps not so, taking all the various adjustments into account. In a way, this is 
quite reassuring. It means that we are not taking a huge leap into the dark in considering a 
transformation that, nonetheless, envisages substantial reductions in marginal rates for 
many social security clients.
9.6 Conclusion on long terms directions for reform
Academic proposals for welfare reform along the lines of the NIT or GMI have met a brick 
wall. This thesis has shown why this is so: they fail to take account of too many important 
factors, and end up being unconvincing. In fact, if they convince of anything, it is of the 
impossibility of the idea as hitherto promulgated.
By delving into the issue in depth, I show in this thesis that it is possible to implement a 
NIT but the model is very different to the original simple conception. In particular it is 
necessary to retain:
• the opportunity of administrative pressures on clients to seek or take work (ie 
categorisation);
140 For the implicit evaluation criteria being used here, I refer the reader back to Appendix 3.9 and the 
discussion of optimisation of the social welfare function.
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• a different and more comprehensive definition of ‘means’ than is apparently possibly in 
the income tax;
It also appears unavoidable -  at least for the medium-term future -  that we persist with 
higher tax rates on working age beneficiaries than on income tax payers. All these 
departures from the original NIT model force the adoption of a family rather than an 
individual income unit, and its extension into the lower ranges of the income tax as a 
means of dovetailing the two systems.
Subject to these constraints, the NIT/GMI model based on full separation is feasible, 
workable, and I believe very sensible. The full separation model provides for swingeing 
increases in income tax thresholds. One effect of this is that the system becomes more 
supportive of part-time, irregular or casual employment, without the necessity for new or 
extended in-work social security benefits. In this way the system can be made much more 
supportive of newly emerging work patterns and labour market trends.
Australia could have a very good tax/transfer system; we just need to make it so. Once we 
have stabilised the basic architecture of the system based on a designed structure of 
marginal rates, future changes in that structure become, on the one hand, much easier to 
implement and, on the other, much less likely to be necessary.
305
306
Figure 9.1: age pension couple: 50% ETR and special tax scale vs current policy
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Figure 9.2: single NSA paying rent, Option A vs current policy
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Figure 9.3: NSA couple paying rent, no children, Option A vs current policy
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Figure 9.4: NS A couple with 3 children, all private inc. to head, Option A vs current
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